Reorganization of the Russian army on the eve of the First World War. The armament crisis of the Russian army in the First World War
On the one hand, in the last decades of the Russian Empire, the country rapidly modernized. On the other hand, there was a sense of technical backwardness and dependence on foreign technologies and imported components. With an impressive aircraft fleet, for example, there was virtually no production of aircraft engines. With the increased role of artillery, the equipment of the Russian army with guns and ammunition was clearly insufficient. While the Germans actively used an extensive railway network to transport troops, our railways did not meet the needs of the huge country and its army. Having had serious successes in the war with Germany's allies - patchwork Austria-Hungary and the Turks, Russia lost almost all the major battles with the Germans and ended the war with territorial losses and the Brest-Litovsk Treaty imposed by the winners. Then Germany collapsed, but quickly rose again as a dangerous, well-armed and aggressive enemy. However, the lessons of the First World War were learned. It took the colossal effort of the first five-year plans for the USSR to be able to provide the energy base for a large military industry, build factories and create its own weapons systems in order, although at the cost of colossal sacrifices, to still end the war in Berlin.
1. Airplane “Ilya Muromets”
On the eve of the First World War, Russia had an impressive fleet of military aircraft (about 250 units), but these were mainly models assembled under foreign licenses from foreign components. Despite the general weakness of the domestic aviation industry of those years, Russia built an aircraft that broke many records. “Ilya Muromets” designed by I.I. Sikorsky became the world's first serial multi-engine aircraft and the first heavy bomber.
2. Battleship "Sevastopol"
The defeat in the Russo-Japanese War seriously weakened the Baltic Fleet, from which squadrons were formed for the Pacific theater of operations. Russia made enormous efforts to restore its potential in the Baltic on the eve of the First World War. One of the important steps in this direction was the laying down of four Sevastopol-class battleships at the shipyards of St. Petersburg. These ships, built in the image of English dreadnoughts, had great firepower, being armed with twelve 305 mm guns in four three-gun turrets.
3. Revolver "Nagant"
The Nagan became the weapon of choice for the Russian army as a result of the rearmament campaign organized by the government of the Russian Empire at the end of the 19th century. A competition was announced in which mainly Belgian gunsmiths competed. The competition was won by Leon Nagant, but according to the terms of the competition he had to simplify his model and remake it to 7.62 mm - the “three-ruler” caliber. In Russia, an “officer” version (with a double platoon system) and a soldier version (simplified) were produced.
4. “Three-line” 1891
In the last third of the 19th century in Europe, the transition to repeating rifles began, which made it possible to increase the rate of fire of weapons. Russia also joined this process in 1888, creating a special commission for rearmament. A member of the commission was the head of the workshop of the Tula Arms Plant, Sergei Mosin. Subsequently, the “three-line” rifle he created competed with Leon Nagant’s rifle, but the Russian design demonstrated greater reliability and was adopted for service.
5. 76-mm gun model 1902
The rapid-fire field gun, one of the most common light guns in the Russian Army, was developed at the Putilov plant in St. Petersburg by designers L.A. Bishlyak, K.M. Sokolovsky and K.I. Lipnitsky. The infantry division included an artillery brigade of two three-battery battalions of these guns. Sometimes the “three-inch” was used as an anti-aircraft gun: in the photo it is installed for shooting at airplanes.
6. 122 mm field howitzer
The army corps, which consisted of two infantry divisions, had a light howitzer division of 12 guns. It is interesting that two models of this type of gun were immediately put into service - one developed by the French company Schneider (with a piston breech, model 1910), the other by the German company Krupp (with a wedge breech, model 1909) . In addition, the Russian army was armed with heavy 152-mm howitzers.
7. Machine gun "Maxim"
The legendary British machine gun was initially an exclusively imported product and fired a 10.62 mm cartridge from a Berdan rifle. Subsequently, it was converted to use the 7.62-mm Mosin cartridge, and in this modification it was adopted for service in 1901. In 1904, the machine gun began to be mass-produced at the Tula Arms Plant. One of the disadvantages of the machine gun was the heavy carriage, which the troops sometimes replaced with a lighter platform.
Forgotten pages of the Great War
Russian army during the First World War
Russian infantry
On the eve of the First World War, the Russian Imperial Army numbered 1,350,000 people, after mobilization the number reached 5,338,000 people, it was armed with 6,848 light and 240 heavy guns, 4,157 machine guns, 263 aircraft, and over 4 thousand cars. For the first time in history, Russia had to maintain a continuous front 900 kilometers long and up to 750 kilometers deep and deploy an army of more than five million people. The war featured many innovations: aerial combat, chemical weapons, the first tanks, and "trench warfare" that rendered Russian cavalry useless. However, the most important thing was that the war clearly demonstrated all the advantages of industrialized powers. The Russian Empire, with its relatively undeveloped industry compared to Western Europe, experienced a shortage of weapons, primarily the so-called “shell famine.”
In 1914, only 7 million 5 thousand shells were prepared for the entire war. Their stocks in warehouses ran out after 4-5 months of hostilities, while Russian industry produced only 656 thousand shells in the entire year of 1914 (that is, covering the needs of the army in one month). Already on the 53rd day of mobilization, September 8, 1914, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich addressed directly to the emperor: “For about two weeks now there has been a shortage of artillery cartridges, which I stated with a request to speed up delivery. Now Adjutant General Ivanov reports that he must suspend operations on Przemysl and on the entire front until the ammunition in local parks is brought to at least one hundred per gun. Now there are only twenty-five available. This forces me to ask Your Majesty to order the delivery of cartridges to be expedited.” Characteristic in this case were the responses of the War Ministry, headed by Sukhomlinov, that “the troops are shooting too much.”
During 1915-1916, the severity of the shell crisis was reduced due to an increase in domestic production and imports; in 1915, Russia produced 11,238 million shells and imported 1,317 million. In July 1915, the empire moved to mobilize the rear, forming a Special Conference on the Defense of the Country. Until this time, the government traditionally tries to place military orders whenever possible at military factories, not trusting private ones. At the beginning of 1916, the Conference nationalized the two largest factories in Petrograd - Putilovsky and Obukhovsky. At the beginning of 1917, the shell crisis had been completely overcome, and the artillery even had an excessive number of shells (3 thousand for a light gun and 3,500 for a heavy one, compared with 1 thousand at the beginning of the war).
Fedorov automatic rifle
At the end of mobilization in 1914, the army had only 4.6 million rifles, with the army itself being 5.3 million. The front’s needs amounted to 100-150 thousand rifles monthly, with production of only 27 thousand in 1914. The situation was corrected thanks to mobilization of civilian enterprises and imports. Modernized machine guns of the Maxim system and Mosin rifles of the 1910 model, new guns of 76-152 mm caliber, and Fedorov assault rifles came into service.
The relative underdevelopment of railways (in 1913, the total length of railways in Russia was six times inferior to the United States) greatly hampered the rapid transfer of troops and the organization of supplies for the army and large cities. The use of railways primarily for the needs of the front significantly worsened the supply of bread to Petrograd, and became one of the reasons for the February Revolution of 1917 (with the beginning of the war, the army took a third of all rolling stock).
Due to the large distances, according to German experts at the beginning of the war, a Russian conscript had to cover an average of 900-1000 km to his destination, while in Western Europe this figure averaged 200-300 km. At the same time, in Germany there were 10.1 km of railways per 100 km² of territory, in France - 8.8, in Russia - 1.1; in addition, three quarters of Russian railways were single track.
According to the calculations of the German Schlieffen plan, Russia will mobilize, taking into account these difficulties, in 110 days, while Germany - in just 15 days. These calculations were well known to Russia itself and the French allies; France agreed to finance the modernization of Russian railway communication with the front. In addition, in 1912, Russia adopted the Great Military Program, which was supposed to reduce the mobilization period to 18 days. By the beginning of the war, much of this had not yet been implemented.
Murmansk railway
Since the beginning of the war, Germany blocked the Baltic Sea, and Turkey blocked the Black Sea straits. The main ports for the import of ammunition and strategic raw materials were Arkhangelsk, which freezes from November to March, and non-freezing Murmansk, which in 1914 did not yet have railway connections with the central regions. The third most important port, Vladivostok, was too remote. The result was that by 1917 a significant amount of military imports were stuck in the warehouses of these three ports. One of the measures taken at the Conference on the Defense of the Country was the conversion of the Arkhangelsk-Vologda narrow-gauge railway to a regular one, which made it possible to increase transportation threefold. Construction of a railway to Murmansk also began, but it was completed only by January 1917.
With the outbreak of war, the government conscripted a significant number of reservists into the army, who stayed in the rear during training. A serious mistake was that, in order to save money, three-quarters of the reservists were stationed in cities, in the location of the units whose replenishment they were supposed to become. In 1916, a conscription was carried out for the older age category, who had long considered themselves not subject to mobilization, and perceived it extremely painfully. In Petrograd and its suburbs alone, up to 340 thousand soldiers of reserve units and units were stationed. They were located in overcrowded barracks, next to a civilian population embittered by the hardships of wartime. In Petrograd, 160 thousand soldiers lived in barracks designed for 20 thousand. At the same time, in Petrograd there were only 3.5 thousand police officers and several companies of Cossacks.
Already in February 1914, former Minister of Internal Affairs P. N. Durnovo submitted an analytical note to the emperor, in which he stated, “in the event of failure, the possibility of which in the fight against such an enemy as Germany cannot but be foreseen, social revolution in its most extreme manifestations is inevitable for us. As already indicated, it will begin with the fact that all failures will be attributed to the government. A violent campaign against him will begin in legislative institutions, as a result of which revolutionary uprisings will begin in the country. These latter will immediately put forward socialist slogans, the only ones that can raise and group broad sections of the population: first a black redistribution, and then a general division of all values and property. The defeated army, having also lost its most reliable personnel during the war and, in most of its parts, overwhelmed by the spontaneously general peasant desire for land, would turn out to be too demoralized to serve as a bulwark of law and order. Legislative institutions and opposition intellectual parties, deprived of real authority in the eyes of the people, will be unable to restrain the diverging popular waves that they themselves raised, and Russia will be plunged into hopeless anarchy, the outcome of which cannot even be predicted.”
Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the Southwestern Front, Adjutant General Alexey Alekseevich Brusilov (sitting) with his son and officers of the front headquarters
By the winter of 1916-1917, the supply paralysis of Moscow and Petrograd had reached its apogee: they received only a third of the necessary bread, and Petrograd, in addition, only half of the required fuel. In 1916, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Stürmer proposed a project for the evacuation of 80 thousand soldiers and 20 thousand refugees from Petrograd, but this project was never implemented.
By the beginning of the First World War, the composition of the corps had changed. Instead of three, it began to include only two infantry divisions, and a cavalry Cossack regiment began to be created in wartime not under each infantry division, but under the corps.
In the winter of 1915/16, General Gurko reorganized the armed forces on the same principle as Germany and then France the year before. Only the Germans and French had 3 regiments in their divisions, while the Russians had 4 left, but the regiments themselves were transferred from 4 to 3 battalions, and the cavalry ones from 6 to 4 squadrons. This made it possible to reduce the accumulation of fighters on the front line and reduce their losses. And the striking power of the divisions was preserved, since they still had the same amount of artillery, and the number of machine gun companies and their composition increased, there were 3 times more machine guns in the formations.
From the memoirs of A. Brusilov: “This time my front was given relatively significant means to attack the enemy: the so-called TAON - the main artillery reserve of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, consisting of heavy artillery of different calibers, and two army corps of the same reserve were supposed to arrive in early spring . I was quite sure that with the same careful preparation that was carried out in the previous year, and the significant funds that were allocated, we could not fail to have good success in 1917. The troops, as I said above, were in a strong mood, and one could hope for them, with the exception of the 7th Siberian Corps, which arrived at my front in the fall from the Riga region and was in a wavering mood. Some disorganization was caused by the unsuccessful measure of forming third divisions in corps without artillery and the difficulty of forming convoys for these divisions due to the lack of horses, and partly of fodder. The condition of the horse stock in general was also questionable, since extremely little oats and hay were delivered from the rear, and it was not possible to get anything on the spot, since everything had already been eaten. We, of course, could break through the first fortified line of the enemy, but further advance to the west with the lack and weakness of the horse force became doubtful, which I reported and urgently asked to quickly help this disaster. But at Headquarters, where Alekseev had already returned (Gurko again took over the Special Army), as well as in St. Petersburg, there was obviously no time for the front. Great events were being prepared that would overturn the entire way of Russian life and destroy the army that was at the front. During the February Revolution, the day before the abdication of the last Russian Emperor Nicholas II, the Petrograd Soviet issued Order No. 1, which abolished the principle of unity of command in the army and established soldiers' committees in military units and on ships. This accelerated the moral decay of the army, reduced its combat effectiveness and contributed to the increase in desertion.”
Russian infantry on the march
So much ammunition was prepared for the upcoming offensive that even with a complete shutdown of all Russian factories it would be enough for 3 months of continuous battle. However, we can remember that the weapons and ammunition accumulated for this campaign were later enough for the entire civilian campaign, and there were still surpluses that the Bolsheviks gave to Kemal Pasha in Turkey in 1921.
In 1917, preparations were being made for the introduction of a new uniform in the army, more comfortable and at the same time made in the Russian national spirit, which was supposed to further raise patriotic sentiments. This uniform was made according to the sketches of the famous artist Vasnetsov - instead of caps, soldiers were provided with pointed cloth hats - “heroes” (the same ones that would later be called “Budenovkas”), beautiful overcoats with “conversations”, reminiscent of Streltsy caftans. Light and practical leather jackets were sewn for officers (the kind that commissars and security officers would soon sport).
By October 1917, the size of the army reached 10 million people, although only about 20% of its total number was at the front. During the war, 19 million people were mobilized - almost half of the men of military age. The war became the most difficult test for the army. By the time it exited the war, Russia's losses in killed exceeded three million people.
Literature:
Military history "Voenizdat" M.: 2006.
Russian Army in the First World War M.: 1974.
Izonov V.V. Preparation of the Russian army on the eve of the First World War
// Military Historical Journal, 2004, No. 10, p. 34-39.
OCR, proofreading: Bakhurin Yuri (a.k.a. Sonnenmensch), e-mail: [email protected]
The issues of preparing the Russian army for war have always attracted the attention of researchers studying the military history of Russia. Of course, in one article it is not possible to consider the selected problem in its entirety, so the author limits himself to the peculiarities of combat training of units and formations, including professional and official training of officers of the Russian army, on the eve of the First World War.
Combat training was carried out according to a specific plan, which provided for the division of the school year into two periods: winter and summer. The latter were divided into smaller ones. To ensure uniformity of training, uniform programs were developed and special instructions were published (1). The training of soldiers arriving for active service took place in several stages. At the first stage, which lasted four months, the young soldier’s program was mastered. The inculcation of professional skills began with single training, which included drill and physical training, mastery of weapons (fire training, bayonet and hand-to-hand combat), performing the duties of a single fighter in peacetime (carrying out internal and guard duty) and in battle (service in the patrol, field guard duty, actions of an observer, a messenger, etc.). In subsequent years, soldiers repeated what they had learned previously.
The orders required “when training lower ranks, whether young or old, training and other teams, to adhere to the system of demonstration and conversation” (2). The main task was “to educate the soldier in devotion to the king and his duty, to develop strict discipline in him, to train -34- action with weapons and the development of physical strength that helps endure all the hardships of service” (3).
Classes for young soldiers were held separately from older soldiers (4). They were conducted by the company commander, sometimes by one of the junior officers. Unfortunately, before the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. In the guidelines for training soldiers, the responsibilities of junior officers were not defined, so they commanded platoons and half-companies only during drills, and in relation to recruits they did “only what they were ordered to do” (5). Only during the period of military reforms 1905-1912. The responsibility of junior officers increased sharply, and they were directly involved in the process of training and education of their subordinates. Now junior officers in the units were directly involved in training privates and non-commissioned officers. The Minister of War demanded this.
For the period of winter training, the company commander selected “teachers of young soldiers” from among non-commissioned officers or old-timers at the rate of one per 6-10 recruits. “Uncles” were supposed to have many qualities, including: “calmness, impartiality, kindness, selflessness, observation” (6). “Teachers of young soldiers” had to teach the recruit to take care of his health, wean him from bad habits, make sure that the soldier received all types of allowances, etc.
Some company commanders considered it necessary to select two teachers for each recruit: one would teach only regulations and study with the soldier during class hours, and the other would monitor every step of the soldier in his free time. When choosing “teachers of young soldiers,” officers were recommended that “one of them should be a “foreigner” who could be entrusted to his fellow countrymen” (7). This, of course, greatly facilitated the individual training of soldiers of non-Russian nationality. Sections of the training course for recruits “were distributed among teachers depending on their abilities and moral data” (8).
Subsequently, during the First World War, special teams of “teachers of young soldiers” were formed in some reserve units. They were given the task of organizing classes so that “soldiers could be put into service six weeks after the start of their training, and no later than two months later” (9).
During the military reforms of 1905-1912. decisive measures were taken to improve physical education in the troops. To achieve the physical development of military personnel, educational classes (in gymnastics and fencing) and physical training began to be carried out systematically. During the winter period of training, classes were held daily throughout the entire service in all branches of the military, and in the summer, “when people already have a lot of physical labor,” they studied daily “only if possible” (10). The duration of daily classes was from half an hour to an hour.
During the winter period of training, regardless of the individual training of a soldier, it was considered necessary to maintain the combat readiness of entire units, “for which to carry out walks, travel, exercises and maneuvers and maneuvers with live fire” (11). Military personnel of the special forces thus received practice and the opportunity to “develop practical dexterity and the best technical work of personnel serving field spark stations attached to large military formations” (12). As we can see, such a system of combat training in the Russian army made it possible to systematically train a single soldier for only four months.
The second stage of training included joint actions as part of a squad, platoon, company and battalion. Combat training in the summer was carried out in two stages. The first one included classes on childbirth.
troops: in the infantry by company - 6-8 weeks, by battalion - 4 weeks, training in regiments - 2 weeks (13). The leadership of the military department demanded that the main attention in training be paid to the conscious assimilation by military personnel of the knowledge, skills and abilities they acquired, and to the development of their intelligence, endurance, stamina and dexterity. For example, the commander of the troops of the Turkestan Military District, cavalry general A.V. Samsonov (14), in order to strengthen health, physical development and agility necessary for combat operations, demanded that gymnastic games be organized in the camps as often as possible in the summer with the issuance of prizes, although would be inexpensive” (15).
Fire training occupied a significant place in the training system of troops in the summer. It was believed that the infantry should prepare the attack themselves with the fire of their hand weapons, so every soldier was trained to be a good marksman. Shooting training was carried out at different distances and at various targets: single and group, stationary, appearing and moving. Targets were designated by targets of different sizes and imitated lying soldiers, artillery pieces, attacking infantry, cavalry, etc. They were taught single, salvo and group fire, shooting at all distances up to 1400 steps, and up to 400 steps they were taught to hit any target with one or two shots. Officers were required “to conduct training during preparatory exercises for shooting and the shooting itself in such a way that the lower ranks were familiar with all types of shooting and from behind cover” (16). Thus, during the First World War, in the battle of Gumbinen, the 17th German Corps suffered 50 percent. losses solely from heavy rifle fire from the 27th Infantry Division. Eyewitnesses examining the battlefield found a mass of German soldiers and officers struck in the head and chest by rifle bullets (17).
The second stage of summer training also included “general training for all three branches of arms” and was divided into four weeks (18). For a number of reasons, not all military units took part in training troops in joint actions.
Depending on climatic conditions, the commanders of the military districts themselves determined the timing of the transition from winter to summer classes, as well as the time for the troops to rest.
Since the 90s XIX century, some military districts began to conduct winter mobile camp training for units of various branches of the military. The school year ended with the so-called big maneuvers. Tactical exercises and maneuvers acquired especially great importance in the combat training of troops in connection with the transition to a cadre army system, when a contingent of untrained recruits began to join formations and units every year. Under these conditions, it was possible to form units and formations and achieve their constant readiness only through regular exercises and maneuvers. The duration of battalion maneuvers was 1-2 days, regimental maneuvers - 4-10 days. No more than 10 percent was allocated to theoretical studies. total amount of time allocated for maneuvers (19).
In addition to combined arms, medical, serf, and landing (together with the fleet) exercises and maneuvers were practiced, during which special training tasks were worked out in more detail. In 1908, landing maneuvers were carried out by military units of the Odessa Military District and naval forces of the Black Sea with the goal of “benefiting both the ground forces and the navy, showing its personnel how to act when all combat forces of the Black Sea theater carry out an amphibious operation” (20) . In 1913, large maneuvers were carried out there, followed by landings in Odessa, Sevastopol and Batumi (21). Such maneuvers became part of army training and took place annually.
The commanders of the military districts taught units and formations during maneuvers “only the requirements of a decisive offensive” (22). There were also maneuvers in which troops from one or two or three military districts took part. Of the most widespread, mention should be made of the maneuvers of 1897 near Bialystok, 1899 in the Warsaw Military District on the river. Bzura and 1902 near Kursk, where troops from four military districts participated. In 1903, major maneuvers were carried out in the St. Petersburg, Warsaw, Vilna and Kiev military districts. In 1912, the last major maneuvers took place in the three western border districts and the Irkutsk Military District. 24 1/2 infantry divisions and 2 rifle brigades took part in the maneuvers{
23
}
.
There were many serious flaws in the practice of maneuvers of that time. “An attack against a well-organized defensive position is hopeless” (24) - this was the opinion of the highest command staff of the Russian army, based on the experience of the Russo-Japanese campaign, when such positions had to be attacked without numerical superiority and without the support of heavy artillery. During the “after assaulting the defense” maneuvers, the enemy was not pursued.
There were other reasons that caused great damage to the normal course of combat training of troops. Let's look at the main ones. At a meeting of officers of the General Staff of the Warsaw Military District, the speaker, Captain I. Lyutinsky (25), noted that “before the last war (26), little attention was paid to the combat training of lower ranks, and even less to the training of a single fighter” (27).
The final report of the commission formed at the headquarters of the 2nd Army, which fought in Manchuria, revealed the reasons for the unsatisfactory training of soldiers, including: “1) the low culture of the contingent (a huge percentage of illiterate); 2) incorrect training of a soldier” (28).
In fact, continuous training was carried out during the training course for young soldiers and the first camp meeting. The rest of the time was occupied by heavy guard and internal service and work in the regimental economy. Moreover, the load was often unnecessary. For example, the commander of the troops of the Odessa Military District, cavalry general A.V. Kaulbars (29), during a personal inspection of the guards in Nikolaev, became convinced that in many cases the garrison infantry guarded the empty buildings of various departments.
In addition, in a report on the inspection of troops in 1907, the Inspector General of Infantry noted that “you cannot expect proper training of young soldiers if company commanders and officers are late for classes or, under various pretexts, do not show up for them at all...”.
Significant harm to the training of soldiers was caused by the large number of illiterate people being drafted into the army. “Endowed by nature, as well as by the historical structure of the socio-economic life of Russian life, with the richest spiritual and physical forces, our soldier,” noted in military literature, “to the deepest misfortune of our homeland -35-, is doomed by fate to be inferior to others in terms of mental outlook and educational preparation"(30). In 1913, about a third of those conscripted into military service were illiterate. When the First World War and general mobilization began, it turned out that in Russia 61 percent. conscripts were illiterate, whereas in Germany - 0.04 percent, in England - 1 percent, in France - 3.4 percent, in the USA - 3.8 percent, in Italy - 30 percent (31).
The limited financial capabilities of the military department did not allow the deployment of troops in barracks during the period under review, which undoubtedly worsened the combat training of units and units. Since 1887, the construction of barracks premises was entrusted to “military construction commissions”, which acted on the basis of the “Regulations on the construction of barracks by order of the military authorities in an economic way” approved on January 17 of the same year (32). Despite enormous difficulties, military construction commissions partially solved the problem of building barracks. At the same time, this harmed the combat training of the troops.
The quartering conditions left much to be desired. It was often impossible to conduct proper training and education of troops given unsatisfactory hygienic conditions (33).
In 1910, for the construction of barracks that met all the requirements, the military department was allocated 4,752,682 rubles in European Russia and the Caucasus, in Finland - 1,241,686 rubles, in the Siberian districts - 9,114,920 rubles. (34) However, financing for barracks construction in the military department, on a residual basis, by the beginning of the First World War it was not possible to station troops in comfortable military camps, and to train personnel on prepared training fields and training grounds.
The so-called free labor had an even more negative impact on the course of combat training of troops. “We have always been poor in money, and therefore completely insufficient funds were allocated for a huge army,” wrote Minister of War Lieutenant General A.F. Roediger(35). “Therefore, the army had to serve itself and even, through free labor, earned itself the means for its own food and the small needs of the soldier” (36).
Freelance work was introduced in
Russian army by Peter I in 1723. Privates and non-commissioned officers were allowed to be hired for work in places where military units were deployed, while “headquarters, chief, and non-commissioned officers were not forced to do such work, unless they themselves wished to do so” (37). During long periods of service, free labor was spread very widely, since with a fairly simple system of training for lower ranks, it was believed that they would not cause damage to the combat training of troops. As a rule, the commander of a unit or subdivision, and sometimes a sergeant major, looked for some kind of work in a private or government enterprise or construction in advance.
A few voices were heard in defense of free labor, proving that these works allow the soldier to maintain a connection with the land, with the village, with production, etc.
An active opponent of free labor was the commander-in-chief of the Guard troops and the St. Petersburg Military District, Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich (38), by whose order free labor in the district in 1900 was “stopped once and for all” (39). In 1906, due to a reduction in service life, an improvement in the financial situation of troops, an increase in pay for the lower ranks and increased demands on the combat training of troops, free labor was prohibited everywhere (40).
The so-called thriftiness caused enormous harm to combat training. Rearmament of the army, modernization of artillery at the end XIX – early XX centuries required large expenses. The troops were forced to support themselves. It was necessary to build premises, dress and feed the troops in an economic way “without expenses from the treasury.”
Regimental bakeries, shoemakers, saddlers, carpenters' and joiners' workshops began to take up “all the forces of the troops and all the attention of the commanders” (41). The entire service, in particular for company commanders, began to consist of all kinds of purchases and checking various reports. “Precious time,” the newspaper wrote, “is spent on maintaining bound, numbered and printed books of the most varied nature” (42). All the thoughts and aspirations of the commanders were aimed at the economic part. For example, the commander of the 36th Siberian Rifle Regiment, Colonel Bykov, simultaneously received gratitude “for his location regiment, maintained perfectly and in perfect order” and a remark “for unsatisfactory preparation of the regiment’s training” (43).
Let us note one more point that left a certain imprint on the army - the strengthening of its police functions. It's at the end XIX - early XX century, during the reign of Nicholas II (44) The participation of troops in suppressing popular uprisings became widespread. Military newspapers wrote: “The barracks are empty, the troops are living in villages, factories, factories, military commanders have become governors” (45).
Sending troops to cities to assist the police, protect railways, government institutions, etc. interfered with the organization and conduct of combat training classes.
Cavalry inspector Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (46) in a report on the activities of the inspection for 1905 and 1906. emphasized that “in many regiments it was not possible to adequately prepare recruits... and generally conduct training correctly and systematically, as was done before the deployments” (47).
In addition, many soldiers were on business trips. Orderlies were appointed from the combat companies not only for their own battalion or regiment, but also for officers, generals and military officials of various higher headquarters and departments up to and including the military district. In 1906, there were 40 thousand orderlies in the army (48). Even after the introduction of the new order about orderlies, about half of this number remained. Of course, taking soldiers away from their studies lowered the level of combat readiness.
The issue of professional and official training of officers of the Russian army remained unresolved until the outbreak of the First World War. The Instructions for Training with Officers, published in 1882, which was a program for tactical training of command personnel and existed without changes until 1904, no longer met the requirements of combat practice. There was an opinion among officers that “theoretical training does not help in the least to understand the wartime situation, since during war the spiritual aspects of a person are inevitably thrown out of balance, due to which much of what is well known in peacetime is lost sight of at first.” step into the field" (49).
In addition, the officers of the Russian army were not distinguished by good physical fitness. -36-
The War Ministry was tasked with eliminating these shortcomings. By the beginning of the First World War, something had been done in this direction. At the direction of the Minister of War, a “commission was created in the Troop Education Committee to develop measures to provide our army with officers and command personnel in accordance with the requirements of this service” (50). The commission came to a unanimous opinion on the need to develop a new legislative act that would regulate and guide the training of officers in the troops.
By 1909, the troop education committee prepared a draft of a new manual for officer training and submitted it to the military department for consideration. After consideration at the Military Council, the Minister of War approved the document. According to the new instructions, the training of unit officers consisted of three main sections: “military-scientific classes, exercises in military units and special tactical classes (this also included a war game)” (51).
For each academic year, commanders of military units planned classes with officers for the winter and summer periods. All responsibility for organizing and conducting classes rested with the unit commander. They took place mainly during class hours with lower ranks and lasted no more than 3 hours a day. In winter they were held once a week, and in summer only at private gatherings no more than once every 2 weeks (52).
Military-scientific training of officers, expansion of their military knowledge, familiarization with military literature, tactical and technical characteristics of new equipment and weapons were organized to one degree or another in each unit. In accordance with the capabilities and availability of funds, military literature was ordered to each library of the regiment, and magazines and newspapers were issued to the officers’ collections. At the same time, it should be noted that the libraries were poorly replenished with literature.
Military conversations (messages or lectures) were held, as a rule, at the headquarters of military units and they involved not only junior officers, but also commanders of all levels, both in the interests of developing the cause and for the sake of maintaining their authority. Topics for conversations were chosen “the most vital, most closely related to issues of education and
education of subordinates, tactical training of various types of troops” (53).
Officers of the General Staff, military engineers and representatives of field and fortress artillery were involved in the interviews. The reports of officers who had combat experience were especially interesting. Military conversations necessarily had to end with an exchange of opinions on the stated problem (54). This form of conducting classes contributed to the improvement of professional and job training of officers.
The next stage of officer training was tactical training. They were usually conducted battalion-by-battalion under the leadership of battalion commanders. During the classes, officers practiced “in solving problems according to the Combat and Field Regulations, in reading maps and plans, in solving tactical problems on plans and in the field, carried out various types of reconnaissance, compiled descriptions of maneuvers and tactical exercises and reports” (55).
Great importance was attached to the assessment of the terrain in tactical and engineering terms. After all, “from the assessment it should be clear why exactly the person solving the problem chose this solution and not another” (56). In addition, officers were involved in field trips and war games.
Whenever possible, officers from all branches of the garrison were invited to attend classes. The experience of the Russo-Japanese War showed that “through the entire war, although not sharply, the separate peaceful training life of all three types of weapons is visible, which during the war is expressed in the fragmentation of the actions of each of them and misunderstanding of each other. Where you would need to strike with one fist, each type of weapon works separately” (57). Officers who had combat experience believed that joint training of officers from all branches of the military provided an opportunity to establish close mutual contacts.
Commanders of brigades, individual military units, and chiefs of staff of divisions were annually involved in a military game of a tactical nature under the leadership of commanders of army corps for a period of 3 to 7 days. Senior officers gathered in places indicated by the corps commander, or at division headquarters under the leadership of division chiefs.
The commanders of the military branches of divisions and corps have now begun to be involved in the war game. They participated in it under the leadership of military district commanders or more senior commanders.
Before the First World War, at the headquarters of the Kyiv Military District, a war game was usually held twice during each winter period for General Staff officers, who were called to the district headquarters in two turns (58). The leader was the Quartermaster General{
59
}
. During the war game, the actions of the district's troops and arriving units of other districts were determined in accordance with the strategic deployment plan developed in case of war.
Along with the war game, fortress and military sanitary games were often held (60). The command of the fortresses considered it desirable “that the officers of the fortress sapper companies be involved in participation in the fortress game, where it is carried out jointly with other officers of the fortress garrison” (61).
Field trips of officers were filled with a fundamentally new content, which had the goal: “a) to prepare senior commanders for resolving strategic problems primarily in the proposed theater of war; b) to establish in combat commanders the ability to quickly assess the tactical position and properties of the terrain; c) provide generals, officers and doctors with practice in disposing of troops in the field, without distracting the troops from their activities” (62).
Field trips were divided into divisional, serf, corps and district. To improve the training of senior officers of cavalry units and special troops, special cavalry trips were conducted in divisions. Field trips, as a rule, ended with a two-way maneuver.
Corps, divisional and special cavalry field trips were carried out annually, serfs - at different times of the year, and district trips - whenever possible, by order of the commander of the troops with the permission of the Minister of War. At the same time, when organizing field trips, commanders of various levels took into account the regional conditions for conducting classes.
An important direction in solving the problem of professional and job training of officers was special training in the troops. For example, in the 1908/09 academic year in the serf aeronautical departments, -37- 50 percent took part in special classes. officers in the Ivangorod fortress, up to 77 percent. in the aeronautical training park, in serf aeronautical companies, from 60 percent. officers in the Warsaw Fortress, up to 62.5 percent. in Vladivostok, in field aeronautical battalions, from 49.2 percent. officers in the 1st East Siberian, up to 82.2 percent. in the 3rd East Siberian (63). During special classes in aeronautical units, officers raised and lowered balloons and aerostats, carried out free flights, delivered secret packages in balloons, flew over cities, photographed railways, fortresses, carried out meteorological observations, etc. (64) During the academic year, officers made 55 flights, of which 5 were night and 6 were winter.
Officers of the spark telegraph companies, in special classes, worked out the issues of arranging station instruments on a gig for infantry, cavalry and artillery, tuned the stations to a certain wavelength, improved some mechanisms of the spark telegraph system, etc. (65)
The Minister of War demanded that officers familiarize themselves with military progress in large armies and study in practice with their units all new techniques for using military equipment (66).
The trend towards a qualitative improvement in professional and official training in the troops, which took place during the period under study, was associated with the implementation of certain activities of the Ministry of War. On the eve of the First World War, the commander-in-chief of the troops of the Caucasian Military District noted in his most humble report: “... I can attest to an increase in the quality and intensity of the work of the officers, which, of course, should be explained by an increase in service requirements and an improvement in the financial situation of officers” (67). In addition to the listed activities, officers improved their knowledge by participating as commanders of various degrees in commissions to control classes in divisions and military units.
Along with the training of junior officers, the military department for the first time tried to take measures to increase the military knowledge of senior and senior officers. In order to exchange experience on various issues
operational art and tactics, lectures, reports, and conversations were held annually at the headquarters of military districts (68).
For practical acquaintance with the latest artillery systems, division chiefs, brigade commanders, corps and division chiefs of staff were sent to army training grounds once every four years for three weeks (69).
Despite the measures taken, combined arms commanders did not effectively use the capabilities of artillery in exercises and maneuvers. “Military commanders forget about artillery,” an artillery officer wrote in a military journal, “when they have to direct the actions of a detachment using all types of weapons” (70).
There were no other schools or courses to improve the professional training of regiment commanders, division chiefs and corps commanders. And even among officers there was an opinion that “in our army it is enough to receive a regiment or a high command position in order to completely protect oneself from any further requirements in theoretical training in military sciences. From that time on, everything comes down only to practice, and if someone does not practice voluntarily, then he may even become completely stupid, and it is all the easier that our regulations do not seem to prohibit it” (71).
As we can see, the professional training of senior officers from regiment commander to corps commander remained very limited. The senior command staff met the First World War without sufficient experience in command and control of troops in combat conditions.
A Russian and Soviet military historian testified to how ready Russia was for war in terms of combat readiness A. M . Zayonchkovsky (72): “In general, the Russian army went to war with good regiments, with mediocre divisions and corps, and with bad armies and fronts, understanding this assessment in the broad sense of preparation...” (73).
This weak point did not escape the keen, cold gaze of a potential enemy. Characterizing the armies of their future opponents, the German General Staff noticed the low quality of training of our military formations. “Therefore, in a clash with the Russians,” stated the annual memorandum in 1913, “the German command may dare to make maneuvers that it would not allow itself against another equal enemy” (74).
The Russian army had to retrain during the war.
Notes
(1) See: Beskrovny L.G.
Essays on source study of Russian military history. M., 1957.
(2) Combat officer. 1909. 13 Jan.
(3) Manual for training lower ranks of infantry. St. Petersburg, 1907. P. 3.
(4) See: Arekhov K.A.
Training program for young and old servicemen. Mogilev-Podolsky, 1907. P. 4.
(5) Military voice. 1906. May 19.
(6) Izmailovich V .
How to train young soldiers: Tips for a teacher-uncle. St. Petersburg, 1902. P. 2.
(7) Butovsky N.
On the methods of training and educating a modern soldier: Practical notes from a company commander. St. Petersburg, 1908. T. 1. P. 19.
(8) The practice of military education. 1908. February 1
(9) Russian State Military Historical Archive (RGVIA). F. 329. Op. 1.D. 53.L.45.
(10) Manual for training troops in gymnastics. St. Petersburg, 1910. P. 10.
(11) Combat officer. 1910. 28 Oct.
(12) Archive of the Military Historical Museum of Artillery, Engineering Troops and Signal Corps (VIMAIV and VS). Eng. doc. f. Op. 22/277. D. 2668. L. 36.
(13) See: Regulations on the training of troops of all types of weapons. St. Petersburg, 1908.
(14) Samsonov Alexander Vasilievich (1859-1914) – cavalry general. Participant in the Russian-Turkish (1877-1878), Russian-Japanese (1904-1905) wars. In 1909-1914. - Commander of the Turkestan Military District. At the beginning of the First World War, he commanded the 2nd Army of the North-Western Front.
(15) Order to the troops of the Turkestan Military District No. 310 of 1909.
(16) Order to the troops of the Turkestan Military District No. 265 of 1908.
(17) See: Zayonchkovsky A. M .
World War. M., 1939.
(18) RGVIA. F. 868. Op. 1. D. 820. L. 24.
(19) See: Circular of the General Staff No. 63 of 1909.
(20) Russian State Archive of the Navy (RGA VMF). F. 609. Op. 1. D. 64. L. 4 vol.
(21) See: ibid. F. 418. Op. 1. (Vol. 2). D. 784.
(22) Order for the troops of the Moscow Military District No. 625 of 1907.
(23) The most comprehensive report on the actions of the -38- War Ministry for 1912. St. Petersburg, 1916. P. 15.
(24) Russian State Military Archive (RGVA). F. 33987. Op. 3. D. 505. L. 248.
(25) Lyutinsky I. –
Captain of the General Staff, on the eve of the First World War he served in the Warsaw Military District.
(26) This refers to the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905.
(27) Lyutinsky I.
Consistency in combat training. Warsaw, 1913. P. 1.
(28) RGVIA. F. 868. Op. 1. D. 714. L. 675.
(29) Kaulbars Alexander Vasilyevich (1844-1929) – cavalry general. Participant in the Russian-Turkish (1877-1878), Russian-Japanese (1904-1905), and First World War (1914-1918). In 1905-1909 - Commander of the Odessa Military District.
(30) Grulev M.
The evils of the day of our army. Brest-Litovsk, 1911. P. 74.
(31) Chernetsovsky Yu.M.
Russia and the Soviet Union in world politics XX V. St. Petersburg, 1993. Part 1. P. 81.
(32) Russian State Historical Archive (RGIA). F. 1394. Op. 1.D.41.L. 115.
(33) RGVIA. F. 1. Op. 2. D. 84. L. 3.
(34) Ibid. D. 106. L. 30 rev.
(35) Roediger Alexander Fedorovich (1854-1920) – infantry general. Participant in the Russian-Turkish War (1877-1878). In 1905-1909 - Minister of War.
(36) RGVIA. F. 280. Op. 1. D. 4. L. 100.
(37) Military encyclopedia / Ed. V.F. Novitsky and others. St. Petersburg, 1911. T. 7. P. 30.
(38) Romanov Vladimir Alexandrovich (1847-1909) - Grand Duke, General of the Infantry. Participant in the Russian-Turkish War (1877-1878). In 1884-1905 - Commander of the Guard troops and the St. Petersburg Military District.
(39) Order on the Guard Troops and the St. Petersburg Military District No. 20 of 1900.
(40) War Department Order No. 23 of 1906
(41) Military newspaper. 1906. June 8.
(42) New time. 1908. 20 Dec.
(43) Order to the troops of the Amur Military District No. 187 of 1911.
(44) Nikolay II (Romanov Nikolai Alexandrovich) (1869-1918) - the last Russian emperor (1894-1917). Since 1915 - Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
(45) Military voice. 1906. May 4.
(46) Romanov Nikolai Nikolaevich (Younger) (1856-1929) - Grand Duke, cavalry general. Participant in the Russian-Turkish War (1877-1878). With the outbreak of World War I, he was appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief. In 1915-1917 - Governor of the Caucasus and Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasian Front.
(47) RGVIA. F. 858. D. 811. L. 42.
(48) Army. 1906. 1 Nov.
(49) Scout. 1903. No. 664
(50) RGVIA. F. 868. Op. 1. D. 713. L. 106-108.
(51) Ibid. D. 830. L. 329.
(52) Ibid. F. 868. Op. 1. D. 830. L. 329.
(53) Ibid. F. 1606. Op. 2. D. 666. L. 26.
(54) Ibid. F. 868. Op. 1. D. 713. L. 23 vol.
(55) Archives of VIMAIV and VS. Eng. doc. f. Op. 22/554. D. 2645. L. 78-80 vol.
(56) Ibid. Op. 22/575. D. 2666. L. 42.
(57) Tarasov M .
Our officer schools // Vestn. Officer shooting school. 1906. No. 151. P. 80-81.
(58) Bonch-Bruevich M.D. Dragomirov about the combat training of officers. M., 1944. P. 16.
(59) Quartermaster General - head of the operational department of the headquarters.
(60) War Department Order No. 511 of 1911
(61) Archives of VIMAIV and VS. Eng. doc. f. Op. 22/555. D. 2646. L. 80 rev.
(62) Manuals for officer training. St. Petersburg, 1909. P. 37.
(63) Archives of VIMAIV and VS. Eng. doc. f. Op. 22/460. D. 2462. L. 5-6 vol.
(64) Ibid. L. 10-29.
(65) Ibid. L. 81-95.
(66) RGVIA. F. 165. Op. 1. D. 654. L. 10.
(67) Ibid. F. 1. Op. 2. D. 689. L. 8.
(68) RGVIA. F. 868. Op. 1. D. 830. L. 328 vol.
(69) War Department Order No. 253 of 1909
(70) Familiarity of combined arms commanders with the use of modern artillery // Bulletin of the Officer Artillery School. 1912. No. 3. P. 65.
(71) Rosenshild-Paulin A.N.
Combat training of army personnel. St. Petersburg, 1907. pp. 7-8.
(72) Zayonchkovsky Andrey Medardovich (1862-1926) - Russian military historian, infantry general. Participant of the Russian-Japanese War (1904-1905). In the First World War - commander of an infantry division and army corps, commander of the Dobrudzhan army. Author of works on the history of the Crimean and First World Wars.
(73) Zayonchkovsky A. M .
World War 1914-1918 In 4 vols. M., 1938. T. 1.S. 23-24.
(74) RGVA. F. 33987. Op. 3. D. 505. L. 246. -39-
At the beginning of the twentieth century, one of the directions of the foreign policy of the Russian Empire was to gain control over the Black Sea straits of the Bosporus and Dardanelles. Joining the Entente in 1907 could resolve this issue in a war with the Triple Alliance. Speaking briefly about Russia in the First World War, it must be said that this was the only chance when this problem could be solved.
Russia's entry into the First World War
On July 28, 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. In response, Nicholas II signed a decree on general mobilization three days later. Germany responded by declaring war on Russia on August 1, 1914. This date is considered the beginning of Russia’s participation in the World War.
There was a general emotional and patriotic upsurge throughout the country. People volunteered for the front, demonstrations were held in large cities, and German pogroms took place. The inhabitants of the empire expressed their intention to wage the war to a victorious end. Against the backdrop of popular sentiment, St. Petersburg was renamed Petrograd. The country's economy gradually began to be transferred to a war footing.
Russia's entry into the First World War was not only in response to the idea of protecting the Balkan peoples from an external threat. The country also had its own goals, the main of which was to establish control over the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, as well as the annexation of Anatolia to the empire, since more than a million Christian Armenians lived there. In addition, Russia wanted to unite under its leadership all the Polish lands that were owned by the opponents of the Entente in 1914 - Germany and Austria-Hungary.
The fighting of 1914-1915
It was necessary to start hostilities at an accelerated pace. German troops were advancing on Paris and in order to pull some of the troops from there, on the Eastern Front they had to launch an offensive by two Russian armies in East Prussia. The offensive did not encounter any resistance until General Paul von Hindenburg arrived here, who established the defense, and soon completely encircled and defeated Samsonov’s army, and then forced Renenkampf to retreat.
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In the southwestern direction in 1914, the headquarters carried out a number of operations against the Austro-Hungarian troops, occupying part of Galicia and Bukovina. Thus, Russia played its role in saving Paris.
By 1915, the shortage of weapons and ammunition in the Russian army began to take its toll. Coupled with heavy losses, the troops began to retreat to the east. The Germans hoped to take Russia out of the war in 1915 by transferring the main forces here. The equipment and strength of the German army forced our troops to leave Galicia, Poland, the Baltic states, Belarus and part of Ukraine by the end of 1915. Russia found itself in an extremely difficult situation.
Few people know about the heroic defense of the Osovets fortress. The fortress's small garrison defended it from superior German forces for a long time. Large-caliber artillery did not break the spirit of Russian soldiers. Then the enemy decided to launch a chemical attack. The Russian soldiers did not have gas masks and almost immediately their white shirts became stained with blood. When the Germans went on the offensive, they were met by a bayonet counterattack by the Osovets defenders, all wearing bloody rags covering their faces and screaming “For the Faith, the Tsar and the Fatherland,” wheezing in blood. The Germans were repulsed, and this battle went down in history as the “Attack of the Dead.”
Rice. 1. Attack of the dead.
Brusilovsky breakthrough
In February 1916, having a clear advantage in the east, Germany transferred its main forces to the Western Front, where the Battle of Verdun began. By this time, the Russian economy had been completely restructured, equipment, weapons, and ammunition began to arrive at the front.
Russia again had to act as an assistant to its allies. On the Russian-Austrian front, General Brusilov began preparations for a large-scale offensive with the goal of breaking through the front and bringing Austria-Hungary out of the war.
Rice. 2. General Brusilov.
On the eve of the offensive, the soldiers were busy digging trenches towards enemy positions and camouflaging them in order to get as close to them as possible before a bayonet attack.
The offensive made it possible to advance tens, and in some places hundreds of kilometers to the west, but the main goal (to defeat the army of Austria-Hungary) was never resolved. But the Germans were never able to take Verdun.
Russia's exit from the First World War
By 1917, dissatisfaction with the war was growing in Russia. In large cities there were queues and there was not enough bread. Anti-landowner sentiment grew. The political disintegration of the country began. Fraternization and desertion became widespread at the front. The overthrow of Nicholas II and the coming to power of the Provisional Government finally disintegrated the front, where committees of soldiers' deputies appeared. Now they were deciding whether to go on the attack or abandon the front altogether.
Under the Provisional Government, the formation of Women's Death Battalions became widely popular. There is one known battle where women took part. The battalion was commanded by Maria Bochkareva, who came up with the idea of forming such detachments. Women fought equally with men and valiantly repelled all Austrian attacks. However, due to large losses among women, it was decided to transfer all women's battalions to serve in the rear, away from the front line.
Rice. 3. Maria Bochkareva.
In 1917, V.I. Lenin secretly entered the country from Switzerland through Germany and Finland. The Great October Socialist Revolution brought the Bolsheviks to power, who soon concluded the shameful Brest-Litovsk separate peace. Thus ended Russia's participation in the First World War.
What have we learned?
The Russian Empire played perhaps the most important role in the victory of the Entente, twice saving its allies at the cost of the lives of its own soldiers. However, the tragic revolution and a separate peace deprived it not only of achieving the main goals of the war, but also of including it in general among the victorious countries.
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In Soviet times, it was generally accepted that the Russian Imperial Army entered the First World War completely unprepared, was “backward” and this resulted in heavy losses, a shortage of weapons and ammunition. But this is not a completely correct judgment, although the tsarist army had enough shortcomings, as in other armies.
The Russo-Japanese War was lost not for military, but for political reasons. After it, colossal work was carried out to restore the fleet, reorganize forces, and eliminate shortcomings. As a result, by the First World War, in terms of its training and level of technical equipment, the Russian army was second only to the German one. But we must take into account the fact that the German Empire was purposefully preparing for a military solution to the issue of redistributing spheres of influence, colonies, domination in Europe and the world. The Russian imperial army was the largest in the world. After mobilization, Russia fielded 5.3 million people.
At the beginning of the 20th century, the territory of the Russian Empire was divided into 12 military districts plus the region of the Don Army. At the head of each was a commander of the troops. Men aged 21 to 43 were liable for military service. In 1906, the service life was reduced to 3 years, this made it possible to have an army of 1.5 million in peacetime, moreover, consisting of two-thirds soldiers of the second and third years of service and a significant number of reservists. After three years of active service in the ground forces, a man was in the 1st category reserve for 7 years, and 2nd category for 8 years.
Those who did not serve, but were healthy enough for combat service, because Not all conscripts were taken into the army (there was an overabundance of them, a little more than half of the conscripts were taken), they were enrolled in the militia. Those enrolled in the militia were divided into two categories. The first category - in case of war, they were supposed to replenish the active army. The second category - those who were removed from combat service for health reasons were enrolled there; they planned to form militia battalions (“squads”) from them during the war. In addition, one could join the army at will, as a volunteer.
It should be noted that many peoples of the empire were exempted from military service: Muslims of the Caucasus and Central Asia (they paid a special tax), Finns, small peoples of the North. True, there were small numbers of “foreign troops.” These were irregular cavalry units, into which representatives of the Islamic peoples of the Caucasus could enroll on a voluntary basis.
Cossacks performed the service.
They were a special military class, there were 10 main Cossack troops: Don, Kuban, Terek, Orenburg, Ural, Siberian, Semirechenskoe, Transbaikal, Amur, Ussuri, as well as Irkutsk and Krasnoyarsk Cossacks. Cossack troops fielded “servicemen” and “militiamen.” “Service” were divided into 3 categories: preparatory (20 - 21 years old); combatant (21 - 33 years old), combatant Cossacks carried out direct service; spare (33 - 38 years old), they were deployed in case of war to make up for losses. The main combat units of the Cossacks were regiments, hundreds and divisions (artillery). During the First World War, the Cossacks fielded 160 regiments and 176 separate hundreds, together with Cossack infantry and artillery, more than 200 thousand people.
The main organizational unit of the Russian army was the corps, it consisted of 3 infantry divisions and 1 cavalry division. During the war, each infantry division was reinforced with a mounted Cossack regiment. The cavalry division had 4 thousand sabers and 4 regiments (dragoons, hussars, ulans, Cossacks) of 6 squadrons each, as well as a machine gun team and an artillery division of 12 guns.
In service with the infantry
There was a 7.62 mm (3-line) repeating rifle (Mosin rifle, three-line) available since 1891. This rifle was produced since 1892 at the Tula, Izhevsk and Sestroretsk arms factories; due to a lack of production capacity, it was also ordered abroad - in France, the USA. In 1910, a modified rifle was adopted for service. After the adoption of the “light” (“offensive”) sharp-nosed bullet in 1908, the rifle was modernized, so a new curved sighting bar of the Konovalov system was introduced, which compensated for the change in the bullet’s trajectory. By the time the empire entered World War I, Mosin rifles were produced in dragoon, infantry and Cossack varieties. In addition, in May 1895, by decree of the emperor, the Nagant revolver chambered for the 7.62 mm cartridge was adopted by the Russian army. By July 20, 1914, according to the report card, the Russian troops had 424,434 units of Nagant revolvers of all modifications (according to the state there were 436,210), i.e. the army was almost completely provided with revolvers.
The army also had a 7.62 mm Maxim machine gun. Initially it was purchased by the navy, so in 1897-1904 about 300 machine guns were purchased. The machine guns were classified as artillery, they were placed on a heavy carriage with large wheels and a large armor shield (the mass of the entire structure was up to 250 kg). They were going to use it for the defense of fortresses and pre-equipped, protected positions. In 1904, their production began at the Tula Arms Factory. The Russo-Japanese War showed their high efficiency on the battlefield; machine guns in the army began to be removed from heavy carriages and, in order to increase maneuverability, they were placed on lighter and more easily transportable machines. It should be noted that machine gun crews often threw away heavy armored shields, having established in practice that in defense camouflage of a position is more important than a shield, and when attacking, mobility comes first. As a result of all the upgrades, the weight was reduced to 60 kg.
These weapons were no worse than their foreign counterparts; in terms of the number of machine guns, the Russian army was not inferior to the French and German armies. The Russian infantry regiment of 4 battalions (16 companies) was armed with a machine gun team with 8 Maxim heavy machine guns as of May 6, 1910. The Germans and French had six machine guns per regiment of 12 companies. Russia met the war with good artillery of small and medium calibers, such as the 76-mm divisional gun mod. 1902 (the basis of the field artillery of the Russian Empire) was superior in its combat qualities to the 75-mm rapid-fire French and 77-mm German guns and was highly praised by Russian artillerymen. The Russian infantry division had 48 guns, the Germans 72, the French 36. But Russia lagged behind the Germans in heavy field artillery (as did the French, British, and Austrians). Russia did not appreciate the importance of mortars, although there was experience of using them in the Russo-Japanese War.
At the beginning of the 20th century, there was an active development of military equipment.
In 1902, automobile troops appeared in the Russian armed forces. By World War I, the army had more than 3 thousand cars (for example, the Germans had only 83). The Germans underestimated the role of vehicles; they believed that they were necessary only for advanced reconnaissance detachments. In 1911, the Imperial Air Force was established. By the beginning of the war, Russia had the most airplanes - 263, Germany - 232, France - 156, England - 90, Austria-Hungary - 65. Russia was the world leader in the construction and use of seaplanes (airplanes of Dmitry Pavlovich Grigorovich). In 1913, the aviation department of the Russian-Baltic Carriage Plant in St. Petersburg, under the leadership of I. I. Sikorsky, built the four-engine aircraft Ilya Muromets, the world's first passenger aircraft. After the start of the war, the world's first bomber formation was created from 4 Ilya Muromtsevs.
Starting from 1914, armored vehicles were actively introduced into the Russian army, and from 1915 the first models of tanks began to be tested. The first field radio stations, created by Popov and Troitsky, appeared in the armed forces back in 1900. They were used during the Russo-Japanese War; by 1914, “spark companies” had been created in all corps, and telephone and telegraph communications were used.
Military science developed,
the works of a number of military theorists were published: N. P. Mikhnevich - “Strategy”, A. G. Elchaninov - “Conducting modern combat”, V. A. Cheremisov - “Fundamentals of modern military art”, A. A. Neznamov - “Modern war". In 1912, the “Field Service Charter”, “Manual for Field Artillery Operations in Combat”, in 1914 “Manual for Infantry Operations in Combat”, “Manual for Firing from a Rifle, Carbine and Revolver” were published. The main type of combat operations was considered to be offensive, but much attention was also paid to defense. The infantry attack used intervals of up to 5 steps (sparrier battle formations than in other European armies). It allowed crawling, movement in dashes, advancement by squads and individual soldiers from position to position under the cover of fire from comrades. The soldiers were required to dig in, not only in defense, but also during offensive operations. We studied counter combat, operations at night, and Russian artillerymen showed a good level of training. Cavalrymen were taught to operate not only on horseback, but also on foot. The training of officers and non-commissioned officers was at a high level. The highest level of knowledge was provided by the Academy of the General Staff.
Of course, there were also disadvantages
So the issue with automatic weapons for infantry was not resolved, although promising developments existed (Fedorov, Tokarev, etc. worked on them). The mortars were not deployed. The preparation of the reserve was very poor; only the Cossacks conducted training and exercises. Those who dropped out and did not get into combat service had no training at all. Things were bad with the officer reserve. These were people who received higher education, they received the rank of ensign with a diploma, but had no idea about active service. The reserve also included officers who retired due to health, age, or misconduct.
Russia underestimated the capabilities of heavy artillery and succumbed to the influence of French theories and German disinformation (the Germans actively criticized large-caliber guns in the pre-war period). They realized it late, before the war they adopted a new program, according to which they planned to seriously strengthen the artillery: the corps was supposed to have 156 guns, of which 24 were heavy. Russia’s weak point was its focus on foreign manufacturers.
Minister of War Vladimir Aleksandrovich Sukhomlinov (1909-1915) was not distinguished by high abilities. He was a smart administrator, but he was not distinguished by excessive zeal; he tried to minimize efforts - instead of developing domestic industry, he found an easier way. I chose it, ordered it, received a “thank you” from the manufacturer, and accepted the product.
