The key to victory is buried under the ducks. “Teplovsky Heights” - a monument in honor of the defenders of the Motherland who turned the tide of World War II Big legal dictionary

July 3rd, 2017 , 11:41 am

Speaking about the Battle of Kursk, today we primarily remember the tank battle near Prokhorovka on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge on July 12. However, events on the northern front were of no less strategic importance - in particular, the defense of the Ponyri station on July 5-11, 1943.




After the disaster at Stalingrad, the Germans longed for revenge, and the Kursk ledge, created as a result of the offensive of Soviet troops in the winter of 1943, seemed geographically quite convenient for the formation of a “cauldron”. Although among the German command there were doubts about the advisability of such an operation - and very justified. The fact is that for an all-out offensive, a noticeable superiority in manpower and equipment was necessary. Statistics indicate something else - the quantitative superiority of Soviet troops.
But on the other hand, the main task of the Germans at that time was to intercept the strategic initiative - and the Battle of Kursk became athe enemy's last attempt to launch a strategic offensive.
The emphasis was placed not on a quantitative, but on a qualitative factor. It was here, near Kursk, that the latest German Tiger and Panther tanks, as well as tank destroyers - a “fortress on wheels” - Ferdinand self-propelled artillery units, were used en masse for the first time.The German generals were going to act the old fashioned way - they wanted to break into our defenses with tank wedges. “Tanks are moving in a diamond pattern” - as the writer Anatoly Ananyev titled his novel dedicated to those events.

People vs tanks

The essence of Operation Citadel was a simultaneous attack from the north and south, gaining the opportunity to unite in Kursk, forming a giant cauldron, as a result of which the path to Moscow was opened. Our goal was to prevent a breakthrough by correctly calculating the likelihood of a main attack by the German armies.
Several defensive lines were built along the entire front line on the Kursk Bulge. Each of them consists of hundreds of kilometers of trenches, minefields and anti-tank ditches. The time spent by the enemy to overcome them should have allowed the Soviet command to transfer additional reserves here and stop the enemy attack.
On July 5, 1943, one of the most important battles of the Great Patriotic War began on the northern front - the Battle of Kursk. The German Army Group Center, led by General von Kluge, was opposed by the central front under the command of General Rokossovsky. At the head of the German shock units was General Model.
Rokossovsky accurately calculated the direction of the main attack. He realized that the Germans would launch an offensive in the area of ​​the Ponyri station through the Teplovsky heights. This was the shortest route to Kursk. The commander of the Central Front took a great risk by removing artillery from other sectors of the front. 92 barrels per kilometer of defense - such a density of artillery was not seen in any defensive operation in the entire history of the Great Patriotic War. And if at Prokhorovka there was the greatest tank battle, where “iron fought with iron,” then here, in Ponyry, approximately the same number of tanks were moving towards Kursk, and these tanks were stopped by people.
The enemy was strong: 22 divisions, up to 1,200 tanks and assault guns, a total of 460 thousand soldiers. It was a fierce battle, the significance of which was understood by both sides. It is characteristic that only purebred Germans took part in the Battle of Kursk, since they could not entrust the fate of such a fateful battle to their satellites.

PZO and “cheeky mining”

The strategic importance of the Ponyri station was determined by the fact that it gave control over the Orel - Kursk railway. The station was well prepared for defense. It was surrounded by controlled and unguided minefields, in which a significant number of captured aerial bombs and large-caliber shells, converted into tension-action landmines, were installed. The defense was reinforced with tanks dug into the ground and a large amount of anti-tank artillery.
On July 6, against the village of 1st Ponyri, the Germans launched an attack of up to 170 tanks and self-propelled guns, as well as two infantry divisions. Having broken through our defenses, they quickly advanced southward to the second line of defense in the area of ​​2 Ponyri. Until the end of the day, they tried to break into the station three times, but were repulsed. With the forces of the 16th and 19th tank corps, ours organized a counterattack, which gained them a day to regroup their forces.
The next dayThe Germans could no longer advance on a wide front, and threw all their forces against the defense center of the Ponyri station. At approximately 8 o'clock in the morning, up to 40 German heavy tanks, supported by assault guns, advanced to the defense line and opened fire on the positions of the Soviet troops. At the same time, the 2nd Ponyri came under air attack from German dive bombers. After about half an hour, the Tigers began to approach our forward trenches, covering medium tanks and armored personnel carriers with infantry.
Five times it was possible to push German tanks back to their original position through dense PZO (moving barrage fire) of large-caliber artillery, as well as actions of Soviet sappers that were unexpected for the enemy.Where the “tigers” and “panthers” managed to break through the first defensive line, mobile groups of armor-piercing soldiers and sappers entered the battle. Near Kursk, the enemy first became acquainted with a new method of fighting tanks. In their memoirs, German generals would later call it “the impudent method of mining,” when the mines were not buried in the ground, but were often thrown directly under the tanks. Every third of the four hundred German tanks destroyed north of Kursk was accounted for by our sappers.
However, at 10 am, two battalions of German infantry with medium tanks and assault guns managed to break into the northwestern outskirts of 2 Ponyri. The reserve of the commander of the 307th division brought into battle, consisting of two infantry battalions and a tank brigade, with the support of artillery, made it possible to destroy the group that had broken through and restore the situation. After 11 o'clock the Germans began attacking Ponyri from the northeast. By 3 p.m. they had taken possession of the May Day state farm and came close to the station. However, all attempts to break into the territory of the village and station were unsuccessful. This day - July 7 - was critical on the northern front, when the Germans achieved their greatest success.

Fire bag near the village of Goreloye

On the morning of July 8, when repelling another German attack, 24 tanks were destroyed, including 7 Tigers. And on July 9, the Germans put together an operational strike group from the most powerful equipment, followed by medium tanks and motorized infantry in armored personnel carriers. Two hours after the start of the battle, the group broke through the May Day state farm to the village of Goreloye.
In these battles, German troops used a new tactical formation, when in the first ranks of the strike group a line of Ferdinand assault guns moved in two echelons, followed by “tigers” covering the assault guns and medium tanks. But near the village of Goreloye, our artillerymen and infantrymen allowed German tanks and self-propelled guns into a pre-prepared fire bag, supported by long-range artillery fire and rocket mortars. Finding themselves under cross artillery fire, also falling into a powerful minefield and being attacked by Petlyakov dive bombers, the German tanks stopped.
On the night of July 11, the bloodless enemy made a last attempt to push back our troops, but this time tooIt was not possible to break through to Ponyri station. A major role in repelling the offensive was played by the PZO supplied by the special purpose artillery division. By midday the Germans had withdrawn, leaving seven tanks and two assault guns on the battlefield. This was the last day when German troops came close to the outskirts of Ponyri station.In just 5 days of fighting, the enemy was able to advance only 12 kilometers.
On July 12, when there was a fierce battle near Prokhorovka on the southern front, where the enemy advanced 35 kilometers, on the northern front the front line returned to its original positions, and already on July 15, Rokossovsky’s army launched an offensive on Oryol. One of the German generals later said that the key to their victory remained forever buried under Ponyri.

In those terrible days, when the sky and earth burned during the Nazi offensive, there were fierce battles for every piece of native land. In almost every village you can erect monuments to Soviet soldiers who defended the Fatherland at the cost of their own lives. Many words have been said about the significance of the Battle of Kursk: about tank battles on the Southern front of the arc, and no less strategically important battles on the Northern front.

A memorial sign in honor of the soldiers of the 19th Red Banner Perekop Tank Corps The IS-2 tank was installed on August 6, 1988 on the initiative of veterans of the 19th Tank Corps under the leadership of the 1st Secretary of the CPSU RK V.V. Gukov, Chairman of the District Executive Committee I.S. Demidov .

Looking back to history

In ancient times, in these places there was a high road called the Pakhnutsky Way, which connected Moscow with the Crimean Khanate. The road passed through Kromy, Olkhovatka and Fatezh and connected Orel with Kursk in the shortest possible way. A whole series of hills stretches here. From the heights, a grandiose overview of the area opens up, and in good weather, with binoculars, you can even see Kursk, located 65 kilometers to the south.

Not far from the villages of Molotychi and Olkhovatka there is the highest place in the Kursk region - Teplovsky Heights, which the Germans wanted to capture. Possession of these places gave the troops an undeniable strategic advantage. The German command also understood this, sending huge forces here. By the summer of 1943, the Soviet-German front, stretching for more than 1,500 kilometers, was a straight line, with the exception of the Kursk salient, the arc of which wedged 200 kilometers to the west. This situation arose in 1943 during Operation Zvezda, when vast areas of the Voronezh and Kursk regions were liberated.

In 2013, the first memorial of the Teplovsky Heights complex, “Northern Face of the Battle of Kursk,” was opened. The monument is made in the shape of an anti-tank mine.

Hitler's command prepared huge forces with the goal of encircling and destroying Soviet troops and capturing Kursk. The operation was called "Citadel". The Germans carefully concealed the direction of the main attack. One thing was clear: if the Nazis launched an offensive, it would be from the south and the north simultaneously. The commander of the troops of the Central Front, Konstantin Rokossovsky, a Soviet military leader, managed to reveal the plans of the Nazis on the Northern Front. Konstantin Konstantinovich understood: in order to stop the German offensive, it was necessary to go on the defensive, to literally hide personnel and military equipment in the ground. Rokossovsky proved himself to be a brilliant strategist and analyst - based on intelligence data, he was able to accurately determine the area where the Germans planned to deliver the main attack, create a defense in depth there and concentrate about half of their infantry, artillery and tanks. Rokossovsky's defenses turned out to be so strong and stable that he was able to transfer part of his reserves to the commander of the southern flank of the Kursk Bulge, Hero of the Soviet Union Nicholas, when there was a threat of a breakthrough there.

The construction of the temple was completed in the shortest possible time: a year and a half after laying the foundation, the temple opened its doors.

However, when mentioning the Battle of Kursk, associations take us to Prokhorovka. In Soviet times, they often printed and showed a photograph taken after the battle, where Soviet troops knocked out 21 Ferdinand self-propelled guns. However, some photographs and a panorama were taken on the Northern face of the Kursk Bulge, including in the village of Goreloye, and near Prokhorovka these same “Ferdinands” did not participate in the battles at all.

Colonel General Model, commander of the German forces on the northern flank, called the Teplov Heights directly “the key to the door to Kursk.” Therefore, the enemy concentrated the main forces in the direction of the village of Olkhovatka. The model argued that the one who owns the heights will own the space between the Oka and the Seimas. The huge field, located between the villages of Olkhovatka, Podsobarovka and Tyoploye, was very convenient for a tank battle. This gave the Germans a great advantage. After all, as is known for certain, the medium T-34-76 and light T-70, which were obsolete by that period, took part in the Battle of Kursk. There were few heavy tanks of the KV-1 type. In order to maintain the strategically damp height 269, Rokossovsky orders the commander of the 13th Army N.P. Pukhov launched a counterattack, thanks to which the Soviet troops provoked the Germans to redirect their forces to the village of Ponyri. This, in turn, made it easier for our troops to defend Olkhovatka and Teploye.

During the construction of the memorial complex “Poklonnaya Height 269,” an aerial bomb from the Great Patriotic War was found, one of those with the help of which the Nazis sought to capture the height. It was neutralized not far from the memorial, and everyone can see what kind of wound such bombings caused to our native land.

The battles were terrible, units and battalions held out until the last soldier, until the last drop of blood, but did not give up their positions. Thus, Captain Igishev’s battery, holding back German tanks on the approaches to the village of Samodurovka, destroyed 19 tanks in three days. The enemy delivered the main blow on July 8, this was another attempt to capture height 269. In the way of the Nazis were two batteries of artillerymen under the command of captains G.I. Igishev and V.P. Gerasimov. Until July 12, 1943, a fierce struggle continued here for every piece of land land. Captain Igishev was shell-shocked, but continued to control the fire of the battery, soon of which only one gun would remain. The entire crew will die as soon as gunner Puzikov continues to fight alone, destroying 12 tanks...

Fortunately, the plans of the Third Reich were not destined to come true. After the victory at Kursk, Soviet troops went on the offensive, and this continued until the end of the war. And at the end of the Battle of Kursk, a monument to the artillerymen was erected at the battle site. The same cannon from Igishev’s battery was placed on the pedestal.

“A time capsule with an appeal to descendants is kept here. This capsule was laid on July 12, 2014 in the presence of the leaders of the Kursk region, philanthropists, and landscapers on the day of laying the foundation for the construction of the “Angel of Peace” monument of the “Poklonnaya Height” Memorial Complex. Open the capsule on July 12, 2043,” reads the inscription addressing descendants on the memorial stone.

As a keepsake for posterity

There are many monuments to soldiers on Kursk land. There are especially many of them north of Kursk on the former Northern face of the Kursk Bulge. Paying tribute to the memory of Soviet soldiers, two memorials were opened on the day of the 70th anniversary of the Great Victory: the Teplovsky Heights monument and the memorial stele “Angel of Peace”.

The memorial complex “Poklonnaya Height 269”, which was installed on the initiative and organization of the ROO (regional public organization) “Kursk Fellowship” to perpetuate the feat of Soviet soldiers who prevented the Nazi invaders from breaking through to Kursk in July 1943, is located near the village of Molotychi Fatezhsky district of the Kursk region.

In November 2011, on the initiative of Vladimir Vasilyevich Pronin, at the height where the command post of the 70th Army of the NKVD was located, an 8-meter cross of worship was installed. “At the cost of their lives, the soldiers of the 140th Infantry Division did not allow the enemy to reach strategic heights,” Vladimir Vasilyevich, Colonel General of the police, honorary citizen of the Kursk region, the city of Fatezh and the Fatezh region, head of the Kursk community, quotes the inscription installed on the monument.

The next stage in the creation of the monumental complex was the construction of a memorial stele and temple. On July 19, 2013, Metropolitan Herman of Kursk and Rylsk, together with representatives of the Kursk community in Moscow, visited Molotiche Heights and gave his blessing for the implementation of the project.

The monument to artillerymen on the Teplovsky Heights, erected on November 26, 1943, was the first monument to military glory in the USSR, opened during the Great Patriotic War

The construction of the temple was carried out in the shortest possible time; a year and a half after laying the foundation, the temple opened its doors . Builders from different parts of Russia took a direct part in the construction of the temple. For example, domes and crosses were made in Rostov, and specialists from Yaroslavl were responsible for the bell. Separately, I would like to note the design solutions in the decoration of the temple, which corresponds to all modern canons. The iconostasis is made to look like malachite, and the floor has Italian malachite tiles. By the way, most of the icons of the temple are directly related to the Kursk land, for example, an exact copy of the Kursk root icon “The Sign”, the faces of Seraphim of Sarov and Luke.

On August 20, 2016, at the memorial complex, in a solemn ceremony, a cross was installed on the dome of the church under construction in honor of the holy apostles Peter and Paul. Among the honored guests of the ceremony are the Governor of the Kursk region Alexander Mikhailov, the head of the community Vladimir Pronin, the general director of Management Company "Metalloinvest" Andrey Varichev and many other high-ranking officials, as well as veterans of the Great Patriotic War, the delegation of the RPO "Kursk community", youth, residents of nearby districts who came here to honor the memory of fallen Soviet soldiers. Alexander Nikolaevich in his welcoming speech expressed the hope that the built temple will become a spiritual center for residents of Kursk and neighboring regions

From the heights, a grandiose overview of the area opens up, and in good weather, with binoculars, you can even see Kursk, located 65 kilometers to the south.

At the memorial complex “Poklonnaya Vysota 269,” His Eminence Benjamin, Bishop of Zheleznogorsk and Lgov consecrated the bells and the main dome for the temple in honor of the holy supreme apostles Peter and Paul. What was unusual was that to sprinkle the bells with holy water, the Bishop climbed to a height using special equipment, but the dome was consecrated on the ground.

On May 9, 2017, the first liturgy for the dead took place in the Church of the Supreme Apostles Peter and Paul, and now priests hold services every Friday, Saturday, and Sunday.

Letter of gratitude from the President to the head of the regional public organization ROO "Kursk Community".

Angel flying in the sky

The memorial complex on the Northern face of the Kursk Bulge was approved and supported by the plenipotentiary representative of the President of Russia in the Central Federal District A.D. Beglov, the leaders of the Kursk region, and public organizations. One of the outstanding links in the artistic composition is the monument “Angel of Peace”. - The monument is a 35-meter sculpture. At its top is an eight-meter angel who holds a wreath and releases a dove,” says Vladimir Vasilyevich. – The elements of the monument were not chosen by chance: the crown symbolizes the memory of the fallen soldiers during the war, and the dove facing the west calls for peace, because the angel stands on the blood, at the site of the death of the soldiers.

The composition is equipped with lighting, so at dusk a beautiful picture opens up: the illusion of an angel soaring in heaven is created. The authors of the idea of ​​artistic composition are Vladimir Vasilyevich Pronin, Mikhail Leonidovich Lytkin, a military engineer by training, and Alexander Nikolaevich Burganov, a world-famous sculptor who made a huge contribution to the development of the national school of monumental sculpture. His monuments and large monumental ensembles are installed in the largest cities of Russia and abroad.

The design of the sacred territory is also not accidental: the red color of the paths and the foundation of the temple symbolize the blood shed by the soldiers in those terrible days. And the white walls of the church are a sign of the light and purity of Soviet soldiers, because the guys who fell here were very young, most of them were not even 23 years old at the time of the fighting.

Now, admiring the beauty of the memorial complex “Poklonnaya Vysot 269”, it is difficult to imagine that six years ago there were only impenetrable thickets of grass. The Worship Cross, the “Angel of Peace” monument, the Temple and other objects of the Memorial Complex were built for future generations solely on donations from individuals and legal entities. The area has been landscaped: the access road has been paved, benches have been installed, and there is convenient parking. It is also planned to restore the army command post dugouts.

The construction of the memorial complex was noted by the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin

In November 2011, an 8-meter worship cross was installed.

The biggest mine

In 2013, the first memorial of the Teplovsky Heights complex, “Northern Face of the Battle of Kursk,” was opened. The monument is made in the shape of an anti-tank mine. The monument is a three-level observation deck, the upper level is located at a bird's eye view - 17 meters above the ground. There is an elevator inside the tower, which allows people with disabilities to go upstairs. The flag of the USSR flutters above the monument, and on the railing of the observation deck there is a calendar of the Battle of Kursk. Looking around the surroundings, you understand why there were such fierce battles for each height. From here the area is clearly visible. The view that opens from this hill is stunning: unprecedented space, fields and copses stretching to the very horizon.

“Poklonnaya Height 269” and “Northern face of the Battle of Kursk” are part of a single memorial complex along with the monument “For our Soviet Motherland”, the Eternal Flame, a mass grave in which 2 thousand soldiers are buried, a colonnade, and personalized plaques of the Heroes of the Soviet Union - the winners battles on the Kursk Bulge. Also carved on the slabs are the names of military units that took part in the hostilities. This is the Teplovsky Heights memorial.

The construction of this complex is a tribute to the memory of the defenders of the Fatherland who stood to their death on the battlefield. Then, in the terrible and bloody 1943, our grandfathers and great-grandfathers gave their lives for our peaceful sky above their heads. And today it is our duty to pay attention and care in memory of them.

The monument is a 35-meter sculpture. At its top is an eight-meter angel who holds a wreath and releases a dove.

Material prepared by: Olga Pakhomova, Nadezhda Rusanova.

Fact

On December 10, 2015, at the Cultural Center of the FSB of Russia, a solemn ceremony was held to award laureates and diploma holders of the FSB of Russia competition for the best works of literature and art about the activities of the federal security service. In the “Fine Arts” category, the first prize was awarded to Alexander Nikolaevich Burganov, sculptor, author of the “Angel of Peace” stela

The material was prepared with the support of JSC Avtodor and JSC Fatezhskoye DRSU No. 6

Battle of Kursk. The largest tank battle in history. In terms of scale, results and consequences, it is one of the key ones in the Patriotic War. The Battle of Kursk completed and summed up the turning point that began at Stalingrad; from its moment until the end of the war, there was practically no more offensive activity on the part of the Germans; the initiative was seized. But losses... 250 thousand killed, 600 thousand wounded. 6 thousand tanks, 5 thousand guns, more than one and a half thousand aircraft. The Germans lost four times less equipment and two times less people.

The length of the Kursk Bulge is about 200 kilometers. Its center is Kursk, hence the name, in the north - Ponyri, where the museum we are going to is located, in the south - Prokhorovka and Belgorod. The battle lasted 49 days, from July 5 to August 23, 1943.

We are driving along the upper edge of the red line indicating the Kursk Bulge on the map. From Zheleznogorsk to Ponyri. Along the way we stop at all the monuments we come across. And the first one is new Memorial "Angel of Peace" with a temple and a worship cross on a hill, installed on the site of the dugouts of the command post of the 70th Army.

The 70th Army, by the way, is an army formed at the end of 1942, consisting of NKVD troops for various purposes (border guards, railway guards, internal troops). Here, on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge in early July 1943, the army repelled the attack of German troops trying to break through to Kursk.

The memorial consists of a stele with an angel holding a wreath - the Angel of Peace:

Temple of the Apostles Peter and Paul:

And the worship cross, which was installed here, on the 269th height, before anyone else, before the stele, opened in 2015, and before the temple, completed only last year:

There is a sign on the temple that says " To the glory of the Holy, Consubstantial, Life-Giving and Indivisible Trinity, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, in honor of the supreme apostles Peter and Paul with the blessing of His Grace Benjamin, Bishop of Zheleznogorsk and Lgov, in prayerful memory of the soldiers who fought on the northern face of the Kursk Bulge, through the labors of General - Colonel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Vladimir Vasilyevich Pronin and those who helped him with good deeds (many names and surnames are listed)"Thus, we conclude that the idea and implementation of the memorial is not entirely state-owned.

The meadows around the height are pitted and abundant with wildflowers:

The work has not yet been completed; a cable for lighting is being laid along the paths:

At the foot of the worship cross there is an inscription: Here in July 1943, the heaviest battles of the Battle of Kursk, the decisive battle of the Great Patriotic War, took place. At the cost of their lives, the soldiers of the 140th Infantry Division did not allow the enemy to reach strategic heights. In one day, July 10, 513 people were killed and 943 wounded. Eternal memory to the defenders of the Fatherland. The worship cross was installed on November 12, 2011 by grateful descendants

The stela with the Angel of Peace has a height of 35 meters, eight of which are the Angel himself. He holds a wreath and releases a dove. The monument faces the West, as planned by the sculptor Burganov - with an appeal from the Russian people to stop the new fascism. Standing at the site of the death of more than 70 thousand Soviet and German soldiers, the Angel reminds everyone how it ends.

The tablets at the foot of the stele give details of the Battle of Kursk:
The Battle of Kursk is a turning point, decisive, fundamental battle in the Great Patriotic War. More troops took part in it than in the Moscow and Stalingrad battles combined. On the northern front, the defense was carried out by the Central Front - commanded by Army General K.K. Rokossovsky, which included the 48th, 13th, 70th, 65th and 60th Armies, 2nd Tank Army. The main blow of Hitler's troops on July 5, 1943 was directed along the old Kromskaya road to Kursk at the junction of the 13th Army - commander Lieutenant General N.P. Pukhov, which took the first blow with its units, and the 70th Army - commander Lieutenant General I.V. Galanin. , which, with attached reserves at the heights, blocked the Nazis’ path to the south and deployed the 9th Wehrmacht Army to retreat. On July 12, the Supreme Command Headquarters introduced Operation Kutuzov and began a counteroffensive of Soviet troops to Berlin. Our victory in this battle came at the cost of heavy losses. 34 soldiers, mostly posthumously, were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

On the other hand - another text:
Operation Citadel was introduced by the German command after the encirclement and defeat in the Battle of Stalingrad, when the Wehrmacht was still strong, to deliver two dagger strikes from the north and south on the Kursk Bulge on July 5, 1943, converging at Kursk in order to take Soviet troops “into the cauldron” ". From the north, in the Olkhovat direction, a group of German troops of the 9th Army was advancing, which included 27 divisions: 20 infantry, 6 tank, 1 motorized - with 460 thousand military personnel, about 6 thousand guns and mortars, up to 1200 tanks and assault guns. Army losses from July 5 to July 11, 1943 amounted to more than 20 thousand soldiers and officers. The Nazis' plans were thwarted and on July 12, 1943, the German command canceled the operation. This was the beginning of the irrevocable retreat of the fascist troops to their lair

My little boy is not yet very versed in military strategies and is simply enjoying the sun, wind and spacious fields around the heights:

The fields are amazing. It’s hard to believe that such heavy fighting took place here - these fields look so peaceful now:

The memorial is very thoughtful. There are paths, benches, lighting, even, excuse me, toilets with running water. In an open field.

Rose hips have been planted, they will soon grow and remove the feeling of new construction:

We drive further and see a fork with signs. One of them promises a monument to the 140th Division (which, by the way, is part of that same 70th Army), but points in the direction opposite to our goal, and Natasha hurries us, because the museum in Ponyri may close. We miss a turn and after a while we run into monument to artillery heroes near the village of Teploe.

The monument was erected at height 240 near the south-eastern outskirts of the village of Teploe. This is one of the first monuments on the Kursk Bulge. It was erected by the artillerymen themselves on November 30, 1943, raising one of the damaged guns on a pedestal - 76-mm gun No. 2242 of Sergeant Katyushenko from the Igishev battery.

In 1968, the monument was reconstructed, slabs with the names of the fallen were installed at the burial site, the pedestal under the gun was changed, a stele was added...

Look at the bouquet standing next to one of the slabs:

The bouquet is like from an old war movie. Cornflowers, wheat... Lilies that grow right there along the fence:

Eternal memory to the heroes who died a brave death in the battles for their homeland against the Nazi invaders on the Kursk Bulge in 1943 - it is written on the stone:

There are a lot of names on the plates:

The 1st artillery battery of Captain Igishev was the first on the enemy’s path and was completely destroyed here, on the Teplovsky Heights, having previously destroyed 19 tanks. Then the 7th battery of Senior Lieutenant V.P. Gerasimov took over the battle. And the last one is the 2nd battery. Almost the entire artillery brigade of Rukosuev died in those battles and is buried here. But the enemy’s attacks on the northern edge of the arc finally fizzled out. Already on July 10 he was forced to go on the defensive...

On the stele there is an icon of artillery troops - crossed cannons. Danka has the same shoulder straps:

Behind the fence are new graves. Search work continues in the area; the remains of the dead are still being found and transferred here:

The next, penultimate stop before Ponyri is a memorial sign in honor of the heroes of the 19th Red Banner Perekop Tank Corps - IS-2 tank , installed near the Ponyri-Olkhovatka highway:

And the last point, already near the village of Ponyri - Mound of Glory. It stands on the border of two battlefields of July 1943. The mound was raised in 1968 by participants in the 4th All-Union youth campaign to places of military glory. Students and schoolchildren carried soil from the surrounding fields in backpacks. At the foot of the Mound of Glory there are slabs on which the appeal is written: “ Stop, passerby! Bow down to this earth! Here, during the menacing years of the Great Patriotic War, soldiers - guardsmen of the 6th Red Army Order of Lenin Rifle Rivne Order of Suvorov Division - fought heroically»

The next point is the museum in Ponyry.

But before I start writing about him, tell me what’s wrong with the photographs in this text? Due to the closure of Yandex Photos, I am trying to use Flickr photo hosting for the first time. Can anyone see anything? Is it visible normally? Ukraine is visible (should be visible)? Has the quality (relatively, let’s call it quality) of the photographs deteriorated compared to the previous ones? Any suggestions?

To establish the exact time of the start of the German offensive along the entire Central Front, the actions of reconnaissance groups were intensified, however, despite the efforts made, it was possible to capture the “tongue” only on the night immediately before the start of Operation Citadel. In a short battle in no man's land, the sapper of the 6th Infantry Division Bruno Formel was captured, who testified during interrogation at the headquarters of the 13th Army that his group had the task of clearing passages in the Soviet barriers on the front line and that the German offensive should begin at 3 a.m. 5'th of July.

According to the memoirs of Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, when these data were received at the front headquarters, there was practically no time left to discuss possible solutions. After a short consultation with the Headquarters representative, Marshal G.K. Zhukov, at 2:20 a.m. the order was given to begin counter-preparations. However, having achieved a certain surprise, the Soviet side nevertheless failed to thwart the enemy’s plans. Darkness not only limited the possibilities of observation and adjustment of artillery fire, but also excluded the intended actions of aviation.

Meanwhile, already at 2:30 the headquarters of the 16th Air Army sent out a directive to the corps and divisions that determined the actions of the aviators for the coming hours. The order of the commander of the 16th Air Army, Lieutenant General S.I. Rudenko, on July 5 read: “One third of the fighters should be ready at dawn to repel possible enemy air raids. The remaining fighters must be in thirty-minute readiness to carry out combat order No. 0048 - a special order. One third of the attack aircraft and bombers should be ready from 6:00, and the rest in thirty minutes readiness to carry out combat order No. 0048 - by special order.". For the first flight to the front line, it was planned to use three groups of the 6th Air Force with a total number of 40 fighters.

To understand the logic of the events that took place in the first half of July 5, it is necessary to consider the decision of General S.I. Rudenko in somewhat more detail. The above-mentioned order No. 0048 determined the actions of aviation in the event of the enemy going on the offensive, and contained a schedule of sorties for fighter and attack aircraft. Its commissioning was especially relevant for the command of the 6th IAC and the 1st Guards. IAD, whose main task was to gain air supremacy. According to Order No. 0048, the headquarters of these formations were to ensure continuous patrolling of at least 30 fighters from the first hours of the battle. However, the commander of the 16th Air Army considered it premature to introduce a busy patrol schedule, limiting himself to sending strong groups of fighters to the front line. This decision was justified based on the uncertainty of the situation that had developed by that time, but later, when the actions of German aviation acquired a large scale, it significantly disorganized the work of fighter formations.

Let us now move on to a description of the beginning of the air battle. The first groups of German aircraft were noted by Soviet observers as early as 4 o'clock in the morning. At about 4:40, with the start of German artillery preparation, the actions of the 1st Air Division bombers received an additional impetus - the targets of their attacks were the positions of Soviet troops and artillery in the Maloarkhangelsk area. In response to increased enemy activity, the command of the 16th Air Army scrambled fighters from the 6th Air Force.

The first to approach the front line were 18 Yaks, led by the commander of the 157th IAP, Major V.F. Volkov (Hero of the Soviet Union from 1.7.44). Among other units of the 6th Air Force, the regiment was distinguished by its assembled and well-trained flight personnel. While still part of the 3rd Air Army, it was staffed by the best fighter pilots of the Kalinin Front. Approaching the patrol area in formation of pairs deployed along the front, the Yakov pilots discovered about 25 Ju-88s bombing the location of Soviet troops in the Maloarkhangelsk - Verkhnyaya Sosna area. The entire area of ​​​​operation of enemy bombers was blocked by numerous Focke-Wulfs from III/JG51, which operated at altitudes from 2000 to 7000 meters.

The strike eight of the squadron commander of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Captain V.N. Zalevsky, tried to break through the FW-190 screen to the bombers. Only four Yaks managed to do this, attacking the Junkers from below from behind, while the rest of the group was engaged in air combat with German fighters. According to the pilots' reports, captain V.N. Zalevsky shot down two bombers. Two more Junkers were set on fire by Lieutenant Anufriev and Sergeant G. Kh. Kargaev. However, upon exiting the attack, the planes of V.N. Zalevsky and Anufriev themselves became victims of Focke-Wulf attacks. Both pilots, having received injuries, jumped out of the burning cars using parachutes. Captain V.N. Zalevsky, who was wounded in the leg, later died in the hospital.

At this time, ten “Yaks” of Major V.F. Volkov were engaged in an intense air battle with a whole flock of Focke-Wulfs. According to data recorded by the regiment headquarters, at the cost of damaging four of their vehicles, they managed to shoot down 9 FW-190s. The future Heroes of the Soviet Union A.E. Borovykh and I.V. Maslov distinguished themselves in battle. However, the command of the 6th IAC assessed the results of the battle differently, crediting the pilots with victories over 3 Ju-88s and 2 FW-190s. The air battle caused great enthusiasm among the ground troops watching. Documents from the 6th IAC testify that the infantrymen and tank crews greeted the appearance and attack of the red star fighters with cries of “Hurray!”, and at the end of the battle, the commander of the 2nd Tank Army, Lieutenant General A.G. Rodin, sent gratitude to the aviators.

On the German side, fighters from III/JG51 participating in the battle claimed five Soviet aircraft shot down, identified by German pilots as Mig-3 and LaGG. The first two victories, within two minutes of each other (at 4:45 and 4:50), were won by Sergeant Major Hubert Strassl from Detachment 8./JG51. We will mention the name of this pilot more than once, but for now we will point out that perhaps it was his attack that became fatal for Captain V.N. Zalevsky and Lieutenant Anufriev. German losses included 1 FW-190 from 9./JG51, which was considered missing, as well as, probably, a Ju-88A-14 of the commander of 8./KG1 (posthumously awarded the Knight's Cross, Michael Hermann), who, according to German according to data, exploded in the air. Of the Junkers crew, only one aviator managed to escape. Unfortunately, the lack of more detailed data about the death of the ace does not allow us to unequivocally state that he became a victim of the pilots of the 157th IAP.

In addition to the 6th Air Force, other fighter divisions of the 16th Air Army were also involved in patrolling the front line. Among them, in particular, was the 286th IAD, whose main task was to escort the attack aircraft of the 299th Shad. However, while the “silts” were forced to stand idle on the ground, the “shopkin” of the 286th IAD made several sorties to cover the ground troops. At about 6:00 a group of 8 La-5s of the 721st IAP, led by Captain N.M. Tregubov (Hero of the Soviet Union from 13.4.44), attacked about 50 bombers, identified as Ju-88 and Do-215 (throughout Apparently, these were Bf-110s from I/ZG1), which were covered by up to 50 FW-190s. Despite the inequality of forces, the pilots of the 721st IAP managed to carry out an attack, in which Captain N.M. Tregubov was credited with two victories over Do-215 and FW-190.

One of the victims of the attacks by fighters of the 16th Air Force was the Ju-87D-3 from detachment 7./StG1, whose crew, consisting of pilot non-commissioned officer Heinz Heinz and gunner-radio operator Gerhardt Schramm Gerhard, was captured by the Red Army soldiers at the location of the 70th Army. Sharing during interrogation their impressions of the resistance strength of Russian fighter aircraft, German aviators testified: “We arrived at the Soviet-German front on July 3 from Yugoslavia. On July 5, at 2:15 a.m., our squadron received an order to bomb Russian fortifications. Before we had time to drop the bombs, our Junkers 87 bomber was set on fire by a Soviet fighter. Frankly, we expected strong opposition from Soviet aviation and anti-aircraft artillery. However, the brutal rebuff of the Russian pilots exceeded all expectations and stunned us.”. Such a flattering description of the actions of Soviet fighters could not pass by Soviet propaganda. The testimony of the downed crew was quoted in one of the issues of the Sovinformburo. Noteworthy is the fact that in the StG1 loss lists, Hale’s crew is listed as a victim of anti-aircraft artillery.

The events of the first hours of the unfolding battle inspired optimism in the Soviet command. Ground attacks, which gave the impression of being poorly organized, were almost universally repulsed, and German air raids were decisively rebuffed by the fighters of the 16th Air Army. Everything changed at 7:30, when units of the 47th and 46th Tank Corps, after powerful artillery bombardment and air strikes, again went on the offensive against the center and left flank of the 13th Army, as well as the right flank of the 70th Army. This time there was no doubt about the seriousness of the enemy's intentions. The actions of the crews of the 1st Air Division of the 6th Air Fleet against the positions of Soviet infantry and artillery began to be continuous.

On the first and second lines of defense, large groups of German aircraft dropped many high-explosive and mini-bombs, designed primarily to knock out the artillery crews.

Unfortunately, the command of the 16th Air Army missed the moment of concentrating fighter forces to combat enemy bomber aircraft. Contrary to the developed plan for combat use, groups of 6–8 fighters continued to take to the air, which were not only unable to prevent massive raids on the combat formations of ground troops, but already on the approach to the front line they themselves became the object of fierce attacks by the Focke-Wulfs " Documents of the 6th Jacob testify: “The first battles immediately brought news that the enemy was appearing in massive groups and the nature of air battles was taking on a fierce form.” .

The main stress of the morning battles on July 5 fell on the aviators of the 273rd IAD and the 1st Guards. iad. A group of 6 Yak-9 and 2 Yak-7b of the 163rd IAP under the command of Major N. E. Morozov in the Maloarkhangelsk area was suddenly attacked from above from behind by twenty FW-190s. German fighters, echeloned along the heights, conducted almost continuous attacks on the Yaks. In 40 minutes of battle, five Soviet aircraft were shot down, killing three pilots. The losses of the German side amounted to two vehicles. One of the downed FW-190 pilots bailed out and was captured.

The departure of 10 Yak-9s from the 2nd squadron of the 347th IAP was also unsuccessful. Operating in the vicinity of the group of the 163rd IAP, the fighters of Major A. M. Baranov attacked large groups of He-111 and Ju-87 at about 8:00, while at the cost of losing four and damaging one Yak-9, they managed to shoot down only one Heinkel. and damage the twin-engine Bf-110 fighter. The second flight was even more tragic - the regiment commander, Major V.L. Plotnikov, died in an air battle. During the attack, his group broke up into separate pairs and cars. As a result, V.L. Plotnikov’s plane was shot down by a pair of FW-190s and did not return to its airfield.

Among the successful battles of the morning of July 5, one can note only the attack at the ninth hour of a large group of German bombers by eight Yak-1s of the 53rd Guards. IAP under the command of Senior Lieutenant P.P. Ratnikov. By that time, German bombers had built a real “conveyor belt” over the front line of Soviet units. Approaching from different directions, they took a combat course, following the front line. Having discovered up to 70 He-111 and Ju-88 flying at an altitude of 3200 meters, a group of the 53rd Guards. The IAP began to gain altitude, bypassing the barrier of enemy fighters. Hiding in the rays of the sun, the Soviet pilots soon found themselves at the tail of the enemy column, which in the Ponyri area began to turn onto a combat course. At this moment, P.P. Ratnikov’s group, at the command of their leader, attacked the He-111, and from the very first attack they managed to hit 2 He-111s and 2 Ju-88s. These planes were counted as shot down. Note that most likely the crews of the 53rd Guards. IAPs attacked a group of Heinkels from III/KG53, shooting down one or two bombers.

After a swift first attack, the group of Soviet fighters split into two fours, one of which, led by Senior Lieutenant P.P. Ratnikov, continued attacks on the Heinkel formation. The leader, together with his wingman Lieutenant A.F. Tselkovikov, managed to damage another He-111, but the latter’s plane was also seriously damaged by the return fire of the gunners. Having received burns, Lieutenant A.F. Tselkovikov made an emergency landing at the location of his troops. The same fate befell Junior Lieutenant Khomich, who crashed his “yak” while landing on the fuselage.

Despite the courage and dedication of the flight crew, the general situation in the air by noon remained not only difficult, but also in many ways tragic. In the first seven hours of the battle alone, the Soviet side recorded over 1,000 German aircraft sorties, of which about 850 were bombers. Tangible losses forced General S.I. Rudenko at 8:30 to transmit a telegram to the fighter formations, stating that starting from 9:30, army units were to act in accordance with order No. 0048. The headquarters of the 6th Air Corps noted that this was the decision of the commander “brought clarity to the deployment and use of the corps’ fighter forces. Then the work boiled down to releasing groups on schedule". However, as practice has shown, blind execution of orders and lack of initiative actually gave air supremacy into the hands of the enemy.

Sensitive losses in the first hours of the battle led to the fact that the headquarters of the 6th IAC and 1st Guards had to maintain the patrol schedule in accordance with order No. 0048. It was getting more and more difficult. Documents of the 163rd IAP indicate: “At the same time, there were so many hotbeds of attacks on our targets that it was not possible to send more than four to fight them. For every one of our fighters there were 6–8 enemy fighters.” .

Assessing the events of the morning of July 5, it is necessary to remember that relatively small forces of fighter aircraft were involved in the struggle for air supremacy. Thus, from the 6th IAP, only two regiments of the 273rd IAP were actively operating in the morning hours, while the already mentioned 157th IAP, consisting of 16 fighters, having carried out the battle we mentioned above, was in the reserve of the commander of the 6th IAP. go jac. The combat strength of the 1st Guards was also far from its normal strength. iad. The four regiments of Lieutenant Colonel I.V. Krupenin’s formation consisted of only 67 aircraft, of which 56 were serviceable. Thus, the average strength of a formation regiment ranged from 12 to 16 fighters. Only the 67th Guards stood out for the better. IAP, which included 27 Airacobras. However, this regiment was in the personal reserve of the commander of the 16th Air Army and did not take part in the defensive battle of early July. However, the reasons for the current difficult air situation were not limited to the insufficient number of fighter groups being sent. Unfortunately, unit and formation commanders did not take the necessary measures to improve control and guidance from the ground. The group of officers permanently located at the headquarters of the 13th Army, led by the deputy commander of the 16th Air Army, was unable to change the situation.

The difficult situation that developed in the first hours of the battle forced the command of the 16th Air Army to involve the 279th Air Force of the 6th Air Force in the fight for air supremacy. Unlike the neighboring 273rd IAD, the command of this division sent groups of fighters of 16–18 aircraft to the front line. However, the first battles also brought only disappointment and bitterness of losses to the subordinates of Colonel F.N. Dementyev. During the first three sorties alone, the 279th Air Force lost 15 aircraft.

Indicative was one of the first battles of 16 La-5s of the 192nd IAP with six FW-190s, in which, despite the loss of two of their vehicles, they managed to shoot down only one Focke-Wulf. In addition, another Lavochkin was hit by anti-aircraft artillery fire. Soon, 18 La-5s of the 92nd IAP in the Ponyri-Buzuluk area were attacked by up to 50 Ju-87 and Ju-88 bombers. The success achieved can be considered very relative - having shot down 2 Junkers, the group lost 5 of its aircraft. However, the most unsuccessful battle was the 18 La-5 of the 486th IAP, led by the regiment commander, Major K. A. Pelipets. At twelve o'clock in the afternoon, this group attempted to attack nine Ju-88s, covered by 12 FW-190s, in the Ponyri area. The fighters of the 486th IAP were echeloned at altitudes from 3000 to 4000 meters, as combat experience prescribed. However, the presence of clouds and poor flight conditions did not allow us to use the numerical advantage. After the attack of the strike six “Lavochkin”, its leading captain A. M. Ovsienko abruptly went up, as a result of which the group broke up. The restraining group of K. A. Pelipets, moving with an excess of 500 meters, also noticed the Junkers and tried to attack them. However, on the second approach, the plane of the commander of the 486th IAP was set on fire by the Focke-Wulfs who arrived in time. At this time, a group of 4 La-5 Lieutenant I. G. Menshov, walking at an altitude of 4000 meters, did not see the battle due to cloudiness and did not take part in it. As a result, 6 La-5s did not return to their airfield, and, according to various sources, one or two enemy fighters were credited to the pilots of the group.

Apparently, the opponents of the pilots of the 486th IAP in this battle were pilots from detachments 8. and 9./JG51. According to German data, in eight minutes of air combat they shot down 8 Soviet fighters, identified as LaGG-3 and LaGG-5. At the same time, the already mentioned Hubert Strassl won his sixth and seventh victories of the day. Just seven minutes after the end of the battle with Soviet fighters, the Focke-Wulf crews attacked the bombers and attack aircraft that appeared over the front line. In this battle, Strassl was credited with 4 more victories - 2 La-5, Il-2 and Boston.

As you can see, fighters from III/JG51 were over the front line just at the moment when the command of the 16th Air Army brought strike aircraft into action. The ground situation that had developed by this time in the center and on the left flank of the 13th Army had taken a threatening turn for the Soviet side. By 10:30, units of the 47th Tank Corps managed to break through the defenses of the 15th and 81st Rifle Divisions, part of whose forces were surrounded. The settlements of Ozerki and Yasnaya Polyana were captured.

Another powerful blow was delivered by the 46th Tank Corps on the right flank of the 70th Army. German bombers, without encountering serious resistance in the air, provided very effective support to their infantry and tanks, helping to break through the defensive lines in this area. So, for example, the 132nd Rifle Division of the 70th Army, having gained a foothold on the Gnilets-Krasny Ugolok line and repulsed three attacks on its positions, was forced to retreat after a massive attack by up to eighty Ju-87s from StG1. The report of the operational department of the 70th Army on the hostilities noted that German aviation “Waves of 20–25 aircraft bombed the battle formations of the 28th Rifle Corps all day long.” In total, about 1,600 enemy aircraft sorties were recorded over the positions of the 70th Army on the first day of the battle. According to army headquarters, 9 enemy aircraft were destroyed by anti-aircraft fire from the ground. According to the operational reports of the 70th Army, during the day of fighting, 3 German aviators were captured at the formation’s location.

During the battle, a dangerous crisis arose. Large groups of tanks and infantry of the 47th Tank Corps began to break through to the settlements of Ponyri, Snova, Podolyan. The command of the Central Front abandoned the reserves at hand. At the same time, at 10:30, the commander of the 2nd Tank Army, Lieutenant General A.G. Rodin, received an order to begin moving the 3rd and 16th Tank Corps to the breakthrough site, which was supposed to ensure the stability of the 13th Army's defense. Air cover for the tankers was provided by specially designated groups of fighters of the 16th Air Army, but German front-line aviation was so busy with attacks on the front line that the movement of large masses of armored vehicles of the 2nd Tank Army took place with virtually no influence on its part.

The strong trump card of the Central Front command in the current situation continued to be the strike aircraft of the 16th Air Army, which had been waiting for the signal to take off since the very morning. The calculation of Lieutenant General S.I. Rudenko, who abandoned raids on enemy airfields that were dubious in their effectiveness, turned out to be correct. Having received a very figurative order from General K.K. Rokossovsky to “straighten your shoulders,” the commander of the 16th Air Army took into the air to localize a breakthrough in the 13th Army zone of the 221st, 241st Badge, as well as the 2nd Guards. and 299th shad. At the same time, part of the forces of the 283rd and 286th IAD were also involved in the struggle for air supremacy. The measures taken by the Soviet side did not go unnoticed by the enemy. The headquarters of Army Group Center noted the strengthening of the actions of the red star aircraft in the final reconnaissance report for July 5: “Enemy aviation, after initial confusion, switched to planned actions” .

Speaking about the participation of bomber aviation of the 16th Air Army in the battles on July 5, we note that the main load fell on the crews of the Boston bombers of the 221st Bad, who flew 89 sorties during the day. To accompany them, fighters of the 282nd IAD, also part of the 6th SAF, took to the air 103 times. Despite the opposition of German fighters and strong anti-aircraft fire from the ground, the losses of the 221st Badge were relatively small - only 4 aircraft did not return to their airfields, and two more bombers made forced landings. German data are not very different from Soviet ones. According to them, JG51 and JG54 fighters shot down 7 American-made bombers during the day.

The Pe-2 crews of the 241st Badge carried out sorties with only two groups, consisting of 5 and 8 Pe-2s, respectively.

The eight “pawns” were forced, due to the absence of enemy troops in the designated strike area, to bombard a reserve target - a concentration of German tanks in a grove 2 kilometers east of Nizhny Tagino. But the crews of 5 Pe-2 covered up to an infantry battalion, 6 tanks and about 40 carts with troops and cargo in the Yasnaya Polyana - Novy Khutor area. As one of the captured German soldiers of the 292nd Infantry Division later testified, bomb explosions covered German positions over an area of ​​about two kilometers, and some fragmentation bombs hit either the trenches or their parapets. As a result, only one battalion lost 23 people killed; and another 56 military personnel were injured.

Let us note that the crews of the 241st Airborne Regiment dropped 66 FAB-100s, 32 AO-15s, 40 AO-10s, 38 AO-8s and 120 ZAB-2.5s during 13 sorties. All Pe-2s that returned from the combat mission had a lot of damage. On one of the “pawns” the mechanics counted up to 40 fragmentation holes. At the same time, the losses of the 241st Badge were minimal. Attacked by a dozen German fighters, the eight Pe-2s lost only one aircraft, which made an emergency landing. Another “pawn” already had its landing gear collapsed during the run - as a result, the crashed bomber had to be written off.

The actions of the attack aircraft from the 2nd Guards turned out to be very effective. and 299th shad. The more united and experienced flight personnel of the 2nd Guards differed for the better. Shad, who went through the harsh school of fighting at Stalingrad. Of the four assault regiments available in the division, three were involved in the battles of the first day (59th, 78th and 79th Guards Cap). At the cost of the loss of 4 attack aircraft, according to the reports of the formation’s crews, 31 tanks, 30 cars, 3 armored vehicles, and other equipment were destroyed. Many attack aircraft were damaged, and the plane of junior lieutenant Popov from the 78th Guards. The cap, having suffered from both anti-aircraft fire and Focke-Wulf attacks, landed on the fuselage at its airfield.

It was much harder for the personnel of the 299th Shad, which suffered heavy losses in a number of air battles. Thus, eight Il-2s under the command of Lieutenant Mitusov lost six vehicles in one flight. In another group of the 217th Shap, three Il-2s were shot down after a surprise attack by Focke-Wulfs. Only the excellent survivability of the “silts” saved us - one plane made an emergency landing, but the rest still made it to their airfield. But all the radio operator gunners on the planes were wounded, and one of them later died in hospital.

Already by 12:00, the number of sorties carried out by the subordinates of General S.I. Rudenko exceeded 500. Note that attack aircraft operated mainly in groups of 6–8 aircraft, which did not allow them to effectively hit large masses of armored vehicles, as well as increased the consumption of fighter escort sorties. It is not surprising that, covering the actions of the attack aircraft, German sources emphasized: “Soviet attack aircraft appeared over the battlefield around noon, but they failed to seriously interfere with the actions of our ground forces.”. Be that as it may, by the afternoon the situation in the 13th Army zone had been somewhat stabilized. Air strikes, as well as destructive artillery fire, made it possible to neutralize the enemy's emerging success in a short time. The German tanks stopped, turning into motionless firing points, and the infantry was forced to lie down.

The captured chief corporal of the 5th company of the 167th regiment Baumhof also gave eloquent testimony about the first day of fighting: “I will never forget the first day of our offensive. I had no hope of getting out of the battle alive. Our regiment suffered very heavy losses. Other regiments of the division suffered even more. By noon 5 July 216 regiment, thrown to break through the Russian defense, lost two-thirds of its personnel, but achieved no result. The pitiful remnants of the regiment were withdrawn to the second echelon. The orderlies did not have time to carry out the wounded. One sanitary non-commissioned officer told me that the dressing station resembles a slaughterhouse yard.”

By the afternoon, the intensity of the fighting on the front of the 13th and 70th armies had reached its climax. According to eyewitnesses, by this time the enemy had ensured that up to 300 bombers and about 100 fighters were simultaneously over the front line of the Soviet defense. In addition, observation posts located in the zone of the neighboring Bryansk Front repeatedly reported the passage of groups numbering up to 150 bombers.

The second half of the day also passed with German aviation dominating the air. Despite fierce resistance from units of the 13th and 70th armies, German troops managed to advance approximately 4–5 kilometers into the depths of the Soviet defense. Summarizing the result of the fighting of the 13th Army, the front commander, General K. K. Rokossovsky, noted in his report to Headquarters: “Units of the army, repelling continuous attacks by enemy tanks and infantry, supported by large groups of aviation, held their positions for three hours. Only after repeated art. air training, bringing up to 400 tanks into battle, the enemy managed to push back army units.” .

The command of Army Group Center emphasized the special role of the 1st Air Division's aviation in achieving this success, noting that large forces of bomber, attack and fighter aircraft supported the offensive operation of the ground forces in successive waves. Numerous direct hits were recorded on artillery batteries, field positions and transport columns.

The intensity of the air battles continued almost until dusk. During the day, guidance from the ground improved somewhat, but even this did not guarantee the disruption of enemy bombing. Thus, a large group of 19 La-5s of the 92nd IAP, which took off on a mission at 12:30, was directed by the Shtyk-2 station in the Podolyan-Tagino area to a mixed group of bombers consisting of 15 Ju-87, 7 Ju-88 and 6 He-111s, covered by a dozen Focke-Wulfs. Dividing into two groups of 12 and 7 aircraft, Soviet pilots attacked enemy bombers and fighters. The analysis carried out by the staff of the 6th IAC headquarters following the results of the previous battle showed that the actions of the pilots of both groups, led by Major D. A. Medvedev and Senior Lieutenant N. G. Butoma, were disjointed. As a result, although the crews were credited with three downed bombers and four fighters, with the loss of two La-5s, the overall result of the battle was considered unsuccessful.

Note that the groups of the 279th IAD continued to suffer heavy losses in air battles until the very end of the day. A group of 16 La-5s of the 486th IAP, which took off from its airfield at 15:15 in an air battle over the Ponyri area with 30 Ju-88s and Bf-110s, covered by a large number of fighters, lost 4 vehicles, shooting down only one Ju-88. Even more tragic was the departure of a group from the neighboring 192nd IAP in the period 19:15–20:40. Led by the regiment commander, Major Kizilov, 15 La-5s in the Maloarkhangelsk-Ponyri area attacked Ju-88 bombers, covered by FW-190 fighters. As a result of the battle, 6 La-5s were lost, plus another of our planes made an emergency landing in a field with the landing gear retracted, while the pilots recorded only four shot down German fighters.

It was in the evening hours that crowned the bloody day of July 5 that the only ram of the entire day was carried out. The pilot of the 54th Guards distinguished himself. IAP junior lieutenant V.K. Polyakov, who, as part of four Yak-1s, took off from the Fatezh airfield at 18:53 to repel an enemy raid in the 2nd Ponyri - Nikolskoye area. During the air battle, two “yaks” were tied up by escort fighters, and the plane of group commander Kalmykov was damaged and left the battle. Then junior lieutenant V.K. Polyakov attacked the He-111 formation on his own. Having approached one of the bombers to a distance of about 20 meters, the Soviet pilot opened fire and scored hits. However, the air gunner's return fire was also accurate. On V.K. Polyakov’s car, the gas tank was pierced, water drained, the right plane caught fire, and the pilot himself received a burn to his face and was wounded in his right arm. Realizing that the fighter would not last long, the brave aviator decided to ram the Heinkel. With a blow from the propeller and the right plane, he demolished the tail of a German bomber, and he himself, thrown out of the burning wreckage of the fighter, bloodied, with burns to his face, but still alive, landed safely at the location of his troops. The rammed He-111, apparently belonging to the KG53 squadron, crashed in the Voza area. This was the twenty-fourth air battle and the pilot's fourth victory. For the ramming over the Kursk bluff, Vitaly Konstantinovich Polyakov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union on September 2, 1943.

So, the first day of the battle - the most difficult and richest in losses for the 16th Air Army - is over. Having completed 1,720 sorties per day (1,232 of them during the day), its crews conducted 76 air battles, in which, according to army headquarters, they managed to shoot down 106 enemy aircraft. At the same time, the losses of the association of General S.I. Rudenko were truly devastating: 98 aircraft did not return to their airfields during the day.

The lion's share of losses of the 16th Air Army, about 75%, were aircraft from fighter aviation formations. Suffice it to say that the 6th JAK alone lost 45 vehicles during the day. The combat strength of his regiments was greatly reduced. By the end of the day, some of them were, at best, reinforced squadrons. So, for example, in the 273rd IAP in the 157th IAP there were 16, and in the 163rd and 347th IAP, respectively, 6 and 7 serviceable “yaks” of various modifications. The combat strength of the 279th IAP was significantly reduced, where the number of La-5 fighters per day decreased in the 92nd IAP from 27 to 19, in the 192nd IAP and 486th IAP from 24 to 13 each. The aviators of the 1st Guards, who fought shoulder to shoulder with the pilots of the 6th Air Corps, lost nine aircraft. iad. Despite the relatively small number of losses, due to the large number of damaged vehicles, the combat effectiveness of some regiments fell sharply. This was especially true of the 54th Guards. iap. Data submitted to the division headquarters, apparently even before the ramming committed by junior lieutenant V.K. Polyakov, indicated that out of 13 fighters (12 serviceable) available at the beginning of the day, by the end of the day only 3 could take off Yak-1 and 2 Yak-9, while 7 vehicles were under repair. Also heavily damaged during the first day of fighting was the 286th IAD, which was busy all day escorting attack aircraft and fighting for air supremacy. During the battles, it lost 14 fighters, 8 of which belonged to the 721st IAP.

The reasons for such heavy losses were obvious. Describing the first day of the Battle of Kursk, the headquarters of the 6th Air Force noted: “This was the first baptism of fire for the young flight personnel of the corps, who could not stay in the group and in combat figures”. Indeed, the basis of most formations (not only the 6th IAC) were young pilots who had undergone accelerated training in flight schools and reserve regiments. According to the 6th IAC, a fighter pilot arriving at the front in the summer of 1943 had only 2-3 training air battles under his belt. While piloting the plane well individually, yesterday's cadets nevertheless found it difficult to operate in a group, which was especially noticeable in the example of the combat work of the 92nd, 192nd and 163rd IAP. The actions of the pilots of the 163rd IAP were considered particularly unsuccessful. The history of the piece says: “The first day in this grandiose battle was unsuccessful for the regiment, which was the reason for issuing a special order for 16 VA, accusing our pilots of indecision bordering on cowardice.” .

Shortcomings in the flight and fire training of young pilots were aggravated by organizational troubles. When flying out on a combat mission on alert, groups often did not gather over the airfield, and the leaders did not wait for the wingmen. As a result, the fighters entered the battle separately, without increasing their forces. Calls of groups to extermination areas were in most cases late. Guidance officers misjudged the air situation and did not assist the pilots in illuminating it. Noting shortcomings in the fighter guidance system, documents from the headquarters of the 16th Air Force testify: “In the first days of combat work, our fighters failed to paralyze the enemy. The fighters walked in the rear, did not see the enemy, sometimes fought against screens, acted sluggishly and reluctantly, due to which the losses in the first days were large. This happened because the guidance radio stations were placed 4–5 km from the front line; observation was difficult due to inclement weather, smoke from fires, artillery and bombing.” .

Another major shortcoming in the actions of Soviet fighter aviation was the desire of the crews to fight over their territory, as a result of which, as the documents of the 6th Air Force note, “the arrival of the bombers became known to the corps command at the moment of the bombing” .

The current situation is most accurately characterized by the lines from the report on the combat operations of the 486th IAP, which can be attributed to many Soviet air units: “From the first days of the enemy’s offensive, air battles in most cases proceeded unorganized, there was no interaction between the covering and restraining groups. Leading groups made little use of radio to guide group air battles. Weak teamwork between the crews in pairs and groups was revealed. The leading pairs lost their senior groups in a group air battle, and the trailing pairs lost their leading groups, which was the result of losses from enemy fighters of the leading groups.”. Let us note that in the 6th IAK alone, during the first day of fighting, three group commanders were killed, including the commanders of the 347th and 486th IAP, which was largely explained by the lack of teamwork and mutual assistance.

In contrast to the Soviet side, the German command at all levels praised the actions of their aviators. During the day, 2,088 sorties were flown, during which “The 1st Aviation Division brilliantly supported the troops of the 9th Army that went on the offensive. In total, 9 A supported 1909 bombers and fighters(meaning sorties. - Note auto),which had a decisive influence on the success of the offensive" .

The crews of Stukas and twin-engine bombers were the most active, completing 647 and 582 sorties, respectively. The fighters of the JG51 and JG54 squadrons practically kept pace with them, destroying 158 Soviet aircraft during 533 sorties. Another 11 victories were attributed to anti-aircraft artillery. As you can see, the successes of the German side were overestimated by approximately 1.5 times. Among the fighters, the pilots of I/JG54 achieved the greatest success, with at least 59 victories to their credit. Group III/JG51 was in second place with 45 victories.

The already mentioned pilot of the 8./JG51 detachment, Hubert Strassl, achieved a phenomenal result by the end of the day, bringing the tally of his victories to 15 downed aircraft, 9 of which were fighters. The second most successful pilot of the 6th Air Fleet was Scheel Gunther from detachment 2./JG54, who shot down 8 Soviet aircraft. 7 victories each were recorded in the combat accounts of Rudolf Rademacher Rudolf and Hermann Lucke Hermann from 1./JG54 and 9./JG51. Luke won all his victories during 3 missions. At least three more pilots scored 5 victories. Among them, we note Chief Sergeant Major Anton Hafner, who by July 11 won his 50th victory. Hafner, who had achieved 204 victories by the time of his death on October 17, 1944, became the most successful pilot of the JG51 squadron.

It is important to emphasize that the actions of German fighters were aimed primarily at the destruction of Soviet aviation. Repeatedly during the day, there were cases when large groups of Focke-Wulfs, numbering 30–40 vehicles, attacked Soviet patrols while approaching the front line, thereby providing their bombers with the opportunity to “work” on ground targets almost unhindered. It is not surprising that, describing the events of the tragic day of July 5 in his memoirs, the former commander of the 16th Air Army S.I. Rudenko was forced to diplomatically note: “The first day did not bring us satisfaction”. The statements of German military leaders regarding the actions of Soviet aviation are much more definite. Thus, the former chief of staff of the 6th Air Fleet, Friedrich Kless, summing up the results on July 5, noted: “Undoubtedly, on July 5, the Luftwaffe turned out to be the master of the battlefield. The breakthrough occurred without any significant intervention from the Air Force." .

What were the losses of German air units during the first day of fighting? According to reports from the headquarters of the 6th Air Fleet, the losses of General von Greim's association amounted to only 7 aircraft (1 Ju-88, 2 Ju-87, 1 Bf-110 and 2 FW-190). Let us note that these same figures were later duplicated in the OKW combat diary. Meanwhile, the list of losses of the 6th Air Fleet, compiled on the basis of the reports of the Quartermaster General, gives us a slightly different picture. According to him, at least 33 aircraft were lost and damaged. At the same time, classifying as decommissioned aircraft those whose percentage of damage exceeded or was equal to 40%, we obtain that the irretrievable losses of the 1st Air Division on July 5 amounted to 21 aircraft (3 Ju-88, 8 Ju-87, 1 He-111 , 7 FW-190, 1 Bf-110, 1 Bf-109). Thus, the losses of the Red Army Air Force were slightly less than 5 times higher than the losses of the 6th Air Fleet, and Soviet pilots overestimated their successes by at least the same 5 times. For the sake of objectivity, it should be noted that some German aircraft became victims of anti-aircraft artillery, and were also destroyed in accidents and disasters.

According to the author, the loss ratio of 1:5 is an adequate expression of the level of combat training, the tactics used and the quantitative ratio of the warring parties. An interesting fact is also that in his report to Headquarters following the battles on July 5, the commander of the Central Front reported only 45 enemy aircraft shot down in air battles. Probably, General K.K. Rokossovsky operated with preliminary data from the headquarters of the 16th Air Army. However, it cannot help but be surprising that as a result of the subsequent “clarification” the number of downed aircraft more than doubled.

So, the first day of the battle on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge is over. The actions of the crews of the 6th Air Fleet made it possible to inflict heavy losses on Soviet aviation in air battles, as well as provide effective support to ground forces. At the same time, units of General Model's 9th Army failed to build on their initial success. The loss of the element of surprise, the lack of infantry formations, as well as the persistent resistance of units of the 13th and 70th armies and massive attacks by Soviet aviation made the prospects for a further attack on Kursk from the north very uncertain. A rapid breakthrough in the style of a “tank raid” was out of the question. The intelligence data was also alarming for the command of the 9th Army, according to which: “6.7 should be expected, first of all, to the west of the Orel-Kursk railway, as well as to the north-west of Maloarkhangelsk, counterattacks of enemy tank formations”. And indeed, already at dawn the next day, fresh reserves of the 13th Army, with the support of tanks from the army of General A.G. Rodin, launched a powerful counterattack on the advanced German units.

The results of the first day of the battle in the Kursk Bulge area became the subject of close attention of Headquarters. According to the memoirs of S.I. Rudenko, during the evening report of K.K. Rokossovsky, Stalin was especially interested in the issue of gaining air supremacy. It can be assumed that the heavy losses suffered by units of the 16th Air Army seriously alarmed the Supreme Commander. The leader was clearly not satisfied with the report of the front commander, who referred to the fierceness of the fighting and mutual heavy losses. From the very streamlined lines of memoirs of the former commander of the 16th Air Army, we can conclude that Stalin expressed his dissatisfaction with the fact that aviation did not have a noticeable impact on the course of events. In addition, he also asked whether the commander of the 16th Air Army was able to rectify the current situation. Nevertheless, K.K. Rokossovsky managed to convince the Supreme Commander that the next day the issue of air supremacy would be “resolved positively.” Despite the commander’s assurances, Headquarters took its own measures to strengthen aviation leadership. First Deputy Commander of the Red Army Air Force, Colonel General G. A. Vorozheikin, urgently flew to the Central Front, having received a categorical order from Stalin: “So that air supremacy is won tomorrow!”

In the current difficult situation, the command of the 16th Air Army urgently needed to take decisive measures to eliminate the failures in the organization of combat operations that led to the fiasco on the first day of the defensive battle. Improving the guidance of fighters from the ground required priority attention, for which additional officers from formation headquarters were deployed to the troops. The second most important task was air support for the counterattack of the 17th Guards Rifle Corps, as well as units of the 2nd Tank Army, designed to restore the situation in the center and on the left flank of the 13th Army.

It is obvious that it was impossible to make any significant changes in the organization of combat work during the short summer night. Planning air support for the counterattack of the 17th Guards Corps, the commander of the air army decided to separate the echelons of attack aircraft and bombers of the 221st bad with altitudes of 1000 and 2000 meters, respectively. As you can see, the bomber aviation forces involved in this operation were represented by only one division, while the most powerful bomber formation of the 16th Air Army - the 3rd tank (as well as several fighter and attack air regiments) remained in the reserve of General S.I. Rudenko. To give the enemy the impression of a larger number of vehicles participating in the raid, groups of attack aircraft had to make several approaches to the target from different directions and altitudes.

At about 4:00, after a short artillery preparation, as well as an attack by attack aircraft, units of the 17th Guards Rifle Corps went on the offensive along with three divisions advancing from the Maloarkhangelsk area. Having defeated the enemy troops, units of the Soviet infantry reached the line 1st Ponyri - Druzhovetsky - Bobrik already at six o'clock. Let us note that from the memoirs of S.I. Rudenko it follows that the infantry offensive was supported by groups of Il-2s and Boston bombers that simultaneously appeared in the air. However, according to archival documents, units of the 221st Badge took off to carry out the first combat mission after 6 a.m., that is, when the rifle units had already achieved their success. So, only at 6:08 did groups of “Bostons” of the 57th BAP begin to take off, and after another 12 minutes the neighboring 8th Guards also set off on a mission. and 745th bap. Most likely, the actions of the bomber crews preceded the offensive in the direction of the Steppe by the brigades of the 16th Tank Corps, which, despite the hopes placed on it, was not successful. The lead 107th tank brigade, moving towards Butyrki, fell into an ambush organized by the enemy and was almost completely destroyed by fire from heavy tanks and self-propelled guns, losing almost 70 T-34s and T-70s. Other parts of the corps did not achieve noticeable success either.

The crews of the 221st battalion continued to fly sorties until the second half of the day, bombing concentrations of enemy manpower and equipment in the areas of Senkovo, Novy Khutor, Ozerki, Yasnaya Polyana, Podolyan, Verkhnee Tagino. July 6 turned out to be the most intense day for the division of Colonel S. F. Buzylev and rich in losses during the entire defensive battle. 16 Bostons did not return to their airfields, with most of the losses occurring in the 8th Guards. and the 745th bap, which lost 7 and 6 vehicles, respectively. The losses of the crews of the 282nd IAD accompanying the bombers amounted to only 5 Yak-1s.

Let us note that the 221st bad suffered the greatest losses from enemy anti-aircraft artillery fire, which shot down 10 aircraft, while German fighters accounted for only 6 Bostons. These data almost completely coincide with the German ones, according to which the first three bombers were shot down by the commander of 1./JG51, Oberleutnant Joachim Brendel, as well as the pilots of the 9./JG51 detachment, Hermann Lücke, and Feldwebel Wilhelm Kuken. By the end of the day, German fighters from III and IV/JG51 managed to shoot down three more bombers from the 221st Bad.

The counterattack of the Central Front, carried out at dawn on July 6, despite the heavy losses suffered by the tankers, nevertheless had a very noticeable impact on the emerging situation. The initiative, albeit for a short time, was wrested from the hands of the enemy. Parts of the 9th Army had to launch attacks on the positions of the 17th Guards Rifle Corps, starting from noon, to restore the lost position. The ground offensive was supported by massive air raids, which played, perhaps, a decisive role in the ensuing battles. At about 15:30, from 50 to 70 Ju-87 and Ju-88 aircraft fiercely bombed the location of the Soviet troops, and the subsequent attack drove back parts of the 17th Guards Corps from their positions occupied in the morning. Describing the actions of German aviation over the battle formations of the 13th Army, the commander of the Central Front in his evening report to Headquarters noted that enemy aviation in groups of 20-30 and 60-100 aircraft continuously influenced the battle formations of the army troops.

The crews of German bombers also showed high activity in other sectors of the front. Thus, the headquarters of the 132nd Infantry Division, comparing the actions of German aviation with the previous day, noted: "On this day(July 6. - Note auto) enemy air actions were even stronger and more massive. Carrying out flights in groups of 80–100 aircraft, the enemy used the tactics of continuous movement of these groups. So throughout the entire day there were at least 100 aircraft continuously in the air.” .

Note that in the second half of the day the priorities of the command of the 6th Air Fleet shifted to the zone of the 41st Tank Corps, which launched an offensive in the general direction of Ponyri. At the same time, crises that arose in the sectors of the neighboring 46th and 47th Tank Corps forced the German command to redirect significant aviation forces there. Thus, the attack of the 46th Tank Corps on the heights south of Gnilets, planned for 19:00, did not take place, since the positions of the 31st Infantry Division, which was preparing to attack, suddenly came under a powerful attack by the 19th Tank Corps. It is unknown how events would have developed for the German infantry if not for the very prompt intervention of the 6th Air Fleet, which made it possible to repel the Soviet tank attack. As a result, units of the 46th Tank Corps advanced only a little more than a kilometer throughout the entire day.

Speaking about the activity of German aviation on the second day of the battle, it should be noted that it decreased by almost half compared to July 5. During the day, 1023 sorties were flown, 546 of which were carried out by Ju-87, Ju-88, He-111 and Bf-110 attack aircraft. At the same time, the crews of the 16th Air Army took their vehicles into the air 1,326 times. Let us note that the decrease in aviation activity of the warring parties occurred not only due to the large number of aircraft damaged the day before, but also due to weather conditions that sharply worsened during the day. Despite this, the intensity of the air battles, as well as their content, practically did not differ from the events of the previous day.

The most unsuccessful for the Soviet pilots was the air battle that took place around 9:40 in the Olkhovatka area, 2nd Ponyri. The patrolling group of 17 La-5s of the 92nd IAP of the 279th IAD (leading Major D.A. Medvedev) was divided into two strike (5 and 6 aircraft, respectively) and a holding (6 aircraft) groups. After the relatively clear pre-dawn hours, heavy cumulus clouds appeared in the sky. The holding group moving above received orders from the ground to gain altitude, soon losing visual contact with the strike groups, which, in turn, also tried to break through the clouds. Suddenly, at 3500 meters, Soviet pilots discovered 6 Ju-88s flying under the cover of the same number of Focke-Wulfs. From the very first attack, Major D. A. Medvedev managed to hit one “eighty-eighth”, which was recorded by the pilot as a victory. However, soon the group of the 92nd IAP broke up into separate pairs and vehicles, which, wandering in the clouds, fought with German aircraft that appeared here and there. The total number of enemy vehicles upon returning to the airfield was estimated at 40 Ju-88s and 16 FW-190s. According to pilot reports, 5 bombers and 5 fighters were shot down. However, even these figures could not justify the heavy losses suffered by the aviators of the 92nd IAP on this flight: 8 La-5s, almost half of the group flying out on a combat mission, did not return to their airfields! Among the dead were not only young pilots, but also the experienced squadron commander, Hero of the Soviet Union I. D. Sidorov. During an air battle with the Focke-Wulfs, the ace did not notice the enemy approaching his tail and was shot down.

On July 6, the level of fighter aircraft losses decreased slightly in absolute terms, amounting, as the day before, to a significant relative value. For example, the 6th Air Force lost 24 aircraft during air battles. Sensitive damage was also inflicted on the 1st Guards. IAD, whose regiments were missing 13 fighters during the day. A significant number of aircraft damaged in battle further affected the combat effectiveness of the formation. By the evening of July 6, as part of the 1st Guards. IAD (excluding the 67th Guards IAP, which continued to be in reserve) there were 26 serviceable aircraft and 17 in need of repair. The 30th Guards presented a sad sight. and 54th Guards. IAP, which by the end of the second day of the battle had only four and two serviceable fighters, respectively. Due to large losses in fighters, the command of the 16th Air Army had to actually combine groups of different regiments for patrolling. For example, fighters of the 163rd IAP operated in battle formations with the neighboring 347th IAP. As part of single groups, the Yaks of the 53rd Guards flew out on missions. and "Cobras" of the 30th Guards. IAP, and several Yak-9T fighters from the 54th Guards. The IAP reinforced groups of other regiments of the division.

July 6, except for the 1st Guards. IAD and 6th IAC, pilots of the 286th and 283rd IAD also took part in the fight for air supremacy. The crews of the latter performed especially well during air battles. Division documents note the actions of Lieutenant S.K. Kolesnichenko from the 519th IAP, who, leading four Yaks, attacked Ju-88 bombers three times in the Olkhovatka area. After the first attack on the bombers, one of the Ju-88s, set on fire by S.K. Kolesnichenko, went towards the ground with a large list. Junior Lieutenant N.V. Chistyakov attacked and set fire to another German bomber. After this, S.K. Kolesnichenko with his wingman Lieutenant V.M. Cherednikov entered into battle with the four Focke-Wulfs pursuing them, shooting down one of them. After the end of this battle, S.K. Kolesnichenko noticed another group of enemy aircraft, consisting of 6 Ju-88s, and attacked it head-on. However, soon the “Yaks” were again engaged in a battle with German fighters, during which junior lieutenant I.F. Mutsenko managed to knock out an FW-190 that had entered the tail of S.K. Kolesnichenko’s plane. However, at the same time, the young pilot himself went into a tailspin, eventually barely breaking away from the enemy fighters pursuing him. During this battle, Lieutenant S.K. Kolesnichenko won his third victory.

Pilots from group 10 Yak-1 of the neighboring 176th IAP under the command of Captain V.G. Lyalinsky were also active. At the end of the day, covering ground troops in the Ponyri-Olkhovatka area, where the situation had sharply worsened after the breakthrough of German tanks, they entered into an air battle with three groups of bombers, each of which consisted of up to 40 Ju-88 and He-111 vehicles. Based on the results of the battle, two bombers were credited to the leader of the group. One Junkers added to the account of junior lieutenant D.S. Kabanov, who, having damaged one German plane, was able to break away from the enemy fighters pursuing him, and then, overtaking the formation of bombers, launched another attack.

An interesting example of the effective work of fighters of the 16th Air Army was recorded by servicemen of the 1st barrier detachment of the 13th Army. At about 17:00, they watched as, west of Ponyri, a pair of La-5s of the 6th Air Force calmly settled down from below a group of 30 He-111s and shot down one of the bombers without interference. It is possible that the downed Heinkel became a victim of a pair of Yak-1s from the same group of V. G. Lyalinsky. During the battle, a pair of fighters, led by junior lieutenant S.Z. Shevchenko, broke away from it, and at about 17:00 they shot down a He-111 in the Ponyri area.

Despite the examples of heroism and self-sacrifice of the pilots, the air situation at the end of the second day of the battle continued to remain difficult. The level of losses of the association of General S.I. Rudenko exceeded all reasonable limits. During the battle on July 6, the 16th Air Army was missing 91 aircraft. Compared to the previous day, when the greatest losses occurred among fighter aircraft, on the second day of fighting a significant proportion of lost aircraft were Il-2 attack aircraft. For example, in the 2nd Guards. The shad were missing 17 “silts”, 9 of which were lost forever, and another 8 made emergency landings, receiving damage of varying degrees of severity. Even more significant losses accompanied the combat work of the 299th Shad, in which 4 attack aircraft became victims of fighters and anti-aircraft artillery, and 25 did not return from combat missions.

The 6th Air Force's reports, according to which 118 Soviet aircraft were destroyed in air combat and another 12 were shot down by anti-aircraft artillery fire, correspond relatively closely to the Soviet casualty figures. Among the most distinguished pilots one can again find the names of Hermann Lücke from 9./JG51 and Hubert Strassl from 8./JG51, who scored 4 and 6 victories respectively. The commander of 9./JG51, Oberleutnant Maximilian Mayerl Maximilian, also recorded 4 downed aircraft on July 6, bringing the pilot’s combat tally to 50 victories. The achievements of the crews of attack aircraft, primarily dive bombers from StG1 and III/StG3, include 29 destroyed and 12 damaged Soviet tanks. The command of Army Group Center noted the role of the crews of bomber aircraft, which were especially good at destroying the initial positions of tanks and at times provided sensitive relief to ground units.

Documents from the 2nd Tank Army note that throughout the day, enemy aircraft in groups of 60–80 aircraft continuously hovered in the air and covered every hundred square meters of area, paving the way for tanks and infantry. At the same time, according to Soviet data, the effectiveness of enemy raids had little effect on the combat effectiveness of tank units and formations. Thus, during the entire period of the defensive battle, the 2nd Tank Army lost only 9 tanks from German aviation. For comparison, we point out that during the same period the total losses of the army amounted to 214 tanks, of which 138 were lost forever.

The losses of the 6th Air Fleet, according to the association's combat diary, on July 6 amounted to only 6 aircraft (3 Ju-88, 1 Ju-87, 1 Bf-110 and 1 FW-190), although the Quartermaster General's reports contain mention of 13 cars, 8 of which were lost forever. One of the three Focke-Wulfs lost that day was piloted by the commander of I/JG54, Major Seiler Reinhard, who opened an impressive list of losses among Luftwaffe air commanders during the Battle of Kursk. A veteran of battles in Spain, where he shot down 9 Republican aircraft, Seiler commanded the 1st Group of the famous "Green Hearts" from mid-April, replacing the legendary Hans Philipp in this position. On July 5, the group commander was credited with 5 victories (4 fighters and an attack aircraft), and the next day two more victories. However, in an air battle, the ace, who reached the mark of 109 victories, was seriously wounded, jumped out of the plane by parachute and did not participate in air battles anymore.

The results of the two-day air battle over the northern front of the Kursk Bulge could not but cause concern both among the leadership of the Central Front and at Headquarters. Over two days of fighting, the strength of the 16th Air Army was reduced by almost 190 aircraft. Particularly heavy losses occurred in fighter aircraft. Thus, in the 6th IAC, which lost 81 aircraft and 58 pilots in two days of fighting, by the end of July 6 only 48 serviceable aircraft remained in service. A similar picture was in the 1st Guards. Iad, where there were 28 serviceable Yaks and Airacobras. The crisis of fighter aviation of the 16th Air Army was so obvious that after a conversation with General S.I. Rudenko, Marshal G.K. Zhukov ordered the transfer of the 234th Air Force from the 15th Air Army of the Bryansk Front to Colonel E.Z. Tatanashvili . This division, despite being staffed with young pilots, was in good standing with the command of the Red Army Air Force following the June inspection. Unfortunately, the journey of the 234th IAD to the Central Front was somewhat delayed. The order of Marshal A. A. Novikov followed on July 7, the next day the division regiments flew to the airfields of the 16th Air Army, joining combat work only on July 9.

According to Soviet historiography, July 7 was a turning point in the battle on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge. In the morning, the 9th Army launched an offensive on the heights north of Olkhovatka and in the Ponyri region, directing its main efforts along the Orel-Kursk railway. Units of the 4th Panzer Division were brought into battle. The 41st Tank Corps, after initial success in capturing the village of May 1st and reaching the northern outskirts of Ponyri, carried out several unsuccessful attacks on the positions of the 307th Infantry Division during the day. The crews of the 16th Air Army, whose actions became increasingly massive and purposeful, provided significant support to the infantrymen in these battles.

For the first time since the beginning of the battle, all three bomber divisions of General S.I. Rudenko took part in battles in full force, who in his order especially drew the attention of the crews to the accuracy of bombing. “I demand the bombing of not just a given area, but the search for the most important targets in a given area, especially monitoring the signals of your troops...”- the commander wrote in his order on July 7.

The bomber operations began at dawn, when about 45 Pe-2s of the 3rd tank bombed a concentration of German troops in front of the 13th Army front. Above the target, the crews noted great activity of German anti-aircraft artillery. At the same time, from 30 to 50 anti-aircraft shells exploded in the air. The enemy provided the same “warm welcome” in the afternoon. However, despite this, the aviators of Major General A. Z. Karavatsky, consisting of 30 Pe-2s, supported by attack aircraft, achieved impressive success. By this time, the rifle units had already repulsed two fierce attacks on Ponyri. Organizing a new attack, the enemy concentrated up to 150 armored vehicles in the Rzhavets-Druzhovetsky area, as well as large infantry forces. This accumulation of equipment was soon discovered by aerial reconnaissance. Up to 120 attack aircraft were taken into the air. According to the commander of the Central Front, the German units suffered serious losses, and their attack was thwarted.

Kurt Blume, a captured non-commissioned officer of the 2nd company of the 35th tank regiment of the 4th tank division, spoke during interrogation about the difficulties that German tank crews had to face when breaking into the Soviet defense: “On the night of July 5, Hitler’s order was read to us. The order stated that tomorrow the German army would launch a new offensive, which was destined to decide the outcome of the war. The 35th Regiment was tasked with breaking through the Russian defenses. Up to 100 tanks of the regiment reached their original positions. At this time, Russian aircraft attacked us and disabled several aircraft. At 5 o'clock our battalion turned in a wedge along the road and went on the attack. Having reached the crest of the height, we came under crossfire from anti-tank guns and Russian anti-tank rifles. The formation immediately broke down and the movement slowed down. The neighboring tank began to smoke. The company commander's lead tank stopped and then backed away. Everything we were taught has lost its meaning. The actions unfolded differently from how they pictured them at school. The tank breakthrough tactics we were taught turned out to be unsuitable. Soon my tank was hit and a fire broke out inside the vehicle. I hastened to jump out of the burning tank. There were at least 40 damaged tanks on the battlefield, many of which were on fire.”

A special role in striking German tanks was played by the Il-2 299th Shad, which actively used PTAB 2.5–1.5 cumulative bombs. Only at the moment of concentration of about two hundred tanks to attack the Ponyri, attack aircraft pilots flew about 120 sorties, achieving excellent results. The 431st group of senior lieutenant D.I. Smirnov (Hero of the Soviet Union from 4.2.44.) destroyed and damaged twelve enemy tanks in the Buzuluk area, for which they received gratitude from the command of the 13th Army. The eight of Captain K.E. Strashny destroyed and damaged eleven enemy tanks in one run. The pilots of the 874th Shap, operating in the Maloarkhangelsk area, expended 980 cumulative bombs on July 7 and 8, declaring the defeat of over forty German tanks with the loss of six crews.

It is important to note that the massive actions of strike aircraft of the 16th Air Army “confused the cards” for the German fighters, who were unable to disrupt these raids. So, 2nd Guards. Shad lost only 1 Il-2 during the day, and another 5 aircraft made emergency landings. Bomber losses were also relatively small. From the 3rd tank, 4 Pe-2s did not return to their airfields during the entire day, two of which were shot down by anti-aircraft artillery, and one Pe-2 on the 24th tank was damaged and finished off by German fighters. Another plane made an emergency landing. A similar picture was observed in the 221st bad, whose bombers made 125 sorties during the day in the areas of Steppe, Podsoborovka, Podolyan and Bobrik, losing only 3 aircraft from the 745th bad. Note that on July 7, victories over the Bostons were recorded for such aces as Joachim Brendel from I./JG51, Scheel Gunther, Schnorrer Karl and Happatsch Hans-Joachim from I /JG54.

The escort fighters of the 282nd Airborne Division showed their best in these battles, successfully interacting with the covered crews of the 221st Airborne Division. This was largely facilitated by the assignment of fighter regiments to the same bomber units. Thus, the 127th IAP accompanied mainly the 8th Guards. bap, 517th IAP - 57th BAP, and 774th IAP - 745th BAP. During the ensuing battles, the pilots of the 282nd IAD had to repel attacks by groups of Focke-Wulfs ranging from 6 to 20 vehicles. Already in the morning flight, eight Yak-1s of the 127th IAP captain I.I. Petrenko, covering the actions of 6 A-20Bs in the Podolyan-Soborovka area, counterattacked 10 FW-190s, who were trying to attack the bombers from below. The pilots of the 127th IAP endured another major battle in the afternoon, when 12 bombers of the 8th Guards. The bap, while retreating from the target, were attacked from above from behind the clouds by two dozen “one hundred and nineties”. Despite the surprise of the attack, there were no losses among the Bostons, while Soviet pilots claimed several FW-190s were shot down. In these battles, many aviators of the 282nd IAD distinguished themselves, including the future Heroes of the Soviet Union, captains K. M. Treshchev and A. P. Savchenko (127th IAP, rank assigned to 2.8.44 and 4.2.44) and senior lieutenant I. I. Romanenko ( 774th IAP, rank assigned 4.2.44).

The death of a hero was the death of the squadron commander of the 517th IAP, Senior Lieutenant M.I. Vizhunov. The escort group he led entered into battle over the 13th Army with a group of FW-190s. Having used up the ammunition of his Yak-1 and trying to prevent German fighters from getting to the bombers, Vizhunov rammed one of the Focke-Wulfs with his plane, diving onto the German plane at an angle of 90 degrees. Probably the victim of the ram was one of two FW-190s from IV/JG51 that went missing on July 7th.

Once again, the fighters of the 283rd IAD showed their best side. In the Ponyri-Molotichi area, 12 Yak-7b of the 519th IAP under the command of Lieutenant P.I. Trubnikov attacked four groups of bombers with a total of 22 Ju-88. The intense air battle lasted about 25–30 minutes. As a result, at the cost of losing one Yak, 2 Ju-88s were shot down, apparently belonging to Group III/KG51. Another Junkers was damaged. In addition, Soviet pilots claimed to have destroyed five German fighters.

Despite the fierce resistance of the Soviet infantry, by the evening of July 7, the German units managed to achieve some successes - after a stubborn battle, the northern outskirts of Ponyri were occupied. In the Olkhovat direction, units of the 17th Guards Rifle Corps, after a massive attack by German bombers, were forced to retreat 2–4 kilometers to the area of ​​altitude 257.0. The headquarters of the 16th Air Army especially noted the organization of enemy aviation actions in this raid. Three groups of German bombers appeared over the front line at about 19:00. The first two, consisting of 25–30 Ju-87 and Ju-88, bombarded the front line of defense of the 13th Army in the area of ​​​​Ponyri, Snova, Samodurovka, Krasavka. The bombing was carried out both from a dive and from a horizontal flight, while the German crews structured their maneuver in such a way as to exit the attack into their own territory. The third group of bombers, under a stronger escort of 20 fighters, made 3-4 approaches to the target. While the Junkers were busy processing the front edge, four pairs of hunters went deep into Soviet territory to a depth of 10–12 kilometers, preventing patrols of the 16th Air Army from approaching the bombing area.

According to the headquarters of the 13th Army, the third day of the battle was the most intense throughout the defensive operation. During the day, units of General N.P. Pukhov’s army set a kind of record, using up almost 3,000 tons of ammunition. Despite some tactical successes of the enemy, the results of the battles on July 7 aroused optimism among K. K. Rokossovsky and his staff. In Soviet historiography devoted to the study of aviation operations, July 7 is also considered a turning point for air supremacy. Here is how the events of this day are described in the study of M. N. Kozhevnikov: “On July 7, 1943, the main efforts of enemy aviation were concentrated against the troops of the Central Front. Here the enemy operated in groups of 80–120 aircraft, but was also unable to achieve air superiority. The 16th Air Army, with the assistance of the 15th Air Army, carried out 1,370 sorties, while the enemy carried out slightly more than 1,000. From that day on, Soviet fighters firmly seized the initiative in the air. Most of the enemy bombers were intercepted and destroyed by our fighters on the approach to the covered objects.". A similar assessment can be found in a book dedicated to the combat path of the 16th Air Army. Speaking about the events of the third day of the battle, its authors report: “Starting from July 7, a turning point occurred in the struggle for air supremacy - Soviet fighters seized the initiative. If in the first two days of air combat our losses were slightly less than the enemy’s losses (the ratio of losses was 1 to 1.2), then on July 7 and 8, army pilots shot down 185 enemy aircraft, losing 89.” .

German sources do not confirm a significant drop in the activity of General von Greim's association. According to the combat diary of the 6th Air Fleet, on July 7, compared to the previous day, the number of sorties not only did not decrease, but also increased significantly, amounting to 1687. Of this number, 1159 sorties were carried out by attack aviation crews - “pieces”, heavy fighters and bombers. Noteworthy is the fact that on July 7, not only the crews of Junkers and Heinkels were involved in attacks on the positions of Soviet troops, but also reconnaissance aircraft with fighters who carried bombs on board in 120 and 18 sorties, respectively. According to reports from German aviators, during the day they managed to destroy 14 and damage 22 tanks, as well as burn 63 vehicles. The losses of the 6th Air Fleet on July 7 were small, amounting to 13 aircraft, of which 8 were written off.

Despite the fact that German bomber aircraft continued to dominate the air on the third day of the battle, their fierce raids on the well-fortified Soviet defenses did not always bring results. For example, during heavy battles for the village of Teploye, the 11th Guards Tank Brigade lost only one tank from German aviation, although its battle formations were bombed by groups of Ju-87 and Ju-88 bombers all day. In addition, the effectiveness of German fighter aircraft fell by more than half. On the one hand, this was due to the devastating losses suffered by the 16th Air Army during the first two days of the battle, on the other hand, due to the massive actions of Soviet bombers and attack aircraft, which the German pilots were unable to disrupt. Note that the tactics of the Soviet fighters gradually began to change, the failures of which in the initial stages of the battle caused a sharp reaction both at Headquarters and at the headquarters of the Red Army Air Force.

Already on July 7, the directive of Air Marshal A. A. Novikov was published. Having briefly noted the positive changes that had occurred in the structure of the Red Army Air Force, which had significantly strengthened and grown in numbers, the commander analyzed in more detail the major miscalculations that existed in the use of aviation. The shortcomings, according to A. A. Novikov, occurred even at the stage of setting the combat mission. Often it was set vaguely, without indicating the necessary results that had to be achieved, which led to a decrease in the sense of responsibility among commanders. The aviators, as the commander-in-chief put it, were more eager to “to carry out the flight, and not to solve the task at hand.” Operation planning was also far from ideal. Staff workers often lacked a creative approach to their work; missions were planned in a formulaic manner, without changing altitudes or flight routes, or changing the method of attack. Immediately before the flights, reconnaissance of the target and its air defense system was not carried out. All this led to cases of missing the target. In addition, meetings with large groups of enemy fighters and powerful anti-aircraft artillery fire often came as a surprise to the flight personnel, among whom, according to A. A. Novikov, broad initiative and military cunning were not sufficiently cultivated.

The Air Force commander devoted two paragraphs of his directive to the management and use of fighters. Radio control, although actively used in all air armies, in the marshal's opinion, did not yet meet the requirements of the modern situation, and in some units it was inferior to other means of communication. The network of radio stations was not yet wide enough everywhere, and the personnel serving it often did not have the necessary qualifications. At the same time, fighter units rarely practiced free search in enemy territory and destruction of enemy aircraft on the approach to the front line. The rigid tying of patrolling fighters to a specific object or area deprived our pilots of the opportunity to conduct an active offensive battle.

Unit commanders were asked to pay close attention to pairing and their interaction during air combat. If possible, pairs should have a permanent composition, which was formalized by order of the regiment. All this, according to the commander, increased the responsibility of the pilots of the pair, especially wingmen, for ensuring the actions of their partners. In air battles it was necessary to create a numerical superiority by skillfully building up forces, which was achieved by using tactics very similar to those used by the enemy. Patrolling pairs had to, upon command from the ground, assemble into a single group to attack detected enemy aircraft.

Another important innovation was the selection of the best pilots from the general mass and the development of “free hunting” tactics behind the front line. The Air Force Commander emphasized: “The practiced free flight of the best fighter pilots (aces) should be carried out primarily in those areas of the front where the main aviation forces operate, without binding them to any specific tasks. Aces always, everywhere, have only one task - to destroy enemy aircraft in the air, taking full advantage of the favorable conditions of the air situation." .

With regard to the command level, the requirements of the directive boiled down to the need to develop initiative among commanders of air divisions and regiments, giving them maximum freedom when planning combat operations. The operations themselves were not to be carried out impromptu, but on the basis of a detailed plan. A special role in the current situation was played by the use of compact combat formations, increasing the level of defense capability of groups of attack aircraft and their interaction with covering fighters, as well as with their anti-aircraft artillery.

As can be seen from the above, for the command of the Red Army Air Force, major shortcomings in the combat work of aviation were no secret. In essence, they were “growing pains” rather than serious “chronic diseases.” Figuratively speaking, by the summer of 1943, the skeleton of the Air Force was assembled, muscle mass had taken shape in muscles, which nevertheless still required patient “pumping.” In addition, the new fighter needed a creative spirit, quick reaction and independence. But it took time to eliminate all the shortcomings and acquire high professionalism. It is important to understand that the Battle of Kursk only highlighted the shortcomings of the new structure, making it possible to outline ways to solve them. In the meantime, combat experience was gained in difficult battles and was generously paid for in the blood of the flight personnel.

The course of the battle on July 8 confirmed the correctness of the conclusions made the day before by the commander of the Central Front, K.K. Rokossovsky, who, following the results of the battles on July 7, in a conversation with army commanders, stated that the defensive battle had already been practically won. In the morning, we managed to restore the situation in the Ponyri area - the 307th Infantry Division with a swift attack regained the northern part of this settlement. However, heavy fighting here continued throughout the day.

Having failed in the Ponyri area, the command of the 9th Army concentrated its efforts in the afternoon on attacks in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bheight 257.0, located north of Olkhovatka. To capture the heights in the areas of Snova, Podsoborovka and Soborovka, according to Soviet estimates, up to 400 tanks and up to two infantry divisions were concentrated. Air reconnaissance of the 16th Air Army noted the continuous movement of vehicles and tanks from Zmievka through Glazunovka to Ponyri and from Zmievka through Glazunovka to Nizhny Tagino, as well as the movement of groups of vehicles along field roads from the Glazunovka, Bogoroditskoye line to the south. The fighting in the area of ​​height 257.0, which changed hands several times, raged all day. Only at 17:00 on July 8, it was captured by German units as a result of a series of attacks from different directions with the participation of approximately 60 tanks.

On July 8, the Soviet aviation command tried to make the necessary changes in the tactics of fighter aircraft, sending large groups to clear the airspace before the raid of bombers and attack aircraft. The first to try this method were the pilots of the 1st Guards. iad. 15 Yak-1s under the command of Hero of the Soviet Union Captain V.N. Makarov, directed from the ground by the division commander, Lieutenant Colonel I.V. Krupenin, conducted two large air battles over the location of the 13th Army in 40 minutes. In the first of them, the battle formation of group 40 Bf-110 from I/ZG1 was disrupted, after which V.N. Makarov’s group was redirected to the Olkhovatka area, which was already approached by up to 50 Ju-88 and Ju-87 aircraft.

As a result of the air battle, the pilots reported the destruction of 5 Ju-87, 2 Ju-88 and FW-190. Although German sources do not confirm the figures for Soviet victory claims, the experience of controlling fighters from the ground was clearly a success.

At the same time, the level of losses of the 16th Air Army on July 8 increased again compared to the previous day, increasing from 37 to 47 vehicles that did not return to their airfields. Updated data suggests that in two days of fighting on July 7–8, S. I. Rudenko’s association lost 89 aircraft. The bulk of losses on the fourth day of the battle again fell on fighter aircraft. The 739th IAP of the 286th IAP, which had been in reserve until that day, was especially affected. During the day of fierce fighting, thirteen aircraft did not return to the airfields, and eight of them were lost during one flight to the Ponyri area. Having engaged in an air battle with 14 FW-190s, apparently belonging to III and IV/JG51, the 739th IAP group was missing six aircraft in the air battle. Two more Lavochkin planes were shot down by anti-aircraft artillery fire.

As a result of heavy losses, the strength of many fighter formations had by this time dropped to a critical level. So, for example, only in the 1st Guards. At the end of the day on July 8, it was noted that the four regiments included a total of 19 operational and 14 aircraft under repair. Despite the current difficult situation, the command of the 16th Air Army nevertheless retained a reserve of two regiments (56th and 67th Guards IAP). According to the memoirs of S.I. Rudenko, G.K. Zhukov, who learned about this, expressed his extreme displeasure, however, having cooled down a little, he approved the actions of the commander-16.

Meanwhile, the issue of covering ground troops on the fourth day of the battle was so acute that it forced the crews of the 3rd Guards to be involved in this task. Iad from the 15th Air Army. The pilots of this formation flew sorties in the 13th Army zone starting from the first day of the Battle of Kursk. So, on July 5, 10 La-5 of the 63rd Guards. The IAP conducted an air battle with 20 FW-190s. According to operational reports, one Focke-Wulf was shot down, but 5 La-5s did not return to their airfields. The next day, aviators of the 15th Air Army flew 72 sorties in the Central Front. During three air battles in the area of ​​Shcherbatovo, Maloarkhangelsk and Krasnaya Slobodka, 6 Bf-109s and 1 FW-190 were shot down. However, their losses were also significant - 2 La-5s were shot down, 2 Il-2s made emergency landings, and 6 La-5s were considered missing. Among those who did not return were the commander of the 32nd Guards. IAP Major B.P. Lyubimov and his deputy for political affairs, Major N.D. Tarasov.

On July 8, out of 113 sorties carried out by the pilots of General N.F. Naumenko’s association, only 14 were carried out in support of the troops of the Central Front. 8 La-5 63rd Guards. The IAP under the command of Captain P.E. Bundelev at about 8:46 discovered and attacked in the Ponyri-Buzuluk area 16 Ju-87s flying under the cover of 16 fighters. According to the results of the battle, at the cost of two non-returning and one damaged fighter, the crews shot down 3 Ju-87, 2 FW-190 and 1 Bf-109. This marked the end of the participation of the aviators of the 15th Air Army in the defensive phase of the battle on the Kursk Bulge.

The fourth day of the defensive operation was also characterized by a decrease in the activity of the attack and bomber aircraft of the 16th Air Army. For example, the crews of the 3rd tank took to the air only 44 times. However, even out of this number, 18 bombers were forced to return due to the lack of covering fighters. One Pe-2 did not return from a combat mission. Units of the 221st Badge suffered somewhat greater losses, missing six crews.

According to German data, the fighters of the 1st Air Division claimed to destroy 5 Bostons, one of which became Hubert Strassl's 27th victory out of 30 he won during the four-day battles near Kursk. Strassl fought with III/JG51 from late 1941. Having shot down his first plane in July 1942, the 24-year-old pilot did not particularly stand out among his colleagues, having 37 victories to his name by the beginning of July. Nevertheless, in the combat biography of the ace, there were frequent cases of destruction of 2-3 aircraft per day. The most productive was on June 8, when Strassl added 6 victories to his battle account. With the start of Operation Citadel, the pilot immediately became the focus of everyone's attention, but military fortunes turned out to be changeable. Having brought his tally to 67 victories by the evening of July 8, Strassl was killed in a battle with a group of La-5 fighters (some sources mention LaGG-3 or LaGG-5). A group of Focke-Wulfs in the area of ​​the Orel-Kursk highway was unexpectedly attacked by a group of Soviet fighters, who managed to damage Strassl’s plane. While leaving for his territory, his black “four” FW-190A-4 (serial number 2351) received several more hits from the pursuing Soviet fighter. The canopy of the parachute of the German pilot who jumped out at an altitude of about 300 meters did not have time to fill with air, causing his death. On November 12, 1943, the pilot was posthumously awarded the Knight's Cross.

It is interesting to note that Strassl's aircraft was only one of two officially recognized losses on July 8 (the other was a Ju-87 from III/StG3). According to the Quartermaster General, 4 FW-190, 1 He-111, 1 Ju-87 were damaged in battle, and a Ju-88 from III/KG1 exploded in the air with its entire crew. In addition, the commander of the 3./JG54 detachment, Franz Eisenach, was wounded in an air battle, but nevertheless managed to land at the Panino airfield.

By July 9, the command of the 6th Air Fleet began to feel alarmed about the fate of such a successful operation. Here is what the chief of staff of the association, General Friedrich Kless, writes about this: “Continuous air battles, dragging on for a long time, reduced the performance of our aircraft; temporary air supremacy of the superior Soviet air forces was inevitable; the enemy could act directly against our troops in the intervals between Luftwaffe sorties. Due to the fact that the ground forces of the 9th Army were participating in an extremely important offensive, the inevitable tactical successes of the Soviet Air Force were extremely unpleasant for us.". There were still three days left before the complete cessation of Operation Citadel on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge. For the German side, they were the final chord of their former power both on earth and in the sky.

It would not be an exaggeration to say that by July 9, the offensive of Model’s army had reached a dead end. Having encountered fierce resistance from the troops of the 13th and 70th armies, units of the 41st and 47th tank corps on the fifth day of the offensive could achieve only minor tactical successes, expressed in another breakthrough to the northern outskirts of Ponyri, as well as in a small advance in area of ​​altitude 257.0. Speaking about the course of the battle, Stephen Newton aptly noted that his “it’s hard to characterize as anything other than a repeat of the Battle of Verdun with a lot of noise from tanks”. Despite the difficult situation that had arisen and the reconnaissance data that continued to arrive about the concentration of significant Red Army forces north and east of Orel, the command of the 9th Army and Army Group Center did not lose hope for a successful outcome of the Citadel. To a large extent, this optimism was determined by the situation on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge, where Hoth's 4th Tank Army reached the rear defensive line of the Voronezh Front. General Model did not abandon plans to resume the offensive. Having obtained permission from Field Marshal Kluge to transfer the 12th Panzer and 36th Infantry Divisions from the reserve to the 9th Army, he planned to regroup his forces and, by shifting the direction of attack in the southwestern direction, complete the breakthrough of the Soviet defense on July 12 .

The plans of the Central Front command at this stage of the battle were determined by the need to maintain the established status quo until the moment when the troops of the Bryansk Front, as well as the left wing of the Western Front, began an operation to encircle the enemy’s Oryol group. In addition to powerful anti-tank defense and rapid counterattacks, the most important factor ensuring the stability of the situation was the massive raids of bombers and attack aircraft of the 16th Air Army. Such tactics in the current situation proved to be the most effective, allowing the first attempts to concentrate the enemy for an attack to inflict sensitive blows on him. At the same time, its own losses were significantly reduced, and the use of escort fighters was optimized. Documents from the headquarters of the 16th Air Army especially emphasize: “The use of massive strikes was caused by the fact that the enemy concentrated large forces of tanks, artillery and infantry on a narrow section of the front to continue the offensive. Massive strikes were used against such targets.” .

Like the previous three days of battle, July 9 began with powerful raids by Soviet bombers and attack aircraft against concentrations of German tanks and infantry in the area of ​​Kashara, Podsoborovka, Soborovka. Around 5:30–6:00, six groups of Pe-2s from the 241st and 301st battalions took off, four of which carried out an effective bombing strike on the enemy’s position, dropping a total of 366 FAB-100s, 7 FAB-50s, 685 AO-10, 42 AO-25. According to the crews, they managed to destroy 12 tanks and suppress the fire of 2 artillery batteries. Two more groups of 18 aircraft each were forced to return to their airfields due to the lack of escort fighters.

It should be noted that in this raid, air clearance groups were used for the first time to support the actions of attack aircraft. Convinced of the effectiveness of the tactics used by the enemy, the command of the 16th Air Army decided to introduce this experience into its own units. The order to units of the 3rd tank for military operations on July 9 stated: “In addition to direct escort, 30 fighters of the 273rd Air Force (6th Air Force) will patrol in the target area 5 minutes before the strike. During the return route of groups of bombers, eighteen Yak-1 273 IADs were cut off.” .

The strike of the bombers and attack aircraft was observed by the commander of the 16th Air Army, who expressed gratitude to all the aviators who participated in the flight. Nevertheless, for the crew members of the “pawns” and “silts” this flight could hardly be classified as an “easy walk”. It was not possible to completely neutralize the activity of enemy fighters. Directly above the 3rd Group's target, the tank was attacked by aircraft from IV/JG51, as well as Bf-110s from I/ZG1. As a result of the battle, 4 Pe-2s were shot down, one bomber became a victim of anti-aircraft artillery, and two more received significant damage and made emergency landings.

The main damage came from the 301st Bad, which lost a total of six aircraft. Pointing to the cause of the losses, the bomber crews “traditionally” laid the blame on the escort fighters from the 279th Air Force, which were distracted by a group of German fighters simulating an air battle in the target area. This allowed the pilots of another group of Focke-Wulfs to launch a surprise attack on the pawns, as a result of which the regimental columns lost two vehicles each. During the attacks, the bomber crews noted the daring actions of the German aces, who, ignoring the fire of the shooters and navigators, repeatedly tried to break into the group of bombers in order to split it. The Focke-Wulf pilots mainly concentrated their fire on the wing tanks of the Pe-2. Despite the attacks, the Jagdfligers failed to disrupt the massive bombing of their troops - large masses of Soviet bombers and attack aircraft, traveling under a powerful escort, turned out to be a tough nut to crack for them.

The effectiveness of the strike is clearly evidenced only by the fact that if in the previous days after the bombing strikes the German troops with some delay, but still went on the offensive, then after the strike on July 9 the enemy was not active in the Olkhovat direction for the whole day. The command of the 2nd Tank Army sent gratitude to the pilots for disrupting the tank attack. On July 9, the 16th Air Army launched two more massive strikes in the Soborovka, Buzuluk, Podsoborovka, and Ponyri areas. This time, Boston groups of the 221st Badge operated here, which flew 69 sorties by the end of the day. Having lost only one aircraft of the 8th Guards to anti-aircraft fire. Bang, the bombers successfully completed their combat mission.

Heavy trials on July 9 befell the pilots of attack aircraft, whose groups were repeatedly subjected to fierce attacks by enemy fighters. According to German data, the pilots of the JG51 and JG54 squadrons managed to shoot down about 30 attack aircraft during the day. It was especially difficult for the 11 Il-2 299th Shad, which, when striking in the Wide Swamp area, were attacked head-on by eight German fighters. The Il-2 crews managed to drop a bomb load on the target, destroying and damaging up to 15 tanks and about 20 vehicles. As a result, the attack on the positions of the 3rd Tank Corps was thwarted. However, the tests for attack pilots were just beginning.

Carried away by the battle with the Focke-Wulfs, the La-5s from the escort group left the “silts” without cover, which the other “one hundred and nineties” were quick to take advantage of. The first attack by the FW-190 did not produce any results, as the attack aircraft stood in a defensive circle, supporting each other with fire. German pilots had to simulate leaving the battle. However, as soon as the attack aircraft began to rebuild the wedge formation, the Focke-Wulfs immediately attacked them again, knocking out four “silts” at once. The remaining seven managed to stand in a circle again, subjected to even more fierce enemy attacks. During the ten-minute battle, German fighters carried out more than thirty attacks. To avoid defeat from below, the Il pilots were forced to descend to 15–20 meters, eventually managing to break away from the enemy.

The pilots of the six Il-2s of the same 299th Shad, who followed behind, were much more unlucky. All the vehicles entering it were either shot down or made forced landings. The Yaks accompanying the attack aircraft of the 896th IAP were cut off from their charges by an unexpected attack by the Focke-Wulfs. As a result, each Il-2 was attacked by three or four FW-190s, and pilot Zadorozhny’s plane was attacked by as many as seven fighters.

The next day, July 10, the attack and bomber aircraft of the 16th Air Army operated on the same scale and with even greater efficiency. From the very morning, the enemy resumed his attacks at the junction of the 13th and 70th armies. Compared to the previous day, German aviation slightly increased its activity, flying 1,136 sorties before sunset. It should be noted that the increase in sorties was achieved mainly due to the crews of Stukas and twin-engine bombers, who, supporting their ground troops, flew almost 280 more sorties than the previous day.

Ground battles mainly took place in front of the front of the 17th Guards Rifle Corps. From 8:30 to 16:00, the formation's personnel repelled three powerful attacks by the enemy, whose forces were estimated at more than one infantry division and up to 250 tanks. In the difficult battle that unfolded, the aviation of the 16th Air Army also managed to say its weighty word. Around noon, a large concentration of enemy tanks and infantry was spotted in the Kashar area, which, apparently, were preparing for another attack. A powerful air force consisting of 171 bombers (108 Pe-2s and 63 Bostons) and 37 attack aircraft was quickly taken into the air. All these vehicles belonged to the 3rd tank, 6th tank and 2nd guards. shad.

Within three minutes from 12:47 to 12:50, eight groups of 17–18 Pe-2s, together with Bostons and IL-2s, launched a concentrated attack on a concentration of enemy equipment. Over the target, the Soviet planes were met with powerful anti-aircraft fire - at the same time, from 80 to 100 explosions were noted in the air. Despite active enemy opposition, the results of the bombing exceeded all expectations. As noted in the operational report of the General Staff of the Red Army: “Infantry and artillery observation established that as a result of an air raid in this area, 14 enemy tanks were burned and 30 were knocked out, and his infantry suffered heavy losses.”. The 2nd Tank Army reported that as a result of air raids on July 10, 8 tanks were burned in the Kutyrka area, 6 tanks in the area of ​​height 238.1-6, and up to 40 tanks were scattered in the Podsoborovka area. The enemy's major attack that was being prepared was thwarted with great damage to him. The losses of the Soviet side amounted to 1 Boston and 5 Il-2.

The command of the 16th Air Army especially noted the successful actions of the crews of the 221st Badge on July 10th. According to reports from ground troops, only after the Boston strike of the 745th tank in the area of ​​height 250.0, fourteen tanks were burned, the rest, apparently prepared for the attack, turned to the rear. This success was all the more significant since the combat performance of the formation from the beginning of the Battle of Kursk was not always at its best. Three times her crews mistakenly struck their own troops. There were also cases of dropping bombs into the field and scattering away from the target. And now, after a week of severe testing, yesterday’s “green” pilots demonstrated themselves to be mature fighters. The enemy also praised their actions. General Friedrich Kless, already mentioned by us, speaking about the actions of the crews of the Boston bombers (which he mistakenly calls “Bristol”), noted them "excellent discipline and exceptional aggressiveness" .

The ground commanders were also generous with their praise for the aviators. So, in particular, the headquarters of the 2nd Tank Army sent a telegram of gratitude to the commander of the 16th Air Army, which said: “During the day on July 10, 1943, aviation carried out a massive attack on a concentration of enemy tanks and infantry north of 1st Ponyri and height 238.1. The tankers looked with admiration at the work of Stalin’s falcons and bring you a big tankman’s thank you. We are confident that our military partnership will further intensify our strikes against the enemy and speed up our final victory over the enemy. Let us remind the enemy of STALINGRAD once again.” .

Let us note that the next day, July 11, the bomber and attack aircraft of the 16th Air Army did not undertake massive strikes. The command of the 9th Army clearly abandoned attempts to make a hole in the Soviet defense. In some sectors of the front, Soviet observers noted that the enemy had begun work to strengthen the defense of its front line.

From considering the actions of strike aircraft, let us turn to the struggle for air supremacy in the last three days of the battle. We have already noted more than once the heavy damage suffered by the fighter aircraft of the 16th Air Army during the first four days of the defensive operation. Among the formations, the 273rd, 279th and 1st Guards suffered the most. IAD, which by the end of July 8 totaled 14, 25 and 19 vehicles, respectively. By July 9, these forces were clearly not enough to combat enemy bomber and fighter aircraft, as well as escort aircraft of the 3rd tank.

The command of the 16th Air Army pinned its main hopes for stabilizing the situation on the entry into battle of the 234th Air Force, which had relocated from the Bryansk Front, under Lieutenant Colonel E. Z. Tatanashvili. This formation, numbering 87 Yak-7b fighters, concentrated on the airfields of the 273rd IAD by the end of July 8, occupying the airfields of Kolpna, Krasnoe, and Limovoe. The division came under the operational subordination of the 6th IAC, having received from its commander a combat mission for July 9 to cover the combat formations of ground troops in the Soborovka, Podsoborovka, Ponyri area.

Despite the bad weather, in the morning groups of the 233rd and 248th IAP were scrambled into the air, while the 133rd IAP was left in reserve by the command. Of the 79 sorties flown by the formation's pilots on July 9, 22 were spent overflying the front line and 57 on patrol. Oddly enough, no encounters with enemy aircraft were recorded. At the same time, as a result of a group loss of orientation, the division pilots made 8 emergency landings, in which five aircraft were destroyed. Two pilots did not return to their airfields. Note that, according to German data, on July 9, the commander of 1./JG51 Joachim Brendel achieved particular success, shooting down 3 Soviet aircraft during a 4-minute air battle. One of the downed fighters became the ace's 50th victory and the 400th victory of his squad.

The next day, already operating at full strength, the crews of the 234th IAK not only provided patrols north of Olkhovatka and in the Ponyri area, but also flew out to intercept the enemy when called from the command post of the 6th IAK. During the day, 11 air battles were carried out, in which, according to the pilots’ reports, they managed to shoot down 22 FW-190s, Bf-109s, and also knock out another Focke-Wulf. The division's losses for the same day of fighting amounted to fifteen aircraft, of which eleven were considered not to have returned to their airfield, one was shot down in air combat, two were shot down by anti-aircraft artillery, and another aircraft, shot down in battle, crashed on landing.

Although German bomber aircraft continued to fly sorties against the 13th Army's front line, the vast majority of engagements were conducted with German fighters. The heaviest air battle occurred around 13:50. Eight Yak-7b of the 233rd IAP, led by Senior Lieutenant A.K. Vinogradov, met 8 FW-190. Having noticed our planes, the German pilots went into the clouds. However, literally a minute later, Soviet fighters were attacked from above from behind the clouds by 18 Focke-Wulfs. A vertical battle ensued between the fighters. From the command post of the 6th IAK, six Yak-7Bs from the 133rd IAP were called to help, which soon also entered into battle, which turned out extremely unsuccessfully for the Soviet pilots. The losses of two groups of the 234th IAD amounted to nine aircraft, of which one was destroyed during an emergency landing. In fact, out of 8 Yak-7b of the 233rd IAP, only 3 aircraft returned to their airfield, and of the six fighters of the 133rd IAP that flew out for reinforcement, only two survived. As a result of the battle, the pilots' combat accounts recorded 9 downed FW-190s. In addition, one of the damaged Focke-Wulfs made an emergency landing south of the village of Mokroe.

With a high degree of probability, it can be argued that the Soviet pilots in this battle were opposed by Focke-Wulfs from IV/JG51, which shot down eight Soviet fighters, identified as MiG-1 and LaGG-3. The group’s own losses for the day amounted to 2 FW-190s belonging to detachment 12./JG51. Among the missing was Hans Pfahler (Pfahler Hans), a 29-year-old pilot who won his 10th victory in this battle since the beginning of the Battle of Kursk and brought his tally to 30 aircraft shot down. Perhaps it was his forced landing that was observed by Soviet pilots. It is possible that Pfahler was shot down by the pilot of the 248th IAP, Lieutenant A. S. Ivanov, after whose bursts the pilot of one of the Focke-Wulfs jumped out with a parachute.

The next day, July 11, the number of sorties flown by pilots of the 234th Airborne Division decreased by almost half. During seven group sorties (60 sorties), only three air battles were carried out. The balance of victories and losses recorded by the division headquarters was almost identical. Nine fighters were lost, despite the fact that, according to the pilots of the formation, they managed to shoot down 2 Ju-87s and 9 FW-190s in air battles.

The main load on July 11 fell on the shoulders of the crews of the 133rd IAP. Having conducted two air battles, the regiment was missing eight aircraft by the end of the day. The first air battle was especially unsuccessful when, at about 5:20, 10 Yak-7b under the command of Major T.F. Amelchenko, immediately before leaving for their airfield, met a group of 24 Ju-87s, which was accompanied by 30 to 40 FW-190s from I/JG54. Captain A. I. Eshchenko’s strike flight attacked the dive bombers, but was counterattacked by the Focke-Wulfs. The entire unit did not return from the combat mission in full force. Another “yak” fell victim to anti-aircraft artillery fire. Despite the numerical superiority of the enemy, Sergeant Major N. Ya. Ilyin still managed to attack the dive bombers, shooting down 2 Ju-87s. According to German data, in this battle, Scheel Gunther from the 2./JG54 detachment won two victories, and two more Soviet aircraft were shot down by the pilots of 3./JG54.

In the afternoon, pilots from the eight of the same 133rd IAP fought an air battle in the Ponyri area with 14 FW-190s. With the loss of 3 Yak-7b, the destruction of five Focke-Wulfs was announced. However, as in many other cases, German sources do not confirm these claims for victories. According to the combat diary of the 6th Air Fleet, only 2 aircraft were lost - FW-190 and Ju-87. The Quartermaster General's reports indicate that five aircraft were lost during the day (2 FW-190s, 2 Ju-87s and 1 Ju-88), and four more were damaged. Note that in total, during the period from July 9 to July 11, the 6th Air Fleet in the area of ​​Operation Citadel irretrievably lost 20 aircraft, and another 11 aircraft were damaged.

A heavy loss for the German side was the loss on July 11 of the commander of IV/JG 51, a veteran of the battles in Spain and holder of the Knight's Cross, Major Rudolf Resch. Having won his last, 94th victory over the Il-2, the German ace was shot down in an air battle and died. Unfortunately, it is not possible to establish the authorship of this victory on the Soviet side.

It should be noted that despite the fact that the battle over the northern front of the Kursk Bulge had already lasted a whole week, the fighters of the 6th Air Fleet continued to demonstrate high performance in air battles with a relatively low level of losses. In addition to well-established interaction and control in battle, the actions of the German crews were characterized by the use of various elements of military cunning. Thus, according to the report of the commander of the 273rd IAD, Colonel I.E. Fedorov, on the combat work of the division for the period from July 5 to 8, in order to get out of an unsuccessful battle, the Focke-Wulf pilots often practiced simulating a disorderly fall and a tailspin. This often created the illusion among young and inexperienced Soviet pilots of destroying the enemy machine, contributing to the unbridled growth of claims for victories.

We have already witnessed more than once that the numbers of victories and losses contained in the documents of the warring parties, when compared, often radically diverge from each other. Considering this very sensitive and painful issue about the effectiveness of fighter aviation, it should be noted that, while recognizing many shortcomings in its work, the documents of the 16th Air Army at the same time contain practically no materials critically assessing the number of claims for aerial victories. Thus, the report on the actions of the army in the defensive operation of the Central Front contains figures, the analysis of which cannot but cause surprise. According to him, the size of the German aviation group at the beginning of the operation, according to army headquarters estimates, was about 900 aircraft, among which there were 525 bombers and about 300 fighters. As you can see, the number of German fighter aircraft was exaggerated by the Soviet side almost twice, nevertheless, as a result of a week of combat work from July 5 to 11, according to the same report, 425 enemy fighters, 88 bombers and 5 enemy reconnaissance aircraft were shot down in air battles. Thus, the number of destroyed Focke-Wulfs and Messerschmitts, even compared to the inflated intelligence data from the beginning of the month, was 140%!

Analysis of German sources allows us to draw the following conclusions. According to the combat diary of the 6th Air Fleet, from July 5 to July 11, only 33 aircraft were lost (10 FW-190, 1 Bf-109, 4 Bf-110, 8 Ju-87, 6 Ju-88, 3 He-111 and 1 Ar-66). An analysis of the Quartermaster General's reports allows us to talk about the great losses of General von Greim's association. According to them, the number of decommissioned aircraft is 64 aircraft (24 FW-190, 2 Bf-109, 5 Bf-110, 15 Ju-87, 11 Ju-88, 5 He-111, 1 Ar-66 and 1 Fi-156) . Another 45 aircraft were damaged. It is possible that these data are also not entirely complete. Thus, according to the Russian historian D. B. Khazanov, by the morning of July 9, the JG51 squadron was missing 37 Focke-Wulfs. Nevertheless, one cannot expect that the order of losses on the German side will change by at least an order of magnitude when the loss figures are clarified.

An analysis of Soviet archival documents allows us to come to the conclusion that failures in the performance of fighters were associated not only with the level of training of the flight personnel and shortcomings in the management of formations. A significant amount of clarity on this issue is brought by telegrams to the commanders of fighter formations, which are contained in the file “Correspondence on combat work” of the 486th IAP fund. To begin with, we present the full text of the order of the chief of staff of the 6th Jacob N.P. Zhiltsov, sent to the unit based on the results of combat work on July 10:

“On 10.7.43, the following shortcomings were identified in the work of the fighters of your units.

1. Not a single group of fighters flew to the designated area to repel enemy bombers, but all went 8-9 kilometers to the south, i.e. Voza, Stanovoe, with the exception of group 6 IAK, which left at about 20-00. Enemy fighters patrol in pairs and fours in this area, tie up our fighters, and bombers without cover calmly bomb the front line in 50-70 Yu-88 and Yu-87.

2. Fighters in the air carry out unnecessary conversations, simply chatter, so they do not hear the guidance stations and do not say their call signs even when asked.

3. Enemy fighters move in pairs and counterattack in fours.

I order:

1. Inform me of the names of all leading groups to hold them accountable for failure to comply with my order. I demand that all leading groups and all pilots patrol over the front line and warn that for failure to comply with this order I will be held to the strictest responsibility - sent to penal battalions and even shot in front of the line for cowardice.

2. Establish discipline in the air. Stop chatting, and watch the air, report on the enemy, command with one or two words and listen to my radio station DUB-1, located in Olkhovatka, 3 kilometers from the front line, and the radio station “Bayonet”. Everyone should go through Olkhovatka and give their call signs, fight the bombers, and pin down the fighters. Division commanders should report to me the names of the leaders of each group and the time of departure.”

General S.I. Rudenko was more harsh and specific in his message, who wrote in a telegram dated July 10: “To cover your troops in this way is a crime, and failure to comply with my order is also a crime. During all the days of fighting, a meager number of bombers were shot down, and according to the pilots’ report, they were “filled” with as many fighters as the enemy did not have, while bombers fly in the hundreds even without cover.”. Threatening to send those guilty to penal battalions and even shoot them in front of the formation for cowardice, the army commander nevertheless appealed to the pilots’ sense of duty: “It’s time, comrade pilots, to stop disgracing our fighters, so that the infantry can unanimously declare that fighters do not protect them, do not fight with bombers, but hide in the rear, while the same infantry admires the courage and bravery of our attack aircraft and bombers.” .

Despite the threatening warnings of the army commander, the actions of the fighters the next day, July 11, left much to be desired. Let us turn again to the instructions of the commander of the 16th Air Army, who, characterizing the combat work of the fighters, especially noted:

“The radio command is not being carried out, this was the case on July 11, when the Dub-1 radio ordered Comrade. Vinogradov, Mishchenko, Silaev and Babenko go to the bombers. The latter accepted the command, but did not go. The airwaves during the flight of our fighters are clogged with unnecessary empty talk and other “obscenities”; they do not carry out precise commands.

I order:

1. All fighters strictly follow the previously given instructions on patrolling in the zone, considering the front line to be their main area.

2. When flying on call with enemy bombers, do not fly directly to the bombing site, but bypass the area where enemy fighters are intercepted significantly east and northeast of the city of Maloarkhangelsk, enter enemy territory from the rear and attack his bombers.

3. The commander of the 6th Air Force [instead of] sending 20 aircraft over the last few days to fight enemy aviation, from 12.7.43, send a group of 40 aircraft and strictly follow paragraph two of this instruction.

4. Bombers and attack aircraft, when flying to the target and back, take into account enemy zones in the air and also bypass them.

5. The commanders of the 6th IAC and 1st Giad should investigate the failure to comply with the order of DUB-1 and BAYONET...".

The devastating characterization of the actions of the front's fighter aviation came not only from the lips of the commander, but also from other aviation commanders. For example, the commander of the 279th IAD, Colonel Dementyev, noted that “All our fighters patrol 10 kilometers behind the front line, stubbornly do not go to the front line, fearing anti-aircraft fire, and allow enemy bombers to remain over the target for an entire hour.” The division commander's resume is saturated with bitterness: “I’m ashamed to look at this” .

The author believes that the above documents very clearly characterize not only the actual situation in the struggle for air supremacy, but also the attitude of the command of the 16th Air Army and commanders of fighter aviation formations to this issue. As you can see, even the introduction of the fresh 234th IAD into the battle did not change the current situation. During three days of fighting as part of the formation of S.I. Rudenko, the pilots of Colonel E.Z. Tatanashvili shot down 36 German aircraft, 34 of which were identified as FW-190, and only 2 Ju-87 bombers. At the same time, its own losses amounted to 27 Yak-7b and 23 pilots. Needless to say, most of the declared victories are not confirmed by German sources.

We have already pointed out the changes in the combat work of the fighters of the 16th Air Army that occurred during the defensive operation of the Central Front. The command of the Red Army Air Force considered it necessary to strengthen the leadership of the formations. Already on July 10, Major General E.E. Erlykin, urgently recalled from Leningrad, was appointed to the post of commander of the 6th IAC, which lost 85 aircraft and 54 pilots in six days of combat work. Until June 29, Major General A. B. Yumashev was at the head of the corps, after which only eleven days later the battle-worn formation was accepted by a new commander. Thus, at the most intense moment of the Battle of Kursk, the corps did not have a commander officially appointed to this position, and his duties, judging by the documents, were performed by the chief of staff, Colonel N.P. Zhiltsov.

Having familiarized himself with the current situation on the spot, General E. E. Erlykin the very next day presented a report to the commander of the 16th Air Army, in which he made proposals aimed at increasing the efficiency of fighter aircraft, mainly in the spirit of the directive of Marshal A. A. Novikov from July 7. The most interesting was the proposal to use the Redut radar located in the air defense system of Kursk and Shchigra in the interests of front-line aviation. The ground surveillance system of air surveillance posts did not allow detecting the approach of groups of enemy bombers to the front line, not to mention detecting the rise of aircraft from the airfields of the Oryol and Bryansk air hubs. The VNOS system, which was in place at the beginning of the defensive operation of the Central Front, did not justify itself. At best, it made it possible to detect enemy bombers at the moment of their approach to the front line, while there was no need to talk about detecting the rise of German aircraft from the airfields of the Oryol and Bryansk hubs. According to Erlykin’s proposal, it was necessary to use two Redut installations in the work of guiding fighters, placing them near the front line and ensuring communication with command control posts. Looking ahead a little, it is worth noting that the introduction of radar to ensure the combat operation of fighters began on the Central Front only after the end of the Battle of Kursk.

Another proposal that the commander of the 6th Air Force submitted for consideration to the commander of the 16th Air Army was the camouflage coloring of domestic aircraft. Having stated that fighters of all types are produced by the Soviet industry with a bright black and green camouflage, which was suitable for camouflage on the ground, but not for air combat, E. E. Erlykin especially noted: “In an air battle, without knowing the type of aircraft, it is easy to identify our aircraft from the enemy aircraft by its too bright colors of the planes and fuselage, i.e. the main figures of the battle.” According to the general, the camouflage of Allied and German vehicles was adapted specifically for air combat, making it difficult to conduct aimed fire with its colors. The corps commander's summary was as follows: “It is necessary to raise the question with the industry about the further production of combat vehicles with camouflage not of a dark color, but of light gray (bluish-steel). This will dramatically reduce the endless German surprise attacks on our planes; will sharply reduce losses and defeats in battles and eliminate the need for annual repainting for the winter.” .

Let's return to the events of July 11. By this time, the obvious futility of the German offensive in the Central Front was no longer in doubt. Despite the maximum advance into the depth of the Soviet defense up to 10–12 kilometers, General Model’s troops failed to achieve any noticeable operational successes. Beginning on July 6, the advance of the 9th Army became increasingly modest. Bloody battles in the Olkhovat direction with units of the 17th Guards Rifle Corps and the 2nd Tank Army, three-day fierce battles in the Ponyri area, which did not give decisive success to units of the 41st Tank Corps, and, finally, the fading of the offensive in the heights area north of Olkhovatka - These are the main stages of Operation Citadel on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge. The plans of the command of the 9th Army, related to the shift in the direction of the main attack, which we have already mentioned above, were also not developed.

On July 11, reconnaissance in force was carried out on the Bryansk and Western fronts, and the very next day, artillery salvoes east and north of Orel unambiguously announced the completion of Operation Citadel north of Kursk. Now the command of Army Group Center had to solve the problem of preventing the encirclement of its own troops, locked within the arc - but not Kursk, but Oryol.

It remains for us to sum up the results of the air battle. Having 1,151 aircraft (1,084 serviceable) at the beginning of the German offensive, the 16th Air Army suffered heavy losses during a week of fierce fighting - army headquarters wrote off 439 aircraft, or almost 38% of the aircraft fleet. Of this number, 391 aircraft were lost for combat and non-combat reasons, and the rest were written off as beyond repair. During the week of fighting, the association of General S.I. Rudenko lost 55% of fighters, 37% of attack aircraft, 8% of bombers. The number of sorties per loss in attack and fighter aircraft was almost the same, equal to 13 and 15 sorties, respectively, while for bombers this figure was 62 sorties.

Note that some of the damaged aircraft were sent to repair authorities. So, according to the report of the 6th IAC, for the entire month of July, about 50 aircraft were evacuated from emergency landing sites, of which 30 were sent to CAM and PARM, 6 were sent for spare parts and disassembly kits, and one fighter, as indicated in the report, was blown up at the landing site.

The 16th Air Army suffered significant losses among its flight personnel - 2 regiment commanders, 2 navigators, 55 squadron commanders and their deputies, 20 flight commanders and 279 pilots were killed in battle.

Comparing these figures with the data of the German side, we note that during the same period, according to the combat diary of the 6th Air Fleet, 586 aircraft were destroyed in air battles, and another 52 aircraft became victims of anti-aircraft artillery. As you can see, the German pilots and anti-aircraft gunners overestimated their successes by 1.5 times, which, given the scale of the battle that unfolded, can be considered a completely acceptable value.

It is more difficult to estimate the real number of victories for the 16th Air Force due to the lack of accurate data on the losses of the 6th Air Fleet. As already indicated, according to the reports of the Quartermaster General, General von Greim’s association lost 64 aircraft irretrievably for all reasons during the week of fighting. Another 45 aircraft were damaged. At the same time, according to the report of the 16th Air Army, its pilots shot down 518 aircraft during 380 air battles, of which 425 were fighters, 88 were bombers and 5 were reconnaissance aircraft. As you can see, our aviators overestimated their successes by at least 5–8 times.

During the operation, units of the 16th Air Army flew 7,548 sorties, almost 98% of which were in the Olkhovat direction. Comparing these data with the indicators of the 6th Air Fleet, whose pilots completed 8,917 sorties during the same time, and also taking into account the overall quantitative superiority of the Soviet side, one can get a clear idea of ​​the workload that fell on the pilots of both warring sides. For Soviet aviation formations, these values ​​are relatively small. Thus, on average, one bomber made 0.9, an attack aircraft 0.6, and a fighter 1.1 sorties per day. Unfortunately, these figures do not reflect the dynamics of changes in the load on air units during different periods of the battle. For example, on July 5, on average, one bomber flew 3.1, an attack aircraft 2.2, and a fighter 4.1 sorties.

Based on the experience of the defensive battle in the Kursk region, pilots of active units assessed some types of aircraft. For example, those tested as part of the 1st Guards. IAD 10 Yak-9T fighters with a 37-mm cannon (2 in the 53rd Guards, 8 in the 54th Guards IAP) flew 136 sorties, conducting 15 air battles. With the loss of three aircraft of this type (one was shot down by German bomber fire), the pilots announced the destruction of 5 enemy aircraft (2 FW-190, 1 Bf-110, 1 Ju-88 and 1 He-111). The high efficiency of the 37-mm OKB-16 11P-37 cannon was noted when working against both ground and air targets. At the same time, the disadvantages included the significant weight of the gun, the long burst range of the projectile (4000 meters, while 1000–1200 meters were required), the ineffectiveness of the ring sight, as well as the slow rate of fire. For air combat, the new “Yak” turned out to be too heavy, “feeling” poorly in the vertical. For this reason, pilots recommended using mixed groups of Yak-1 and Yak-9T fighters in combat in a 2:1 ratio. It would not be amiss to note that already after the end of the Battle of Kursk, parts of the 1st Guards. The IADs were never armed with A. S. Yakovlev’s new fighter, having retrained in the fall for the well-proven Airacobra.

Pe-2 bombers also performed well, demonstrating excellent survivability in a number of cases. Thus, some “pawns” returned to the airfield with from 40 to 70 fragmentation holes, without losing control if the ailerons and elevator were damaged. The documents of the 3rd tank noted the thoughtful arrangement and successful design of the roller guide rods, which ensures control of the aircraft's rudders in the event of damage to the rudders by projectiles and fragments of antiaircraft guns. The crews especially liked the dual chassis control system - electric motors and emergency. During combat operations, there were frequent cases of aircraft arriving at their airfield with damaged control rods along the profile up to 70%.

However, the pilots and navigators also had plenty of comments about the “pawn”. The main one was the weakness of the aircraft's weapons and defenses. The bomber's small arms, according to the aviators, were insufficient by the summer of 1943. The front firing point, which consisted of only one machine gun, was criticized. In addition, the unsuccessful and cramped turret provided only small firing angles of 50–65 degrees. The system for filling gas tanks with inert gas did not provide sufficient fire protection for the aircraft. The M-105 engines, which had low survivability, also drew criticism.

Concluding the description of the battles on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge, I would like to say a few words about the struggle for air supremacy. The question of who retained the sky over Ponyri and Olkhovatka, despite the obvious outcome of the battle, does not, oddly enough, imply an unambiguous answer. In the future, we will see more than once that the results and course of ground battles cannot be automatically transferred to the situation developing in the confrontation between aviation.

With an overall higher training of flight personnel, more advanced and, most importantly, proven tactics of combat use, the Luftwaffe managed to almost completely dominate the air in the first two days of the battle, which was expressed not only in the suppression of Soviet fighter aircraft, but also in the almost unhindered bomber attacks on positions of ground troops. The lack of proper flight and combat training among the majority of the young flight personnel of the 16th Air Army, weak cohesion within squadrons and regiments, as well as an ineffective, poorly-functioning aviation control system - all this largely predetermined the tragic beginning of the battle for the Soviet side. The shortcomings in the work of fighter aviation, where the pilot was primarily required to have increased independence in decision-making and initiative, as well as good flight and fire training, could not be eliminated in full not only during the battle, but throughout the entire summer campaign of 1943 .

Thrown into the thick of battle, the newly created formations over and over again suffered heavy losses in the very first battles, which we witnessed in the example of the 6th IAC and the 234th IAD and will encounter more than once during the course of the story when describing events in other areas of the Soviet-German front. Unfortunately, the introduction of combat experience turned out to be a long and painful process, associated with heavy losses and bitter lessons in air battles. It could not always be “brought down from above” in the form of an order or directive.

However, it would be unwise to see only one side of the coin. The command of the 16th Air Army convincingly demonstrated the ability to “hold the punch” in an unfavorable environment, as well as its understanding and quick perception of the new realities of air warfare. Starting from the third day of the battle, it embarked on the path of organizing massive attacks on concentrations of enemy armored vehicles and manpower. As it turned out, the command of the 6th Air Fleet did not have any effective means of countering these raids by bombers and attack aircraft of the 16th Air Army, which in most cases achieved their goal. Starting from July 7, they began to directly influence the course of ground events, which was especially evident during the battles of July 9 and 10, which finally buried the hopes of the 9th Army command for the success of Operation Citadel.

TsAMO RF. F. 486th IAP. Op. 211987. D. 3. L. 131.

TsAMO RF. F. 486th IAP. Op. 211987. D. 3. L. 130.

TsAMO RF. F. 486th IAP. Op. 211987. D. 3. L. 127.

TsAMO RF. F. 368. Op. 6476. D. 56. L. 194.

TsAMO RF. F. 368. Op. 6476. D. 54. L. 9, 10.

TsAMO RF. F. 1st Guards iad. Op. 1. D. 7. L. 10.

The memorial complex “Poklonnaya Height 269” is located near the village of Molotychi, Fatezhsky district, Kursk region, where during the battles on the Northern face of the Kursk Bulge in July 1943, the command post of the 70th NKVD Army was located, which defended these heights before the advancing 9th German Army. The memorial complex was erected on the initiative and organization of the Kursk Community Association in Moscow with the aim of perpetuating the feat of Soviet soldiers who, at the cost of their lives, prevented the Nazi invaders from breaking through to Kursk in July 1943.

Construction of the complex began on November 12, 2011, when the Worship Cross was installed. The inscription on it reads: “Here in July 1943 the hardest battles of the Battle of Kursk took place - the decisive battle of the Great Patriotic War. At the cost of their lives, the soldiers of the 140th Infantry Division did not allow the enemy to reach strategic heights. In one day, July 10, 513 people were killed and 943 wounded. Eternal memory to the defenders of the Fatherland. The worship cross was installed on November 12, 2011 by grateful descendants.

V.V. Pronin and S.I. Kretov with a veteran on the day of the installation of the Worship Cross

Worship cross on opening day

Installation of the Worship Cross

Opening of the Worship Cross 11/12/2011

After declassifying military archives and studying documents, it became known that the facts of courage and resilience of Soviet soldiers and officers, as well as the civilian population on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge, especially on the left flank of the front in the area of ​​Molotychevsky - Teplovsky - Olkhovatsky Heights, were kept silent.

Our soldiers fought heroically against an enemy who had significant technical superiority in comparison with the equipment of the Soviet troops. 34 of them became Heroes of the Soviet Union. Most are posthumous.

The favorable location of the height near the highway, from which visibility in good weather is open to the outskirts of Kursk, explains the reason for the Germans’ fierce zeal for these heights.

portraits of 34 heroes of the Soviet Union at the Poklonny Cross

On July 19, 2013, Metropolitan Herman of Kursk and Rylsk, together with representatives of the Kursk community in Moscow, visited the above places. Their importance was noted in terms of perpetuating the memory of the heroism of soldiers and officers on the line of the Northern front of the Kursk Bulge and he blessed the implementation of the project.

Metropolitan German at Poklonnaya Heights 2013

On July 12, 1943, units of the Central Front launched a counter-offensive, inflicting such a blow on the Nazis after which their offensive impulse was broken, Operation Citadel to capture Kursk and create a pocket for Soviet troops was canceled. On this day in 2014, the ceremonial laying of a time capsule with an appeal to descendants took place: “A time capsule with an appeal to descendants is kept here. This capsule was laid on July 12, 2014 in the presence of the leaders of the Kursk region, philanthropists, and landscapers on the day of laying the foundation for the construction of the “Angel of Peace” monument of the “Poklonnaya Height” Memorial Complex. Open the capsule on July 12, 2043."

Capsule laying ceremony 2014

On May 7, 2015, the monument “Angel of Peace” was opened, which was erected for the 70th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War at height “269”, as the main object of the Memorial complex of the Northern face of the Kursk Bulge - the location of the command post of the 70th NKVD Army, which defended together with other military formations of the Central Front, the defense of the Molotychevsky - Teplovsky - Olkhovatsky heights from July 5 to July 12, 1943, where a grandiose battle took place that decided the fate of the whole World and marked the beginning of the irrevocable expulsion of fascism from Europe.

visit of the Presidential Plenipotentiary Representative to the Central Federal District
to Poklonnaya Height 269

Installation of the monument. November 20, 2014

The first bucket of earth. Start of installation work
Monument to the Angel of Peace. August 6, 2014

Installation of the monument November 20, 2014

Installation of the monument to the Angel of Peace. November 20, 2014

Opening of the monument 05/07/2015

The monument is a 35-meter sculpture, the top of which is crowned by an eight-meter angel who holds a wreath and releases a dove. The monument faces the West with a call from the Russian people to stop the new fascism. Standing at the site of the death of more than 70 thousand Soviet and German soldiers, the “Angel of Peace” reminds all of humanity how it all ends.

The author of the artistic composition “Angel of Peace” is sculptor A.N. Burganov. - a world-famous sculptor who made a huge contribution to the development of the national school of monumental sculpture. His monuments and large monumental ensembles are installed in the largest cities of Russia and abroad.

A.N. Burganov

Angel of Peace

The composition is illuminated, thanks to which a beautiful picture opens at night (an Angel soaring over the Kursk land).

On December 10, 2015, at the Cultural Center of the FSB of Russia, a solemn ceremony was held to award laureates and diploma holders of the FSB of Russia competition for the best works of literature and art about the activities of the federal security service. In the Fine Arts category, the first prize was awarded to Alexander Nikolaevich Burganov, sculptor and author of the stele.

Presentation to A.N. Burganov Prize of the FSB of Russia

Award of the FSB of Russia

The construction of the memorial complex was noted by President V.V. Putin. In 2016, a letter of gratitude was presented from the President to the head of the regional public organization ROO “Kursk Community” for his active personal participation in the preparation and holding of events dedicated to the seventieth anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.

Letter of gratitude from the President

Presentation to V.V. Pronin Letter of Gratitude from the President of the Russian Federation

On February 12, 2016, construction began on a temple in honor of the glorious and all-praised supreme apostles Peter and Paul. On July 12, 1943, the counter-offensive of Soviet troops began on the Northern Front on the day of the above-mentioned feast day. The official start to the work was given by Alexander Mikhailov, Vladimir Pronin and Bishop Veniamin of Zheleznogorsk and Lgov. They laid a capsule in the foundation of the building with an appeal to descendants.

laying a capsule in the foundation of the Temple

construction of the Temple

At the memorial complex “Poklonnaya Vysota 269” on August 16, 2016, His Eminence Benjamin, Bishop of Zheleznogorsk and Lgov consecrated the bells and the main dome for the temple in honor of the holy chief apostles Peter and Paul. A special feature of the consecration was that in order to sprinkle the bells with holy water, the Bishop ascended to a height using special equipment. But the dome was consecrated on the ground.

Consecration of the Dome and bells of the temple

On August 20, 2016, a solemn ceremony of erecting a cross on the dome of the church under construction in honor of the holy apostles Peter and Paul took place at the memorial complex. Witnesses to this event were veterans of the Great Patriotic War, a delegation from the Kursk Community Association, young people, and residents of nearby areas who came here to honor the memory of the fallen Soviet soldiers. Among the honorary guests of the ceremony were the Governor of the Kursk Region Alexander Mikhailov, the Honorary Citizen of the Kursk Region and Fatezhsky District, the head of the community Vladimir Pronin, the General Director of Management Company Metalloinvest Andrey Varichev and many other high-ranking officials. Alexander Mikhailov, in his welcoming speech, expressed the hope that the built temple would become a spiritual center for the residents of Kursk and neighboring regions.

Installation of crosses

In addition, the geoglyph “70 years of Victory” was created here - a giant inscription that was “written” by pine seedlings. Each letter contains from 100 to 200 trees, and its height will be 30 meters. Giant letters can be seen driving along the V. Lyubazh – Ponyri highway at the foot of the monument, as well as from a bird’s eye view or on satellite images.

It is also planned to restore the army command post dugouts.

The Worship Cross, the “Angel of Peace” monument, the Temple and other objects of the Memorial complex were built exclusively on donations from individuals and legal entities - Kursk residents living in Moscow and the Kursk region for future generations.