Socio-economic development of the Russian Empire. Economic development of Russia in the first half of the 19th century

So, the light industry of the Russian Empire can be characterized as follows: high-class, world-class products, extremely dynamically developing. After the Bolshevik occupation, the entire light industry was virtually destroyed and eked out a miserable existence.

Food industry and agriculture

Agriculture in the Russian Empire generated significant income from exports, especially wheat. The structure of exports can be presented on this graph; for more information about the harvest for 1883–1914, you can see the detailed report

Russia took first place in grain collection; trade in grain, eggs (50% of the world market) and butter brought in the majority of export income. And here, as we see, the role of private forces was again the most important. The state was poorly represented in agriculture, although it owned 154 million dessiatines of land, while 213 million dessiatines belonged to peasant communities and individuals. Only 6 million dessiatines of the state were cultivated, the rest was mainly forest. In other words, enterprising peasants provided the basis of the country's economy by producing goods, the sale of which made it possible to buy necessary foreign goods.

Productivity for 1883–1914

Livestock farming was relatively developed. “The number of horses per 100 inhabitants: Russia — 19.7, Britain — 3.7, Austria-Hungary — 7.5, Germany — 4.9. France - 5.8, Italy - 2.8. The only European country that competes with Russia is Denmark. There, there were 20.5 horses per 100 people. In general, the supply of horses was at the level of America, but inferior to Argentina, Canada and Australia.
In cattle, Russia was not a leader — rather, a strong middle peasant. On average, there were 29.3 head of cattle per 100 inhabitants of the Russian Empire. In Austria-Hungary - 30, in Britain - 26.1, in Germany - 30, in Italy - 18, in France - 32.1, in the USA - 62.2. That is, pre-revolutionary Russia was quite adequately provided with cattle — in fact, every third person had a cow.
When it comes to sheep, Russia is also a strong average: the indicators are not the best, but far from the worst. On average — 44.9 sheep and rams per 100 people. In Austria-Hungary this number was less than 30, in Britain - 60.7, in Germany - 7.5, in Italy - 32.3, in France - 30.5, in America - 40.8 sheep per hundred people. The only industry in which Russia was inferior to some of the leading powers was pig farming; it was not very widespread. On average, there were 9.5 pigs per 100 people. In Austria-Hungary - about 30, in Britain - 8.1, in Germany - 25.5, in Italy - 7.3, in France - 11.2. However, here the average level is not inferior to French or British.” Data from here.

The mechanization of agriculture from 1905 to 1913 can be represented in the form of the following figures:

97 units of steam plows were imported in 1905, and 73 thousand units in 1912.

In 1905, 30.5 thousand seeders were imported, in 1913 about 500 thousand.

In 1905, 489.6 thousand locomobiles were imported; in 1913, more than 1 million units.

In 1905, 2.6 million pounds of Thomas slag were imported, in 1913 - 11.2 million.

In 1905, 770 thousand pounds of phosphorites were imported, in 1913 - 3.2 million.

In 1905, 1.7 million poods of superphosphates were imported, in 1913 - 12 million.

Nikolai Vasilievich Vereshchagin. “Cheerful milkman” of a healthy person.

Butter production developed. Exports of butter in 1897 amounted to 529 thousand poods worth 5 million rubles, although before that there was almost no export. In 1900, 1,189 thousand poods worth 13 million rubles, in 1905 exports increased to 2.5 million poods worth 30 million rubles, and a year later 3 million poods worth 44 million rubles were already exported. At the same time, the Empire owed the development of the industry to Nikolai Vasilyevich Vereshchagin. “Transportation by rail, as statistics have shown, is over 20,000,000 poods per year, and since up to 3,000,000 poods of oil from this amount is exported abroad and is estimated at approximately 30,000,000 rubles, then the rest, over 17,000,000 poods, in any case, it is worth no less than 30,000,000 rubles, and, therefore, we already produce approximately 60,000,000 rubles worth of dairy products per year. The value of better-yielding cattle and more productive land has undoubtedly increased considerably wherever improved dairy farming has taken root.”

Sugar production increased from 1887 to 1913 from 25.9 million poods to 75.4 million poods. Its consumption also increased (see table):

Population

It is no secret that the population of the Russian Empire grew at a very rapid pace. The population of the European part of Russia from 1897 to 1914 grew from 94 million to 128 million, Siberia from 5.7 million to 10 million. The total for the Empire, including Finland, from 129 million to 178 million people (according to other sources, in 1913 the population excluding Finland was 166 million). The urban population, according to 1913 data, was 14.2%, i.e. more than 24.6 million people. In 1916, about 181.5 million people already lived in the Empire. In essence, this human asset laid the foundations for the future victory in the Second World War - this is the numerical advantage of people who grew up in the relatively well-fed imperial years, received good immunity and physical characteristics, and provided Russia with labor and an army for many years to come (as well as those who was born to them in the early 1920s).

Education

The number of students in lower, secondary and higher educational institutions, as well as literacy, grew steadily in the last decades of the Empire. This can be assessed from the following data:

Education budget of the Ministry of Public Education for the period from 1894 to 1914: 25.2 million rubles and 161.2 million rubles. An increase of 628%. According to other sources, the MNE budget was 142 million rubles in 1914. The total expenditure of ministries on education was 280–300 million + expenses of cities and zemstvos of about 360 million rubles. In total, total expenses on education in the Republic of Ingushetia in 1914 amounted to 640 million rubles, or 3.7 rubles per person. For comparison, in England this figure was 2.8 rubles.

The intention to achieve full literacy as a long-term goal of the government was obvious. If in 1889 the ability to read among men and women aged 9 to 20 was 31% and 13%, respectively, then in 1913 this ratio was already 54% and 26%. Russia, of course, lagged behind all developed European countries in this regard, where from 75% to 99% of the population could read and write.

The number of primary educational institutions by 1914 was 123,745 units.

The number of secondary educational institutions by 1914: about 1800 units.

The number of universities by 1914: 63 state, public and private units. The number of students was 123,532 students in 1914 and 135,065 students in 1917.

Urban literacy increased by an average of 20% between 1897 and 1913.

The increase in literacy among recruits speaks for itself.

In 1914 in Russia there were 53 teacher institutes, 208 teachers' seminaries, and 280 thousand teachers worked. More than 14 thousand students studied at pedagogical universities and seminaries of the MNP; In addition, additional pedagogical classes at women's gymnasiums graduated 15.3 thousand students in 1913 alone. The number of professionally trained teachers in primary schools also steadily increased, including in the remaining parochial schools (despite lower pay in them): by 1906, 82.8% (in single-class) and 92.4% (in two-year) professionally trained teachers, then by 1914 — already 96 and 98.7%, respectively.

In general, according to the expectations of that time, problems with population literacy and the creation of a system of universal education should have been resolved by 1921–1925. And I have no doubt that this would be the case.

Results

Thus, we see that in absolutely all parameters of economic development of the Russian Empire from the late 1880s to 1917, the country made significant progress. There is no doubt that Russia still remained behind France, Germany, England, the USA and even in some aspects from Italy and Denmark. But the trend of continuous development is obvious — this allows us to conclude that even after 1917 the country would have made progress in the economy. As for the relatively low standard of living of the majority of the population in the 1900s, Russia, in principle, almost always lagged behind the rest of Europe, just as it lagged behind the USSR and today. But in the Republic of Ingushetia we see how the income of the population grew continuously and at a rapid pace, which cannot be said about the life of Soviet people and our current long-term stagnation.

One of the factors hindering economic development was the increase in duties and protectionism. You may already be familiar with the idea that tariffs supposedly boosted domestic industry. But this is not so, because it was those industries that developed faster where there was no competition with foreign products (raw materials, processing, agriculture, handicrafts, textiles). Tariffs slowed down the development of engine manufacturing, automobile manufacturing, and aircraft manufacturing — largely because the nascent industry in these industries lacked foreign components, so necessary at the initial stage, making business in these industries unprofitable. The Tariff of 1868, for example, imposed duties on cars. In the same way, duties on cars were increased in 1891. As a result, it is in mechanical engineering that since then the growth has been the least significant and the share of imported machines is high. When adherents of protectionism always point out to us the impressive growth in the raw materials industry and agriculture, where, in general, nothing could threaten Russia even if it wanted to.

Countries and peoples constantly learn from each other: those lagging behind strive to catch up with the leaders, and sometimes even overtake them. However, everyone has different opportunities and abilities for development, including through the assimilation of other people’s experience.

The writer I. A. Goncharov, who visited Japan in the 1850s, noted that the Japanese are very interested in Western technical achievements, while the Chinese show complete indifference. Indeed, modernization began in Japan already in the next decade, while in China it was delayed for at least half a century and proceeded with much greater difficulties.

What external and internal factors determined Russia's economic success in the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries? This and other questions about the nature and rate of economic growth in Russia before the First World War are answered by the leading researcher of the post-reform history of our country, director of the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Historical Sciences Yuri Aleksandrovich PETROV. The word is to the specialist.

Russia, which embarked on the path of modern industrial growth later than the leading countries of Western Europe and the United States, belonged to the number of states of the “catching up” type in economic development. Western historiography traditionally places emphasis on the active role of the state in the economic life of the country and on Western investments - these two main points in Russia overcoming economic backwardness. Internal - non-state - forces are not taken into account.

In recent domestic historiography, on the contrary, there has been a desire for an in-depth study of the Russian business world - the third and most important player in the economic field. The history of the industrial growth of our country is inextricably linked with the process of decomposition of the natural economy and the development of commodity-money relations in the countryside. Even in the pre-reform era (that is, before 1861), two paths of industrial progress emerged.

The first is the use of Western forms of large-scale industrial (manufacturing) production using forced labor of serfs. This is how the mining and metallurgical industry of the Urals and the industries where noble entrepreneurship showed itself developed - distilling, cloth, linen, beet sugar, etc. But this path, in the end, turned out to be a dead end.

And with the abolition of serfdom, the “noble” industry either withered away or switched to the rails of a new economic path - with private entrepreneurship and wage labor. It was this second model of industrial development that became the main line of economic growth in the post-reform period.

What was its basis? Industrial enterprises based on the wage labor of serfs, whom the landowners transferred to cash rent. In obtaining funds to pay it, peasants more often went to the cities or were engaged in waste trades in their villages.

Thus, at the end of the 18th - beginning of the 19th century, the Russian cotton industry, in particular, grew out of peasant textile production. It was this that served as the basis for the industrial development of the country. The textile industry, which worked for a broad consumer market, was quite independent (in comparison with heavy industry) from government orders and foreign investments, and grew from peasant “small shops” to textile mills equipped with the latest Western technology, concentrated primarily in the Central region. the key to organic and autonomous industrial growth of the country.

With the emergence of other industrial sectors (primarily heavy industry) in the post-reform period, the share of textile production gradually decreased. And yet, until 1913, it remained the largest branch of Russian industry. By that time, its share accounted for about 30% of the gross value of industrial products (see Table 1). And the total share of all industries whose growth was the result of the market evolution of agriculture (textiles, food, processing of animal products) was about 55% on the eve of the First World War.

The volume of industrial production for the years 1887-1913 increased 4.6 times. Heavy industry developed especially dynamically - metalworking and the mining industry (metallurgy, coal and oil mining). The extensive railway construction of the 1860s - 1880s required the creation of new industries. And this had a decisive influence on changes in the industry structure. Russia made a giant leap in its industrial development in the 1890s. It was a period of rapid economic growth, when industrial production in the country doubled in just a decade.

While Russia was moving forward by leaps and bounds, other countries did not stand still. How much did the pace of Russia's economic development at this time affect its place among the developed economies of the world?

The growth rate of the tsarist economy - according to the observation of the authoritative American economist P. Gregory - was relatively high from the point of view of world standards of the late 19th - early 20th centuries. Russia belonged to the group of countries with the fastest growing economies, such as the USA, Japan and Sweden.

In terms of the most important economic indicators, Russia has moved significantly closer to the leading Western countries. In terms of absolute volumes of iron ore mining, iron and steel smelting, volume of mechanical engineering products, industrial consumption of cotton and sugar production, it ranks fourth or fifth in the world. And in oil production at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, thanks to the creation of the Baku oil industrial region, it even became a world leader. The length of the Russian railway network was the second in the world, second only to the United States.

The industrial boom of the late 19th century and 1909-1913 significantly advanced the country along the path of industrial development. According to calculations carried out by the staff of the League of Nations, Russia's share in world industrial production, which was 3.4% in 1881-1885, increased to 5.0% by 1896-1900, and by 1913 - to 5.3% ( see table 2). Meanwhile, the shares of advanced industrial states (with the exception of the USA) began to decline from the end of the 19th century. Russia was consistently ahead of them in terms of industrial production growth rates: its gap with Great Britain decreased threefold in 1885-1913, and with Germany by a quarter.

The shifts in Russian industry are much less noticeable when calculating its output per capita. But this is largely due to the extremely high rate of population growth in the country. The growth of the population, primarily rural, reduced the success of Russian industrialization to almost nothing. Russia's share in world industrial production - 5.3% in 1913 - as we see, was far from corresponding to the share of its population among the inhabitants of the globe - 10.2%. The only exceptions were oil (17.8% of world production) and sugar (10.2%).

In terms of industrial production per capita, Russia continued to be at the level of Italy and Spain, inferior many times to the advanced industrial powers. And at the beginning of the twentieth century, Russia remained a country with a significant predominance of agricultural production over industrial production. The value of Russia's agricultural production assets by 1914 was 13,089 million rubles, industrial assets - 6258, railway assets - 6680 and trade assets - 4565 million rubles. And although the preponderance of new forms of economic activity is obvious, the value of the industrial assets of the empire was still twice as low as the national wealth accumulated in the agricultural sector. And yet, it is already quite obvious that Russia has entered a phase of transition to an industrial-agrarian society.

Russia made its first industrial leap under Peter I. By the beginning of his reign, there were 30 manufactories in the country, by the end - about 200. However, for a long time, the reformer tsar increased the industrial potential of the country exclusively through the creation of new state-owned (state) enterprises. Peter began to pay attention to the development of private entrepreneurship only at the end of his reign, after a trip to France in 1717. What was the role of the state in ensuring industrial growth in Russia in the 19th century?

To a large extent, this growth was associated with the active policy of the state in the economic sphere. The government contributed, as already noted, not only to railway construction, but also to the creation of heavy industry, the growth of banks and, finally, the protectionist protection of domestic industry, and therefore, thereby, the development of industrial production. At the same time, the leadership of the empire steadily and consistently defended the system of state control and economic management, defended the interests of the “prime class” of the empire - the nobility, limited freedom of enterprise, and preserved the archaic order in the countryside.

This policy found its embodiment in the activities of S. Yu. Witte, the largest statesman of pre-revolutionary Russia, Minister of Finance in 1892-1903. Witte was convinced that the accelerated development of national industry was possible only through the intensive use of the state economy.

“In Russia,” he wrote to Nicholas II in 1895, “according to the living conditions of our country, state intervention in the most diverse aspects of public life was required, which radically distinguishes it from England, for example, where everything is left to private initiative and personal enterprise and where the state only regulates private activities...” The American economist of Russian origin A. Gerschenkron (1904-1978) - in the spirit of Witte’s views - put forward the concept according to which government intervention played a decisive role in the industrialization of tsarist Russia.

Along with foreign investments, the economic policy of the government served, in his opinion, as a compensating factor and allowed the patriarchal empire to become one of the relatively developed industrial powers in a short historical period. Stimulating economic growth, according to Gerschenkron, was achieved (in addition to general protectionist policies) through the budgetary redistribution of tax funds from the agricultural sector to the industrial sector.

And it was precisely the policy of industrialization, carried out at the expense of funds pumped out of the countryside, that led to the revolution of 1905: when the solvency of the rural population was exhausted, “the patience of the peasantry came to an end.” Most likely, Gerschenkron made an attempt to explain the industrial takeoff of post-reform Russia with budgetary mechanisms similar to the Soviet an economy whose industrial growth actually initiated a fiscal redistribution of national income. However, subsequent studies did not confirm this thesis.

The state indeed played a very active role in the economic life of pre-revolutionary Russia. But it is hardly possible to talk about his “planting” industry through channels of redistribution of tax funds. No transfer of capital from the agricultural to the industrial sector through the budget was detected. The fiscal policy of late imperial Russia was at least neutral in this regard. The priority expenditure items of the tsarist empire remained the costs of national defense and administrative management.

However, the same picture was observed in economically developed European countries, where budgetary financing of economic growth as a deliberate policy dates back no earlier than the global crisis of the late 1920s - early 1930s. The industrial breakthrough of Russia at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries was by no means the merit of the government, in any case, not only the government. In the pre-revolutionary period, the state was not so much an investor in the economy (with the exception of the railway industry, where government investments were really large), but rather a recipient of income from economic growth.

There is even a reasonable consensus in historiography that Russian industrialization could have been just as rapid (or even more dynamic) and at lower costs to society if the state had played a less active role in driving industrialization and relied instead on private initiative and free market forces .

Witte’s economic policy (which is widely admired today) aggravated the backwardness of agriculture and strengthened government control over private enterprise initiatives. Until 1917, Russia retained the licensing system of joint-stock incorporation, while in the countries of Western Europe a more progressive attendance system operated, independent of bureaucratic “discretion.” The development of national industry inevitably collided with the narrowness of the domestic market as a consequence of the stagnation of the agricultural sector.

The agrarian reform of P. A. Stolypin is a belated government reaction to this imbalance. In the conditions of domestic and foreign political crises at the beginning of the twentieth century, it was unable to solve this most important task for the country’s economic growth.

There is an opinion that the successes of economic development in Russia at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries were financed mainly by the state wine monopoly (which provided 26% of budget revenues in 1913) and external loans. At the same time, it is obvious that the authorities of that time, and above all S. Yu. Witte as Minister of Finance, managed to make Russia attractive to foreign capital. What, in your opinion, is the relationship between these moments?

An essential condition for accelerating economic growth in Russia (in addition to state policy) was foreign investment, presented in two main forms - loans and investments. By 1914, the country's public debt was expressed in the amount of 8824.5 million rubles: 7153 million were loans “for national needs”, and the remaining 1671.5 million were debts on bonds of railway companies guaranteed by the government.

In terms of the size of public debt, Russia was in second place in the world table of ranks after France and in first place in terms of the absolute size of payments associated with loans. Payments in 1913 amounted to 424 million rubles (13% of the budget expenditures), being the second largest budget item after the military expenditures of the empire. Funds from direct government borrowings for the so-called national needs were used to cover military expenses, to pay off old loans, to replenish free cash in the treasury, etc. - goals far from productive use.

In addition to government loans and government-guaranteed railway funds, Russia's public debt should also include the obligations of state mortgage banks (Dvoryansky and Peasant). Domestic economists of that era, sharply criticizing the government’s policy for debt dependence on the European money market, reproached the financial department “for borrowing money abroad right and left, on all sorts of conditions, just to make ends meet and equalize the balance of accounts that is always unfavorable for us.”

But at the same time, experts recognized that the debt burden does not threaten Russia’s status as a great power and is not even too heavy compared to other European countries. Despite the noisy campaign in the right-wing and left-wing radical press against the growing “enslavement” of Russia by foreign capital, internal debt grew at a faster pace than external debt, which indicated a gradual reorientation of lending policy towards internal reserves (see Table 3).

Internal debt for the period from 1900 to 1913 rose by 3224 million rubles (or 83%), while external debt increased by 1466 million (or 36%). As a result, the share of domestic debt by 1913 exceeded external debt, amounting to 56.5% versus 43.5%, although at the beginning of the century their ratio was almost equal. What is the reason? Intensive economic development on the eve of the First World War forced domestic sources to play a decisive role in the formation of public debt.

For what purposes were the proceeds of the national debt used? Since the time of Witte, the ideological basis for the expansion of state debt has been the thesis about the lack of internal savings in Russia. But, as can be seen from table. 4 on the structure of external and internal state obligations for investment objects, those considerable internal resources that were drawn into the treasury under state obligations were diverted from productive premises. As follows from the same table. 4, almost 3/4 of the “general needs” of the empire, that is, expenses associated with public administration and foreign policy goals, were covered from internal savings.

The construction of the railway network, on the contrary, was subsidized by 3/4 from external loan sources. Internal savings were used more productively in the field of state-owned mortgage loans (as a result of the Stolypin land reform, the activities of both state-owned banks reached significant proportions). In general, we can say: the domestic debt on the eve of the World War served the purpose of financing the government and its mortgage banks. The external one was used as a compensator for internal savings diverted through the state credit system for unproductive purposes.

As for private foreign investments, S. Yu. Witte considered their attraction to be the basis of his financial system. “The influx of foreign capital,” he reported to Nicholas II in 1899, “is, in the deep conviction of the Minister of Finance, the only way to accelerate our industry to a position in which it will be able to supply our country with abundant and cheap products.” By 1913, 1,571 million rubles of foreign capital were invested in shares and bonds of Russian joint-stock companies, or 18.6% of the total volume of private investments.

For adherents of Witte’s policy, this ratio of foreign and domestic capital was the embodiment of the “golden bridge” through which life-saving foreign investments flowed into Russia; for opponents, it was unconditional evidence of a threat to national security and loss of economic independence. This two-faced judgment accompanied foreign investment in the Russian economy in subsequent times.

To summarize, we can state: foreign capital is an important, but by no means determining factor in the economic development of the country.

Satisfying the urgent needs of the Russian national economy, focusing on the domestic market, intertwining and merging with domestic capital, foreign capital was integrated into the process of industrialization of the country. He facilitated progress along this path and pushed for the creation of a number of economic sectors, for example, the coal and metallurgical region of Donbass.

The First World War destroyed this financial and economic system, which turned out to be quite fragile. With the outbreak of hostilities, the investment flow from Europe to Russia was interrupted, and the gold circulation system was eliminated in all warring countries. The payment for assistance with capital and technology (know-how) was considerable. And yet, although the services of foreign businessmen were not philanthropy and were generously paid, the economic effect was higher.

Ultimately, these investments worked for the industrialization of Russia. Their directions and sectoral structure were determined by the internal needs of the country. And further. The importance of foreign investment, whose decisive contribution to the economic modernization of Russia Western historiography likes to write about, was certainly not decisive for economic growth, since domestic capital retained a leading position in the country’s national economic system.

Russia, which was still significantly behind the economically developed countries of the West, on the eve of the World War entered a trajectory of healthy economic growth. Its guarantee was the economic activity of yesterday's serfs, who became, on the one hand, the largest manufacturers and leaders of the business world, and on the other hand, they joined the millions of the working class, with whose hands the industrial potential of the country was created.

Thanks to their efforts, by the beginning of the twentieth century, the empire became one of the five industrialized powers of the then world. The peasant reform of 1861 set the development model, and the “freedom factor” became the decisive factor that, according to the American economist P. Gregory, “economic growth and structural changes in the tsarist economy in 1885-1913 corresponded to the pattern of modern economic growth experienced in industrialized countries." The only difference is that, having embarked on the path of industrial development later than other European powers, imperial Russia traveled a shorter portion of this path.

Figures and facts

1. In the formation of European capitalism, the leading place was occupied by Protestants, for whom industrial and financial activity was a form of personal service to God. In the development of Russian industry, the Old Believers played a largely similar role, but for completely different reasons. Like the Protestants, the Old Believers formed many different churches (“concords”), but they all considered the Russian Empire to be the state of the Antichrist. Persecuted by the official church and the tsarist authorities, the Old Believer communities, trying to provide themselves with work and at least some means of subsistence, started production. But since the authorities did not want to deal with “schismatic” communities, their proxies acted as owners. This is exactly how the Kaluga peasant Fyodor Alekseevich Guchkov, a representative of the community of Old Believers-bespopovtsy of the “Fedoseevsky consent”, which formed in the village of Preobrazhenskoye near Moscow, founded a wool weaving factory. From among the Old Believers - non-drinkers and hard workers - came the famous dynasties of merchants and industrialists Ryabushinsky, Tretyakov, Morozov, Mamontov, Kokorev, Soldatenkov and many others. Over time, under pressure from their superiors, some of them changed their faith, joining official Orthodoxy or the so-called Edinoverie Church, which, while formally remaining Old Believers, made reconciliation with the authorities. Their enterprises turned into full-fledged privately owned firms, but the memory of their communal origin remained for a long time. And when a strike broke out at the Morozov manufactory in 1885, the workers not only put forward demands to the owner, but threatened to drive him out altogether if they were not met (!): “And if you don’t agree, then you won’t run the factory.”

2. By the beginning of the 20th century, 39,787 versts of railways were in operation in Russia (verst - 1066.8 m): of which 25,198 versts belonged to the treasury, and 14,589 versts belonged to private companies. In the USA, the total length of railways in 1900 was 309 thousand kilometers, reaching a maximum length of 409 thousand kilometers by 1916. American railroads were then included in the Guinness Book of Records. However, absolute figures are only indicative when comparing countries with comparable area and population. In terms of the density of the railway network, that is, in terms of the ratio of the length of the railway to the area of ​​the country, Belgium took first place, where there were 22 km of track for every 100 square kilometers. In Great Britain this figure was 11.4 km, in Germany and Switzerland - 9.5 km each, in the USA - 4 km, and in the European part of Russia - only 0.9 km.

3. The construction and operation of railways were associated with large cash flows. But a developed banking system did not exist in Russia. The “railroad kings” of that time (Derviz, Kokorev, Gubonin, Bliokh, Polyakov), not trusting precocious private bankers and especially each other, preferred to establish their own banks, personally controlled by them. “Thanks to all this,” wrote Witte, “these individuals had the greatest social influence even on the highest class of property-owning individuals.”

4. State priorities in the economic development of the country were largely determined by the activities of state banks. Both the State Commercial Bank and its successor, the State Bank of Russia, lent to large trade and industry. The situation changed only after the appointment of S. Yu. Witte to the post of Minister of Finance in 1892, who introduced changes to the Charter of the State Bank. And the Peasant Land Bank, opened in 1882, preferred to provide loans to peasant communities and was very reluctant to lend to private owners. The State Bank's new Charter of 1894 secured its right to make industrial loans. A significant part of them were loans to small and medium-sized industry, trade, peasants and artisans. On the other hand, the volume of lending to individual industrial enterprises, mainly heavy industry, has increased. The volume of issuing commercial loans, mainly grain loans, was also expanded. At the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th centuries, the size of a loan to an industrial enterprise could not exceed 500 thousand rubles, and to a small trader - 600 rubles.

5. Heavy engineering in Russia actually began with the Izhora factories. In 1710, on the Izhora River, by order of Prince Menshikov, a dam and a water-powered saw mill were erected to cut timber for the construction of ships. The decree of Peter I of May 22, 1719 pushed the development of the industries that appeared under it - iron, copper, anchor and hammer factories assigned to the Admiralty. Hence the name - Admiralty Izhora Plants (from the moment of its foundation they were a state enterprise). Since the middle of the 19th century, Izhora factories have become the main supplier of armor for the Russian fleet and coastal fortifications. They mastered the construction of destroyers: from 1878 to 1900, 19 destroyers and 5 minesweepers were built.

6. Historians have discovered the origins of 400 owners of industrial enterprises in Moscow in the first half of the 19th century. It turned out that 58 came from merchants, 138 from peasants, 157 from townspeople and artisans (20 owners were nobles and 58 were foreigners). The founders of commercial and industrial establishments were often people from the state class and the so-called economic peasants (formerly monastic) who merged with them. Apparently, they had better conditions for active economic activity than the previous serfs.

First of all, it should be noted that in the 80s. XIX century The industrial revolution ended.

The expansion of the country's transport network intensified trade exchange and the growth of small-scale production (especially in the textile industry, the center of which was the Moscow region). Intensified competition, monopolization of production, and the global economic crisis caused the death of many financially, organizationally and technically weak Russian enterprises (the crisis of 1900-1903 led to the closure of over three thousand enterprises, which employed 112 thousand workers). At the same time, within the framework of agricultural production (more than 4/5 of the population was employed in the country’s agriculture; in 1905, peasants in the European part of Russia owned 160 million dessiatinas and rented another 20-25 million, leaving only 40-50 million dessiatines of arable land), handicraft, handicraft and fishing industries developed. For example, at the beginning of the 20th century. in the Ozernaya region (which included the Pskov, Novgorod and St. Petersburg provinces) there were 13-14 thousand factory workers and 29 thousand handicraftsmen. In the Central Russian Black Earth Region, 127 thousand people were employed in factories and factories, and there were 500 thousand artisans. In the Vyatka province, 180-190 thousand workers were involved in handicrafts. Craftsmen made a variety of crafts from wood, bark, fabric, leather, felt, clay and metal.

Russian agriculture has also been capitalized, as evidenced by the growth of commercial entrepreneurship and the associated specialization of individual economic regions of the country. This was facilitated by the rise in world prices for agricultural food products at the beginning of the 20th century. At the beginning of the 20th century. The steppe provinces of the South and Trans-Volga region were finally identified as grain production areas for sale on the market, mainly on the external market. The northern, Baltic and central provinces became areas of cattle breeding and dairy farming. The northwestern provinces specialized in the production of flax, and the cultivation of sugar beets was concentrated in Ukraine and the Central Black Earth Zone. In the agricultural economy, the use of machinery, mineral fertilizers, and selective seeds increased. All these processes went in parallel with a sharp increase in the peasant population. In 1905, the tsar's manifesto announced a reduction in half from January 1, 1906 and a complete cessation of redemption payments from January 1, 1907. At the same time, a Senate decree was issued establishing more preferential conditions for issuing loans from the Peasant Land Bank in order to successfully help land-poor peasants in expanding the purchasing area of ​​their land holdings. The revolutionary explosion among the peasantry in the first Russian revolution was a reaction to unjust land management. By the beginning of the 20th century. 2-3% of the peasant population were kulaks, and 7-8% of wealthy peasants joined them; There were 25% of horseless farms; 10% of peasant farms did not have cows. The basis of the village was the middle peasant, the main bearer of patriarchal traditions. The peasants wanted to take the land from the landowners and divide it among themselves. A surplus population appeared in the Russian village, the number of which at the beginning of the century was 23 million people. Part of it served as a reserve for Russian industry, but the latter’s capabilities were limited and this circumstance stimulated “peasant intervention.” The head of government, P. A. Stolypin, was able to pass a decree that marked the beginning of agrarian reform (the creation of small personal land ownership). But Stolypin spoke out for recognition of the inviolability of private property and against the forced alienation of landowners' lands. Stolypin, speaking out against the agrarian programs of the radical left parties, prophetically warned: “...recognition of the nationalization of the land will lead to such a social revolution, to such a displacement of all values, to such a change in all social, legal and civil relations, which history has never seen.” By 1915, individual farms accounted for 10.3% of all peasant farms, occupying 8.8% of all allotment land. Of the 2.5 million households that separated from the community, 1.2 million sold their plots and rushed to the cities and beyond the Urals. The government forced the mass resettlement of peasants, exempted them from paying taxes for a long time, exempted men from military service, provided them with a plot of land (15 hectares for the head of the family and 45 hectares for the rest of the family) and cash benefits (200 rubles per family). Over three years (1907-1909), the number of immigrants amounted to 1 million 708 thousand. In total, from 1906 to 1914. 40 million people moved to Siberia. The percentage of those who settled in the new place was very high; only 17% or 524 thousand people returned. The resettlement had a progressive significance: the population of Siberia increased, new settlers developed more than 30 million acres of empty land, built thousands of villages, and generally gave impetus to the development of the productive forces of Siberia.

The agriculture of the resettlement areas was looking for the most acceptable ways of existence for itself, including the formation of land relations in the resettlement areas in accordance with the program of P. A. Stolypin - along the path of creating strong individual farms based on credit cooperation, which then began to carry out sales and supply functions. The increased specialization of agricultural areas led to the formation of cooperative unions. Cooperative unions included peasant production in the system of not only the Russian but also the world market. The Siberian unions sold oil, furs, wool, wheat, bast, and hemp abroad. Exports provided huge revenues to the treasury. Over time, similar cooperation spread to European Russia. In 1912, the cooperative Moscow People's Bank was created, which provided loans and supplies to the peasantry through cooperation of agricultural machinery, fertilizers, and seeds. The bank took over the cooperation activities of local cooperative unions. The next stage in the development of the cooperative movement occurred during the First World War. On January 1, 1917, there were 63 thousand different types of cooperatives in Russia, which united 24 million people. Rural cooperation served 94 million people, or 82.5% of the rural population.

The rapid economic development of Russia, the modernization of production, the expansion of the domestic market, the growth of the purchasing power of the population, the increase in wages for workers, positive changes in the country's agriculture (increased profitability) contributed to a new industrial boom (since 1909). The new rise was characterized by the increased development of agricultural production, the further growth of cities, an increase in the level of technical equipment and power supply of industry, and an increase in military orders from the government. In 1909-1913. industrial production increased almost 1.5 times. During the pre-war industrial boom, the State Bank remained the country's largest commercial bank, which expanded trade lending, especially in the periphery. His role in lending grain trade was great. The entry of Russian banks into the financing of industry marked the beginning of the merging of banking and industrial capital. During this period, the system and form of industrial financing changed: the role of the main investors was increasingly assigned to domestic rather than foreign banks.

Government reforms of the second half of the 19th century. and the beginning of the 20th century. contributed to the growth of the country's population. According to the 1897 census, the total number of inhabitants of the Russian Empire was 125.5 million people; in January 1915 it was 182 million people. Russia was the country with the highest population growth in Europe - 1.6% (Germany - 1.4%; England - 1.2; Belgium - 1.0; France - 0.12;).

In Russia, the social structure of the population was also changing. First of all, the erosion of the “old” commercial bourgeoisie - the merchants - began. At the end of the 20th century. Professional criteria for enrollment in merchant guilds were abolished. They began to enroll as merchants to gain advantages. For example, Jews enrolled as merchants of the 1st guild in order to obtain the right to reside outside the Pale of Settlement. Class prestige led to the “flight to the nobility” of merchants through receiving the rank of general for great merits (for example, donating collections to museums or the Academy of Sciences; such generals were P.I. Shchukin, A.A. Titov, AABakhrushin). At the same time, a new bourgeoisie was being formed from among the directors and board members of joint-stock enterprises and banks. This was a narrow group of people closely connected economically and politically with the state apparatus (its most famous representatives were N. Avdakov, A. Vyshegradsky, A. Putilov, L. Davydov).

The Moscow and large provincial bourgeoisie (the Ryabushinskys, Morozovs, Mamontovs, Vogau, Knops and other “Old Russian” clans) had a different character. At the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th centuries. these millionaires began to turn their family firms into joint-stock companies (share partnerships with a very narrow circle of owners), which claimed to be the spokesmen for the common interests of Russian commercial and industrial circles. Some of the “Moscow” entrepreneurs, who had merchant roots, were closely connected with the Old Believers and inherited religious beliefs, gave the capital they received from God a “godly” direction in the form of supporting art and education, clinics and hospitals.

Intensive capitalist development and the corresponding social changes in Russia occurred so quickly that they could not qualitatively change mass consciousness. This especially applies to the Russian peasantry. The capitalist elite included both entrepreneurs and shareholders or homeowners (representatives of the old nobility and bureaucracy). There were a lot of new owners and proprietary interests in Russia, but they did not yet have their own “worldview”, a disinterested and superpersonal belief in the sanctity of the property principle. The peasantry, having entered into new economic relations affected by the city, fell into confusion and spiritual division. It was not ready to meet the outside world.

The landed nobility also largely determined the political and economic face of Russia. Huge funds in the form of land ownership were concentrated in the hands of landowners (over 4 trillion, rubles in 1905). But by the beginning of the 20th century. even large landownership lost its purely noble character (in 1905, out of 27,833 large (over 500 dessiatines) estates, 18,102, or less than two-thirds, belonged to nobles). A third of large landowners were bourgeois in origin. To an even greater extent, bourgeoisification affected the average landownership (from 100 to 500 dessiatines), which was most suitable for transfer to capitalist rails. In this category, nobles owned 46% of the estates. Thus, the nobility gradually lost the privilege of monopoly ownership of land.

The process of loss of land by noble landowners proceeded at a rapid pace. Their total number was 107,242 people, of which 33,205, or 31%, owned plots the size of which did not exceed 20 dessiatinas, which made their farms similar in size to peasant farms. 22,705, or 25.8%, nobles owned from 20 to 100 acres. Only 18,102, or 17%, large landowners owned 83% of all noble landownership, and the 155 largest latifundists - 36.6%.

The bulk of the noble landowners were unable to adapt to the new conditions. Landowners' expenses, as a rule, exceeded their income. Lands were mortgaged and remortgaged, sold off. By 1915, almost 50 million dessiatines of land worth over 4 billion rubles were pledged. Since January 1, 1905, the total area of ​​noble estates in European Russia has decreased by 20%. Bankrupt landowners joined the ranks of officials and intellectuals. The noble elite was losing its economic importance.

After the abolition of serfdom, the Russian peasantry sharply increased its numbers. In rural areas of European Russia alone, the population grew by 50% from 1858 to 1897. This army replenished the cities, spread beyond the Urals, exploring new geographical spaces. In the country at the beginning of the century, there were 363 thousand 200 beggars and vagabonds, almost 14.5 thousand professional prostitutes, more than 96 thousand people were in prisons and other places of detention.

By 1917, there were up to 500 thousand officials in the country (under Nicholas I, 30 thousand officials ruled Russia). 14% of the state budget was spent on maintaining the administrative apparatus (for comparison: in England - 3%, France - 5%. Italy and Germany - 7% each). According to the Ministry of Finance, the number of officials and officers who received salaries exceeding 1 thousand rubles. per year, reached 91,204 people. The higher bureaucracy was replenished by hereditary nobles. Officials, appreciating their professionalism and great connections, were willingly hired to work in private banks and joint-stock companies.

According to the 1897 census, the percentage of literate people averaged 22.9% across the country. In cities - 45.3%, in European Russia - 48.9%, in St. Petersburg - 62.6%, in Moscow - 56.3%.

There were 3,296 scientists and writers in the country (including 284 women), people of other creative professions - 18,254 (4,716 women), technical intelligentsia - 4,010 (4 women), medical workers of various specialties - 29,636 (including 10,391 women) .

At the beginning of the 20th century. a group of the population called the “intelligentsia” is distinguished. The term “intelligentsia” was introduced by the writer P. D. Boborykin in the 60s. XIX century and was used in several senses. In a broad sense, the intelligentsia included people engaged in complex, predominantly creative and intellectual work - the “educated class.” In a narrow sense, the term was used as a political category.

Features of economic development of Russia in the post-reform period:

By the 80s of the 19th century, the industrial revolution in Russia was completed.

Compressed historical periods and high rates of development of Russian industry;

The huge role of the state in economic development;

Widespread attraction of foreign capital into the Russian economy;

Multistructure – preservation of feudal and early capitalist forms of exploitation;

Uneven economic development –...

Five industrial regions

Old – Central, Northwestern, Ural;

New – Donbass And Baku.

The predominance of agro-handicraft production throughout the rest of the country.

Development of agriculture in the post-reform period:

Preservation of feudal remnants:

Workouts;

The dominance of communal orders in the village;

Land scarcity of peasants;

The dominance of landownership;

The predominance of the extensive development path;

The development of capitalist (commodity-money) relations in the countryside means an increase in the marketability of agricultural production.

Vectors of agricultural development:

Prussian - drawing large estates into capitalist relations (central provinces);

American - Farmer (Siberia, steppe regions of the Volga region, the Caucasus and the North of Russia).

MODERNAZATION OF THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY

ActivityN. H. Bunge 1 ( 1881–1886 ) .

Protectionist policy (protection of the internal market):

Increase in customs duties;

Support for private joint-stock banks;

Taxation reform - the introduction of new taxes on real estate, trade, crafts, and monetary transactions.

Peasant question :

1881 – Liquidation of the temporarily obligated state of peasants and reduction of redemption payments;

1882 - Creation of a peasant bank for preferential lending to peasants;

1885 – Abolition of the poll tax;

Working question os.

1882 – Child Labor Restriction Act.

« We don’t have enough to eat, but we’ll take it out».

Vyshnegradsky

ActivityI. A. Vyshnegradsky 1 ( 1887–1892.) :

Continuation of the policy of protectionism :

1891 – Increase in customs tariffs;

Increasing indirect taxes and expanding taxation of commercial and industrial enterprises;

Strengthening the role of the state in regulating the economic activities of private enterprise;

Subordination of private railways to the state.

Achieved stability of the financial system .

Self-control tests

Alexander's Great ReformsIILiberator.

The introduction of the legal profession and the irremovability of judges, the creation of zemstvos took place during the reign of...

Alexandra I

Alexandra II

Alexandra III

Nicholas I

One of the results of the liberal reforms of the 60-70s. XIX century became...

abolition of class organization of society

creation of the Zemsky Sobor

creation of an all-class court

introduction of the constitution

According to the judicial reform of 1864 was entered...

Senate

advocacy

estate court

prosecutor's office

Zemstvos appeared in Russia during the reign of the emperor...

Alexandra II

Nicholas II

Alexandra I

Alexandra III

The creators of the theory of “Russian socialism” - the ideological basis of the populism movement - are considered...

P. Milyukov and A. Guchkov

A. Herzen and N. Chernyshevsky

N. Muravyov and P. Pestel

G. Plekhanov and V. Lenin

The peasant community was considered a “cell of socialism”...

Slavophiles

Marxists

Westerners

populists

Alexander II reigned...

In 1825–1855;

In 1855–1881;

In 1881–1894;

In 1818–1881

The transformation of Alexander II in the social sphere includes:

Introduction of city all-class self-government bodies

Permission to open educational institutions for zemstvos, public organizations and individuals

introduction of universal conscription

The transformation of Alexander II in the social sphere includes:

Introduction of city all-class self-government bodies

Permission to open educational institutions for zemstvos, public organizations and individuals

Slavery was abolished in Russia

introduction of universal conscription

The transformation of Alexander II in the social sphere includes:

Introduction of city all-class self-government bodies

Permission to open educational institutions for zemstvos, public organizations and individuals

Slavery was abolished in Russia

INimplementation of universal conscription

The reason for the war with Turkey during the reign of Alexander II was:

Russia's desire to conquer Turkey;

Turkey's desire to return Crimea;

Europe's desire to divide Turkey;

Russian support for the national liberation movement of the Balkan peoples against Turkey.

Whom the Turks nicknamed “Ak Pasha” (“White General”):

Skobeleva;

Milutina;

Dragomirova;

Nikolai Nikolaevich.

Alexander II survived ____ assassination attempts:

Alexander II received the nickname:

« Peacemaker";

"Bloody";

"Liberator";

"Blessed".

Alexander's counter-reformsIIIPeacemaker.

The development of factory legislation and the attack on the reforms of Alexander II were characteristic of the reign of...

Alexandra I

Paul I

Alexandra III

Nicholas I

One of the program provisions of the “Emancipation of Labor” group, created in Geneva in 1883, was ...

establishing close ties with liberals

organization of Jewish pogroms

preparation of the socialist revolution

spread of Marxist views in Russia

Alexander III received the nickname

« Peacemaker";

"Bloody";

"Liberator";

"Blessed".

Alexander III reigned...

In 1825–1855;

In 1855–1881;

In 1881–1894;

In 1845–1894

During the reign of Alexander III, Russia moved towards rapprochement:

With France;

With England;

With Germany;

With Turkey.

Socio-political and economic development of the Russian Empire at the turn of the centuryXIX– XXcenturies.

At the turn of the 19th–20th centuries, the privileged classes included:

Bourgeois;

Peasants;

Nobles;

Cossacks.

At the turn of the 19th–20th centuries, the unprivileged classes included:

Bourgeois;

Peasants;

Nobles;

Cossacks.

At the turn of the 19th–20th centuries, the semi-privileged (military) classes included:

Bourgeois;

Peasants;

Nobles;

Cossacks.

The largest class of the population of the Russian Empire at the turn of the 19th–20th centuries were:

Bourgeois;

Peasants;

Nobles;

Cossacks.

At the turn of the 19th–20th centuries, new social classes began to form in the Russian Empire:

Merchants:

Workers;

Bourgeoisie;

Philistinism.

The Cabinet (Council) of Ministers in the Russian Empire is...

The State Council in the Russian Empire is...

Body for dealing with matters requiring the personal intervention of the emperor;

executive body of the Russian Empire;

legislative body in 1810-1906 and the upper house of the legislative institution in 1906-1917;

the highest state body of church-administrative power.

The Holy Synod is...

Body for dealing with matters requiring the personal intervention of the emperor;

executive body of the Russian Empire;

legislative body in 1810-1906 and the upper house of the legislative institution in 1906-1917;

the highest state body of church-administrative power.

His Imperial Majesty's own office is...

Body for dealing with matters requiring the personal intervention of the emperor;

executive body of the Russian Empire;

legislative body in 1810-1906 and the upper house of the legislative institution in 1906-1917;

the highest state body of church-administrative power.

Give a definition that most accurately reflects the essence of the concept of “Cossacks” -

population engaged in agricultural production.

a special ethnosocial group, the military class (cavalry).

a special social group of people who have a set of rights and responsibilities enshrined in law and passed on to inheritance.

a group of people who sell their labor power.

The activities of S. Yu. Witte as Minister of Finance include:

Sale of Trans-Siberian Railway to China.

The activities of N. H. Bunge as Minister of Finance include:

Introduction of gold backing of the ruble and its free conversion;

Elimination of the temporarily obliged state of peasants and reduction of redemption payments;

Subordination of private railways to the state;

Sale of Trans-Siberian Railway to China.

The activities of I. A. Vyshnegradsky as Minister of Finance include:

Introduction of gold backing of the ruble and its free conversion;

Elimination of the temporarily obliged state of peasants and reduction of redemption payments;

Subordination of private railways to the state;

Sale of Trans-Siberian Railway to China.

In the Russian Empire, the American (farmer) path of agricultural development prevailed:

Siberia, Caucasus, Trans-Volga region.

Central provinces;

Far East;

Baltics.

The industry of the Russian Empire was most developed:

In the Caucasus;

In Siberia;

In the center of the country;

In the Far East.

1 Nikolai Khristianovich Bunge (1823–1895). Statesman, economist, academician. Was born 11(23). XI.1823 year in Kyiv. Graduated from the First Kyiv Gymnasium and the Law Faculty of Kyiv University ( 1845). Master of Public Law ( 1847). Doctor of Political Sciences ( 1850). From 1845 to 1880– teaching activities. In 1880-1881- Comrade (Deputy) Minister of Finance. WITH 6. V.1881 - Manager of the Ministry of Finance. From 1.I.1882 to 31.XII.1886- Minister of Finance. 1. I.1887–3. VI.1895 - Chairman of the Committee of Ministers and member of the State Council. From 10.XII.1892- Vice-Chairman of the Siberian Railway Committee. Died 3(15). VI.1895 year in Tsarskoe Selo.

1 Ivan Alekseevich Vyshnegradsky (1831(1832)–1895. ). Russian scientist (specialist in the field of mechanics) and statesman. Founder of the theory of automatic control, honorary member of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences ( 1888). Minister of Finance ( 1887–1892). From the clergy. Was born 20. XII.1831 (1. I.1832) years in the village of Vyshny Volochyok. Studied at the Tver Theological Seminary ( 1843-1845). Graduated from the Faculty of Physics and Mathematics of the Main Pedagogical Institute in St. Petersburg ( 1851). Master of Mathematical Sciences ( 1854). In 1860–1862 border. Since 1851- in teaching. Since 1869– private entrepreneurial activity. Died 25. III(6. IV).1895 in St. Petersburg.

Requisites

Economic policy of the tsarist government after the crisis of 1900-1903.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Russian industrial capital was in dire need of long-term loans, which was expressed in the rapid corporatization of domestic industry. After the crisis of 1900-1903. There was a massive reorganization of individual industrial enterprises into joint-stock companies, and in essence - the mobilization of free financial resources by industrial capital. This concerned, first of all, medium and small enterprises. Large industrial corporatized enterprises carried out financial reorganization through banking institutions, which were often branches of large foreign banks.

There are three stages in the movement of capital between Russia and foreign money markets. At the first stage (1904-1905), there was an outflow of capital, including foreign capital from Russia. Hundreds of millions of rubles in gold were transferred abroad. At the second stage (1906-1909), when the economic situation stabilized, foreign capital began to return to the Russian economy, but in insignificant quantities. The third stage (1909-1914) is a period of active attraction of foreign capital by the tsarist government.

The Russian government believed that without the influx of foreign capital, domestic industry would not be able to develop. This position was due to the fact that the industrial boom of the 90s. was largely provided by government orders, and as soon as this support was reduced, the entire inability of many industries to serve the domestic domestic market was revealed.

Let us also note that the initiative to attract French and Belgian capital to Russia belonged, first of all, to French banks, whose representatives (Verneuil and others) proposed to Minister of Finance V.N. Kokovtsov to form a powerful financial group to promote industrial development in Russia. It was assumed that Russian banks would share responsibility for the development of industrial enterprises with French ones. Minister of Finance V.N. Kokovtsov supported this initiative. Thus, the concentration of industry was ensured by the activities of large banks, which completely controlled the market. By 1913, more than 50% of banking transactions began to be carried out through six St. Petersburg banks, which in turn were controlled by foreign banks. For example, in 1914, 65% of the capital of the largest Russian-Asian Bank belonged to French investors.

The years of expansion (1909-1913) were characterized for the Russian financial system by a significant increase in the sources of free funds. A clear indicator of this increase was the growth of deposits on current accounts in the credit network, and in commercial banks alone their amount increased by 1913 to 3.3 billion rubles, against 1.3 billion rubles. in 1900. The number of banknotes in circulation also increased, with their high gold backing. All these sources gave an increase in the working capital of the national economy by 2-2.25 billion rubles on the money capital market in Russia. The reasons for this phenomenon were the high volumes of bread exports and a 30-40% increase in prices on the international grain market. Accordingly, the demand from agriculture for light and heavy industry products has increased.

Another important indicator of economic recovery was the growth of domestic savings in industry. Average profit percentage in 1911-1914 was equal to 13%, and the issuance of dividends accounted for an average of 6.6%, which accounted for half of the profit, and in total the amount of more than a billion rubles.

In general, for the period 1891-1914. 2330.1 million rubles of fixed capital were invested in the joint-stock industry. The actual source of this investment was not only purely industrial profits, but also the influx of foreign capital. The share of internal accumulation accounted for 1188 million rubles, or 50.9% of the total increase in fixed capital, which will correspondingly amount to 2349.7 million rubles of profits and 1063.8 million rubles. dividends. It was these huge financial reserves that foreign, predominantly French and English financial capital began to manage, effectively subjugating Russian industry through the subsidiary system of Russian banks. It should also be taken into account that approximately 50% of profits in the form of dividends were exported in the form of payments abroad. Thus, Professor S.G. Strumilin determined the export of industrial profits from Russia abroad by 1913 in the amount of 721 million rubles.

The reference is to the fact that 70% of the entire issue of securities for 1908-1912. were sold domestically and only 30% abroad, only indicates that large quantities of mortgage notes from land banks were sold on the domestic market (over 2 billion rubles, out of a total issue amount of 5.2 billion rubles). The debt obligations of the bankrupt landowner did not find holders on the European money markets; they were forced to be sold within the country with the active support of the state. If we exclude mortgage securities from the total amount of the issue, we will find that 53% of industrial and railroad securities were sold in 1908-1912. Abroad.

Having penetrated into the banking system, foreign capital began to control the huge reserves of internal accumulation in Russia. In this regard, the speech of P.P. is indicative. Ryabushinsky, the largest Russian manufacturer, spoken by him at the All-Russian Trade and Industrial Congress in Moscow (March 19, 1917). He said: “We, gentlemen, understand that when the war ends, a flow of German goods will come to us, we must prepare for this in order to resist. Allied countries (France, Belgium and others), each also has its own selfish motives. This does not mean that we should reject foreign capital, but it is necessary that foreign capital should not be victorious capital, but that our own capital should be opposed to it, for which we must create conditions under which it could arise and develop. We need a trade that would be able to export our goods to foreign markets. Our consuls, almost all foreigners, are unkind to Russian traders. All consuls should be convened in St. Petersburg, and let everyone see who is entrusted with our Russian interests abroad. In order for us to be able to economically resist foreigners, it is necessary not only to look for ways to penetrate the foreign market for our goods, but also to work to create a number of new high-quality enterprises.”

Meanwhile, Russia's international balance remained passive, and it had to increasingly export agricultural products at low prices and buy industrial products at high prices (both abroad and within the country) to maintain gold circulation. This provoked a constant outflow of gold from Russia abroad. The increase in prices was also influenced by the fact that banks, expanding credit, constantly increased the volume of money in circulation. Thus, bank credit expansion provoked, in turn, an additional outflow of gold abroad.

Changes in the fuel and energy balance of Russia as a factor in the “fuel hunger”

In the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the fuel and energy balance of Russian industry differed significantly from the industrialized countries of the world. From 1867 to 1901, the rate of increase in oil production was almost 20 times faster than the rate of coal production. At the same time, as D.I. wrote then. Mendeleev, coal served as the main fuel for the modern world.

What is the reason for such specificity of the fuel and energy balance of Russia? What pushed the Russian economy to use oil as an industrial fuel?

Firstly, Russian industry owed this to the influence of technical and economic factors. As is known, when heavy Baku oil was processed into kerosene, 70-80% went into the so-called “residues” (fuel oil), and these “residues” were increasingly used as industrial fuel, which was associated with the invention and mass production of “Nobel injectors” for the use of fuel oil in factories, factories, ships and locomotives, etc. Thus, fuel oil has turned from a waste product into a major oil commodity.

Secondly, a significant role was played by the tax policy of the Ministry of Finance, which was interested in receiving large fiscal revenues from the population who consumed kerosene, along with obtaining cheap fuel oil for its own needs, since a significant part of the fuel oil was used at that time for the needs of state-owned factories and railways . Since 1888, excise taxes have been imposed on all petroleum products. The excise tax was 40 kopecks. from a pound of kerosene and 30 kopecks. with a pound of heavy oils. Thus, for oil industrialists, the profitability of converting crude oil not so much into kerosene, but into fuel oil, becomes obvious. For example, the excise tax on kerosene sold domestically was five times higher than the cost of kerosene produced by the Nobel Brothers in 1879.

The result of this tax policy was that the growth rate of domestic demand for kerosene lagged behind the growth rate of oil production. The supply of fuel oil to Russian industry was made dependent on the expansion of kerosene exports abroad, and not on the use of kerosene within Russia. This contributed to the fact that from 1887-1888. The Russian oil industry paid increased attention to the excise-free export of kerosene abroad, entering into a fight with Standard Oil (USA). As noted by S.M. Lisichkin, the use of fuel oil as boiler fuel was convenient, first of all, for foreign companies operating in Russia.

As a result, by the end of the 19th century. In the Russian energy sector, a wasteful energy trend has emerged in the consumption of oil reserves.

However, at the end of the 19th century. and the beginning of the 20th century. under the influence of price factors, the ratio between coal production and oil production in Russia begins to change in favor of coal. This was largely due to the fact that in Russia there was a consistent decline in flowing oil production in Baku and a decrease in oil production from wells. Coal gradually began to displace oil as the main energy resource of industry.

From the beginning of the 20th century until the revolution of 1917, there was a consistent increase in energy prices. According to I. Dyakonova, the rise in oil prices occurred not only due to an increase in production costs, but also due to the monopoly pricing policy of oil companies. For example, at the Nobel Brothers company, the cost of oil production from 1893 to 1913 increased 4 times, while sales prices for oil on the Russian market during the same period increased 20 times. At the same time, Russian kerosene in 1894 was sold abroad four times cheaper than American firms sold it, and in 1912-1913. - 2 times cheaper. Thus, the monopolistic pricing factor was added to the existing objective conditions for oil shortages in Russia.

A similar situation developed with coal. As noted by V.I. Frolov, the artificial increase in coal prices was associated both with the high share of fuel oil used as fuel and with the monopolization of coal mining. As a result, when in 1907-1913. a gradual transition of railway transport to coal fuel began, and since 1908 there has been a sharp increase in coal consumption by industry - up to 55%, with oil consumption -12.1%. Fuel shortages, primarily coal, began to gradually increase in Russia.

Monopolization of industry as one of the factors for rising prices

The combination in the Russian economy of the early twentieth century. The monopolistic organization of production with protective tariffs allowed syndicates to maintain artificially high prices in the domestic market while increasing exports to foreign markets, even at prices below cost. High prices on domestic markets could compensate for losses in exports. The profitability of this type of activity was also due to the fact that state-owned or state-regulated railroads set lower tariffs for transporting goods abroad than within the country.

Crisis of 1900-1903 stimulated the process of monopolization of domestic industry. One of the reasons for the crisis was trade intermediation, which was very expensive for Russian industry. Trading profits were higher than production profits. Thus, dividends of joint-stock engineering and mechanical enterprises in 1906-1908 amounted to 2-2.7%, and dividends of trading enterprises according to the same reports amounted to 6-7.9%. Thus, the formation of syndicates provided a way for industry to free itself from high intermediary trading costs.

The tsarist government considered it expedient to carry out and reorganize weak and poorly organized enterprises and restore the fixed capital of large enterprises; reducing the cost of intermediary and trading costs through syndication and monopoly regulation of the sale of industrial products.

In addition, since 1901, due to a reduction in the volume of government orders, the influx of foreign capital stopped, and then the outflow of foreign financial investments began. However, foreigners could not take back already imported means of production, so they also sought to syndicate Russian industry. Thus, in their activities, the oil monopolies “Nobel Brothers” and “Mazut” (Rothschilds), which concentrated 70% of all kerosene production, adhered to the tactics of reducing oil production in order to maintain prices for oil and oil products at the price level of 1905. The coal industry began to successfully use the underproduction of fuel oil. In 1904, the Produgol syndicate was organized, the council of which was located in Paris. The management of Produgol reported to the Paris committee on its activities on a monthly basis, and the Paris committee reviewed Produgl's estimates and set prices.

The main task of Produgol was to establish a relationship between production and sales in which prices remained at a high level. On the other hand, Produgol began to purchase coke abroad in order to prevent the possibility of direct contacts between Russian buyers and foreign producers. Produgol's pricing policy on the domestic market immediately affected coal prices: until 1905, the price of coal did not exceed 6.5 kopecks. for the lowest grade and 7.5 kopecks. for the highest grade, then already in 1907, following a telegram from the board in Paris, Produgol raised prices to 10 kopecks per pood. During the period of industrial boom in 1909-1914. Produgol further raised coal prices, sharply reducing coal production at its enterprises. In 1912, with a base price of 8.6 kopecks. per pound, and in August 1914 Produgol already announced 14 kopecks. per pood, the selling price of “Produgol” was 11-12 kopecks.

All attempts by the Ministry of Railways to reduce the price failed, since many large officials in the economic committee of the Ministry of Railways were on the payroll of Produgol. As a result of this policy, the national economy began to experience a huge shortage of fuel and the paralyzing influence of excessively high prices.

The management of the Prodamet metallurgical syndicate was in the hands of French financial circles, and their representative P. Daren remained the chairman of Prodamet throughout its existence. The factories syndicated by Prodamet produced 74% of all imperial iron smelting, and without the Urals - up to 90%. In its activities, “Prodamet” strongly encouraged a reduction in production and sought to keep the market for metal products in a tense state.

In 1902, the price of cast iron was 40-41 kopecks. per pood, and duties on cast iron according to the 1891 tariff were set at 45-52.5 kopecks. from the pood. Consequently, the high price of cast iron in the domestic market was supported by high customs duties. In 1911-1912 production costs at the Prodamet factories did not exceed 40-45 kopecks, and at the Yuzovsky plant - 31-32 kopecks, while the price in 1912 rose to 66 kopecks per pood. At the same time, Prodamet obtained from the government the establishment of special export tariffs on iron products. For example, for cast iron the export tariff was reduced by half compared to the general one. As a result of this measure, Prodamet exported 74 thousand tons of cast iron and 246 thousand tons of iron and steel abroad in 1907 alone. Thus, the basis of Prodamet’s policy was the desire to limit metal production in Russia, as a means of increasing prices on the domestic market, and, due to this, selling metal at dumping prices abroad.

Prodamet's usual tactic was to seize all major government orders and private orders without guaranteeing the possibility and urgency of execution. Failure to fulfill orders on time has become a chronic phenomenon from which railroads, engineering and military factories, etc. have suffered. When the metal famine broke out in 1911, Prodamet kept the level of rail production 20% below 1904 (13.3 million poods versus 16.6 million poods in 1904), so, in order to limit the production of rails Prodamet closed two rail rolling plants (Strakhovitsky and Nikopol-Mariupol), as a result of which rail prices increased by more than 40%. And when in 1910-1912. metal famine forced the government to pay attention to the activities of monopolies and in 1912, Minister of Trade Timashev raised the issue of lowering import duties on cast iron, iron, and coal, then “Prodamet” and “Produgol” protested. Essentially, Prodamet’s policy was supported by the government, to which a special committee established by the government transferred government orders for rolling stock, rails, clamps, etc.

As a result, after 1905, most industries in Russia and a significant part of transport became completely dependent on these syndicates, which left the entire domestic market facing chronic underproduction, accompanied by a continuous increase in prices for coal, metal, and petroleum products, and ultimately brought the country to a fuel economy. and metal hunger.

And although for a whole decade (1903-1912) senatorial audits were systematically carried out, revealing a picture of systematic abuses of syndicates and showing that rising prices for fuel and metal affected the interests of the treasury, only in 1912 the Council of Ministers recognized that the cause of the fuel famine - this is a reduction in coal and oil production in order to increase prices. As a way out of the crisis, it was proposed to promote the creation of an organization of consumers fighting against the syndicates and organize state-owned coal and oil production. Foreign capital and Russian syndicate participants responded to this by the fact that in April-May 1912 the exchanges noted the depressed state of Russian securities, motivated by the persecution of Produgol and the restriction of joint-stock companies. This demarche was reinforced by diplomatic pressure from Paris, which prompted the government to curtail the investigation, because it threatened to expose corruption in the state apparatus.

Speaking in the State Duma on June 8, 1913, A.I. Konovalov drew attention to the fact that due to the actions of the syndicates, Russia was forced to import products such as coal, metal and others that could be produced in Russia itself in sufficient quantities. This import increased from year to year, and accordingly, millions of Russian gold rubles went abroad. Since 1912, this phenomenon has become chronic, and only thanks to the import of English and German coal for the Northern and Central regions, it became possible, although not fully, to meet the fuel needs of Russia in 1913-1914.

Thus, on the eve of the war, one of the main direct factors of the economic collapse of Russia was revealed - fuel and metal hunger. Another important factor in the economic collapse was the general rise in prices, provoked by the inevitable rise in energy prices under these conditions.

The main reasons for the economic collapse of Russia during the First World War

With the outbreak of war in 1914, drilling operations and oil exports were reduced, and with the capture of the Polish provinces, Russia lost about 500 million pounds of coal from the Dombrovsky basin. The only major source remained the Donetsk basin. The situation in the coal industry was also aggravated by the fact that the loss of workers in the Donbass was greater than in the country as a whole (about 27%). The State Bank was forced to open loans for coal and coke. Coal production in the Donbass has decreased since January 1915 compared to January 1914 from 912.6 million poods to 790.3 million poods.

In turn, the difficult situation in railway transport prevented the export of Donetsk coal from the fields, and therefore the share of hard coal in the fuel balance systematically decreased. Oil production during the war was on average higher than in 1913, but this could not alleviate the fuel crisis, due to the impossibility of ensuring uninterrupted supplies of petroleum products to consumers.

The fuel shortage affected the work of the iron and steel industry. Due to the lack of fuel and iron ore, the 17th domain was extinguished in the Donbass at the beginning of 1916. Iron smelting decreased from 283 million poods in 1913 to 231.9 million poods in 1916. Steel production fell even more - from 300.2 million poods to 205.4 million poods. To cover the acute shortage of ferrous metals, steel imports were sharply increased - up to 14.7 million poods in 1916, i.e. 7 times more than in 1913. At the same time, orders were placed abroad for rolled metal products and other materials. Also, to meet the needs of the military industry, all sectors of the national economy not related to the implementation of military orders were deprived of metal. 80% of Russian factories were transferred to military production.

However, all these measures could not ensure the operation of the military industry in the required volumes. With a mobilization stock of 4 million rifles, 10 million were required. The rate of shell consumption established by the General Staff for the entire war was fired by the batteries of the Southwestern Front within 16 days. As for the strategic reserves of raw materials (saltpeter, non-ferrous metals, coal, etc.), in the first year of the war the huge needs for them were satisfied mainly by placing orders abroad. And only in 1915, by special order of the government, under the leadership of Academician Ipatiev, it was possible to create an industry for the production of explosives on the basis of the Okhtensky and Samara plants.

In the metallurgical industry, pig iron production by 1917 had fallen to 190.5 million pounds against 282.9 million pounds in 1913. Finished iron and steel were produced in 1917, 155.5 million pounds versus 246.5 million. poods in 1913. The coal industry reduced its production in 1917 to 1.74 billion rubles. against 2.2 billion rubles. in 1913. Oil production fell in 1917 to 422 million poods instead of 563 million poods in 1913.

All this undermined the economic basis for waging war. It should also be noted that in the insufficient supply of industry with metals and fuel, not only the reduction in production played a significant role, but also the sabotage of entrepreneurs - their concealment of reserves, reluctance to sell goods at fixed prices. Thus, the largest oil companies provided the government with deliberately false figures about the amount of oil available. For example, Nobel announced 82 million poods for export, having the opportunity to export 150 million poods. Coal miners also hid and did not export their reserves, demanding higher prices.

The devastation of railway transport was explained by a lack of fuel, but, in turn, the shortage of fuel was caused by the shortage of wagons. Ministry of Railways orders for rails were not systematically fulfilled. It turned out to be a vicious circle.

In view of the catastrophic situation with the production of railway equipment at Russian factories, the government already at the beginning of 1915 decided to transfer a large order abroad for gold. The supply of carriages and steam locomotives began only in 1917, when transport in Russia was already in a catastrophic state. Since there was no general state transportation plan, a huge amount of cargo was transported chaotically, for bribes, while other cargo lay at stations, rotting and plundered. Already at the beginning of 1916, cargo deposits on the railways reached 150 thousand cars.

To cover military expenses and the budget deficit during the war years up to and including September 1917, the tsarist government acquired foreign loans in the amount of 8.5 billion rubles. The loans were used both for the purchase of weapons, raw materials and supplies, and for the payment of interest on previous government loans, thereby increasing Russia’s dependence on its allies.

The criticality of the current situation was complemented by the food crisis, largely provoked by the transition to paper money at the beginning of the war. The exceptionally strong growth in emissions entailed, following the loss of gold currency, a decrease in the purchasing power of money and increased prices. The current situation forced the peasantry to hold back food products in increasing quantities. As a result, prices for agricultural products rose as quickly as for industrial goods.

In August 1915, a Special Conference on Food was established. Food procurement for the population was carried out by the government and local authorities. And from December 1916, the free grain market was liquidated and a system of forced grain allocation was introduced, which, however, also did not give the desired results. In 1916, the rate of distribution of bread to workers decreased by 50%. Since July 1917, a food rationing system was introduced in Petrograd.

The general characteristics of the economic situation of the Russian Empire are most clearly presented in the note by M.V. Rodzianko to Nicholas II in February 1917. All of Russia, as Rodzianko wrote, experienced an acute shortage of fuel - oil, coal, peat, firewood. Many plants and factories stopped. A partial shutdown of military factories was threatened. In Petrograd alone, 73 enterprises shut down. The pre-war fuel crisis caused a metallurgical crisis, which limited the supply of metal for defense needs. In transport, there was a catastrophic drop in traffic due to a lack of fuel. And the disruption of transport, the chairman of the government pointed out, is a paralysis of the entire nervous system of the country.

These are the main roots of the economic crisis in Russia, which predetermined the collapse of the economy of the Russian Empire even before the revolutionary events of 1917-1918.

Note Administration website: Obviously, we are talking about the famous one addressed to Nicholas II in February 1917.