Kursk Bulge, northern face. Heavy trophy from the Kursk Bulge Tank battle near Prokhorovka

The Kursk Bulge (Battle of Kursk) is a strategic salient in the area of ​​the city of Kursk. From July 5 to August 23, 1943, one of the most significant battles of the Great Patriotic War took place here (06/22/1941 – 05/09/1945). After the defeat at Stalingrad, the German army wanted to take revenge and regain the offensive initiative. The General Staff of the Wehrmacht (German armed forces) developed Operation Citadel. Its goal was to encircle a huge group of Red Army troops in the area of ​​​​the city of Kursk. To do this, it was planned to strike from the north (Army Group "Center" from Orel) and the south (Army Group "South" from Belgorod) towards each other. Having united, the Germans formed a cauldron for two fronts of the Red Army at once (Central and Voronezh). After this, the troops of the German army had to send their forces to Moscow.

Army Group Center was led by Field Marshal Hans Günther Adolf Ferdinand von Kluge (1882 - 1944), and Army Group South was led by Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (1887 - 1973). To implement Operation Citadel, the Germans concentrated enormous forces. In the north, the organizational strike force was led by the commander of the 9th Army, Colonel General Otto Moritz Walter Model (1891 - 1945); in the south, the coordination and leadership of the tank units was carried out by Colonel General Hermann Hoth (1885 - 1971).

Scheme of the Battle of Kursk

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (the body of highest military command that exercised strategic leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945) decided to first conduct a defensive battle in the Battle of Kursk. Next, having withstood the enemy’s blows and exhausted his forces, at a critical moment launch crushing counterattacks against the enemy. Everyone understood that the most difficult thing in this operation would be to withstand the enemy's onslaught. The Kursk Bulge was divided into two parts - the northern and southern faces. In addition, understanding the scale and significance of the upcoming operation, the reserve Steppe Front was located behind the ledge under the command of Colonel General Ivan Stepanovich Konev (1897 - 1973).

Northern face of the Kursk Bulge

The northern face is also called the Oryol-Kursk Bulge. The length of the defense line was 308 km. The Central Front was located here under the command of Army General Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky (1896 - 1968). The front included five combined arms armies (60, 65, 70, 13 and 48). The front reserve was mobile. It included the 2nd Tank Army, as well as the 9th and 19th Tank Corps. The headquarters of the front commander was located in the village of Svoboda near Kursk. Currently there is a museum dedicated to the Battle of Kursk on this site. Here they recreated the dugout of K.K. Rokossovsky, from where the commander led the battles. The interior is very modest, just the bare necessities. In the corner on the bedside table there is an HF communication device, through which you can contact the General Staff and Headquarters at any time. Adjacent to the main room is a rest room, where the commander could restore his strength by resting his head on a camp metal bed. Naturally, there was no electric lighting; simple kerosene lamps burned. At the entrance to the dugout there was a small room for the duty officer. This is how a man lived in combat conditions, under whose command were hundreds of thousands of people and a huge amount of various equipment.

Dugout of Rokossovsky K.K.

Based on intelligence data and his combat experience, Rokossovsky K.K. determined with a high degree of certainty the direction of the main German attack on the Olkhovatka-Ponyri section. The 13th Army occupied positions in this place. Its front segment was reduced to 32 kilometers and reinforced with additional forces. To the left of it, covering the Fatezh-Kursk direction, was the 70th Army. Positions on the right flank of the 13th Army, in the Maloarkhangelsk region, were occupied by the 48th Army.

The artillery preparation carried out by the Red Army troops against Wehrmacht positions on the morning of July 5, 1943 played a certain role in the beginning of the battle. The Germans were simply dumbfounded by surprise. In the evening, Hitler's farewell address was read to them. Full of determination, early in the morning they prepared to go on the attack and defeat the enemy to smithereens. And so, at the most inopportune moment, thousands of Russian shells fell on the Germans. Having suffered losses and lost offensive fervor, the Wehrmacht began its attack only 2 hours after the scheduled time. Despite the artillery bombardment, the power of the Germans was very strong. The main blow was delivered to Olkhovatka and Ponyri by three infantry and four tank divisions. Four more infantry divisions went on the offensive at the junction between the 13th and 48th armies, to the left of Maloarkhangelsk. Three infantry divisions attacked the right flank of the 70th Army, in the direction of the Teplovsky Heights. Near the village of Soborovka there is a large field along which German tanks walked and walked towards Olkhovatka. Artillerymen played a major role in the battle. At the cost of incredible efforts, they resisted the advancing enemy. To strengthen the defense, the command of the Central Front ordered some of our tanks to be dug into the ground, thus increasing their invulnerability. To protect the Ponyri station, the surrounding area was covered with numerous minefields. In the midst of the battle this provided great assistance to our troops.

In addition to the already known tanks, the Germans used their new self-propelled guns (self-propelled artillery units) Ferdinand here. They were specifically designed to destroy enemy tanks and fortifications. Ferdinand weighed 65 tons and had frontal armor twice that of the Tiger heavy tank. Our guns could not hit self-propelled guns only if they were the most powerful and at very close range. Ferdinand’s gun penetrated armor over 100 mm. at a distance of 2 km. (armor of the Tiger heavy tank). The self-propelled gun had an electric transmission. Two engines drove two generators. From them, the electric current was transmitted to two electric motors, each rotating its own wheel. At that time this was a very interesting decision. Self-propelled guns Ferdinand, made with the latest technology, were used only on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge (they were not on the southern front). The Germans formed two heavy anti-tank battalions (653 and 654) with 45 vehicles each. Seeing this colossus crawling towards you through the sights of a cannon, but nothing can be done, is not a sight for the faint of heart.

The fighting was very fierce. The Wehrmacht was rushing forward. It seemed that this German power could not be stopped. Only thanks to the talent of K.K. Rokossovsky, who created a deeply layered defense in the direction of the main attack and concentrated more than half of the front’s personnel and artillery in this sector, was it possible to withstand the enemy’s onslaught. In seven days, the Germans brought almost all their reserves into the battle and advanced only 10-12 km. They never managed to break through the tactical defense zone. Soldiers and officers fought heroically for their land. The poet Evgeny Dolmatovsky wrote the poem “Ponyri” about the defenders of the Oryol-Kursk Bulge. It contains these lines:

There were no mountains or rocks here,

There were no ditches or rivers here.

Here a Russian man stood,

Soviet man.

By July 12, the Germans were exhausted and they stopped the offensive. Rokossovsky K.K. tried to take care of the soldiers. Of course, war is war and losses are inevitable. It’s just that Konstantin Konstantinovich always had many fewer of these losses. He spared neither mines nor shells. More ammunition can be made, but it takes a lot of time to raise a person and make him a good soldier. People felt this and always treated him with respect. Rokossovsky K.K. and previously had great fame among the troops, but after the Battle of Kursk his fame soared very high. They started talking about him as an outstanding commander. It was not for nothing that he commanded the Victory Parade on June 24, 1945, which was hosted by G.K. Zhukov. The country's leadership also valued him. Even Stalin himself I.V. after the Great Patriotic War, he apologized to him for his arrest in 1937. He invited the marshal to his dacha in Kuntsevo. Walking past the flowerbed with him, Joseph Vissarionovich broke a bouquet of white roses with his bare hands. Handing them to Rokossovsky K.K., he said: “Before the war, we greatly offended you. Please forgive us..." Konstantin Konstantinovich noticed that the thorns of the roses injured the hands of Stalin I.V., leaving small drops of blood.

On November 26, 1943, near the village of Tyoploye, the first monument to military glory during the Great Patriotic War was unveiled. This modest obelisk glorifies the feat of the artillerymen. Then many more monuments will be erected along the defense line of the Central Front. Museums and memorials will be opened, but for veterans of the Battle of Kursk this simple monument to artillerymen will be the most expensive, because it is the first.

Monument to artillerymen near the village. Warm

Southern face of the Kursk Bulge

On the southern front, the defense was held by the Voronezh Front under the command of Army General Nikolai Fedorovich Vatutin (1901 - 1944). The length of the defense line was 244 km. The front included five combined arms armies (38, 40, 6th Guards and 7th Guards - stood in the first echelon of defense, 69th Army and 35th Guards Rifle Corps - in the second echelon of defense). The front reserve was mobile. It included the 1st Tank Army, as well as the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps. Before the Germans began their offensive, artillery preparation was carried out, which slightly weakened their first onslaught. Unfortunately, it was extremely difficult to determine exactly the direction of the main attack on the Voronezh front. It was carried out by the Wehrmacht in the Oboyan area, against the positions of the 6th Guards Army. The Germans tried to build on their success by advancing along the Belgorod-Kursk highway, but they failed. Units of the 1st Tank Army were sent to help the 6th Army. The Wehrmacht sent a diversionary attack on the 7th Guards Army in the Korocha area. Taking into account the current situation, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered Colonel General Konev to transfer two armies from the Steppe Front to the Voronezh Front - the 5th combined arms and the 5th tank. Having not advanced sufficiently near Oboyan, the German command decided to transfer the main attack to the Prokhorovka area. This direction was covered by the 69th Army. In addition to the Tigers, the Wehrmacht used its new Pz tanks on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge. V "Panther" in the amount of 200 pcs.

Tank battle near Prokhorovka

On July 12, southwest of Prokhorovka, the Germans launched an offensive. The command of the Voronezh Front sent here the 5th Guards Tank Army with two attached tank corps and the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps a little earlier. One of the largest tank battles in the entire history of World War II took place here (09/01/1939 – 09/02/1945). To stop the advance of the 2nd SS Tank Corps (400 tanks), the corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army (800 tanks) were thrown into a frontal attack. Despite the seemingly large advantage in the number of tanks, the 5th Guards Tank Army was inferior in their “quality.” It consisted of: 501 T-34 tanks, 264 light T-70 tanks and 35 heavy Churchill III tanks with low speed and insufficient maneuverability. Our tanks could not compare with the enemy in striking range. To knock out the German Pz. VI "Tiger" our T-34 tank needed to approach at a distance of 500 meters. The Tiger itself with 88 mm. with a cannon he effectively fought a duel at a distance of up to 2000 meters.

It was possible to fight in such conditions only in close combat. But it was necessary to shorten the distance in some incomprehensible way. Despite everything, our ordinary Soviet tank crews survived and stopped the Germans. Honor and praise to them for this. The price of such a feat was very high. Losses in the tank corps of the 5th Guards Army reached 70 percent. Currently, Prokhorovskoe Field has the status of a museum of federal significance. All these tanks and guns are installed here in memory of the Soviet people who, at the cost of their lives, turned the tide of the war.

Part of the exposition of the Prokhorovskoe Field memorial

Completion of the Battle of Kursk

Having withstood the onslaught of the Germans on the Northern front of the Kursk Bulge, on July 12, the troops of the Bryansk Front and the left wing of the Western Front launched an offensive in the Oryol direction. A little later, on July 15, the troops of the Central Front struck in the direction of the village of Kromy. Thanks to the efforts of the attackers, on August 5, 1943, the city of Orel was liberated. On July 16, the troops of the Voronezh Front and then on July 19, the troops of the Steppe Front also went on the offensive. Developing a counterattack, on August 5, 1943, they liberated the city of Belgorod. In the evening of the same day, fireworks were given for the first time in Moscow in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod. Without losing the initiative, the troops of the Steppe Front (with the support of the Voronezh and Southwestern Fronts) liberated the city of Kharkov on August 23, 1943.

The Battle of Kursk (Kursk Bulge) is one of the largest battles of the Second World War. Over 4 million people from both sides took part in it. A huge number of tanks, planes, guns and other equipment were involved. Here the initiative finally passed to the Red Army and the whole world realized that Germany had lost the war.

Battle of Kursk on the map

The memorial complex “Poklonnaya Height 269” is located near the village of Molotychi, Fatezhsky district, Kursk region, where during the battles on the Northern face of the Kursk Bulge in July 1943, the command post of the 70th NKVD Army was located, which defended these heights before the advancing 9th German Army. The memorial complex was erected on the initiative and organization of the Kursk Community Association in Moscow with the aim of perpetuating the feat of Soviet soldiers who, at the cost of their lives, prevented the Nazi invaders from breaking through to Kursk in July 1943.

Construction of the complex began on November 12, 2011, when the Worship Cross was installed. The inscription on it reads: “Here in July 1943 the hardest battles of the Battle of Kursk took place - the decisive battle of the Great Patriotic War. At the cost of their lives, the soldiers of the 140th Infantry Division did not allow the enemy to reach strategic heights. In one day, July 10, 513 people were killed and 943 wounded. Eternal memory to the defenders of the Fatherland. The worship cross was installed on November 12, 2011 by grateful descendants.

V.V. Pronin and S.I. Kretov with a veteran on the day of the installation of the Worship Cross

Worship cross on opening day

Installation of the Worship Cross

Opening of the Worship Cross 11/12/2011

After declassifying military archives and studying documents, it became known that the facts of courage and resilience of Soviet soldiers and officers, as well as the civilian population on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge, especially on the left flank of the front in the area of ​​Molotychevsky - Teplovsky - Olkhovatsky Heights, were kept silent.

Our soldiers fought heroically against an enemy who had significant technical superiority in comparison with the equipment of the Soviet troops. 34 of them became Heroes of the Soviet Union. Most are posthumous.

The favorable location of the height near the highway, from which visibility in good weather is open to the outskirts of Kursk, explains the reason for the Germans’ fierce zeal for these heights.

portraits of 34 heroes of the Soviet Union at the Poklonny Cross

On July 19, 2013, Metropolitan German of Kursk and Rylsk, together with representatives of the Kursk community in Moscow, visited the above places. Their importance was noted in terms of perpetuating the memory of the heroism of soldiers and officers on the line of the Northern front of the Kursk Bulge and he blessed the implementation of the project.

Metropolitan German at Poklonnaya Heights 2013

On July 12, 1943, units of the Central Front launched a counter-offensive, inflicting such a blow on the Nazis after which their offensive impulse was broken, Operation Citadel to capture Kursk and create a pocket for Soviet troops was canceled. On this day in 2014, the ceremonial laying of a time capsule with an appeal to descendants took place: “A time capsule with an appeal to descendants is kept here. This capsule was laid on July 12, 2014 in the presence of the leaders of the Kursk region, philanthropists, and landscapers on the day of laying the foundation for the construction of the “Angel of Peace” monument of the “Poklonnaya Height” Memorial Complex. Open the capsule on July 12, 2043."

Capsule laying ceremony 2014

On May 7, 2015, the monument “Angel of Peace” was opened, which was erected for the 70th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War at height “269”, as the main object of the Memorial complex of the Northern face of the Kursk Bulge - the location of the command post of the 70th NKVD Army, which defended together with other military formations of the Central Front, the defense of the Molotychevsky - Teplovsky - Olkhovatsky heights from July 5 to July 12, 1943, where a grandiose battle took place that decided the fate of the whole World and marked the beginning of the irrevocable expulsion of fascism from Europe.

visit of the Presidential Plenipotentiary Representative to the Central Federal District
to Poklonnaya Height 269

Installation of the monument. November 20, 2014

The first bucket of earth. Start of installation work
Monument to the Angel of Peace. August 6, 2014

Installation of the monument November 20, 2014

Installation of the monument to the Angel of Peace. November 20, 2014

Opening of the monument 05/07/2015

The monument is a 35-meter sculpture, the top of which is crowned by an eight-meter angel who holds a wreath and releases a dove. The monument faces the West with a call from the Russian people to stop the new fascism. Standing at the site of the death of more than 70 thousand Soviet and German soldiers, the “Angel of Peace” reminds all of humanity how it all ends.

The author of the artistic composition “Angel of Peace” is sculptor A.N. Burganov. - a world-famous sculptor who made a huge contribution to the development of the national school of monumental sculpture. His monuments and large monumental ensembles are installed in the largest cities of Russia and abroad.

A.N. Burganov

Angel of Peace

The composition is illuminated, thanks to which a beautiful picture opens at night (an Angel soaring over the Kursk land).

On December 10, 2015, at the Cultural Center of the FSB of Russia, a solemn ceremony was held to award laureates and diploma holders of the FSB of Russia competition for the best works of literature and art about the activities of the federal security service. In the Fine Arts category, the first prize was awarded to Alexander Nikolaevich Burganov, sculptor and author of the stele.

Presentation to A.N. Burganov Prize of the FSB of Russia

Award of the FSB of Russia

The construction of the memorial complex was noted by President V.V. Putin. In 2016, a letter of gratitude was presented from the President to the head of the regional public organization ROO “Kursk Community” for his active personal participation in the preparation and holding of events dedicated to the seventieth anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.

Letter of gratitude from the President

Presentation to V.V. Pronin Letter of Gratitude from the President of the Russian Federation

On February 12, 2016, construction began on a temple in honor of the glorious and all-praised supreme apostles Peter and Paul. On July 12, 1943, the counter-offensive of Soviet troops began on the Northern Front on the day of the above-mentioned feast day. The official start to the work was given by Alexander Mikhailov, Vladimir Pronin and Bishop Veniamin of Zheleznogorsk and Lgov. They laid a capsule in the foundation of the building with an appeal to descendants.

laying a capsule in the foundation of the Temple

construction of the Temple

At the memorial complex “Poklonnaya Vysota 269” on August 16, 2016, His Eminence Benjamin, Bishop of Zheleznogorsk and Lgov consecrated the bells and the main dome for the temple in honor of the holy chief apostles Peter and Paul. A special feature of the consecration was that in order to sprinkle the bells with holy water, the Bishop ascended to a height using special equipment. But the dome was consecrated on the ground.

Consecration of the Dome and bells of the temple

On August 20, 2016, a solemn ceremony of erecting a cross on the dome of the church under construction in honor of the holy apostles Peter and Paul took place at the memorial complex. Witnesses to this event were veterans of the Great Patriotic War, a delegation from the Kursk Community Association, young people, and residents of nearby areas who came here to honor the memory of the fallen Soviet soldiers. Among the honorary guests of the ceremony were the Governor of the Kursk Region Alexander Mikhailov, the Honorary Citizen of the Kursk Region and Fatezhsky District, the head of the community Vladimir Pronin, the General Director of Management Company Metalloinvest Andrey Varichev and many other high-ranking officials. Alexander Mikhailov, in his welcoming speech, expressed the hope that the built temple would become a spiritual center for the residents of Kursk and neighboring regions.

Installation of crosses

In addition, the geoglyph “70 years of Victory” was created here - a giant inscription that was “written” by pine seedlings. Each letter contains from 100 to 200 trees, and its height will be 30 meters. Giant letters can be seen driving along the V. Lyubazh – Ponyri highway at the foot of the monument, as well as from a bird’s eye view or on satellite images.

It is also planned to restore the army command post dugouts.

The Worship Cross, the “Angel of Peace” monument, the Temple and other objects of the Memorial complex were built exclusively on donations from individuals and legal entities - Kursk residents living in Moscow and the Kursk region for future generations.

The Battle of Kursk was a turning point in World War II. Soviet troops defeated Hitler's army and went on the offensive. The Nazis planned to strike Kursk from Kharkov and Orel, defeat Soviet troops and rush south. But, fortunately for all of us, the plans were not destined to come true. From July 5 to July 12, 1943, the struggle continued for every piece of Soviet land. After the victory at Kursk, the USSR troops went on the offensive, and this continued until the end of the war.

In gratitude to Soviet soldiers for their victory, on May 7, 2015, the Teplovsky Heights monument was unveiled in the Kursk region.

Description

The monument is made in the form of a three-level observation deck. The upper level is located at bird's eye height (17 meters). From here you can see the battle arena. The Teplov Heights were the key to Kursk for the Nazis, but the Nazis failed to get this key.

The USSR flag flutters above the monument, and the dates of each day of the Battle of Kursk are posted on the railings of the observation deck. The soldiers and officers fought to the death, but did not let the enemy into the city.

The Teplovsky Heights monument is installed on the northern face of the arc. Until recently, this area was not immortalized, although it was of great importance in determining the outcome of the war.

Celebration of the opening of the monument

The opening ceremony of the monument was attended by representatives of United Russia, Governor of the Kursk Region Alexander Mikhailov, Senator of the Federation Council Valery Ryazansky, Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of Russia Alexander Beglov, Head of the Ponyrovsky District Vladimir Torubarov, war veterans, members of public organizations, and concerned citizens.

Speaking to the audience, A. Beglov noted that the construction of the Teplovsky Heights monument is a tribute to the memory of the defenders of the Fatherland who fell on the battlefield. The plenipotentiary also emphasized the importance of the northern front during hostilities and praised officials in the region for their worthy preparations for Victory Day.

After the speech of the plenipotentiary representative, the veterans went up to the observation deck. A resident of the village of Olkhovatka, Ponyrsky district, I. G. Bogdanov thanked the regional leadership for preserving historical memory and wished that young people would follow the traditions of their ancestors. “Teplovsky Heights” is a memorial that was created taking into account the wishes of the defenders of the Fatherland.

The spectacular part of the event included skydiving and a festive concert. The best athletes of Russia and the Kursk region dressed in the military uniform of soldiers of the Great Patriotic War. The paratroopers landed on the northern front exactly at the moment when the veterans climbed onto the observation deck. The warriors heard words of gratitude for peace.

"Teplovsky Heights": memorial

The monument erected on the northern front is part of a single monument, together with the monument “For Our Soviet Motherland”, the Eternal Flame, a mass grave in which 2 thousand soldiers are buried, a colonnade, and personalized plaques of the Heroes of the Soviet Union - the winners of the battle on the Kursk Bulge. Also carved on the slabs are the names of military units that took part in the hostilities. This is the Teplovsky Heights memorial.

Ponyri

The regional center of Ponyri is known for the fact that the fate of the peoples of the Soviet Union, and perhaps all of humanity, was decided here. According to the German plan "Citadel", the enemies were going to close the Kursk Bulge in order to gain access to Moscow. Thanks to intelligence data, it became known that the Nazis chose Ponyri as their point of attack. This is where the battle began, during which German tanks were stopped by living Soviet people... In memory of the exploits of the soldiers, a museum was opened in Ponyry.

The village is also famous for its memorial in honor of the defenders of the Motherland. There is a fire burning near the monument. The railway station, where reinforcements arrived and tanks were delivered, was also of great strategic importance. Also in Ponyry, monuments to the liberating warrior, sapper heroes, signalmen and artillery heroes were erected.

Teplovsky Heights (Kursk region) is a place of historical memory of the people about the war.

Angel bringing peace

In Fatezhskoye, in the village of Molotynich, on May 7, the sculpture “Angel of Peace” was unveiled. An 8-meter angel rises on a 27-meter pedestal. The total length of the monument is 35 meters. The celestial being holds in his hands a wreath with a dove of peace.

The composition is equipped with backlighting, so at dusk it creates the illusion of an angel hovering above the earth. “Angel of Peace” perpetuates the feat of Soviet soldiers who gave their lives for the Victory.

In honor of the seventieth anniversary of the Victory, a memory lane was laid out on Fatezh land and a geoglyph was created from pine seedlings. Wood also became the material for creating giant stars with the Kursk Antonovka in the center. The compositions are visible from a bird's eye view and on satellite photographs.

The results of the Battle of Kursk made it possible to debunk the myth of the superiority of the Aryan race. The Nazis broke down psychologically, and therefore could not continue the offensive further. And the invincible once again proved to the world that true strength does not lie in aggression, but in love. To the Motherland, family and friends.

July 3rd, 2017 , 11:41 am

Speaking about the Battle of Kursk, today we primarily remember the tank battle near Prokhorovka on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge on July 12. However, events on the northern front were of no less strategic importance - in particular, the defense of the Ponyri station on July 5-11, 1943.




After the disaster at Stalingrad, the Germans longed for revenge, and the Kursk ledge, created as a result of the offensive of Soviet troops in the winter of 1943, seemed geographically quite convenient for the formation of a “cauldron”. Although among the German command there were doubts about the advisability of such an operation - and very justified. The fact is that for an all-out offensive, a noticeable superiority in manpower and equipment was necessary. Statistics indicate something else - the quantitative superiority of Soviet troops.
But on the other hand, the main task of the Germans at that time was to intercept the strategic initiative - and the Battle of Kursk became athe enemy's last attempt to launch a strategic offensive.
The emphasis was placed not on a quantitative, but on a qualitative factor. It was here, near Kursk, that the latest German Tiger and Panther tanks, as well as tank destroyers - a “fortress on wheels” - Ferdinand self-propelled artillery units, were used en masse for the first time.The German generals were going to act the old fashioned way - they wanted to break into our defenses with tank wedges. “Tanks are moving in a diamond pattern” - as the writer Anatoly Ananyev titled his novel dedicated to those events.

People vs tanks

The essence of Operation Citadel was a simultaneous attack from the north and south, gaining the opportunity to unite in Kursk, forming a giant cauldron, as a result of which the path to Moscow was opened. Our goal was to prevent a breakthrough by correctly calculating the likelihood of a main attack by the German armies.
Several defensive lines were built along the entire front line on the Kursk Bulge. Each of them consists of hundreds of kilometers of trenches, minefields and anti-tank ditches. The time spent by the enemy to overcome them should have allowed the Soviet command to transfer additional reserves here and stop the enemy attack.
On July 5, 1943, one of the most important battles of the Great Patriotic War began on the northern front - the Battle of Kursk. The German Army Group Center, led by General von Kluge, was opposed by the central front under the command of General Rokossovsky. At the head of the German shock units was General Model.
Rokossovsky accurately calculated the direction of the main attack. He realized that the Germans would launch an offensive in the area of ​​the Ponyri station through the Teplovsky heights. This was the shortest route to Kursk. The commander of the Central Front took a great risk by removing artillery from other sectors of the front. 92 barrels per kilometer of defense - such a density of artillery was not seen in any defensive operation in the entire history of the Great Patriotic War. And if at Prokhorovka there was the greatest tank battle, where “iron fought with iron,” then here, in Ponyry, approximately the same number of tanks were moving towards Kursk, and these tanks were stopped by people.
The enemy was strong: 22 divisions, up to 1,200 tanks and assault guns, a total of 460 thousand soldiers. It was a fierce battle, the significance of which was understood by both sides. It is characteristic that only purebred Germans took part in the Battle of Kursk, since they could not entrust the fate of such a fateful battle to their satellites.

PZO and “cheeky mining”

The strategic importance of the Ponyri station was determined by the fact that it gave control over the Orel - Kursk railway. The station was well prepared for defense. It was surrounded by controlled and unguided minefields, in which a significant number of captured aerial bombs and large-caliber shells, converted into tension-action landmines, were installed. The defense was reinforced with tanks dug into the ground and a large amount of anti-tank artillery.
On July 6, against the village of 1st Ponyri, the Germans launched an attack of up to 170 tanks and self-propelled guns, as well as two infantry divisions. Having broken through our defenses, they quickly advanced southward to the second line of defense in the area of ​​2 Ponyri. Until the end of the day, they tried to break into the station three times, but were repulsed. With the forces of the 16th and 19th tank corps, ours organized a counterattack, which gained them a day to regroup their forces.
The next dayThe Germans could no longer advance on a wide front, and threw all their forces against the defense center of the Ponyri station. At approximately 8 o'clock in the morning, up to 40 German heavy tanks, supported by assault guns, advanced to the defense line and opened fire on the positions of the Soviet troops. At the same time, the 2nd Ponyri came under air attack from German dive bombers. After about half an hour, the Tigers began to approach our forward trenches, covering medium tanks and armored personnel carriers with infantry.
Five times it was possible to push German tanks back to their original position through dense PZO (moving barrage fire) of large-caliber artillery, as well as actions of Soviet sappers that were unexpected for the enemy.Where the “tigers” and “panthers” managed to break through the first defensive line, mobile groups of armor-piercing soldiers and sappers entered the battle. Near Kursk, the enemy first became acquainted with a new method of fighting tanks. In their memoirs, German generals would later call it “the impudent method of mining,” when the mines were not buried in the ground, but were often thrown directly under the tanks. Every third of the four hundred German tanks destroyed north of Kursk was accounted for by our sappers.
However, at 10 am, two battalions of German infantry with medium tanks and assault guns managed to break into the northwestern outskirts of 2 Ponyri. The reserve of the commander of the 307th division brought into battle, consisting of two infantry battalions and a tank brigade, with the support of artillery, made it possible to destroy the group that had broken through and restore the situation. After 11 o'clock the Germans began attacking Ponyri from the northeast. By 3 p.m. they had taken possession of the May Day state farm and came close to the station. However, all attempts to break into the territory of the village and station were unsuccessful. This day - July 7 - was critical on the northern front, when the Germans achieved their greatest success.

Fire bag near the village of Goreloye

On the morning of July 8, when repelling another German attack, 24 tanks were destroyed, including 7 Tigers. And on July 9, the Germans put together an operational strike group from the most powerful equipment, followed by medium tanks and motorized infantry in armored personnel carriers. Two hours after the start of the battle, the group broke through the May Day state farm to the village of Goreloye.
In these battles, German troops used a new tactical formation, when in the first ranks of the strike group a line of Ferdinand assault guns moved in two echelons, followed by “tigers” covering the assault guns and medium tanks. But near the village of Goreloye, our artillerymen and infantrymen allowed German tanks and self-propelled guns into a pre-prepared fire bag, supported by long-range artillery fire and rocket mortars. Finding themselves under cross artillery fire, also falling into a powerful minefield and being attacked by Petlyakov dive bombers, the German tanks stopped.
On the night of July 11, the bloodless enemy made a last attempt to push back our troops, but this time tooIt was not possible to break through to Ponyri station. A major role in repelling the offensive was played by the PZO supplied by the special purpose artillery division. By midday the Germans had withdrawn, leaving seven tanks and two assault guns on the battlefield. This was the last day when German troops came close to the outskirts of Ponyri station.In just 5 days of fighting, the enemy was able to advance only 12 kilometers.
On July 12, when there was a fierce battle near Prokhorovka on the southern front, where the enemy advanced 35 kilometers, on the northern front the front line returned to its original positions, and already on July 15, Rokossovsky’s army launched an offensive on Oryol. One of the German generals later said that the key to their victory remained forever buried under Ponyri.

“I decided, as soon as weather conditions permitted, to launch the Citadel Offensive, the first offensive of the year. This offensive is given decisive importance. It must end in quick and decisive success, putting the initiative in our hands for the spring and summer of this year... Every commander and every soldier must be imbued with the consciousness of the decisive significance of this offensive. The victory at Kursk will be a guiding star, a torch for the whole world.”

In February-March 1943, Army Group South, under the command of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, managed to inflict a heavy defeat on the troops of the Voronezh and Southwestern fronts and recapture Kharkov.

As a result, the Soviet command had to switch to a tough defense, although they managed to stop the Germans only at the end of March. There was an operational pause that lasted 100 days—the longest lull in the entire war. On the southern flank, the front line acquired a double arc configuration. This situation was especially unfavorable for the German side, and Manstein considered it necessary, albeit with the last of his strength, to launch an immediate attack on Kursk. To do this, he needed reinforcements, which could only be quickly obtained from the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal von Kluge. The latter not only did not meet Manstein halfway, but also developed extreme activity in Berlin, convincing Hitler, Chief of the General Staff Zeitzler and Field Marshal Keitel of the need to postpone the offensive in the Kursk salient area at least until the end of the spring thaw. In vain Manstein argued in favor of an immediate offensive, citing the fact that the Soviet troops had not yet been able to build any defense and then “cutting off” the ledge would be a hundred times harder - it was all in vain.

Hitler said that for the offensive it was necessary to better prepare by supplying new tanks to the troops, and to begin it “from May 3, as soon as weather conditions permit.” For the Soviet command, the plans of the German leadership were no secret - the Wehrmacht strike groups were pulled together almost demonstratively. At this time, in the places where the enemy was supposed to attack, Soviet troops were building an unprecedentedly powerful field defense system, which would eventually become the strongest anti-tank defensive position in history. In addition, a strong group of reserve armies was created - the Steppe Front under the command of I. Konev. The Supreme Command Headquarters canceled all offensive operations - literally all forces were devoted to preparing for a defensive battle.

At this time, endless meetings and conferences of the Reich's high military command were held at the Fuhrer's headquarters, devoted to two questions - when and how to attack. Zeitzler, Keitel and von Kluge advocated an offensive through double flanking - attacks “under the base” of the Kursk ledge and, as a result, the encirclement and destruction of many Soviet divisions. Thus, the offensive impulse of the Soviet troops was to be weakened to such an extent that the strategic initiative would again pass to the Wehrmacht. Manstein hesitated, expressing doubts about the success he could guarantee if the offensive began in April. Inspector General of Panzer Forces Heinz Guderian was a fierce opponent of Zeitzler's plan. From the very beginning, he stated that the offensive was pointless, since the General Staff plan programmed heavy losses in tanks, and it would not be possible to significantly replenish the Eastern Front with new armored vehicles during 1943 due to the limited capabilities of German industry. This position of the “father of tanks” was shared by the Reich Minister of Arms and Ammunition Albert Speer, whose opinion the Fuhrer always respected.

Guderian also tried to dispel his opponents' illusions regarding the newest Pz tanks. V "Panther", recalling that these tanks were still an unproven design with many defects that could not be eliminated before August. The training of the crews of the new vehicles was also not up to par, since the few Panthers that arrived in units were almost immediately sent for repairs. There were too few heavy “tigers”, which had already proven their exceptional effectiveness, to “push through” the Soviet defense in all sectors with their help alone. At this meeting, held on May 3, Hitler, after listening to all sides, did not come to a definite opinion, but ended it with these words: “There should be no failure!” On May 10, Guderian again tried to convince Hitler to abandon the offensive, this time in a personal conversation.

The Fuehrer said: “You are absolutely right. As soon as I start thinking about this operation, my stomach starts to hurt.” But no matter what ailed Hitler, he did not listen to Manstein’s proposal, who recommended changing the plan of operation and advancing from the Kharkov area in a south-eastern direction, expanding the flanks of the breakthrough, that is, where the Soviet command simply did not expect a strike. During these endless discussions, Hitler himself came up with an interesting proposal - to attack Kursk from west to east, through Sevsk, forcing Soviet troops to fight with an “inverted front”, but Zeitzler, Keitel and von Kluge managed to force the Fuhrer to abandon even his own idea. In the end, Hitler “gave in” and finally agreed with the General Staff’s plan. The offensive, which was supposed to decide the outcome of the war, was scheduled for July 5.
Balance of power

On the southern face of the Kursk Bulge
a defensive line 244 km long was held by the Voronezh Front under the command of N.F. Vatutina.

Voska Voronezh Front(two echelons):
First line 38th, 40th, 6th, 7th Guards Armies
Second line 69th Army, 1st Tank Army, 31st Rifle Corps
Reserve 5th and 2nd Tank Corps
Cover 2nd Air Army

The Voronezh Front was opposed by:
4th Tank Army as part of the 52nd Army Corps (3 divisions)
49th Panzer Corps (2 tank, 1 elite motorized division "Grossdeutschland")
2nd SS Panzer Corps (tank divisions "Das Reich", "Totenkopf", "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler")
7th Army Corps (5 infantry divisions)
42nd Army Corps (3 infantry divisions)
Task Force "Kempf" consisting of the 3rd Panzer Corps (3 tank and 1 infantry divisions) and the 11th Army Corps (2 infantry divisions)
Reserve 24th Panzer Corps (17th Panzer Division and SS Wiking Panzer Division)
Cover 8th Air Corps of the 4th Air Fleet
The commander of the strike force was Field Marshal Erich von Manstein.

On the northern face of the Kursk Bulge
a defensive line 306 km long was held by the Central Front of K.K. Rokossovsky.

Troops of the central front(two echelons):
First line 48th, 60th, 13th, 65th, 70th armies
Second line 2nd Tank Army, 19th and 3rd Tank Corps
Cover 16th Air Army

The Central Front was opposed by:
First line German 9th Army (6 tank and motorized divisions and 15 infantry divisions)
Second line 13th Army Corps (4 infantry divisions)
The commander of the group was Colonel General Walter Model, subordinate to Field Marshal von Kluge.

Both Soviet fronts had sufficient forces to repel the German offensive, but just in case, the Supreme High Command Headquarters placed the Steppe Front under the command of I.S. behind these two fronts. Konev, which became the most powerful strategic reserve of the Soviet command during the entire war (2 guards, 5 combined arms, 5th guards tank, 5th air army, 3 tank, 3 cavalry, 3 mechanized and 2 rifle corps). In the event of the most unfavorable outcome, the front troops would defend themselves at the base of the arc in previously prepared positions, so the Germans would have to start all over again. Although no one believed that things could come to this, in 3 months they managed to build an exceptionally powerful field defense according to all the rules.

The main zone, 5-8 kilometers deep, included battalion resistance centers, anti-tank obstacles and reserve engineering structures. It consisted of three positions - in the first of them there were 2-3 continuous trenches of a full profile, connected by communication passages, the second and third had 1-2 trenches. The second defense line, 10-15 km from the front edge of the main line, was equipped in the same way. The rear army zone, running 20-40 km from the front edge, adjoined three front defensive lines with a total depth of 30-50 km. The entire defensive system consisted of eight lines. The forward tactical defense zone consisted of a developed network of strong points, each of which had from 3 to 5 76.2 mm ZiS-3 guns or 57 mm ZiS-2 guns, several anti-tank rifles, up to 5 mortars, up to a company of sappers and infantrymen . The area was literally strewn with minefields - the average mining density reached 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines per 1 km of front (4 times more than in Stalingrad).

And behind there was an “insurance policy” - the defensive line of the Steppe Front. So the Soviet troops spent their time in endless exercises, alternating with rest. But the Germans’ morale was also very high - never before had troops had 3 months to rest, study and replenish. Never before had the Germans concentrated such a mass of armored vehicles and troops in such limited areas. The best of the best were here. True, the veterans, looking at all the preparations, recalled the First World War, since the upcoming battle was supposed to be similar to the battles of the last war, when one huge army stomped around, trying to “gnaw through” the layered defense of the other, and both sides suffered huge losses with scanty results . But there were much more young people, and they were determined, although there was a certain fatalism in the air - if so many armored vehicles and troops do not crush the Ivans this time, then what to do next? Nevertheless, everyone believed in victory...

Prologue

The Germans had to start the battle not on the 5th, but on the 4th of July. The fact was that from the starting position of the 4th Tank Army on the southern front it was impossible to see either the positions of the Soviet artillery or the defense system in general - the ridge of hills behind the no-man's land was in the way. From these hills, Soviet artillery observers could clearly see all the German preparations and adjust the artillery fire accordingly. So the Germans had to take this ridge in advance. On the night of July 4, sappers from Grossdeutschland made passages in the minefields and several grenadier battalions from the same division, after intensive artillery bombardment and an air raid by Ju-87G Stuka dive bombers, went on the attack at approximately 15.20. Only in the evening did the grenadiers manage to push back the advanced units of 3 Soviet guards divisions and gain a foothold on the heights, suffering heavy losses.

Not a single shot was fired on the northern front that day. The commander of the Central Front, Army General Rokossovsky, knew the day and hour of the German offensive as early as July 2, so he prepared a surprise for the enemy. At 1.10 on July 5, when German motorized units had already moved to their initial positions for the attack, Soviet artillery began intensive shelling of the areas where German troops were concentrated.

The artillery raid lasted about an hour and caused heavy damage, but did not affect the timing of the German attack, which began at exactly 3.30 am. It took the sappers a full 2 ​​hours to make passages in the minefields for the “tigers” from the 505th heavy tank battalion under continuous fire. The 20th Panzer Division advanced the furthest that day, managing to reach the second line of Soviet defense and capture the village of Bobrik, a strong stronghold 8 km from the original line of attack. The 41st Tank Corps also managed to make significant progress, but on the left wing of Model, in the offensive zone of the 23rd Tank Corps, things did not go very well for the Germans. They were stuck in the defensive positions of four rifle divisions and could not break through them, even despite the use of two hitherto secret new products - Goliath mini-tanks (teletanks) and B-IV mine clearing vehicles.

The Goliaths were 60 cm high, 67 cm wide and 120 cm long. These “mighty dwarfs” were controlled either remotely by radio or using a cable that unrolled from the rear of the vehicle up to 1,000 meters. They carried 90 kg of explosives. According to the designers, they had to be brought as close as possible to enemy positions and undermined by pressing a button in their trench. Goliaths proved to be effective weapons, but only when they managed to crawl to the target, which did not happen often. In most cases, teletanks were destroyed as they approached.

To make wide passages in minefields, the Germans used a very exotic B-IV vehicle in battles on the northern front, which weighed 4 tons and carried a high-explosive explosive charge of 1,000 kg and resembled an armored ammunition transporter. The driver had to drive up to the edge of the minefield, turn on the remote control device, and then run away like he had never run in his life. The high-explosive charge detonated all mines within a radius of 50 m. Near Maloarkhangelsk, the Germans used 8 of these “mechanical sappers”, and quite successfully - the large minefield ceased to exist.

But out of eight drivers, four died because they were not fast enough, so since then it has been difficult to find anyone willing to drive the B-IV. However, after the Battle of Kursk the Germans practically did not use them. From the very beginning, Model massively used 90 Ferdinand heavy assault guns designed by F. Porsche. Few could resist this 68-ton monster, armed with an even longer-barreled 88-mm gun than the Tiger’s and 200 mm of frontal armor, but one drawback negated all the efforts of their crews. The Ferdinands did not have a single (!) machine gun - only a cannon.

It is strange that no one paid attention to this at the stages of development and testing, but now, having “ironed” the Soviet trench, the low-speed “self-propelled gun” could not fight the infantry with anything other than tracks, which had adapted to let the “monster” through and cut off the German enemy with intense fire infantry from their "ram". As a result, the “Ferdinands” had to go back in order to somehow help their own. During these movements back and forth, self-propelled guns often got stuck in trenches and craters or were blown up by mines, becoming prey to Soviet troops.

But, operating from cover as a tank destroyer, the Ferdinand was guaranteed to destroy any Soviet tank or self-propelled gun at a distance of up to 2,500 m. This vehicle was clearly not suitable as a “ram” for infantry. Of the 90 Ferdinands, the Germans lost half on the Kursk Bulge.

By the end of July 6, the Soviet front had been broken through by Model 32 km wide and up to 10 km deep, but at least 16 km remained to be broken through. Neither Model nor any of his soldiers and officers had ever encountered such an incredibly powerful defense. The immediate target of the Germans was the village of Olkhovatka, and mainly the ridge of hills around it. From a strategic point of view, the importance of these heights was difficult to overestimate - they offered a view of Kursk, the final goal of the offensive, located 120 m below the Olkhovat hills.

If it were possible to capture these heights, the extremely important area between the Oka and Seim rivers could be considered ours. To seize a bridgehead around Olkhovatka, Model sent 140 tanks and 50 assault guns of the 2nd Panzer Division and more than 20 Tigers into the attack, supported by numerous motorized infantry. Dive bombers and FW-190F3 attack aircraft non-stop bombed and strafed Soviet positions, clearing the way for tanks. On July 8, the 4th Tank Division joined the assaulters, but Soviet troops, replenished the day before by 2 infantry and artillery divisions, with the support of 2 tank brigades (tbr), held their positions.

For 3 days there was a continuous battle for the village of Teploye and the Olkhovat hills, but the Germans failed to achieve decisive success. Companies in which there were 3-5 soldiers left without a single officer were replaced with new ones, but nothing helped. To the left of Olkhovatka, 2 tank and 1 infantry German divisions fought for a week for the village of Ponyri, which the soldiers called “little Stalingrad.” There were battles here for every house, and the village changed hands a dozen times. Only on July 11, with the help of Model’s last reserve—the 10th Motorized Infantry Division—Ponyri was captured. But the Germans were not destined to advance further. The German commander knew about the impending counterattack of the Soviet troops from air reconnaissance data. Now he had to think about holding his position.

The combat order of the High Command of the German Ground Forces to von Manstein and the commander of the 4th Panzer Army, Colonel General Hoth, read: “Achieve a connection with the 9th Army by a direct breakthrough through Oboyan.” However, both Manstein and Goth understood that when all their forces were in front of the crossings across Psel in Oboyan, Soviet tank troops from the Prokhorovka area would hit the flank of the advancing German troops and, at a minimum, seriously slow down the advance on Kursk.

Therefore, Hoth proposed to his commander some change in the plan of action - after breaking through the main lines of Soviet defense, turn not to Oboyan, but to Prokhorovka, in order to repel the inevitable massive Soviet tank counterattack, and only then move north towards Kursk. Manstein approved this proposal, and on July 5 Hoth went on the offensive according to a new plan. Manstein’s tactics differed from Model’s tactics on the northern front - a quick breakthrough was made not by infantry, but by tank divisions, all at once. Manstein considered the traditional method of breaking through layered defenses, when motorized infantry with assault guns punches a hole into which tanks then rush, too time-consuming and labor-intensive, given the large width of the front.

Hoth, with his approximately 700 tanks, was supposed to push through the Soviet defenses immediately, “with a jerk, not a crawl,” and meet the Soviet tank reserves already in the operational space, where he, with the support of the Luftwaffe, had a good chance of defeating them. General Kempff's task force further south was to operate in a similar manner. Manstein was confident that the Russians would not be able to withstand a simultaneous attack from 1,300 tanks and assault guns. They won't be able to stand it. But the outbreak of hostilities did not confirm Manstein’s optimism - although his troops managed to advance 8 km deep into the Soviet defense and capture the village of Cherkasskoe, the task for the first day was to break through all lines of enemy defense. The next day, July 6, the 11th TD was supposed to capture the bridge over Psel, south of Oboyan, 50 km from the starting position! But it was by no means 1941, and therefore we could no longer count on such a pace.

Although it must be said that all plans went into the trash bin largely due to the incredible failure of the new “miracle weapon” - the Panther tank. As Heinz Guderian predicted, the new combat machine, which did not have time to get rid of “childhood diseases,” showed itself very poorly from the very beginning. All “Panthers” were consolidated into two battalions of 96 vehicles each. Both of them became part of the 39th Panzer Regiment under the command of Major von Lauchert. Together with 8 headquarters vehicles, the regiment consisted of exactly 200 tanks. The Panther regiment was attached to the Grossdeutschland motorized division and, together with its tank regiment (about 120 tanks), operated in the Oboyan direction throughout the entire operation. Of the 196 Pz tanks that went into battle. 162 V Panthers were lost due to technical reasons alone. In total, in the battles on the Kursk Bulge, the Germans irretrievably lost 127 Panthers. It's hard to imagine a more unsuccessful debut. Although in some cases the new tanks performed very well: for example, one “Panther” managed to knock out a T-34 at a distance of 3,000 m!

But all these, although successful, few episodes did not play any positive role for the Germans. But at one time, waiting for the commissioning of these tanks, Hitler moved the start of the “Citadel” at least a month and a half ahead! However, not paying attention to these failures, the German tank wedge penetrated the defenses of the 6th Guards Army. Here the SS tank divisions especially distinguished themselves, after just a few hours they found themselves directly in front of the command post of army commander M. Chistyakov. The commander of the Voronezh Front, N. Vatutin, gave the order to the commander of the 1st Tank Army, M. Katukov, to immediately counterattack. In Katukov’s army, 1/3 were light T-70 tanks, which for German tanks were only mobile targets, and the “thirty-four” guns were inferior to the German ones. Under these conditions, several brigades went on the attack and immediately suffered heavy losses. Katukov turned to Vatutin with a request to cancel the order, but he refused. The restless army commander then contacted Stalin and proved to the Supreme Commander that he was right.

Vatutin's order was canceled. T-34s continued to operate from ambushes, which was much more effective than frontal counterattacks. By the end of the first day, the Germans had advanced 10-18 km and did not stop fighting even at night. On July 6-7, they developed an offensive along the Oboyan highway to Syrtsovo-Greznoye, and by the end of July 7, the Leibstandarte and Totenkopf began to break through the key position of the Soviet defense between the Psel and Donets rivers. The front of the 6th Guards Army no longer existed, and the 1st Tank Army suffered heavy losses. Arriving on the evening of July 7 at the Katukova command post, member of the Military Council N.S. Khrushchev said: “The next two or three days are the worst. Either the lord or... the Germans are in Kursk. They put everything on the line, for them it is a matter of life or death. It’s necessary... for them to break their necks, and for us to move forward!” But on July 8-10, the Germans “didn’t break their necks,” but, on the contrary, methodically shaking the Soviet defenses, reached the town of Verkhopenye and crossed the Pena River. Then the SS Leibstandarte and Das Reich TDs turned towards Prokhorovka. The 48th Panzer Corps partially went to Oboyan, which was about 30 km away, and partially supported the advance of the SS Panzer Corps to the east.

But Hoth had nothing to cover the eastern flank of his operation - the Kempf task force missed the schedule before reaching the upper reaches of the Donets. Nevertheless, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps continued to advance, and the Headquarters representative, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky together with General N.F. Vatutin asked Stalin to nominate the 5th Guards Army of Lieutenant General A.S. to strengthen the Prokhorov direction. Zhadov and the 5th Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant General P.A. Rotmistrov from the Ostrogozhsk region. By the end of the day on July 9, the 5th Guards approached Prokhorovka. At this time, Colonel General Hoth condensed the battle formations of the 2nd SS Tank Tank and reduced its offensive zone by half. The Kempf task force, which had arrived on July 10, was preparing an attack on Prokhorovka from the south, through Rzhavets.

Battle

The Battle of Prokhorov began on July 10. By the end of the day, the Germans captured an important defensive point - the Komsomolets state farm - and entrenched themselves in the area of ​​​​the village of Krasny Oktyabr. The Germans would not have been able to achieve all this, even despite the striking power of their formations, if not for the exceptionally effective actions of the Luftwaffe in supporting their troops. As soon as the weather permitted, German planes literally “lived” in the skies above the battlefield: 7-8, or even 10 combat sorties a day were not uncommon for pilots. Ju-87Gs with 37-mm cannons in suspended containers literally terrorized Soviet tank crews, inflicting very heavy losses on them. The artillerymen suffered no less, especially since in the first week of the battle Soviet aviation was unable to organize a proper rebuff to the Luftwaffe.

By the end of July 11, the Germans had pushed back the Soviet units in the area of ​​the Storozhevoye farmstead and formed a tight ring around the units defending Andreevka, Vasilievka and Mikhailovka. On this day, a platoon of anti-tank rifles of the 284th joint venture of the 95th Guards Infantry Division under the command of Lieutenant P.I. accomplished their feat. Shpyatnogo. 9 armor-piercing soldiers entered into battle with 7 German tanks and knocked out all of them. All Soviet soldiers were killed, and the last enemy tank was blown up by the seriously wounded platoon commander himself, throwing himself under it with grenades. There were only 2 km left to Prokhorovka itself without any serious fortifications. Vatutin understood that the next day, July 12, Prokhorovka would be taken and the Germans would turn to Oboyan, at the same time going to the rear of the 1st Tank Army. One could only hope for a counterattack from Rotmistrov’s army, which was supposed to turn the situation around.

The tankers were supported by the 5th Guards Army. Its commander, General Zhadov, recalled: “There were only a few hours of daylight and a short summer night left to organize a counterattack. During this time, a lot needs to be done: make a decision, assign tasks to the troops, carry out the necessary regrouping of units, arrange artillery. In the evening, mortar and howitzer artillery brigades arrived to reinforce the army, having an extremely limited amount of ammunition. The army had no tanks at all.” Rotmistrov's tankers also experienced a shortage of ammunition. Around midnight, Vatutin changed the time of the attack from 10.00 to 8.30, in order, in his opinion, to forestall the Germans.

This decision became fatal. Having gone into battle in a narrow 10-kilometer area, the tankers discovered that they were attacking the prepared SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler tank head-on. The German gunners had a clear view of the Soviet tanks, and already in the first minutes of the battle, dozens of T-34s and light T-70s flared up on the field, which should not have been sent to attack at all. The SS men were attacked by the 18th and 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Division in cooperation with the 42nd Guards Rifle and 9th Guards Airborne Divisions. It was the battle of these two corps with the SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler tank battle that later received the name of an oncoming tank battle, and the place where it took place - a “tank field”.

190 T-34s, 120 T-70s, 18 British heavy Mk-4 Churchills and 20 self-propelled guns attacked the German positions. The Leibstandarte consisted of 56 tanks (4 Tigers, 47 Pz. IV, 5 Pz. III and 10 Stug. III self-propelled guns).

Having launched the attack at 8.30, Soviet tanks only reached German artillery positions by 12.00 and during this time were subjected to a powerful air raid by Ju-87Gs and Messerschmitt-110s. As a result, both corps lost about 200 tanks and self-propelled guns, while the Germans lost 10 times less. And how could it be otherwise? The commander of the Voronezh Front threw 2 tank corps into a suicidal frontal attack not on the German infantry, but on the SS tank deployed for the attack, reinforced with artillery. The Germans were in a very advantageous position - they fired from a standing position, taking full advantage of the excellent ballistic qualities of their long-barreled guns and the excellent optics of their sights. Being under the disastrously accurate fire of German armored vehicles, being subjected to strong attacks from the air and not having, in turn, proper support from their own aviation and artillery, Soviet tank crews had to grit their teeth and “break” the distance in order to get closer to the enemy as quickly as possible. The MK-4 Churchill tank under the command of Lieutenant Lupakhin received 4 through holes, but the crew continued to fight until the engine caught fire.

Only after this did the crew, all of whose members were wounded, leave the tank. The mechanic-driver of the T-34 of the 181st Tank Brigade, Alexander Nikolaev, saving a wounded battalion commander, managed to successfully ram a German tank in his damaged tank. The Soviet tankers fought literally until the last shell, until the last man, but no miracle happened - the remnants of the corps rolled back to their original positions, managing, however, to slow down the German offensive and paying an incredible price for it.

But everything could have been different if Vatutin had not moved the time of the attack from 10.00 to 8.30. The fact is that according to the plan, the Leibstandarte was supposed to begin attacking our positions at 9.10, and in this case, the Soviet tanks would have met the German tanks with fire from the spot. In the afternoon, the Germans launched a counterattack, concentrating their main efforts north of Prokhorovka, in the zone of the Totenkopf division. Here they were opposed by about 150 tanks from the 5th Guards Army and the 1st Guards Army, as well as 4 Guards Rifle Divisions of the 5th Guards Army. Here the Germans were stopped mainly due to the excellent actions of anti-tank artillery. "Das Reich" fought with two tank corps of the 5th Guards and practically with an open right flank, since the 3rd Tank Corps of the "Kempf" task force was unable to approach Prokhorovka from the southeast on time. Finally, the day of July 12th ended. The results for the Soviet side were disappointing - the 5th Guards, according to the combat log, lost 299 tanks and self-propelled guns that day, the 2nd SS Tank - 30.

The next day the battle resumed, but the main events no longer took place in the Prokhorovka area, but on the northern front, near Model. The commander of the 9th Army was planning on July 12 to make a decisive breakthrough in the area of ​​​​the village of Teploye, but instead was forced not only to abandon the offensive, but also to withdraw mobile formations from the front to repel a major offensive on Orel, undertaken by the troops of the Bryansk Front. But the most important thing was that on July 13, Hitler summoned von Manstein and von Kluge to his Headquarters in East Prussia. As soon as the field marshals appeared before him, the Fuhrer stunned them with the news that, in connection with the successful Allied landing in Sicily, he was stopping the Citadel and transferring the SS Panzer Corps to Italy. However, Hitler allowed Manstein, acting only on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge, to try to bleed the Soviet troops as much as possible, but on July 17 he ordered him to stop the useless offensive, withdraw the SS Panzer Corps from the battle and, moreover, transfer 2 more tank divisions to von Kluge so that he could try hold Eagle.

It was on this day that the Battle of Prokhorov ended. At the beginning of August, Manstein was forced to retreat to his original starting positions, which he also failed to hold for any long time.

I.V. Stalin was extremely dissatisfied with the huge losses suffered by the 5th Guards in the battles near Prokhorovka. As part of the internal investigation P.A. Rotmistrov wrote several notes, one of which was addressed to G.K. Zhukov. In the end, the Soviet tank general literally miraculously managed to justify himself.

Sov. secret

To the First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR - Marshal of the Soviet Union, Comrade. Zhukov

In tank battles and battles from July 12 to August 20, 1943, the 5th Guards Tank Army encountered exclusively new types of enemy tanks. Most of all on the battlefield there were T-V (Panther) tanks, a significant number of T-VI (Tiger) tanks, as well as modernized T-III and T-IV tanks. Having commanded tank units from the first days of the Patriotic War, I am forced to report to you that our tanks today have lost their superiority over enemy tanks in armor and weapons. The armament, armor and fire targeting of German tanks became much higher, and only the exceptional courage of our tankers and the greater saturation of tank units with artillery did not give the enemy the opportunity to fully exploit the advantages of their tanks.

The presence of powerful weapons, strong armor and good sighting devices on German tanks puts our tanks at a clear disadvantage. The efficiency of using our tanks is greatly reduced and their breakdown increases. The battles I conducted in the summer of 1943 convince me that even now we can successfully conduct a maneuverable tank battle on our own, taking advantage of the excellent maneuverability of our T-34 tank. When the Germans go over to the defensive with their tank units, at least temporarily, they thereby deprive us of our maneuvering advantages and, on the contrary, begin to fully use the effective range of their tank guns, while at the same time being almost completely out of reach of ours. aimed tank fire.

Thus, in a collision with German tank units that have gone over to the defensive, we, as a general rule, suffer huge losses in tanks and are not successful. The Germans, having opposed our T-34 and KV tanks with their T-V (Panther) and T-VI (Tiger) tanks, no longer experience the former fear of tanks on the battlefields. T-70 tanks simply cannot be allowed into tank battles, since they are more than easily destroyed by the fire of German tanks. We have to admit with bitterness that our tank technology, with the exception of the introduction into service of the SU-122 and SU-152 self-propelled guns, did not produce anything new during the war years, and the shortcomings that occurred on the tanks of the first production, such as the imperfection of the transmission group (main clutch, gearbox and side clutches), extremely slow and uneven rotation of the turret, extremely poor visibility and cramped crew accommodation, have not been completely eliminated to this day.

Now the T-34 and KV tanks have lost the first place, which they rightfully had among the tanks of the warring countries in the first days of the war... Based on our T-34 tank - the best tank in the world at the beginning of the war, the Germans in 1943 were able to give even more The improved T-V "Panther" tank, which, in fact, is a copy of our T-34 tank, is significantly superior in quality to the T-34 tank, and especially in the quality of weapons. I, as an ardent patriot of the tank forces, ask you, Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union, to break the conservatism and arrogance of our tank designers and production workers and raise with all urgency the issue of mass production by the winter of 1943 of new tanks, superior in their combat qualities and design design of currently existing types of German tanks.

Commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army of the Guard, Lieutenant General of Tank Forces - (Rotmistrov) signature “20” August 1943 active army

The actions of the Soviet command in the Battle of Kursk can hardly be called a role model - the losses were too great, but still the main thing was achieved - the power of the Wehrmacht tank units was broken, the army tank and infantry divisions were no longer full-fledged combat instruments - their decline was irreversible. And although the SS divisions retained high combat effectiveness, there were too few of them to radically influence the situation at the front. The strategic initiative in the war firmly passed after Kursk to the Soviet troops and remained with them until the complete defeat of the Third Reich.