“Teplovskie Heights” is a monument in honor of the defenders of the Motherland who turned the tide of World War II. The key to victory is buried under the dives Northern face of the Kursk Bulge

This was the second Stalingrad... This is what veterans of the Great Patriotic War and historians spoke about the Battle of Kursk.

What is seventy years? For space it’s just a moment, but for a person it’s a whole life, and what’s more, an era. Today, in these places, rye is growing peacefully, daisies and cornflowers are blooming, wild strawberries, or, in simple terms, berry blossoms are blooming, larks are pouring in - beauty! I can’t believe at all that some seven decades ago everything here was dug up by trenches, mangled by exploding shells and bombs, covered with the bodies of the dead and broken abandoned equipment. Ponyrovskaya land - the Northern face of the Kursk Bulge - at what a difficult price it went to the soldiers of the Red Army! After all, for every piece of it, small village, station, hill, entire divisions died. To clearly understand this, you need to visit Ponyry. That’s what we did last week as part of the press tour “With a watering can and a notepad,” organized by the Information and Press Committee of the Kursk Region.

I've waited my time

The village of Ponyri greeted us with bustle, which is not surprising, because there are only a few days left before the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the Battle of Kursk, which will take place on July 19. The craftsmen were still putting in order the memorial signs - to the Heroes-sappers, artillerymen on the Teplovsky Heights and others. The village streets were improved. But the main work took place on the central Ponyri square, where a memorial dedicated to the memory of the heroes of the Northern face of the Kursk Bulge is being erected. The monument will be installed in the form of a colonnade with arched ceilings. On each of the columns there are granite tables with the numbers of military units and fronts - participants in the Battle of Kursk and the names of the fallen heroes.

As it turned out, this memorial sign is one of the parts of the whole complex that will be founded on Ponyrovskaya land. Its second part will be installed in the year of the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the Victory near the village of Olkhovatka - it will be an observation deck at an altitude of 274.5.

By the way, funds for the memorial complex, which is 77 million rubles, were allocated from the federal and regional budgets.

Along with the feeling of pride and joy for the Ponyrovsk land, the question arose - why was the Southern front of the Kursk Bulge - Prokhorovka so popular for so long and why the Northern front, where no less, and, as history has proven, even more fierce battles took place, so stayed in the shadows for a long time?!

There are several versions. One of them is associated with Konstantin Rokossovsky, the commander of the Central Front and who led the actions of the troops of this front in the great defensive and then counter-offensive battle on the Kursk Bulge. It is no longer a secret that the commander was arrested before the start of the Great Patriotic War and imprisoned in the famous “Crosses”, from which he was released in the spring of 1940. We realized how far-sighted and smart Konstantin Konstantinovich was when we visited the branch of the Kursk Museum of Local Lore in Ponyry, dedicated to the Battle of Kursk.

From intelligence reports it was clear that in the summer of 1943 the Germans were planning a large offensive in the Kursk area. The commanders of some fronts proposed building on the successes of Stalingrad and launching a large-scale offensive, but Konstantin Rokossovsky had a different opinion. He believed that an offensive required double or triple superiority of forces, which the Soviet troops did not have in this direction. To stop the enemy, the commander proposed going on the defensive, literally hiding personnel and military equipment in the ground.

Preparations for the great battle, the most terrible battles of which took place on Ponyrovskaya land from July 5 to July 17, 1943, were very serious on both sides.

In the Red Army, every soldier not only knew the vulnerable points of German tanks, he was also taught not to be afraid of these machines. As for the artillerymen, each crew was interchangeable, this was very useful during the battles.

The Germans did not show the direction of the main attack for a long time, - said Olga Kushner, senior researcher at the Ponyrovsky Museum, - it finally became clear that this was the village of Olkhovatka. The locality was chosen for three reasons. Firstly, the shortest route to Kursk through the city of Fatezh ran through Olkhovatka. Secondly, to the west of this village stretches a ridge of heights (they are known as Teplovsky), and this is a huge advantage for all branches of the military. Thirdly, between the villages of Podsoborovka, Olkhovatka and Teply there was a huge field, which was very convenient for conducting a tank battle. When Konstantin Rokossovsky realized this, he did everything possible to prevent the Germans’ plans from coming true. On July 6, the commander ordered the left wing of the 13th Army to launch a counterattack and forced the enemy to redirect his forces to the village of Ponyri. The losses were colossal, but Olkhovatka and the famous Teplovsky Heights remained impregnable.

There is also a legend that after the Battle of Kursk, the head of Krestov sent a telegram of congratulations to Rokossovsky, and the commander even seemed to answer him that he was glad to try. Despite all his merits, Konstantin Konstantinovich still remained “in disgrace” after the war.

A confirmed fact is also the story that after the battle in the village of Goreloye, where Soviet troops knocked out 21 Ferdinands, with the permission of Konstantin Rokossovsky, a panorama of the battlefield was photographed and published in newspapers with a caption that this place was filmed near Prokhorovka. Although it will later become known that there were no “Ferdinands” at all on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge.

The category of unconfirmed facts also includes the version that in the nineties, our famous fellow countryman Vyacheslav Klykov proposed to the regional authorities to build a belfry on Ponyrovskaya land, to which he received no response. But the sculptor was supported in Prokhorovka - on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge, and she now flaunts there.

Alas, whether it was or not no longer matters. The main thing is that the Northern Front still waited for its happy hour, which would not have happened without the participation of Governor Alexander Mikhailov.

Here a Russian man stood...

Listening to the guide’s story, we became more and more imbued with the idea that we had found ourselves in a truly unique place, and it couldn’t have been otherwise! Here, not just divisions and brigades - almost every fighter could be awarded the high title of Hero.

A fairly impressive number of tanks took part in the Battle of Kursk. Among the combat units that entered the fight against them was the 1st Guards Special Purpose Engineer Brigade under the command of Mikhail Ioffe. It was a mobile barrage detachment, consisting of fighters hardened in the Battle of Stalingrad. How did they act? When a column of tanks separated, they crawled as close to them as possible and placed a charge under the caterpillar. It seems that everything is simple, but it was necessary to overcome the fear of such a colossus as a tank, in addition, the weight of each mine was equal to 25 kilograms, and the combat engineer carried two on his back. There was only one task - to stop the practically “indestructible” car at all costs. On the Kursk Bulge, more than one soldier threw himself with such mines under the tracks of a tank and carried out the order at the cost of his life. After the Battle of Kursk, this brigade was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War for its exploits.

No less impressive was the history of Captain Georgy Igishev’s battery, which was part of the 3rd Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade. It took up defensive positions in the area of ​​the village of Samodurovka, Ponyrovsky district, and literally destroyed 19 enemy tanks in three days!

On July 8, when the crew died, only gunner Andrei Puzikov remained alive. The gun's sight was knocked down and one of the wheels was lost. But this did not frighten the fighter - he substituted a box of shells instead of a wheel and continued to load, aim “by eye” and shoot at enemy tanks.

It was believed that all the Igishevites died; their names were even carved on the famous monument to artillerymen, built immediately after the Battle of Kursk - in November 1943. But what was the surprise of the Ponyrovites when in 1995 Andrei Puzikov himself came to the village as part of the Lipetsk delegation.

The veteran stood silently for a long time at the monument, looking at gun No. 2242, placed on a pedestal, and then said: “The carriage is the same, but the wheel has been replaced.”

And how can we not say about the first guards battalion, which was part of the 9th regiment of the 4th airborne division under the command of guard captain Alexander Zhukov, who died in full force on July 10, 1943 in Ponyri. It so happened that the Germans surrounded him with a tight ring. The paratroopers had only one choice - to fight until the last bullet, which is what they did. The division destroyed a German artillery battery, capturing its guns, and directed them against enemy vehicles, knocking out seven tanks, almost as many armored personnel carriers, and killing about 700 German soldiers and officers.

The paratroopers also left an inscription written in their own blood: “We are dying, but we are not giving up. Farewell.” Not a single person from this battalion surrendered.

When you think about all this, you understand how true the words from Evgeniy Dolmatovsky’s poem “Ponyri” are, by the way, carved on the monument to Heroic Sappers:

"There were no mountains or rocks here,

There were no ditches or rivers here,

Here a Russian man stood..."

But there wasn’t enough memory...

I would like to say separately about memorial signs. There are 28 mass graves on the territory of the Ponyrovsky district. Those located near the village are in good condition, which cannot be said about distant mass graves. This is all due to one of the laws, according to which monuments and burials were transferred to the balance of municipalities. Alas, some villages are so poor that they don’t even have money for a can of paint, so it turns out that almost no one takes care of the graves.

We encountered an equally sad sight at the monument to Heroic Sappers. The fact is that the Eternal Flame does not work near it. The reason is simple - there are no gas cylinders to “feed” it.

However, one of the reports of the commanding subjects of the Ponyrovsky district stated that it was 100 percent gasified. But the treasured fuel was not enough for memory...

And I reached the governor

At the same time, there are more positive examples in Ponyry. We were sincerely struck by the story of nine-year-old Davitkhan Belalov. The boy’s family moved to Ponyrovskaya land even before his birth and fell in love with this place to the depths of their souls.

The boy was interested in the fate of the Ponyrovites who received the title of Heroes of the Soviet Union. Among them is Vasily Gorbachev, a native of 2 Ponyri.

Davithan was amazed that no one knew about this Hero in his native village! A nine-year-old boy, using social networks, found the Hero’s relatives - a son who lives in Yakutia, and a niece. He learned that Vasily Semenovich was very ill and in the last years of his life, being in madness, which was the result of a front-line shell shock, he left home and went missing.

Davitkhan was so touched by this story that he wrote a letter to Governor Alexander Mikhailov with a request to install a memorial plaque to the Hero in his native village and, perhaps, name a street and school in his honor.

“We have a Veselaya street in Ponyri,” the boy wrote, “and what kind of fun can we talk about on a land that does not remember or know about its fellow countrymen heroes!

And the boy has already achieved that a memorial plaque appeared in his native village in honor of Vasily Gorbachev, Hero of the Soviet Union.

Drops of blood on Teplovsky Heights

The last point of the press tour was height 268.9 - one of the ridges located near the villages of Teploye, Samodurovka and Olkhovatka, on which residents of the neighboring Fatezhsky district erected a worship cross. The high hill offers a stunning view, and it is all overgrown with meadow strawberries. One of the veterans who visited this place, seeing the raging berry patch, began to cry and said: “These are drops of soldier’s blood, shed for every piece of Ponyrovskaya land.”

Nadezhda Glazkova

There is between Kursk and Orel
There is one train station and one.
In the distant past
There was silence here.

And July finally arrived
And the fifth at dawn
The thunder of shells and the squeals of bullets

And the tanks rushed at us.

But still no one ran,
The order of the mouths did not waver.
And every dead one lay here

Face the enemy, face forward.

There were guns on the hills
Almost at the Ponyri.
Remained in their places

Battery calculations.

Evgeny Dolmatovsky.

During great wars, it often happens that some previously unremarkable place becomes central to the fate of the world and the course of history. This is what the small Ponyri railway station would look like during the Battle of Kursk. Today this station has been forgotten, but in 1943 the whole world knew about it.

After successful battles near Moscow and Stalingrad, Soviet troops made a breakthrough in the Kursk direction. A gigantic protrusion with a length of 550 km was formed, which later received the name Kursk Bulge.

The German army group “Center” was opposed by the central front under the command of Rokossovsky. In the path of the Army “South” stood the Voronezh front under the command of Vatutin. The Germans, holding the occupied territories, were preparing the decisive Operation Citadel. Its essence was a simultaneous attack from the north and south, gaining the opportunity to unite in Kursk, forming a giant cauldron, striving to defeat our troops and move on Moscow. Our goal was to prevent a breakthrough at all costs and to correctly calculate the likelihood of a main attack by the German armies.

Spring 1943. There was a strategic pause in the Kursk direction - 100 days of silence. Sovinformburo reports invariably contained the phrase: “Nothing significant happened at the front.” Intelligence worked carefully, our troops were preparing, the Germans were preparing. The success of the future operation in these days was decided by providing the front with ammunition, equipment and new reinforcements. The main burden in this difficult task fell on the shoulders of the railway workers. 100 days of silence for them were 100 days of fierce battle. On June 2, 1943, the most powerful raid of fascist aviation was carried out on the Kursk railway junction. It lasted without a break for exactly 22 hours. 453 aircraft dropped 2,600 bombs on the Kursk station, practically destroying it. Perhaps it was easier at the front than here in the rear. And people worked, restored locomotives, did not leave the depot for weeks to ensure military cargo transportation.

On July 5, 1943, one of the most important battles of the Great Patriotic War began on the northern front - the Battle of Kursk. Rokossovsky accurately calculated the direction of the main attack. He realized that the Germans would launch an offensive in the area of ​​the Ponyri station through the Teplovsky heights. This was the shortest route to Kursk. The commander of the central front took a great risk by removing artillery from other sectors of the front. 92 barrels per kilometer of defense - such a density of artillery was not seen in any defensive operation in the entire history of the Great Patriotic War. And if at Prokhorovka there was the greatest tank battle, where iron fought with iron, then here, in Ponyry, approximately the same number of tanks were moving towards Kursk, and these tanks were stopped by PEOPLE. The enemy was strong: 22 divisions, up to 1,200 tanks and assault guns, a total of 460 thousand soldiers. It was a brutal battle. “Both sides seem to have an inkling of the significance that history will assign to it in the future,” writes Paul Carrel in Scorched Earth. Only purebred Germans took part in the Battle of Kursk; they did not trust anything to others. They didn't have 17 year olds. 20-22 years old - these were experienced and trained personnel officers. Fierce fighting continued near Ponyri on July 6 and 7. On the night of July 11, the bloodless enemy made a last attempt to push back our troops and was able to advance 12 kilometers in 5 days of fighting. But this time the Nazi offensive floundered. One of the German generals later said that the key to our victory was buried forever under Ponyri. On July 12, when there was a fierce battle near Prokhorovka on the southern front, where the enemy advanced 35 kilometers, on the northern front the front line would return to its positions, and on July 15, Rokossovsky’s army would go on the offensive towards Oryol.

The whole world knows about the tank battle near Prokhorovka - the largest in the history of the war. But few people wondered how the Soviet troops managed to quickly transfer such a mass of tanks to Kursk. From March to August, only 1,410 trains with military equipment were delivered to the Kursk Bulge. This is seven times more than near Moscow in 1941. The tanks went straight from the platforms into battle.

The Battle of Kursk ended with the complete defeat of the enemy, access to the Dnieper and the capture of Kharkov. The first train arrived there already on the 5th day after the liberation of the city. The main task now, having secured the offensive, is not to lag behind the advancing units. After all, when the Germans left, they left behind a scorched desert. Behind the locomotive, a heavy hook was hooked onto one of the sleepers; it goes and tears all the sleepers in half. That's it, the path is disconnected, you can't go along the path. The track destroyer is coming, tearing the sleepers. A joint, a link is undermined. The rails at that time were 12.5 meters long. At each junction and in the middle of the junction, after 6 meters, a stick of dynamite was placed, it was blown up and the rails were all out of order. So there are no sleepers and no rails. All this created a general background when it was almost impossible to work. But everything was done.

Victory was in the making. The commander of the central front, Army General Rokossovsky, wrote: “The railway workers of the Kursk junction showed exceptional heroism, restoring the destruction caused by enemy bombs. Remember, railway worker! The Russian soldier will pass everywhere if every 20 minutes we ensure the delivery of 30 wagons with troops, ammunition, weapons and food to the front. One hundred thousand Red Army soldiers will go where no deer can go.” Our railway workers did not leave a single locomotive, not a single carriage, or a single switch to the occupiers. Everything that could not be evacuated was exploded and destroyed. It was very scary to drive trains on this section due to constant aerial bombing. Railway workers are very modest, simple hard-working soldiers of the Great Patriotic War. Without them there would have been no victory, not only at Stalingrad, not only at the Kursk Bulge, there would not have been this victory at all.

Every old soldier has a secret dream of once again visiting those places where the war took him. What do they want to see, what else to remember, what to experience? They know that no newsreel in the world contains the footage that their memory preserves. No one will ever be able to measure their pain. No one but them will smell gunpowder, sweat, dry dust and warm blood. And that's why they come back.

Go forward, fight, burn,
Someday after the war

Return to your native Ponyri,
Where the victorious path began.

Thundered in the valleys and forests
Fights from dawn to dawn.
Orel and Kursk, like on scales,
And in the middle - Ponyri.

Evgeny Dolmatovsky.

Based on the films “Trains that won the war” (written and directed by Valery Shatin) and “Kursk Bulge. Iron Frontier" (author and director Daria Romanova).

Losses Defensive phase:

Participants: Central Front, Voronezh Front, Steppe Front (not all)
Irrevocable - 70 330
Sanitary - 107 517
Operation Kutuzov: Participants: Western Front (left wing), Bryansk Front, Central Front
Irrevocable - 112 529
Sanitary - 317 361
Operation "Rumyantsev": Participants: Voronezh Front, Steppe Front
Irrevocable - 71 611
Sanitary - 183 955
General in the battle for the Kursk ledge:
Irrevocable - 189 652
Sanitary - 406 743
In the Battle of Kursk in general
~ 254 470 killed, captured, missing
608 833 wounded, sick
153 thousand small arms units
6064 tanks and self-propelled guns
5245 guns and mortars
1626 combat aircraft

According to German sources 103 600 killed and missing on the entire Eastern Front. 433 933 wounded. According to Soviet sources 500 thousand total losses on the Kursk ledge.

1000 tanks according to German data, 1500 - according to Soviet data
less 1696 airplanes

The Great Patriotic War
Invasion of the USSR Karelia Arctic Leningrad Rostov Moscow Sevastopol Barvenkovo-Lozovaya Kharkiv Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad Rzhev Stalingrad Caucasus Velikie Luki Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh Voronezh-Kastornoye Kursk Smolensk Donbass Dnieper Right Bank Ukraine Leningrad-Novgorod Crimea (1944) Belarus Lviv-Sandomir Iasi-Chisinau Eastern Carpathians Baltics Courland Romania Bulgaria Debrecen Belgrade Budapest Poland (1944) Western Carpathians East Prussia Lower Silesia Eastern Pomerania Upper Silesia Vein Berlin Prague

The Soviet command decided to conduct a defensive battle, exhaust the enemy troops and defeat them, launching counterattacks on the attackers at a critical moment. For this purpose, a deeply layered defense was created on both sides of the Kursk salient. A total of 8 defensive lines were created. The average mining density in the direction of expected enemy attacks was 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines for every kilometer of the front.

In the assessment of the forces of the parties in the sources, there are strong discrepancies associated with different definitions of the scale of the battle by different historians, as well as differences in the methods of recording and classifying military equipment. When assessing the forces of the Red Army, the main discrepancy is related to the inclusion or exclusion of the reserve - the Steppe Front (about 500 thousand personnel and 1,500 tanks) from the calculations. The following table contains some estimates:

Estimates of the forces of the parties before the Battle of Kursk according to various sources
Source Personnel (thousands) Tanks and (sometimes) self-propelled guns Guns and (sometimes) mortars Aircraft
USSR Germany USSR Germany USSR Germany USSR Germany
RF Ministry of Defense 1336 over 900 3444 2733 19100 about 10000 2172
2900 (including
Po-2 and long range)
2050
Krivosheev 2001 1272
Glanz, House 1910 780 5040 2696 or 2928
Müller-Gill. 2540 or 2758
Zett., Frankson 1910 777 5128
+2688 “reserve rates”
total more than 8000
2451 31415 7417 3549 1830
KOSAVE 1337 900 3306 2700 20220 10000 2650 2500

The role of intelligence

However, it should be noted that back on April 8, 1943, G.K. Zhukov, relying on data from intelligence agencies of the Kursk fronts, very accurately predicted the strength and direction of German attacks on the Kursk Bulge:

...I believe that the enemy will launch the main offensive operations against these three fronts, so that, having defeated our troops in this direction, he will gain freedom of maneuver to bypass Moscow in the shortest direction.
2. Apparently, at the first stage, the enemy, having gathered the maximum of his forces, including up to 13-15 tank divisions, with the support of a large number of aircraft, will strike with his Oryol-Krom grouping bypassing Kursk from the northeast and by the Belgorod-Kharkov grouping bypassing Kursk from the southeast.

Thus, although the exact text of the “Citadel” fell on Stalin’s desk three days before Hitler signed it, four days before that the German plan became obvious to the highest Soviet military command.

Kursk defensive operation

The German offensive began on the morning of July 5, 1943. Since the Soviet command knew exactly the start time of the operation, at 3 a.m. (the German army fought on Berlin time - translated to Moscow 5 a.m.), 30-40 minutes before the start of the operation, artillery and aviation counter-preparation was carried out.

Before the start of the ground operation, at 6 a.m. our time, the Germans also launched a bomb and artillery strike on the Soviet defensive lines. The tanks that went on the offensive immediately encountered serious resistance. The main blow on the northern front was delivered in the direction of Olkhovatka. Having failed to achieve success, the Germans moved their attack in the direction of Ponyri, but even here they were unable to break through the Soviet defense. The Wehrmacht was able to advance only 10-12 km, after which from July 10, having lost up to two-thirds of its tanks, the 9th German Army went on the defensive. On the southern front, the main German attacks were directed towards the areas of Korocha and Oboyan.

July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkasy.

To complete the assigned task, units of the 48th Tank Corps on the first day of the offensive (Day “X”) needed to break into the defenses of the 6th Guards. A (Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov) at the junction of the 71st Guards Rifle Division (Colonel I.P. Sivakov) and 67th Guards Rifle Division (Colonel A.I. Baksov), capture the large village of Cherkasskoe and make a breakthrough with armored units in direction to the village of Yakovlevo. The offensive plan of the 48th Tank Corps determined that the village of Cherkasskoe was to be captured by 10:00 on July 5. And already on July 6, units of the 48th Tank Army. were supposed to reach the city of Oboyan.

However, as a result of the actions of Soviet units and formations, their courage and fortitude, as well as their advance preparation of defensive lines, the Wehrmacht’s plans in this direction were “significantly adjusted” - 48 Tank Tank did not reach Oboyan at all.

The factors that determined the unacceptably slow pace of advance of the 48th Tank Corps on the first day of the offensive were the good engineering preparation of the area by Soviet units (from anti-tank ditches almost throughout the entire defense to radio-controlled minefields), the fire of divisional artillery, guards mortars and the actions of attack aircraft against those accumulated in front of engineering barriers to enemy tanks, competent placement of anti-tank strong points (No. 6 south of Korovin in the 71st Guards Rifle Division, No. 7 southwest of Cherkassky and No. 8 southeast of Cherkassky in the 67th Guards Rifle Division), rapid reorganization of the battle formations of the 196th Guards Battalions .sp (Colonel V.I. Bazhanov) in the direction of the enemy’s main attack south of Cherkassy, ​​timely maneuver by the divisional (245 detachment, 1440 gap) and army (493 iptap, as well as the 27th brigade of Colonel N.D. Chevola) anti-tank reserve, relatively successful counterattacks on the flank of the wedged units of the 3rd TD and 11th TD with the involvement of forces of 245 detachment (Lieutenant Colonel M.K. Akopov, 39 tanks) and 1440 sap (Lieutenant Colonel Shapshinsky, 8 SU-76 and 12 SU-122), as well as not completely suppressed resistance of the remnants of the military outpost in the southern part of the village of Butovo (3 baht. 199th Guards Regiment, Captain V.L. Vakhidov) and in the area of ​​workers’ barracks southwest of the village. Korovino, which were the starting positions for the offensive of the 48th Tank Corps (the capture of these starting positions was planned to be carried out by specially allocated forces of the 11th Tank Division and 332nd Infantry Division by the end of the day on July 4, that is, on the day of “X-1”, but the resistance of the combat outpost was never completely suppressed by dawn on July 5th). All of the above factors influenced both the speed of concentration of units in their initial positions before the main attack, and their progress during the offensive itself.

A machine gun crew fires at advancing German units

Also, the pace of the corps' advance was affected by the German command's shortcomings in planning the operation and poorly developed interaction between tank and infantry units. In particular, the “Greater Germany” division (W. Heyerlein, 129 tanks (of which 15 Pz.VI tanks), 73 self-propelled guns) and the 10 armored brigade attached to it (K. Decker, 192 combat and 8 Pz.V command tanks) in the current conditions The battle turned out to be clumsy and unbalanced formations. As a result, throughout the first half of the day, the bulk of the tanks were crowded in narrow “corridors” in front of engineering barriers (it was especially difficult to overcome the swampy anti-tank ditch south of Cherkasy), and came under a combined attack from Soviet aviation (2nd VA) and artillery from PTOP No. 6 and No. 7, 138 Guards Ap (Lieutenant Colonel M. I. Kirdyanov) and two regiments of the 33 detachment (Colonel Stein), suffered losses (especially among officers), and was unable to deploy in accordance with the offensive schedule on tank-accessible terrain at the line Korovino - Cherkasskoe for a further attack in the direction of the northern outskirts of Cherkassy. At the same time, infantry units that had overcome anti-tank barriers in the first half of the day had to rely mainly on their own firepower. So, for example, the combat group of the 3rd battalion of the Fusilier Regiment, which was at the forefront of the attack of the VG division, at the time of the first attack found itself without tank support at all and suffered significant losses. Possessing huge armored forces, the VG division was actually unable to bring them into battle for a long time.

The resulting congestion on the advance routes also resulted in the untimely concentration of artillery units of the 48th Tank Corps in firing positions, which affected the results of artillery preparation before the start of the attack.

It should be noted that the commander of the 48th Tank Tank became hostage to a number of erroneous decisions of his superiors. Knobelsdorff's lack of an operational reserve had a particularly negative impact - all divisions of the corps were brought into battle almost simultaneously on the morning of July 5, after which they were drawn into active hostilities for a long time.

The development of the offensive of the 48th Tank Corps on the day of July 5 was greatly facilitated by: active actions of engineer-assault units, aviation support (more than 830 sorties) and overwhelming quantitative superiority in armored vehicles. It is also necessary to note the proactive actions of units of the 11th TD (I. Mikl) and 911th department. division of assault guns (overcoming a strip of engineering obstacles and reaching the eastern outskirts of Cherkassy with a mechanized group of infantry and sappers with the support of assault guns).

An important factor in the success of German tank units was the qualitative leap in the combat characteristics of German armored vehicles that occurred by the summer. Already during the first day of the defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge, the insufficient power of anti-tank weapons in service with the Soviet units was revealed when fighting both the new German tanks Pz.V and Pz.VI, and modernized tanks of older brands (about half of the Soviet anti-tank tanks were armed with 45-mm guns, the power of 76-mm Soviet field and American tank guns made it possible to effectively destroy modern or modernized enemy tanks at distances two to three times less than the effective firing range of the latter; heavy tank and self-propelled units at that time were practically absent not only in the combined arms 6th Guards A, but also in the 1st Tank Army of M.E. Katukov, which occupied the second line of defense behind it).

Only after the bulk of the tanks had overcome the anti-tank barriers south of Cherkassy in the afternoon, repelling a number of counterattacks by Soviet units, the units of the VG division and 11th Panzer Division were able to cling to the southeastern and southwestern outskirts of the village, after which the fighting moved into the street phase. At about 21:00, Divisional Commander A.I. Baksov gave the order to withdraw units of the 196th Guards Regiment to new positions to the north and northeast of Cherkassy, ​​as well as to the center of the village. When units of the 196th Guards Regiment retreated, minefields were laid. At about 21:20, a combat group of grenadiers from the VG division, with the support of the Panthers of the 10th brigade, broke into the village of Yarki (north of Cherkassy). A little later, the 3rd Wehrmacht TD managed to capture the village of Krasny Pochinok (north of Korovino). Thus, the result of the day for the 48th Tank Tank of the Wehrmacht was a wedge into the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. And at 6 km, which can actually be considered a failure, especially against the backdrop of the results achieved by the evening of July 5 by the troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (operating to the east parallel to the 48th Tank Corps), which was less saturated with armored vehicles, which managed to break through the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. A.

Organized resistance in the village of Cherkasskoe was suppressed around midnight on July 5. However, German units were able to establish complete control over the village only by the morning of July 6, that is, when, according to the offensive plan, the corps was already supposed to approach Oboyan.

Thus, the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD, not possessing large tank formations (at their disposal were only 39 American tanks of various modifications and 20 self-propelled guns from the 245th detachment and 1440 glanders) held in the area of ​​​​the villages of Korovino and Cherkasskoe five for about a day enemy divisions (three of them are tank divisions). In the battle of July 5 in the Cherkassy region, the soldiers and commanders of the 196th and 199th Guards particularly distinguished themselves. rifle regiments of the 67th Guards. divisions. Competent and truly heroic actions of the soldiers and commanders of the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD allowed the command of the 6th Guards. And in a timely manner, pull up army reserves to the place where units of the 48th Tank Corps are wedged at the junction of the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD and prevent a general collapse of the defense of the Soviet troops in this area in the subsequent days of the defensive operation.

As a result of the hostilities described above, the village of Cherkasskoe virtually ceased to exist (according to post-war eyewitness accounts: “it was a lunar landscape”).

The heroic defense of the village of Cherkassk on July 5 - one of the most successful moments of the Battle of Kursk for the Soviet troops - unfortunately, is one of the undeservedly forgotten episodes of the Great Patriotic War.

July 6, 1943 Day two. First counterattacks.

By the end of the first day of the offensive, the 4th TA had penetrated the defenses of the 6th Guards. And to a depth of 5-6 km in the offensive sector of 48 TK (in the area of ​​​​the village of Cherkasskoe) and at 12-13 km in the section of 2 TK SS (in the Bykovka - Kozmo-Demyanovka area). At the same time, the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (Obergruppenführer P. Hausser) managed to break through the entire depth of the first line of defense of the Soviet troops, pushing back units of the 52nd Guards SD (Colonel I.M. Nekrasov), and approached the front 5-6 km directly to the second line of defense occupied by the 51st Guards Rifle Division (Major General N. T. Tavartkeladze), entering into battle with its advanced units.

However, the right neighbor of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps - AG "Kempf" (W. Kempf) - did not complete the task of the day on July 5, encountering stubborn resistance from units of the 7th Guards. And, thereby exposing the right flank of the 4th Tank Army that had advanced forward. As a result, Hausser was forced from July 6 to July 8 to use a third of the forces of his corps, namely the Death's Head infantry division, to cover his right flank against the 375th Infantry Division (Colonel P. D. Govorunenko), whose units performed brilliantly in the battles of July 5 .

Nevertheless, the success achieved by the Leibstandarte divisions and especially Das Reich forced the command of the Voronezh Front, in conditions of not complete clarity of the situation, to take hasty retaliatory measures to plug the breakthrough that had formed in the second line of defense of the front. After the report of the commander of the 6th Guards. And Chistyakova about the state of affairs on the left flank of the army, Vatutin with his order transfers the 5th Guards. Stalingrad Tank (Major General A. G. Kravchenko, 213 tanks, of which 106 are T-34 and 21 are Mk.IV “Churchill”) and 2 Guards. Tatsinsky Tank Corps (Colonel A.S. Burdeyny, 166 combat-ready tanks, of which 90 are T-34 and 17 are Mk.IV Churchill) subordinate to the commander of the 6th Guards. And he approves of his proposal to launch counterattacks on the German tanks that broke through the positions of the 51st Guards SD with the forces of the 5th Guards. Stk and under the base of the entire advancing wedge 2 tk SS forces of 2 guards. Ttk (directly through the battle formations of the 375th Infantry Division). In particular, on the afternoon of July 6, I.M. Chistyakov assigned the commander of the 5th Guards. CT to Major General A. G. Kravchenko the task of withdrawing from the defensive area he occupied (in which the corps was already ready to meet the enemy using the tactics of ambushes and anti-tank strong points) the main part of the corps (two of three brigades and a heavy breakthrough tank regiment), and a counterattack by these forces on the flank of the Leibstandarte MD. Having received the order, the commander and headquarters of the 5th Guards. Stk, already knowing about the capture of the village. Lucky tanks from the Das Reich division, and more correctly assessing the situation, tried to challenge the execution of this order. However, under the threat of arrest and execution, they were forced to begin implementing it. The attack by the corps brigades was launched at 15:10.

Sufficient own artillery assets of the 5th Guards. The Stk did not have it, and the order did not leave time for coordinating the actions of the corps with its neighbors or aviation. Therefore, the attack of tank brigades was carried out without artillery preparation, without air support, on flat terrain and with practically open flanks. The blow fell directly on the forehead of the Das Reich MD, which regrouped, setting up tanks as an anti-tank barrier and, calling in aviation, inflicted a significant fire defeat on the brigades of the Stalingrad Corps, forcing them to stop the attack and go on the defensive. After this, having brought up anti-tank artillery and organized flank maneuvers, units of the Das Reich MD between 17 and 19 hours managed to reach the communications of the defending tank brigades in the area of ​​the Kalinin farm, which was defended by 1696 zenaps (Major Savchenko) and 464 Guards Artillery, which had withdrawn from the village of Luchki. .division and 460 Guards. mortar battalion 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade. By 19:00, units of the Das Reich MD actually managed to encircle most of the 5th Guards. Stk between the village. Luchki and the Kalinin farm, after which, building on the success, the command of the German division of part of the forces, acting in the direction of the station. Prokhorovka, tried to capture the Belenikhino crossing. However, thanks to the proactive actions of the commander and battalion commanders, the 20th Tank Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel P.F. Okhrimenko) remaining outside the encirclement of the 5th Guards. Stk, who managed to quickly create a tough defense around Belenikhino from various corps units that were at hand, managed to stop the offensive of the Das Reich MD, and even forced the German units to return back to x. Kalinin. Being without contact with corps headquarters, on the night of July 7, surrounded units of the 5th Guards. The Stk organized a breakthrough, as a result of which part of the forces managed to escape from the encirclement and linked up with units of the 20th Tank Brigade. During July 6, parts of the 5th Guards. Stk 119 tanks were irretrievably lost for combat reasons, another 9 tanks were lost for technical or unknown reasons, and 19 were sent for repairs. Not a single tank corps had such significant losses in one day during the entire defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge (the losses of the 5th Guards Stk on July 6 even exceeded the losses of 29 tanks during the attack on July 12 at the Oktyabrsky storage farm).

After being surrounded by 5th Guards. Stk, continuing the development of success in the northern direction, another detachment of the tank regiment MD "Das Reich", taking advantage of the confusion during the withdrawal of Soviet units, managed to reach the third (rear) line of the army defense, occupied by units 69A (Lieutenant General V.D. Kryuchenkin) , near the village of Teterevino, and for a short time wedged itself into the defense of the 285th infantry regiment of the 183rd infantry division, but due to the obvious insufficient strength, having lost several tanks, it was forced to retreat. The entry of German tanks to the third line of defense of the Voronezh Front on the second day of the offensive was regarded by the Soviet command as an emergency.

Battle of Prokhorovka

Belfry in memory of those killed on the Prokhorovsky field

Results of the defensive phase of the battle

The central front, involved in the battle in the north of the arc, suffered losses of 33,897 people from July 5-11, 1943, of which 15,336 were irrevocable, its enemy - Model’s 9th Army - lost 20,720 people during the same period. which gives a loss ratio of 1.64:1. The Voronezh and Steppe fronts, which took part in the battle on the southern front of the arc, lost from July 5-23, 1943, according to modern official estimates (2002), 143,950 people, of which 54,996 were irrevocable. Including the Voronezh Front alone - 73,892 total losses. However, the chief of staff of the Voronezh Front, Lieutenant General Ivanov, and the head of the operational department of the front headquarters, Major General Teteshkin, thought differently: they believed that the losses of their front were 100,932 people, of which 46,500 were irrevocable. If, contrary to Soviet documents from the war period, the official numbers are considered correct, then taking into account the German losses on the southern front of 29,102 people, the ratio of losses of the Soviet and German sides here is 4.95: 1.

During the period from July 5 to July 12, 1943, the Central Front consumed 1,079 wagons of ammunition, and the Voronezh Front used 417 wagons, almost two and a half times less.

The reason that the losses of the Voronezh Front so sharply exceeded the losses of the Central Front was due to the smaller massing of forces and assets in the direction of the German attack, which allowed the Germans to actually achieve an operational breakthrough on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge. Although the breakthrough was closed by the forces of the Steppe Front, it allowed the attackers to achieve favorable tactical conditions for their troops. It should be noted that only the absence of homogeneous independent tank formations did not give the German command the opportunity to concentrate its armored forces in the direction of the breakthrough and develop it in depth.

On the southern front, the counter-offensive by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began on August 3. On August 5, at approximately 18-00, Belgorod was liberated, on August 7 - Bogodukhov. Developing the offensive, Soviet troops cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway on August 11, and captured Kharkov on August 23. The German counterattacks were unsuccessful.

After the end of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the German command lost the opportunity to conduct strategic offensive operations. Local massive offensives, such as the “Watch on the Rhine” () or the operation at Lake Balaton () were also unsuccessful.

July 3rd, 2017 , 11:41 am

Speaking about the Battle of Kursk, today we primarily remember the tank battle near Prokhorovka on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge on July 12. However, events on the northern front were of no less strategic importance - in particular, the defense of the Ponyri station on July 5-11, 1943.




After the disaster at Stalingrad, the Germans longed for revenge, and the Kursk ledge, created as a result of the offensive of Soviet troops in the winter of 1943, seemed geographically quite convenient for the formation of a “cauldron”. Although among the German command there were doubts about the advisability of such an operation - and very justified. The fact is that for an all-out offensive, a noticeable superiority in manpower and equipment was necessary. Statistics indicate something else - the quantitative superiority of Soviet troops.
But on the other hand, the main task of the Germans at that time was to intercept the strategic initiative - and the Battle of Kursk became athe enemy's last attempt to launch a strategic offensive.
The emphasis was placed not on a quantitative, but on a qualitative factor. It was here, near Kursk, that the latest German Tiger and Panther tanks, as well as tank destroyers - a “fortress on wheels” - Ferdinand self-propelled artillery units, were used en masse for the first time.The German generals were going to act the old fashioned way - they wanted to break into our defenses with tank wedges. “Tanks are moving in a diamond pattern” - as the writer Anatoly Ananyev titled his novel dedicated to those events.

People vs tanks

The essence of Operation Citadel was a simultaneous attack from the north and south, gaining the opportunity to unite in Kursk, forming a giant cauldron, as a result of which the path to Moscow was opened. Our goal was to prevent a breakthrough by correctly calculating the likelihood of a main attack by the German armies.
Several defensive lines were built along the entire front line on the Kursk Bulge. Each of them consists of hundreds of kilometers of trenches, minefields and anti-tank ditches. The time spent by the enemy to overcome them should have allowed the Soviet command to transfer additional reserves here and stop the enemy attack.
On July 5, 1943, one of the most important battles of the Great Patriotic War began on the northern front - the Battle of Kursk. The German Army Group Center, led by General von Kluge, was opposed by the central front under the command of General Rokossovsky. At the head of the German shock units was General Model.
Rokossovsky accurately calculated the direction of the main attack. He realized that the Germans would launch an offensive in the area of ​​the Ponyri station through the Teplovsky heights. This was the shortest route to Kursk. The commander of the Central Front took a great risk by removing artillery from other sectors of the front. 92 barrels per kilometer of defense - such a density of artillery was not seen in any defensive operation in the entire history of the Great Patriotic War. And if at Prokhorovka there was the greatest tank battle, where “iron fought with iron,” then here, in Ponyry, approximately the same number of tanks were moving towards Kursk, and these tanks were stopped by people.
The enemy was strong: 22 divisions, up to 1,200 tanks and assault guns, a total of 460 thousand soldiers. It was a fierce battle, the significance of which was understood by both sides. It is characteristic that only purebred Germans took part in the Battle of Kursk, since they could not entrust the fate of such a fateful battle to their satellites.

PZO and “cheeky mining”

The strategic importance of the Ponyri station was determined by the fact that it gave control over the Orel - Kursk railway. The station was well prepared for defense. It was surrounded by controlled and unguided minefields, in which a significant number of captured aerial bombs and large-caliber shells, converted into tension-action landmines, were installed. The defense was reinforced with tanks dug into the ground and a large amount of anti-tank artillery.
On July 6, against the village of 1st Ponyri, the Germans launched an attack of up to 170 tanks and self-propelled guns, as well as two infantry divisions. Having broken through our defenses, they quickly advanced southward to the second line of defense in the area of ​​2 Ponyri. Until the end of the day, they tried to break into the station three times, but were repulsed. With the forces of the 16th and 19th tank corps, ours organized a counterattack, which gained them a day to regroup their forces.
The next dayThe Germans could no longer advance on a wide front, and threw all their forces against the defense center of the Ponyri station. At approximately 8 o'clock in the morning, up to 40 German heavy tanks, supported by assault guns, advanced to the defense line and opened fire on the positions of the Soviet troops. At the same time, the 2nd Ponyri came under air attack from German dive bombers. After about half an hour, the Tigers began to approach our forward trenches, covering medium tanks and armored personnel carriers with infantry.
Five times it was possible to push German tanks back to their original position through dense PZO (moving barrage fire) of large-caliber artillery, as well as actions of Soviet sappers that were unexpected for the enemy.Where the “tigers” and “panthers” managed to break through the first defensive line, mobile groups of armor-piercing soldiers and sappers entered the battle. Near Kursk, the enemy first became acquainted with a new method of fighting tanks. In their memoirs, German generals would later call it “the impudent method of mining,” when the mines were not buried in the ground, but were often thrown directly under the tanks. Every third of the four hundred German tanks destroyed north of Kursk was accounted for by our sappers.
However, at 10 am, two battalions of German infantry with medium tanks and assault guns managed to break into the northwestern outskirts of 2 Ponyri. The reserve of the commander of the 307th division brought into battle, consisting of two infantry battalions and a tank brigade, with the support of artillery, made it possible to destroy the group that had broken through and restore the situation. After 11 o'clock the Germans began attacking Ponyri from the northeast. By 3 p.m. they had taken possession of the May Day state farm and came close to the station. However, all attempts to break into the territory of the village and station were unsuccessful. This day - July 7 - was critical on the northern front, when the Germans achieved their greatest success.

Fire bag near the village of Goreloye

On the morning of July 8, when repelling another German attack, 24 tanks were destroyed, including 7 Tigers. And on July 9, the Germans put together an operational strike group from the most powerful equipment, followed by medium tanks and motorized infantry in armored personnel carriers. Two hours after the start of the battle, the group broke through the May Day state farm to the village of Goreloye.
In these battles, German troops used a new tactical formation, when in the first ranks of the strike group a line of Ferdinand assault guns moved in two echelons, followed by “tigers” covering the assault guns and medium tanks. But near the village of Goreloye, our artillerymen and infantrymen allowed German tanks and self-propelled guns into a pre-prepared fire bag, supported by long-range artillery fire and rocket mortars. Finding themselves under cross artillery fire, also falling into a powerful minefield and being attacked by Petlyakov dive bombers, the German tanks stopped.
On the night of July 11, the bloodless enemy made a last attempt to push back our troops, but this time tooIt was not possible to break through to Ponyri station. A major role in repelling the offensive was played by the PZO supplied by the special purpose artillery division. By midday the Germans had withdrawn, leaving seven tanks and two assault guns on the battlefield. This was the last day when German troops came close to the outskirts of Ponyri station.In just 5 days of fighting, the enemy was able to advance only 12 kilometers.
On July 12, when there was a fierce battle near Prokhorovka on the southern front, where the enemy advanced 35 kilometers, on the northern front the front line returned to its original positions, and already on July 15, Rokossovsky’s army launched an offensive on Oryol. One of the German generals later said that the key to their victory remained forever buried under Ponyri.

In those terrible days, when the sky and earth burned during the Nazi offensive, there were fierce battles for every piece of native land. In almost every village you can erect monuments to Soviet soldiers who defended the Fatherland at the cost of their own lives. Many words have been said about the significance of the Battle of Kursk: about tank battles on the Southern front of the arc, and no less strategically important battles on the Northern front.

A memorial sign in honor of the soldiers of the 19th Red Banner Perekop Tank Corps The IS-2 tank was installed on August 6, 1988 on the initiative of veterans of the 19th Tank Corps under the leadership of the 1st Secretary of the CPSU RK V.V. Gukov, Chairman of the District Executive Committee I.S. Demidov .

Looking back to history

In ancient times, in these places there was a high road called the Pakhnutsky Way, which connected Moscow with the Crimean Khanate. The road passed through Kromy, Olkhovatka and Fatezh and connected Orel with Kursk in the shortest possible way. A whole series of hills stretches here. From the heights, a grandiose overview of the area opens up, and in good weather, with binoculars, you can even see Kursk, located 65 kilometers to the south.

Not far from the villages of Molotychi and Olkhovatka there is the highest place in the Kursk region - Teplovsky Heights, which the Germans wanted to capture. Possession of these places gave the troops an undeniable strategic advantage. The German command also understood this, sending huge forces here. By the summer of 1943, the Soviet-German front, stretching for more than 1,500 kilometers, was a straight line, with the exception of the Kursk salient, the arc of which wedged 200 kilometers to the west. This situation arose in 1943 during Operation Zvezda, when vast areas of the Voronezh and Kursk regions were liberated.


In 2013, the first memorial of the Teplovsky Heights complex, “Northern Face of the Battle of Kursk,” was opened. The monument is made in the shape of an anti-tank mine.

Hitler's command prepared huge forces with the goal of encircling and destroying Soviet troops and capturing Kursk. The operation was called "Citadel". The Germans carefully concealed the direction of the main attack. One thing was clear: if the Nazis launched an offensive, it would be from the south and the north simultaneously. The commander of the troops of the Central Front, Konstantin Rokossovsky, a Soviet military leader, managed to reveal the plans of the Nazis on the Northern Front. Konstantin Konstantinovich understood: in order to stop the German offensive, it was necessary to go on the defensive, to literally hide personnel and military equipment in the ground. Rokossovsky proved himself to be a brilliant strategist and analyst - based on intelligence data, he was able to accurately determine the area where the Germans planned to deliver the main attack, create a defense in depth there and concentrate about half of their infantry, artillery and tanks. Rokossovsky's defenses turned out to be so strong and stable that he was able to transfer part of his reserves to the commander of the southern flank of the Kursk Bulge, Hero of the Soviet Union Nicholas, when there was a threat of a breakthrough there.


The construction of the temple was completed in the shortest possible time: a year and a half after laying the foundation, the temple opened its doors.

However, when mentioning the Battle of Kursk, associations take us to Prokhorovka. In Soviet times, they often printed and showed a photograph taken after the battle, where Soviet troops knocked out 21 Ferdinand self-propelled guns. However, some photographs and a panorama were taken on the Northern face of the Kursk Bulge, including in the village of Goreloye, and near Prokhorovka these same “Ferdinands” did not participate in the battles at all.

Colonel General Model, commander of the German troops on the northern flank, called the Teplov Heights directly “the key to the door to Kursk.” Therefore, the enemy concentrated the main forces in the direction of the village of Olkhovatka. The model argued that the one who owns the heights will own the space between the Oka and the Seimas. The huge field, located between the villages of Olkhovatka, Podsobarovka and Tyoploye, was very convenient for a tank battle. This gave the Germans a great advantage. After all, as is known for certain, the medium T-34-76 and light T-70, which were obsolete by that period, took part in the Battle of Kursk. There were few heavy tanks of the KV-1 type. In order to maintain the strategically damp height 269, Rokossovsky orders the commander of the 13th Army N.P. Pukhov launched a counterattack, thanks to which the Soviet troops provoked the Germans to redirect their forces to the village of Ponyri. This, in turn, made it easier for our troops to defend Olkhovatka and Teploye.


During the construction of the memorial complex “Poklonnaya Height 269,” an aerial bomb from the Great Patriotic War was found, one of those with the help of which the Nazis sought to capture the height. It was neutralized not far from the memorial, and everyone can see what kind of wound such bombings caused to our native land.

The battles were terrible, units and battalions held out until the last soldier, until the last drop of blood, but did not give up their positions. Thus, Captain Igishev’s battery, holding back German tanks on the approaches to the village of Samodurovka, destroyed 19 tanks in three days. The enemy delivered the main blow on July 8, this was another attempt to capture height 269. In the way of the Nazis were two batteries of artillerymen under the command of captains G.I. Igishev and V.P. Gerasimov. Until July 12, 1943, a fierce struggle continued here for every piece of land land. Captain Igishev was shell-shocked, but continued to control the fire of the battery, soon of which only one gun would remain. The entire crew will die as soon as gunner Puzikov continues to fight alone, destroying 12 tanks...

Fortunately, the plans of the Third Reich were not destined to come true. After the victory at Kursk, Soviet troops went on the offensive, and this continued until the end of the war. And at the end of the Battle of Kursk, a monument to the artillerymen was erected at the battle site. The same cannon from Igishev’s battery was placed on the pedestal.


“A time capsule with an appeal to descendants is kept here. This capsule was laid on July 12, 2014 in the presence of the leaders of the Kursk region, philanthropists, and landscapers on the day of laying the foundation for the construction of the “Angel of Peace” monument of the “Poklonnaya Height” Memorial Complex. Open the capsule on July 12, 2043,” reads the inscription addressing descendants on the memorial stone.

As a keepsake for posterity

There are many monuments to soldiers on Kursk land. There are especially many of them north of Kursk on the former Northern face of the Kursk Bulge. Paying tribute to the memory of Soviet soldiers, two memorials were opened on the day of the 70th anniversary of the Great Victory: the Teplovsky Heights monument and the memorial stele “Angel of Peace”.

The memorial complex “Poklonnaya Height 269”, which was installed on the initiative and organization of the ROO (regional public organization) “Kursk Fellowship” to perpetuate the feat of Soviet soldiers who prevented the Nazi invaders from breaking through to Kursk in July 1943, is located near the village of Molotychi Fatezhsky district of the Kursk region.

In November 2011, on the initiative of Vladimir Vasilyevich Pronin, at the height where the command post of the 70th Army of the NKVD was located, an 8-meter cross of worship was installed. “At the cost of their lives, the soldiers of the 140th Infantry Division did not allow the enemy to reach strategic heights,” Vladimir Vasilyevich, Colonel General of the police, honorary citizen of the Kursk region, the city of Fatezh and the Fatezh region, head of the Kursk community, quotes the inscription installed on the monument.

The next stage in the creation of the monumental complex was the construction of a memorial stele and temple. On July 19, 2013, Metropolitan Herman of Kursk and Rylsk, together with representatives of the Kursk community in Moscow, visited Molotiche Heights and gave his blessing for the implementation of the project.


The monument to artillerymen on the Teplovsky Heights, erected on November 26, 1943, was the first monument to military glory in the USSR, opened during the Great Patriotic War

The construction of the temple was carried out in the shortest possible time; a year and a half after laying the foundation, the temple opened its doors . Builders from different parts of Russia took a direct part in the construction of the temple. For example, domes and crosses were made in Rostov, and specialists from Yaroslavl were responsible for the bell. Separately, I would like to note the design solutions in the decoration of the temple, which corresponds to all modern canons. The iconostasis is made to look like malachite, and the floor has Italian malachite tiles. By the way, most of the icons of the temple are directly related to the Kursk land, for example, an exact copy of the Kursk root icon “The Sign”, the faces of Seraphim of Sarov and Luke.

On August 20, 2016, at the memorial complex, in a solemn ceremony, a cross was installed on the dome of the church under construction in honor of the holy apostles Peter and Paul. Among the honored guests of the ceremony are the Governor of the Kursk region Alexander Mikhailov, the head of the community Vladimir Pronin, the general director of Management Company "Metalloinvest" Andrey Varichev and many other high-ranking officials, as well as veterans of the Great Patriotic War, the delegation of the RPO "Kursk community", youth, residents of nearby districts who came here to honor the memory of fallen Soviet soldiers. Alexander Nikolaevich in his welcoming speech expressed the hope that the built temple will become a spiritual center for residents of Kursk and neighboring regions


From the heights, a grandiose overview of the area opens up, and in good weather, with binoculars, you can even see Kursk, located 65 kilometers to the south.

At the memorial complex “Poklonnaya Vysota 269,” His Eminence Benjamin, Bishop of Zheleznogorsk and Lgov consecrated the bells and the main dome for the temple in honor of the holy supreme apostles Peter and Paul. What was unusual was that to sprinkle the bells with holy water, the Bishop climbed to a height using special equipment, but the dome was consecrated on the ground.

On May 9, 2017, the first liturgy for the dead took place in the Church of the Supreme Apostles Peter and Paul, and now priests hold services every Friday, Saturday, and Sunday.


Letter of gratitude from the President to the head of the regional public organization ROO "Kursk Community".

Angel flying in the sky

The memorial complex on the Northern face of the Kursk Bulge was approved and supported by the plenipotentiary representative of the President of Russia in the Central Federal District A.D. Beglov, the leaders of the Kursk region, and public organizations. One of the outstanding links in the artistic composition is the monument “Angel of Peace”. - The monument is a 35-meter sculpture. At its top is an eight-meter angel who holds a wreath and releases a dove,” says Vladimir Vasilyevich. – The elements of the monument were not chosen by chance: the crown symbolizes the memory of the fallen soldiers during the war, and the dove facing the west calls for peace, because the angel stands on the blood, at the site of the death of the soldiers.

The composition is equipped with lighting, so at dusk a beautiful picture opens up: the illusion of an angel soaring in heaven is created. The authors of the idea of ​​artistic composition are Vladimir Vasilyevich Pronin, Mikhail Leonidovich Lytkin, a military engineer by training, and Alexander Nikolaevich Burganov, a world-famous sculptor who made a huge contribution to the development of the national school of monumental sculpture. His monuments and large monumental ensembles are installed in the largest cities of Russia and abroad.

The design of the sacred territory is also not accidental: the red color of the paths and the foundation of the temple symbolize the blood shed by the soldiers in those terrible days. And the white walls of the church are a sign of the light and purity of Soviet soldiers, because the guys who fell here were very young, most of them were not even 23 years old at the time of the fighting.

Now, admiring the beauty of the memorial complex “Poklonnaya Vysota 269”, it is difficult to imagine that six years ago there were only impenetrable thickets of grass. The Worship Cross, the “Angel of Peace” monument, the Temple and other objects of the Memorial Complex were built for future generations solely on donations from individuals and legal entities. The area has been landscaped: the access road has been paved, benches have been installed, and there is convenient parking. It is also planned to restore the army command post dugouts.

The construction of the memorial complex was noted by the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin


In November 2011, an 8-meter worship cross was installed.

The biggest mine

In 2013, the first memorial of the Teplovsky Heights complex, “Northern Face of the Battle of Kursk,” was opened. The monument is made in the shape of an anti-tank mine. The monument is a three-level observation deck, the upper level is located at a bird's eye view - 17 meters above the ground. There is an elevator inside the tower, which allows people with disabilities to go upstairs. The flag of the USSR flutters above the monument, and on the railing of the observation deck there is a calendar of the Battle of Kursk. Looking around the surroundings, you understand why there were such fierce battles for each height. From here the area is clearly visible. The view that opens from this hill is stunning: unprecedented space, fields and copses stretching to the very horizon.

“Poklonnaya Height 269” and “Northern face of the Battle of Kursk” are part of a single memorial complex along with the monument “For our Soviet Motherland”, the Eternal Flame, a mass grave in which 2 thousand soldiers are buried, a colonnade, and personalized plaques of the Heroes of the Soviet Union - the winners battles on the Kursk Bulge. Also carved on the slabs are the names of military units that took part in the hostilities. This is the Teplovsky Heights memorial.

The construction of this complex is a tribute to the memory of the defenders of the Fatherland who stood to their death on the battlefield. Then, in the terrible and bloody 1943, our grandfathers and great-grandfathers gave their lives for our peaceful sky above their heads. And today it is our duty to pay attention and care in memory of them.


The monument is a 35-meter sculpture. At its top is an eight-meter angel who holds a wreath and releases a dove.

Material prepared by: Olga Pakhomova, Nadezhda Rusanova.

Fact

On December 10, 2015, at the Cultural Center of the FSB of Russia, a solemn ceremony was held to award laureates and diploma holders of the FSB of Russia competition for the best works of literature and art about the activities of the federal security service. In the “Fine Arts” category, the first prize was awarded to Alexander Nikolaevich Burganov, sculptor, author of the “Angel of Peace” stela

The material was prepared with the support of JSC Avtodor and JSC Fatezhskoye DRSU No. 6



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