What is a nation state? “Russian Empire” or “Russian National State”? Russian nation state

Russian people have a natural gift for feeling injustice and lack of freedom. But in the era of mass media, this feeling is offset by streams of harmful ideological cliches and sticky conclusions that have distracted the Russian people from a healthy attitude towards their own history and their current situation. An information and ideological war is being waged against the Russians. And ideology can only be defeated by ideology. What does it mean: ideological writings and the trail of journalism that follows them, propaganda projects, declarations of slogans - something absolutely necessary for the Russian people to resist the destructive actions of the media and, in general, the information environment in which we are all involuntarily immersed.

The foundations of the Russian worldview were set out more than once in various kinds of declarative works or philosophical and political doctrines of private writing. I had the opportunity to participate in the creation of the Manifesto for the Revival of Russia, which became the basis for the political position of the Congress of Russian Communities (1993-1999), the National Manifesto (2009), which currently expresses the ideology of the Great Russia party, and in collaboration with Boris Vinogradov, published the book “Becoming Russian” in Russia" (2011), and then summarize national conservative ideas in the book "Russian Ideology", which is planned to be published in the near future. I have also produced many programs dedicated to Russian national ideology as part of the electronic video channel "Russian News".

There is a core idea in Russian ideology that is worth repeating constantly and illuminating from different angles. In order for it to constantly be the focus of attention of educated Russian people who are looking for a reliable basis for their position, and often for a personal propaganda contribution to the liberation of the Russian people from the tyranny of the oligarchy. This is the idea of ​​the Russian national state, expressed in the key slogan of the Russian movement: “Russia - Russian power.”

Unfortunately, recently people have been joining the Russian movement who stopped in their intellectual development somewhere in the mid-90s or even earlier - they simply stopped reading books and current journalism. They invite us to “dance from the stove,” and therefore to repeat our favorite liberal fictions about the Russian people, the Russian state, and Russian nationalism. If the official media are trying to discredit Russian nationalism and intimidate the Russian people with its “animal grin,” then well-wishers, who suddenly feel involved in the Russian people, are trying to persuade them. Persuade them to abandon everything Russian and strive only for “social security” and “common sense.” It’s as if both become accessible to a Russian person only after he renounces everything Russian - first of all, the idea of ​​a Russian national state.

First of all, they are trying to “remind” us that “Russia is a multinational state.” At the same time, they believe that they are quoting Yeltsin’s Constitution, supposedly adopted by us in an all-Russian referendum. Firstly, this Constitution was not adopted in a referendum (there were not enough votes for this), and secondly, in the text of this Constitution, which was foisted on us by deception, there are no words “multinational state”. It only talks about “multinational people”. Which, of course, is absurd if by “multinationality” we mean several nations. This term can only be conventionally reasonable in the sense of a plurality of “nationalities,” that is, nationalities. As in any state, many peoples live in the Russian Federation. If they prefer to be called “nationalities,” then the generalized “people of the Russian Federation” is made up of them. This completely fruitless thought can be accepted. But for a state to contain many nations, such an idea can only be considered absurd. There can only be one nation in one state. Historical Russia also never had many nations. Even in the USSR, the “Soviet people” - “a new human community” could be considered a nation. But there was no plurality of nations in it. Such plurality is present only in international organizations - for example, in the United Nations.

The theoretical question is: was there and is there a nation in Russia? In the political sense, a “nation” is a community of solidarity of citizens (subjects) who are aware of this community and accept it as its creators. In a national state, this awareness is universal and constant; in a pre-national state, it is inherent either in the leading social stratum or in the entire population, but only during periods of special danger to the state. And, if we are talking about Russia, then we should name this nation and say where it comes from. A nation does not arise out of emptiness, but is generated by a people who have reached a certain level of self-awareness.

Russian self-awareness includes, as signs of national solidarity, outstanding military triumphs, which were shared as common glory by all the Russian people. Starting with the Battle of the Ice and the Battle of Kulikovo. In this empathy, as well as in the consolidation of the duty to serve “Faith, Tsar and Fatherland,” the sign of the existence of a nation is manifested. This means that the nation existed in Russia even before the very term with which we now operate appeared. And the Russian Empire was a Russian national state. Other peoples also had their home in it, the leading strata of which joined the administration of the Russian state and became Russified, recognizing Russia as a Russian state. At the same time, Russia has never been a “multinational”, much less a “multi-confessional” state. And if such a state is ever achieved, then the existence of Russia will cease, and the history of the Russian people will end.

Can we say that the Russian Federation is a nation state? After all, we have terms about “national security” and recently even created a “national guard”. Some dreamers believe that a “Russian nation” appeared from somewhere in the Russian Federation. From where - no one knows. And the only justification for this fantasy is the distribution of Russian passports and the registration of all citizens of the Russian Federation as members of a certain “nation” - that is, the state. This approach cannot be considered to be in any way justified. For the “Russian nation” is no more real than the “Soviet people,” and formal citizenship does not contain obligatory loyalty to the state and the state-forming people.

Currently, the Russian Federation is a non-national (or even anti-national) state. And, of course, non-denominational. In the Russian Federation and other fragments of historical Russia, there is a nation, of course. To the extent that the state-forming Russian people feel themselves to be a community responsible for their fate and the fate of the state. Such responsibility is obvious, but the power circles of the Russian Federation use it only for imitative patriotism, which replaces political solidarity with loyalty to the anti-national authorities. In this sense (as in many others), the Russian Federation ceases to be a state - there is no state-oriented worldview in it, no nation, no legal institutions designed to preserve the national character of the state. The Russian Federation is something faceless, in no way connected with the history of Russia. And the power of such a connection is shunned in every possible way.

In Russia there can only be one nation - Russian. This is a historical fact. Even if Russians in Russia made up not 80% of the population, but, say, 10%, the situation would not change. Russia is Russians united by relations of solidarity and who have created state institutions on this basis. This is the formula of modern Russian statehood. Anyone who doesn’t like this doesn’t like the Russian State.

Only the Russian people can continue the history of Russia. Without the Russian people, Russia is nothing. Any other people, if they disappeared, would not affect the history of Russia in any way. Therefore, in history there is only Russian Russia, and not “Russia in general” or “Russia for everyone.” As much as Russia is Russian, it exists.

Of course, representatives of other peoples can enter the Russian nation if they Russify their political view of things, if they are patriots of Russian Russia, and not some other. Then these will be those who are part of the Russian nation. Otherwise, these are political marginals who belong in unique ethnographic reserves. This choice can be humanely given to them. Commitment to marginalized ethnicity should be respected, but it should also be recognized that the marginalized cannot be given political rights. What can you do, Russia is a Russian country, a country where the Russian nation exists, and there cannot be any other nations here.

Our country cannot be multi-religious either. Russia is historically the center of Orthodoxy, the Christian center. We do not consider Catholics and Protestants to be Christians, although they repeat words from Scripture. But they do not understand anything about it and distort the meanings so that we define them as heretics. These can be quite decent people in everyday matters. But in dogmatic questions they veered somewhere away from Christ. And if they insist on their delusions or try to impose them on us, then they turn into our enemies. And the enemies of our worldview cannot be in the same nation as us.

Russia is the core of Orthodox civilization, the stronghold of Christianity. Representatives of other faiths cannot have any rights that elevate them above the Orthodox. All other confessions here can only have a representative character, because historically in Russia there were no other confessions, no other world religions.

Yes, over time, some people with different religious views moved in with us. Some peoples converted to Islam. But this does not mean at all that Russia is multi-confessional, and here you can put Orthodoxy and any other confession on the same level.

If we had national state power, it had to grow from national roots, be flesh and blood of the Russian people. These roots and this flesh are absolutely Orthodox, and no others. This does not mean that other beliefs should be suppressed or persecuted. Destructive cults - of course, but we must tolerate the presence of world religions - to the extent that they do not encroach on the Orthodox essence of Russia.

The special relationship between the current government and the bureaucracy of the Moscow Patriarchate does not mean the emergence of any signs of a Russian national state. Firstly, because this bureaucracy is thoroughly permeated with ecumenism and captured by the crypto-Catholic sect, and secondly, because the government officials have developed even warmer relations with Jewish rabbis and Islamic mullahs.

If Judaism in Russia cannot in any way be considered a “traditional confession” (as its status is indicated in Russian legislation), and it is also not a world religion, then Islam in Russia is certainly traditional, and in its prevalence covers the whole world. However, there are not as many Muslims in the Russian Federation as they say. Conversations generally attribute all non-Orthodox peoples of the Russian Federation to Islam. Hence the crazy numbers, reaching 20 and 25 million. This is a deliberate lie spread by mossy “multi-religious” and “multinational” people. That is, enemies of Russia and Russians. The overestimation is by an order of magnitude, that is, ten times.

The deception is organized like this: they gathered one hundred thousand Chechens and migrants in the square on Bayram and declared our country half Muslim. Of course, there was and cannot be anything Muslim in the statehood of historical Russia. Yes, now Moscow has been occupied by immigrants; a monstrous cathedral mosque has been built for them, without asking the Russians, to which crowds of Muslims flock in the thousands from all over the Moscow region. But these are not residents of Moscow, not Muscovites, not Russians. These are people whom the Russophobic authorities brought to the center of the country in order to suppress everything Russian and everything Orthodox. And also to demonstrate to us what idiots we are for allowing the Russian Orthodox capital to be populated by foreigners and non-Basmachis.

The role of Orthodoxy in the formation of the Russian state is well known. The Russian people are state-forming people - this is also clear to every sane person. Maybe there are other peoples who participated in the state building of Russia? There is no doubt that many peoples gave Russian statehood their worthy representatives. But is there at least one people in Russia, besides the Russians, who built statehood? That the peoples resisted Russian statehood is true. That the peoples of Russia were fleeing extermination is true. But there are no peoples who would create Russia together with the Russian people.

The people closest to us in number are the Tatars (5%). Did the Tatars participate in building the Russian state? No, they resisted Russia - both in the Volga region, and in Crimea, and in Siberia. On the contrary, we had to fight the Tatars for a long time. The Tatars tried to prevent the Russians from developing and extending their statehood to undeveloped spaces in the east and south. Only in opposition to the Tatars (Crimean, Astrakhan, Volga) did the Russian state emerge. This does not mean that a modern Tatar, or a Tatar from the time of Ivan the Terrible, could not serve the Russian state. Could. And there were more Tatars in the army of Ivan the Terrible than outside the walls of the Kazan Kremlin. But there were also ten thousand Russian mercenaries outside the walls of the Kazan Kremlin. Here the question was not ethnic, but political: either dominance would remain with the Tatar khans, or with the Russian Tsar and the Russian Orthodox people.

The Tatars during the time of Ivan the Terrible were already split, and in the ethnic sense they formed into a community only under the rule of the White Tsar. Kazan Tatars are the fruit of Russian statehood, and not vice versa. At the same time, we, Russians, are obliged to respect in every possible way the contribution made by individual representatives of the Tatar people to our statehood. By the way, can we name at least a dozen names?

Are the Tatar people now the builders of the Russian state? No, not at all! No other nation, except the Russian, bears the burden of statehood. If there is something from the state in the Russian Federation, it is only due to the fact that the Russians have not yet given up and have not thrown the idea of ​​reviving their native state out of their hearts. From other nations we often see competitive relationships. Are there Tatars or representatives of other nations in the Russian movement? Are any Tatar organizations supported by the Russians? No, this is not visible. And we know how the Kazan Tatars treat Russians - the Tatar ethnic clan rules there and has seized power. Of course, he represents not all Tatars, but an ethnic oligarchy, suppressing everything Russian in Tatarstan. But do the rest of the Tatars really have something against and support the Russians who are fighting for the status of the Russian language and the access of Russians to public service? No, this is not the case.

Russians strive to ensure that the Russian state is restored. It can only be restored as Russian. Therefore, Russians strive to preserve Russian statehood in any form, but so that it is necessarily Russified. But the Tatars and other peoples do not. They are fighting for their local privileges, local rights, and even for the creation of their own ethnic statehood - like the peoples of the former USSR who supported Yeltsin’s “parade of sovereignties.” When they flee to the Russian Federation and remember the “friendship of peoples,” we must remember the genocide of Russians in their ancestral nests. These uninvited guests are not ours - they are guests of the Russophobic oligarchy, “socially close” to the oligarchy hostile to us.

Why is the Russian Federation not only not a Russian state, but not even a state at all? Because in some cases the status of a foreigner in the Russian Federation is higher than the status of a citizen. Firstly, these are foreigners close to the oligarchy, for whom the Russian Federation is a free hunting zone. Foreign or multinational corporations are at home here. Gazprom or Rosneft, VTB or Alfa Bank are international structures, not Russian ones. They act exclusively contrary to Russian national interests and even against Russian statehood, subjugating it to themselves. Secondly, uninvited guests freely enter the Russian Federation - having no connection with the Russian statehood and replenishing ethnic criminal structures. Thirdly, in the Russian Federation there are no restrictions on the acquisition by foreigners of land for housing construction and the construction of housing here. And in court, foreigners are treated equally with Russian citizens. Not only Russians, but all citizens of the Russian Federation are freely discriminated against by foreigners. But also criminal elements - formally citizens of the Russian Federation, but actually members of anti-state groups.

The task of the Russians is to Russify the legal system, saturate it with Russian meanings, equalize the rights of respectable citizens, infringe on the status of foreigners in comparison with citizens, decisively defeat the rights of criminal elements and uninvited guests - immigrants, as well as all kinds of ethnocrats.

The constitution should have a clause on state-forming status only for the Russian people. No other people should have state-forming status, otherwise it will be a lie in the founding document, and no statehood can be built on lies. Only the Russian people created Russia! But the Russian national state is a total Russification of all legislation.

The state-forming status of the Russian people without the Russification of the entire body of laws that will guarantee this status is worth nothing. Each declarative position (and there should also be such in legislation - so that the meaning of the legal system does not slip away) must be supported by laws, and the constitutional status of the Russian people must be supported by a number of laws. They must infringe on other peoples to the extent that tendencies arise against the Russian content of statehood. If a person does not want to live in Russian Russia, he either lives on a reservation or he moves abroad. In this sense, there must be infringement. If you do not speak Russian, you cannot acquire any civil rights. Because they are not even able to understand what these rights are and what responsibilities they imply.

Civil status should be the same, but this status assumes only Russian content. Russian culture, Russian education, the Russian state language - all this takes precedence and is protected from any competition within Russian territory.

The constitutional norms of the future Russian national state cannot be directed against other peoples who live on the territory of our country, but they must be aimed at ensuring that these peoples live in peace with the Russian people. So that the Russian people do not adapt to everyone, but on the contrary, so that other peoples strive to live in peace and harmony with the Russians. The Russians became too good-natured and gave up positions for the sake of peace, which they never achieved. On the contrary, the more peace-loving we are, the more impudent the ethnocrats are, the more atrocious the ethnobandits are. There should be no ethnic clans in the Russian state. Ethnic attempts to de-Russify Russia must be eliminated, and the impossibility of this is enshrined in law.

Russian solidarity is ensured not only by laws but also by the Russian social atmosphere and government efforts in the field of promoting national values ​​and customs, in cultural and educational policies. Therefore, we all solve a common problem together, each in our own place - due to our capabilities, powers and abilities. When we build the Russian national state in relations between Russian people, the Russophobic oligarchy will collapse by itself.

I came across here an interesting reservation by the main creator of the “multinational Russian Federation” Tishkov, that people who dealt with ethnic problems in the USSR did not consider this state an empire, but considered it... a national state. But the question arises, whose nation-state was it? It is clear that this was a Russian national state. Such a crap, unfinished, but Russian national state.

The point is that ethnic nationalism cannot be separated from political nationalism. In theory, these nationalisms are separated and opposed, but in reality, ethnic nationalism always strives to realize itself in a political form, and political nationalism always has an ethnic content.

What is “100% American”? He is an American of Anglo-Saxon origin and a Protestant by faith. Those. in this “melting pot” there was a hierarchy of nations, and it cannot be otherwise. There is no state in the world where ethnicity does not play a primary role. The Anglo-Saxons who lived in North America won their independence and began to build their own state, which was dominated by the Anglo-Saxon elite, spoke English, wrote and read it, and English culture became the basis for the creation of the United States. If the United States were dominated by another ethnic group, say, the Germans, then it would be a German state, everyone would speak German, there would be German culture there, and this state would be oriented toward Germany, not England. Those. everything would be different, and world history would be different. This is what the ethnic factor is. And even now in the United States, only 16% of the population considers themselves simply Americans; everyone else remembers that they are British, Germans, Swedes, Poles, Russians, etc.

What is a “one hundred percent Soviet person” in the late USSR? This is a Russian, a member of the CPSU. All the rest were of a lower rank, and there were even nationalities taken on suspicion.

The creation of a Russian national state from the international USSR began immediately after the civil war. Lenin screamed, fought hysterically, fought against it. He was a very strange Marxist, he seemed to have to understand that there are laws of development and that it is useless to ignore them, but he tried. He declared communism in the Soviet of Deputies in 1918, and they tried to build real communism, that’s how it was. They called this period "war communism". Precisely because it was “communism”, and not out of necessity, these psychos abolished money and property and tried to socialize everything. It didn't work out. Because everything stopped, nothing worked, little people fled to the villages and rebelled against their native Soviet power. And these psychos, led by Lenin, were forced to return to capitalism and admit that it is impossible to build socialism in one country.

From the ghostly, communist Council of Deputies, the Russian state clearly peeped through. Lenin was mad, he fought madly against Russian great-power chauvinism. But chauvinism won, and the “Russian chauvinists” were the Pole Dzerzhinsky and the Georgian Ordzhonikidze. For they acted based on objective reality. Lenin began to create a new state and demanded that its name not contain the word “Russia”. They went to meet him halfway, but then other “Russian chauvinists” appeared, led by Stalin, and almost the entire Central Committee was the same. They wanted to create a unitary state, based on the principle of expediency, Lenin screamed and demanded the creation of a federation. He was supported by local national people. Historical Russia was divided into three states, Russia proper, Ukraine and Belarus.

Next - the death of Lenin and the struggle for power. And here’s a strange thing: the majority in the CPSU (b) was left-radical (remember that this was the time of the NEP), but they voted not for the “left” at the top of the party, but for the “right”. Why? The answer is simple - the leftists were Jews - Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev. The “right” were Russians - Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky. As a result of all these fights, power gradually passed to the Russified Georgian Stalin, who was not perceived in the party as a Georgian, but only as a Russian. In 1927, Russians already dominated the top leadership. This was the balance of power after the departure of the Russophobe Lenin.

Politburo, elected at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on December 19, 1927. Members: N. I. Bukharin, K. E. Voroshilov, M. I. Kalinin, V. V. Kuibyshev, V. M. Molotov, A. I. Rykov, Ya. E. Rudzutak, I. V. Stalin, M. P. Tomsky. Candidates: A. A. Andreev, L. M. Kaganovich, S. M. Kirov, S. V. Kosior (1907), A. I. Mikoyan, G. I. Petrovsky, N. A. Uglanov, V. Ya. Chubar.

And here we see only one Jew, and that is Kaganovich. Jews were left in the leadership of the NKVD, where they dominated, but this was a political decision. It was assumed that foreigners performed punitive functions better, which was tested in the civil war. At the same time, Jews, of all foreigners, were the most loyal to the Soviet regime; they pushed aside Latvians and Poles in the Cheka. The Red Army was led predominantly by Russians. Although the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff was headed predominantly by Jews.

Jews would dominate the NKVD not only until 1937; they occupied important positions even under Yezhov, at the height of the bloodiest purges, and only under Beria were they significantly displaced by Russians and Caucasians.

The ethnic aspect in the political struggle in the 1920s is usually not taken into account, because it is difficult to rely on any facts, except for one fact - the crushing victory of the Russians. And here it is important to note that for some reason all researchers do not see that this happened LONG before Stalin’s purges. And that Stalin’s purges were not carried out on an ethnic basis, and many times more Russians died in them than Jews. This means that the Russification of the top of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) did not occur at the will of Stalin, as almost everyone writes, some with delight, others with hatred, it happened before Stalin’s dictatorship, and Stalin himself rose precisely on this wave. It was a completely objective process.

And therefore, when in the 30s the communists began to move from the practice of suppressing everything Russian to an alliance with the Russians, it was quite logical. There was no “ethnic gap” between the leadership of the CPSU (b) and the people. And this is not just important, it is something without which no modern society can exist normally.

But society did not support the communists. The small part that supported for various reasons was enough in peaceful conditions. And during the war, this minority was doomed.

After all, why does a nation state arise? In times of feudalism and monarchies, for successful existence, the efforts of a small part of the people, the same nobility, peasants drafted into the army who became professional soldiers, and a small bureaucratic apparatus were sufficient. But in the conditions of the new society this is no longer sufficient. To survive and win, the efforts of the whole society are needed. This is exactly what the national state provides. Nationalism unites all layers of society.

The communists tried to do without this, but their Karl Marx, their brotherhood of workers of the whole world did not “ignite” society. Society didn't care about it. But Russian society immediately responded to the ideas of Russian patriotism. And not to say that in the 30s there was some serious campaign in favor of Russian patriotism, but everything Russian stopped being persecuted, the Russians were offered to be proud of being Russian, and this was not just heard by the people, it laid the basis for an alliance between communists and the Russian people during the war.

The nation state solves the question - who is in charge in society? The main thing is the titular people. If this is ensured, then national power in a nation state is unshakable. Stalin understood this well, he said in plain text that the Russian people are the main people in the USSR. This was completely absurd from the point of view of Marxism and internationalism. Moreover, it was a crime for a Marxist to say such words. But Stalin said it. And not at all out of love for the Russian people.

And these were not just words. The Russians dominated the USSR after 1945. At one time they wrote a lot about the fact that Russians in the RSFSR were subject to heavy taxes, that the national republics were subsidized at the expense of the Russian people. All this is correct. But at the same time, the leadership of the USSR under Stalin and after him consisted mainly of ethnic Russians. They headed the KGB and the army, the Russians headed the Academy of Sciences. In order for a Soviet person to have an unhindered career, he had to be one hundred percent Soviet, i.e. party and Russian. The nationalist could only get into the top leadership of the country thanks to personal connections with the General Secretary of the CPSU.

And the Russians who remained to live in the CIS and the Baltic countries remember the USSR with nostalgia, not because there was socialism there, but because they were first-class citizens, they were elected in the national republics. Behind them was all the power of the state.

In order for the USSR to survive, Stalin had to abolish the national republics after 1945 and create a unitary state instead of a federal one, which would be divided into regions. There was a need for a massive resettlement of Russians to Central Asia and the Caucasus, whose population was then small. It was necessary to “abolish” Ukraine and Belarus as republics. And most importantly, the abolition of national elites. Without their communist parties, without their Central Committee, KGB, Ministry of Internal Affairs, the national elites simply could not exist.

It was necessary not to shoot Russian patriots in the leadership of the country, as Stalin did with Voznesensky and Kuznetsov, but it was necessary to ensure that there was only one center in the CPSU, so that there was one Central Committee of the CPSU, and no party centers for the nationals. Only cultural autonomy. And this is not something exceptional in the world, this is the rule. The exception was the USSR, in which the wise Ilyich created republics with the right of secession.

After all, it was not the peoples who separated in 1991, but their elites.

And the first crisis did not happen in 1991, but much earlier. From everything that has been written about the last year of Brezhnev’s life and the struggle for power, an interesting picture emerges. Brezhnev did not have a receiver. Romanov had the best chance of being elected general secretary, but there was no power behind him. Andropov was in no way ranked among the bosses of the CPSU.

And what happened? Brezhnev planned to transfer power to the head of Ukraine Shcherbitsky. Which completely broke the entire configuration of power. For after Stalin, the Russian Khrushchev ruled, then the Russian Brezhnev. A fair part of their lives was connected with Ukraine, hence the Ukrainian personnel and the favor of Ukraine under Khrushchev, hence the “Dnepropetrovsk mafia” under Brezhnev.

Actually, Shcherbitsky had nothing nationalistic; moreover, he was known as a Russophile. But his move to the Kremlin automatically meant the strengthening of central power not only by the people of Dnepropetrovsk, but also by the people of Kiev, because according to the laws of the genre, the Secretary General could not govern the country without his people.

Local national elites had not only formed by that time, but also considered the republics of the USSR as their fiefdoms. The Russian nomenclature understood perfectly well that appetite comes during the game. And that the crests will make the most of Sherbitsky’s appointment. In essence, his appointment meant a war between the elites.

This is where the entire unviability of the USSR manifested itself. It was not a full-fledged Russian state, because the people were removed from power. There was no full-fledged Russian political elite. If in the same Ukraine, in the state of the Russian (even Ukrainian in name) people, there was such an elite, as in any other republic of the USSR, then the Russians did not have it. The Union nomenklatura, which consisted mainly of Russians, was not such. In fact, the Russian nomenclature was the most disorganized among all the nomenclatures of the USSR.

And how does it work during a crisis? That is, at the moment when the prospect of falling under the power of the Kievites loomed? No way. But completely different forces are at work.

Some facts. Researchers claim that in January 1982, Brezhnev decided to talk to his man in the KGB, General Tsvigun, and the second man in the CPSU, Mikhail Suslov. Brezhnev was interested in where information came from in the country and abroad about his daughter Galina, about her connection almost with the criminal world, about her passion for diamonds. This conversation inevitably had to end with Andropov’s resignation from the post of KGB chairman. For it was secret KGB officers who disseminated compromising information about Galina Brezhneva throughout the country.

What happens next? On January 19, 1982, Semyon Kuzmich Tsvigun shot himself, and six days later, on January 25, 1982, Suslov died, as his son-in-law writes from the words of Suslov’s daughter, the doctor gave the main ideologist a pill, and two hours later he died. So Brezhnev had no one to talk to. But Leonid Ilyich did not deviate from his own. He did deal a blow to Andropov. He removed him from the key post of KGB chairman. On the one hand, he moved him to Suslov’s post, where Andropov did not have his own people, on the other, he put a man from Ukraine, the head of the KGB of Ukraine, Vitaly Fedorchuk, at the head of the KGB.

If Brezhnev had decided to give power to Andropov, he would have let him choose his successor in the KGB. The appointment of Fedorchuk speaks only of one thing: Brezhnev wanted to give the post of General Secretary to Sherbitsky. And he prepared the ground for this.

And further, as Suslov’s consultant Alexander Baigushev recalled, Andropov invited people who were Brezhnev’s eyes and ears in the country. His “party intelligence” told them in plain text that if Brezhnev was replaced by Shcherbitsky, he would replace Brezhnev’s people, i.e. this very “intelligence”, and if he, Andropov, becomes secretary general, then they will get everything they want. As a result, Brezhnev was handed over, and he could not and did not have time to bring Shcherbitsky to the post.

The security forces (the army led by Ustinov and the KGB) actually imposed a new General Secretary Andropov on the CPSU, about whom it is still unknown for certain what nationality he was. They write that he is a Jew.

But what is interesting for us here is that the ethnically Russian nomenklatura, which seemed to really belong to power, all these first secretaries of regional committees, union ministers, etc., were simply excluded from the game.

But what would happen if Shcherbitsky became Secretary General? This move by Brezhnev was visible, because earlier he saw his successor in the leader of Belarus Masherov. He wanted to transfer him to Moscow, but he was killed, as many write, a car accident was set up for him. It is quite possible that, as an experienced apparatchik, Leonid Ilyich understood the whole game that was going on in the elites, he understood that in order to prolong the life of the USSR it was necessary to unite the Slavic part of the country’s population, for which it was necessary to unite the elites.

Due to the game of the elites, due to the weakness and disunity of the Russian ethnic elite, a Belarusian or Ukrainian at the head of the CPSU could theoretically unite the Slavs.

Actually, Ukrainians and Belarusians are Russians, but they had their own elites. In exactly the same way, if there had been a Siberian SSR in the USSR, then there would have been an elite that separated from Moscow in 1991. Or if the Karelo-Finnish SSR existed, as it did for some time, then it would have separated from Moscow in 1991.

This is where the most important difference between the USSR as a national state of Russians and a full-fledged national state lies. In a full-fledged national state there are no elites other than the elite of the titular nation. In the same France in the mid-19th century, 50 percent of the population were not French, they spoke their own languages, and they did not have the identity of the French, but they did not have their own elites. Therefore, by introducing French-language primary schools everywhere, the French easily solved this problem.

Could the same Masherov or Shcherbitsky solve the problem of Russian-Slavic unity? If so, then they would have taken another big step towards creating a Russian national state.

The “Russian party” in the CPSU with a Ukrainian or Belarusian at the head of the country would be reconciled by the latter’s struggle against “Zionism”. Both Masherov and the Ukrainian group in power would undoubtedly strike a blow at the Jewish group. Jews were influential in the USSR, well organized, and had a lot of their own agents of influence among the Russian nomenklatura. And as is now clear, Andropov mentally belonged to this group, was their main figure, although it was he who began the schizophrenic fight against “Zionism,” but as you can see now, this fight only united the Jews more strongly, and made Russophobia among them the dominant mood.

As a result, the struggle of the elites in the USSR ended with the victory of the Jewish group led by Andropov, which, paradoxically, relied on part of the Russian security forces. It makes sense to talk about Gorbachev’s drama separately, but there is no doubt that he relied on the cadres of the “Jewish party,” and they also became the basis for Yeltsin.

And this group under no circumstances wanted the creation of a Russian national state after 1991, and it does not want this today. Although they have some understanding that there is a problem here and it needs to be solved somehow.

For the Russian Federation can only take place and develop as a national state.

rupolitika.ru, Alexander Samovarov

About a month ago I made a small sketch for a simple catechism on Russian nationalism. As always, sores and other things distracted me. But, as working material for collective work, this text may be useful.

The main goal of Russian nationalists is the Russian nation state

Who are Russian nationalists?
Russian nationalists are all those who want Russia, both in law and in practice, to be the national state of the Russian people. The state of the Russians.

What is a nation state?
A nation state is a state that declares as its goal, and often even enshrines in the constitution, concern for the well-being, prosperity, security, numbers, and social security of the nation that established this state.

Give an example of a nation state?
Germany is a state of Germans. Hungary is the state of Hungarians - this is exactly what is written in the constitution. Israel is a state of Jews. Japan is the state of the Japanese.

Isn’t the Russian Federation already a Russian national state?
No. The Constitution of the Russian Federation even begins with the words “we, the multinational people...”. The Russian people are not mentioned even once in the text.

It turns out that in multinational Russia all peoples have equal rights, so what’s wrong with that?
No, in the Russian Federation not all peoples have equal rights even by law, not to mention in reality. Within the Russian Federation there are subjects that, according to their constitutions, are national states of certain peoples - Bashkiria, Udmurtia, Buryatia. It is characteristic that the majority of the population in many of these regions are Russians, who have actually turned out to be second-class citizens.

So, Russian nationalists are in favor of including in the Constitution the words that Russia is the state of the Russian people?
Russian nationalists advocate that Russia should have a new constitution corresponding to the status of the Russian national state. But, as a first step, a “Russian amendment” to the existing constitution will also be useful, at least in such a cautious form as is available regarding the Udmurt nation in the Udmurt constitution (that is, there is a precedent for such wording in Russian constitutional law):

Article 1.
“Based on the will of its people, Russia is a state that has historically established itself on the basis of the Russian nation exercising its inalienable right to self-determination. The development of Russia within its existing borders is carried out by the equal participation of all nations and nationalities of the country in all spheres of its life. In Russia, the preservation and development of the language and culture of the Russian people, languages ​​and cultures of other peoples living on its territory is guaranteed; there is concern for the preservation and development of the Russian diaspora, living compactly outside Russia.”

If such an amendment is adopted, does this mean that Russians will have advantages in life over representatives of other nations, for example, when getting an apartment or getting a job?
No, that doesn't mean it. If we do not want constant conflicts and civil wars, then we must ensure the strictest equality of rights for every citizen of Russia. But, the adoption of such an amendment means that the interests of Russians both as a people and as a group of citizens will never be sacrificed in any way to the interests of other peoples and their specific representatives. No one will demand from the Russians that we sacrifice our interests in order to “show respect” for other peoples. Everyone will truly have equal rights and equal before the law.

What then will be the benefit for a specific Russian from this amendment?
Those Russians who live in the current “national republics” will not have to face formal and actual discrimination. They will not be forced to learn a language other than Russian. Those Russians who live outside of Russia will be able to automatically obtain citizenship. The entire Russian population will be subject to protective measures that will prevent, for example, migrants from taking their jobs. Nowhere on the territory of Russia will there be any laws, “Sharia laws” or other mandatory norms of behavior that do not coincide with those that are familiar and natural to Russians.

Will this make us happy?
Many people know how difficult it is to live in someone else’s house, hostel, rented apartment, or disputed living space that strangers are trying to grab from you. If a person is pleased to have his own house and land, correctly legally registered as property and really protected by law, then we will undoubtedly feel joy from the Russian people having their own correctly legally registered home - the Russian national state.

You say either “Russian people” or “Russian nation” - are these concepts different or the same?
The word “people” has several accepted meanings - these are ordinary people as opposed to the rich and influential, this is the totality of all citizens of the state who have civil rights, this is also a historical cultural community - in this sense we say “Russian people, Tatar people, Udmurt people , Kalmyk people”, etc. A nation is a people in the third sense, a historical and cultural community that has the will and desire to establish its own state and live in it. A people can live without a state; for a nation, its own state is the highest value.

Does the Russian nation exist or do we just have to become one?
The Russian people created their state more than a thousand years ago. He defended the independence of the Russian land against the Mongol-Tatars, Lithuanians, Swedes, Poles and other aggressors, formed a single centralized administrative apparatus headed by the autocratic kings and conquered vast new lands - the Urals, Siberia, the Caucasus, and liberated Little Russia. More than 500 years have passed since Russia became early nation state- one of the first in Europe.
After, simultaneously with the establishment of the Russian Empire by Peter I, the noble elite of Russia carried out a virtual coup against the rights and cultural values ​​of their own people (many nobles even forgot how to speak Russian), the ideology gradually began to be implanted according to which Russians are only one of many peoples in the Empire, without any special rights or privileges. Great Russian people actively argued with this view, for example Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky, who wrote: “The owner of the Russian land is only one Russian (Great Russian, Little Russian, Belarusian - this is all one) - and it will be so forever... believe that a Russian will never allow anyone to say veto to himself on his land!” . Nevertheless, in one form or another, the policy of alienating Russians from their own national state continued throughout the era of the empire. But the real triumph of the alienation of the state from the nation came when the Bolsheviks, after the revolution of 1917, adopted the “Leninist national policy” and divided the unified historical Russia into 15 “republics”, established many autonomies within the Russian Federative Republic, in which the Russians were driven under the rule of representatives small nations. Even the Russian people themselves were forcibly divided into three - Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian, and the forced Ukrainization of the southern Russian population began. The policy of the modern Russian Federation is a continuation and aggravation of this “Leninist national policy” - small nations, none of which constitute even a twentieth part of the Russian people, are granted numerous autonomies and privileges, while any reminder of the rights of Russians is punished by severe administrative penalties and criminal repression. The task of the Russian people is to change this state of affairs, to be reborn as a nation, to return the national state we created, which was taken from us by force, into our own hands.
So, the Russian nation exists, but the state was taken away from us long ago and they don’t want to return it to us. The Russian people must be reborn as a nation and take back their state.

Who can be considered a Russian person?
The basis of any nation is the unity of origin and self-awareness of people. That is, a Russian is someone who has at least one Russian parent and who considers himself Russian.

What if the person is Ukrainian or Belarusian?
Russian nationalists do not recognize the artificially drawn border between the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian people - we are all representatives of a single Russian people and must make efforts to live in a single state. Until this goal is achieved, Russia must be a common home for all representatives of the three branches of a single people.

Do Russian nationalists recognize the existence of Siberians, Uralians, Cossacks, and other similar nationalities?
Russian nationalists recognize such communities as cultural groups within a single Russian nation. In the Russian national state, all Russian communities will be given the broadest opportunities for their development, injustices will be eliminated, and sometimes the consequences of genocide, such as that committed by the Bolsheviks against the Cossacks. But, if someone, on behalf of and usually without any instructions from these communities, demands for them separate statehood, other rights that can only belong to the Russian nation as a whole, then Russian nationalists say a decisive “No” to this kind of speculation. The Russian nation as a political body must be united.

And if a person is of non-Russian origin, but is included in Russian culture and considers himself Russian, is he Russian?
It is impossible to prohibit a person from having one or another national self-identification. Accordingly, if someone’s parents were not Russian, and he considers himself Russian, then we cannot and should not prohibit him from doing so. And if a person is good, we can only welcome him. But core Any nation always and everywhere consists of people whose origin and identity are identical. The presence of people who consider themselves Russian, regardless of origin, is not a reason to blur our concept of this core. In addition, situations should not arise when someone first calls himself Russian, and then begins, as a Russian and on behalf of Russians, to demand some benefits and privileges for another nationality to which he actually belongs. By allowing such “transformations,” we can little by little, imperceptibly, lose all the rights and freedoms of the Russian people, and face the fact that the state is again alienated from them.

The Russian national movement is the only force that, having gotten rid of the enemy agents embedded in it and united in a common cause, is capable of saving Russia from destruction. The Russian national movement expresses the interests exclusively of the Russian people. But these interests also turn out to be close to the interests of other peoples who have lived in Russia since ancient times, who today have lost their understanding of the value of Russian leadership and are now succumbing to Russophobic propaganda, everyone is trying for himself. We hope to return their healthy attitude towards Russians and towards Russia. But the main thing is that the same thing happens to Russians - Russian people must remember their Russian nature and defend Russia for future generations of the Russian people.

The threat to the existence of Russia comes not so much from external as from internal enemies - from the international oligarchy that has seized power, from foreign clans and ethnocrime. The Russian movement is also divided by internal disagreements and the agents of the enemy, introduced to us under the Russian name, but with completely different goals that are unacceptable to us. By suppressing the internal enemy, we will be able to repel the external one.

This Manifesto, summarizing the intellectual efforts of Russian thinkers and the experience of political struggle for the interests of the Russian people, offers a basis for uniting the entire Russian movement, all Russian people.

The national-power path is political

The choice of a Russian person.

Russians, who have not lost their identity, their original national qualities, are acutely aware of the tragedy of Russia. In search of solutions for the future for themselves and the Fatherland, they are looking at many options for organizing the state and ways to change the situation. But every time the question arises: what force will take on these transformations?

Any progress and revolutions in society occur only when a critical mass of people is captured by a common idea, impulse, insight.

Our people have been deceived many times: by revolutionaries, priests, communists, democrats and liberals. Each time it turned out that all the tempting, often beautiful slogans were just a means, a tool for the makers of cataclysms - a complete deception. And today, in order to retain power, our “elite” has enveloped the people in a network of total deception: a peculiar combination of patriotism, democracy, liberal freedoms and the notorious stability. But the most long-lasting and insidious deception turned out to be internationalism. Carrying out long-term hidden work to “educate” internationalists from the previously freedom-loving and independent Russian people, our enemies turned them into a patient mass, dependent on their guides.

In an effort to cut down our roots they instill in us tolerance, which in medical terms means non-recognition, non-rejection of the foreign, defenselessness. Proclaiming universal equality, our enemies introduced the practice of free use of the material and intellectual property of our people, turning the people themselves into consumables.

In an effort to maintain their dominant position and the established management system, they saddled patriotism, as a way to preserve the territory and material wealth of our country at our disposal. They brazenly use the holy memory of our fathers and grandfathers, who achieved Victory in the Great Patriotic War with their blood for PR of the so-called “national leader.”

We, Russian nationalists, will not allow the foundation of the state to be built on the bones of our people! We are against the sacrificial killing of our people for the sake of the state political system, or economic prosperity.

The enemies are trying to outlaw our desire to preserve the culture and memory of our ancestors, love for our people and traditions. By distorting the concept of Russian nationalism in every possible way, they simultaneously encourage and support the nationalism of small nations, bringing it to an unacceptable level.

Russian nationalism is a life-saving medicine to cure the disease of the Russian people. Realizing this, our enemies are directing their greatest efforts to suppress the growth of Russian national self-awareness. We will bring to the understanding of the population the necessity and decisive role of Russian nationalism for the liberation of the nation from foreign domination.

We will be supported by the people of other countries who value their national spirit and independence.

Russian nation state

One of the most important features of the Russian way of life is community. Community played a huge role in building the Russian State. The dominance in the Russian way of life of a sense of mutual assistance, joint work and protection from enemies, spiritual unity, and high moral standards contributed to the construction of the state and its subsequent transformation into a powerful empire. “Destroy our community, and our people will immediately be corrupted in one generation...” (F.M. Dostoevsky). It is no coincidence that our enemies set the task of “preventing the revival of social collectivism in Russia.” Preaching “liberalism” individual well-being, unlimited consumption, they destroy the understanding of a simple principle that is obligatory for us: “the general is higher than the particular.”

We have all the prerequisites for the restoration of our state and its power: the colossal heritage of our ancestors in the form of rich territory, infrastructure, and, most importantly, a potentially powerful people. But today we also have a power “elite” that has been destroying and plundering the country for a quarter of a century, which has convincingly proven its inability and unwillingness to take the path of reviving Russia and saving its people.

We argue that only people with a clear orientation towards the national path of development can change the vector of movement. These people are Russian nationalists and other representatives of indigenous nationalities who support the ideas of the Russian liberation movement. A government hostile to the people, carrying out the plans of the international financial industry, will hold on to the levers of power until the last opportunity. She will not stop at inciting a civil war and great bloodshed, as has already happened in Ukraine, not without the participation of the Kremlin’s sidekicks.

In an effort to prevent the awakening of the Russian people, the Kremlin group is intensifying measures to “cleanse” the population of bearers of the Russian spirit and consciousness. The “imprisonment” of Russian patriots just for expressing their beliefs has become more frequent, and the authorities are trying to brand attempts to provide them with legal assistance as “extremism.” The most “dangerous” Russian patriots, like Alexei Mozgovoy, face imminent death and a ban on even mentioning them. To give the appearance of “concern for maintaining order and tranquility,” those in power assign labels to Russian patriots: from “extremist” to “organizer of the overthrow of the legitimate government.” The gullible population easily “buys” the wording presented by the media, without burdening itself with searching for the true sources of terrorist attacks, extremism and genocide of the people.

Today we are faced with a difficult task: to unite thinking citizens in conditions of isolation from the media. So that citizens feel like Citizens, and security forces remember their Charters and “Oaths of Allegiance” to our people and state, and put them above personal commitment to the “bokhan” and the nouveau riche who pays.

It is extremely important for us not to bring the country to the extreme, but to deal with the rat pack of financial interns in advance. During the transition period, only the national elite will be able to maintain order in the country by establishing a dictatorship of national interests. The population will need support for the new, national leadership of the country, which is radically different from today’s “stability of degradation and hopelessness” ensured by bloated security forces, corrupted “justice” and duping of the people.

Related information.

Aryan myth in the modern world Shnirelman Viktor Aleksandrovich

“Russian Empire” or “Russian National State”?

25 years ago, Roman Szporluk proposed dividing Russian nationalists into those who are trying to save the empire and those who stand for building a national state (Szporluk 1989). These debates have not died down and still seem relevant. However, over the past 10 years, their meaning has changed: “empire” is now often associated not with the USSR, but with Russia, and the nation state is understood as a “purely Russian state”, free from any ethnic minorities. The latter may look like the same Russia, or it may appear in the form of separate Russian regions that have received state registration.

In the early 1990s. An uncompromising supporter of the empire was the rock musician and at the same time right-wing radical ideologist S. Zharikov, who tried to revive the teachings of the patriarch of Western anti-Semitism, H. Chamberlain. Linking the Russians with the Aryans, he contrasted the Indo-Europeans with the Semites as “masculine” with “feminine” and “solar” with “lunar”. Claiming that Christianity had spiritually enslaved the Aryans, he advocated empire and royal power. Instead of Christianity, he proposed introducing a “traditional tribal cult,” that is, returning to paganism. And the “national leader” was combined in his head with the “power of Svarog.” At the same time, he saw the “Masons” and “Jewish Masons” as his most terrible enemies (Zharikov 1992).

The idea of ​​the “Russian Empire” appears most clearly in the religious system of V. M. Kandyba. This system, on the one hand, is designed to unite “ancient Russian beliefs” with the “true” teachings of Christ, and on the other, to contrast them with “distorted Western Christianity.” Anti-Semitism, emanating from the idea of ​​a “Jewish-Masonic conspiracy,” plays a significant role in this, and in order to once again emphasize the close relationship of his teaching with the version of the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion,” Kandyba makes King Solomon the founder of Freemasonry (Kandyba 1997a: 166; Kandyba, Zolin 1997a: 156–157)312. His co-author P. M. Zolin goes even further. Commenting on the fantasies of the “great psychologist,” he not only popularizes the classics of world anti-Semitism, but does his best to assure the reader of the existence of a “Jewish-Masonic conspiracy.” After all, even if the “Protocols” were a fake, their predictions are being realized with high accuracy, he declares (Kandyba, Zolin 1997a: 394), repeating the attitude towards the “Protocols” that is popular among anti-Semites (about this, see: Korey 1995: 155).

Such fantasies take on a special appearance in Kandyba’s esoteric works, due to the fact that their author seems to be trying to seize the baton from the “international Zionism” constructed by Russian anti-Semites. Kandyba himself has a dream of “world domination,” and he assures that the Russians have already possessed it more than once, that the Kiev prince Vladimir allegedly tried to return it, and that all this inevitably awaits world civilization in the future (Kandyba D. 1995: 162, 182). That is why Kandyba announces “the idea of ​​​​conquering world domination and the victory of Yavi (this is how the name of Yahweh is glorified. - V. Sh.)”… the idea of ​​“the victory of the light principle in man over his dark earthly nature” (Kandyba D. 1995: 144). Accordingly, the author presents the Jews as a “branch of the southern Rus,” reducing the intensity of the Russian-Jewish conflict to the level of a family quarrel. He even sympathizes with the ancient Israelis, “our younger brothers,” who lost their statehood and fell into Babylonian captivity (Kandyba D. 1995: 144, 151). At the same time, he clearly disapproves of the activities of the “Volga Rus”, who tried to establish their financial, cultural and administrative dominance in the “Russian Empire” in the early Middle Ages. Without distinguishing between Jews and Khazars and calling them all “Volga Rus,” Kandyba accuses them of “international financial intrigues” that put many groups of “southern Rus” in heavy debt dependence (Kandyba D. 1995: 157).

One can only sympathize with the author who sets himself a historiographical trap with his complex “meta-historical” constructions. Indeed, why, while repeatedly noting disagreements and civil strife between “ancient Russian tribes and unions” within the Empire, admiring the global conquests of the Rus and their ability to impose tribute on vast territories, does he express indignation at tributary relations only in one case - when it comes to the Khazar Kaganate, which itself he calls it a “Russian-Jewish state” (Kandyba D. 1995: 160)? It is quite obvious that he is dominated by the “Khazar syndrome”, characteristic of many other Russian neo-pagans.

An attentive reader will notice that Kandyba does not treat all “Russians” equally kindly. The activities of the “Russian-Jews” irritate him. But in order to avoid accusations of anti-Semitism, which is present among many modern Russian nationalists in their attitude towards Khazaria, he tries to soften the relevant passages as much as possible. This is done with the help of linguistic tricks - by introducing euphemisms “foreigners”, “merchants”. It was the “foreigners” who were representatives of the “incomprehensible trade and financial octopus” that entangled the entire Eastern Europe in the Khazar era, and it was from them that the legendary Prince Bravlin cleared it, Prince Svyatoslav waged victorious wars with them, and the uprising of the Kievites was directed against them in 1113 (Kandyba D. 1995: 157–160, 178). The author diligently hides the fact that “our younger brothers” and “foreigners” are, in fact, the same persons. Not without reason, he hopes to be clearly understood by like-minded people who understand the meaning of neo-pagan mythologies perfectly.

What about Christianity? In this regard, Kandyba’s judgments are equally contradictory. It is clear to him that Christianity was an alien ideology aimed at undermining the “Russian spirit,” behind which certain “financial and military interests” were hidden. Following the example of his predecessors, he accuses Prince Vladimir and some of his successors of all conceivable and unimaginable crimes against the Russian people (Kandyba D. 1995: 137, 158, 160–163, 177–180). At the same time, he recognizes Christ as a “Russian prophet”, pays tribute to his wisdom and even... justifies Vladimir’s introduction of Christianity by the urgent needs of the multinational Kyiv state (Kandyba D. 1995: 162, 202).

In other words, like all other nationalist concepts, Kandyba’s constructions suffer from striking contradictions. But, unlike the materials discussed above, they have an important feature: Kandyba, like no one else, openly blurts out the secret dream of a number of Russian radicals about world domination. That is why for them there are no more terrible enemies than Christianity and the Jews, which, in their opinion, are the only serious obstacles to this goal.

However, Kandyba does not reject all Christianity, and in words he is most concerned not with the “Zionist conspiracy”, but with the expansion of “false Christianity”, hostile to the “Russian Religion” he creates. He describes the origin of “false Christianity” as follows. Allegedly, once upon a time one of the Rus’ detachments, led by a priest named Yahweh, ended up in the Eastern Mediterranean. After his death, Yahweh was deified by the local inhabitants. Later, the “South Russian priest” Abram, who lived in Ur, carried out a religious reform and created Judaism, the religion of the “Rusalim”. From the context of the book, it is quite obvious that the term “Rusalim” is introduced by the author to refer to Jews. Indeed, according to him, the latter not only believed in the god Yahweh, but it was their “blond king” David who captured the “Russian Donkey”, renaming it Jerusalem, and on the site of the “Temple of Rev on Siyan Mountain” he built the temple of Yahweh, giving the mountain the name Zion (Kandyba 1997a: 46–47, 72, 163; Kandyba, Zolin 1997a: 42–43, 50, 69, 153). However, the author claims that there never was such a people as Jews, but there were “Ararat Rus” who settled on the lands of the “Palestinian Rus” and forgot about their kinship (Kandyba 1997a: 259).

Kandyba makes Jesus Christ a “Russian prophet from Galilee”, with one stroke of the pen declares Jerusalem as the place of his birth and completely confuses the reader by calling him the father of both the “Roman warrior Pandora”313 and a certain “carpenter” and, finally, sending the young Jesus to India and Nepal for the study of Vedic texts (Kandyba 1997a: 197; Kandyba, Zolin 1997a: 180–187. Cf.: Ivanov 2000: 44–45)314. The latter allegedly became one of the most important sources of the true “pure teaching” of Jesus Christ. Contrary to the entire New Testament tradition, the author proves that Jesus Christ did not come at all to atone for human sins, but to fight the “Pharisee Church” and restore the true “Russian Religion”. However, the Pharisees subjected him to painful execution, and the “Roman ideologists” distorted his teaching and made it the basis of their misanthropic ideology, calling it “Christianity.” Since then, the latter has carried out the barbaric destruction of “the entire spiritual wealth of the Russian Religion” - churches, libraries, written documents. In particular, Kandyba accuses the “Rusalim” of burning the “Great Etruscan Library” and the “Old Russian Library of Alexandria,” where all documents on “Russian history” over the past 18 million years were destroyed in the fire. Ancient Russian rituals were abolished, Vedic knowledge was prohibited, the original texts of the Gospels were rewritten and distorted, even the alphabet was changed beyond recognition so that no one could read “Old Russian.” In particular, it was the distortion of the “primordial alphabet” that Constantine the Philosopher allegedly dealt with in Crimea (Kandyba 1997a: 227–241, 276–277)315.

The attack on the “Russian tradition” is still ongoing: the enemies destroyed the “Russian Empire”, violated its shrines, and now they want to completely deprive the Russian people of their ideology (Kandyba 1997a: 230). Kandyba accuses the Christian Church of all kinds of sins - here are murders, debauchery, the spread of venereal and mental diseases, the darkest machinations, the robbery of the Russian people, the cultivation of foreign values, and the inculcation of the cult of cruelty. It is to the priests that Kandyba’s words, full of anger, are addressed: this “criminal mafia scum is robbing the holy Russian people, profiting from their desire for spiritual life and faith in the Ideal” (Kandyba 1997a: 324).

Although Kandyba avoids the term “Jews” in every possible way, replacing it with euphemisms such as “Rusalim” and “Roman ideologists,” he makes it quite clear who he is talking about. After all, resisting Christianization, “many Russian peoples believed that it was better to perish than to pray to foreign Jewish gods.” And Christian priests have always served mainly “persons of Jewish (Rusalim) nationality” (Kandyba 1997a: 228, 324). Kandyba does not shun the blood libel, declaring that the Eucharist included a ritual that previously consisted of “eating the blood of a foreign child.” He insists that even now the “Rusalim” are engaged in the murder of Russian babies and the sale of their organs abroad (Kandyba 1997a: 228, 325). Consequently, all the author’s accusatory pathos against Christianity is directed primarily against Jews. These also include his threats, which will be discussed below.

According to Kandyba, the conspiracy of the “Rusalim” against humanity is rooted in the very division of sacred space into North-South and West-East, where North and East mean the pure, spiritual principle, and South and West mean the base material. That is why the “Rusalim” who initially lived in the South, selfish and gold-loving, settled all over the world, created a wide global trade and financial network and planned to use it to seize power over the world. This idea was taken into its service by Christianity, which was obliged to teach peoples obedience (Kandyba 1997a: 233–234).

But Kandyba connects the primordial idea of ​​world domination and God's chosenness with the Russian heritage. He notes the fundamental differences in its implementation between the “northern” and “southern Rus”: if the former sought to rule the world openly with the help of knowledge and weapons, then the latter wanted to achieve this in the most insidious ways - through trade and finance and succeeded a lot in this (Kandyba 1997a: 234, 283). But, Kandyba insists, the establishment of material prosperity on Earth brings death and destruction to humanity, alienating it from the spiritual, and this must be avoided in every possible way (Kandyba 1997a: 440). That is why the “Russian Empire,” built on different principles, became an obstacle for the “Rusalim” on their path to world domination, their “only mortal enemy,” and they tried with all their might to destroy it (Kandyba 1997a: 341–342).

After all, the pure teaching of Christ, in Kandyba’s understanding, was preserved only in Rus', where Andrew the First-Called allegedly brought it in its original form (Kandyba 1997a: 206). The further fate of the teachings of Christ in Rus' is presented by the author in a rather confusing manner. On the one hand, he connects the Christianization of Rus' with Prince Vladimir and, like many neo-pagans, accuses him of cruelly inculcating this “Western ideology.” The first Russian Metropolitan Hilarion also gets it from him for participating in the “Rusalem conspiracy” against the peoples of the world (Kandyba, Zolin 1997a: 261–264). However, on the other hand, the author insists that the “Russian peoples” did not accept “Christianity” and almost until 1941 remained faithful to the “Russian Religion” in the form of Orthodoxy and Islam. And only recently, under foreign influence, religion here was reborn and “Orthodox Christianity” became “a breeding ground for debauchery and devilish temptations” (Kandyba 1997a: 229).

All this was a consequence of the machinations of evil foreign forces. For the first time they achieved the collapse of the “Russian Empire” in 1917. However, while briefly describing the events of 1917, the author falls into monstrous contradictions. On the one hand, he strongly vilifies the “German-Rusalem” Romanov dynasty, which pursued an exclusively “anti-Russian” policy and was rightly overthrown by the Russian people. After all, as the author claims, the royal government and its entourage consisted of 99% “Rusalim” (Kandyba 1997a: 335). But, on the other hand, a little lower, he insists that the revolution was inspired by the machinations of Western “Rusalim” and that 90% of the revolutionary organizations consisted of “Rusalim”. And at the same time, he represents Soviet history as the continuous struggle of Lenin and Stalin against the “Rusalim” (Kandyba 1997a: 342, 345, 350, 353). The author assigns the role of a silent extra in all these processes to the Russian people.

However, no matter how contradictory the author’s views may seem, his political sympathies are obvious. His main priority is the "Russian Empire". Therefore, he is a supporter of Soviet power, accuses the White movement of supporting foreign intervention during the Civil War, and at the same time stands for the unification of “Reds” and “Whites” against “criminal democracy” and the “anti-people regime” (Kandyba 1997a: 344). In other words, the author's red-brown inclinations are obvious. No matter how the historical situation develops, his anger is always directed against the West and the “Rusalim.” In them alone he sees the causes of all the troubles of the “Russian Empire” - they are guilty not only of the crimes of the Romanov dynasty, but also of the outbreak of the First World War, the collapse of the Russian Empire, the turmoil of 1917, the “ritual murder” of Stalin and the denigration of his activities, “ Brezhnev stagnation" and the dismemberment of the USSR (Kandyba 1997a: 342, 350–354).

Kandyba goes so far as to accuse the United States and the supposedly ruling “Rusalim” there of plans for the physical destruction of the Russian and neighboring Islamic peoples. He needs all this in order to demand the creation of a powerful “Russian-Islamic Union”, the restoration of the “Russian Religion” and the complete “destruction of Evil” up to the use of a preventive nuclear strike (Kandyba 1997a: 354–355). This threat is addressed primarily to the “Rusalim,” and the author states: “They don’t have long to live, and their death will be terrible and painful, and this ancient prophecy will come true during the lifetime of the current generation of these madmen” (Kandyba 1997a: 440). The price of “victory” does not frighten him, because all the same, sooner or later Russians are destined to turn into “radiant immortal humanity from Light”, into “a single type of radiant energy” and dissolve in the Universe. It is in this that Kandyba sees “the path of salvation, the path of science, reason and conscience” (Kandyba 1997a: 88, 381–382). Such a destiny follows from esoteric teaching. In fact, the fight against “Christianity” should, according to Kandyba, end in a new Holocaust, even more terrible than that perpetrated by the German Nazis.

Kandyba’s ideas were enthusiastically picked up and disseminated by the Samara neo-pagan newspaper “Veche Roda”. Its founder was A. A. Sokolov in the 1980s. was the editor-in-chief of the Samara newspaper Volzhsky Komsomolets, and then at the turn of the 1980s - 1990s. - People's Deputy of the USSR. Brought up by Soviet ideology, he became disillusioned with the communists and equally does not accept the monarchy. Being an ardent supporter of Russian ethnonationalism, he sees no other way out but to turn to pre-Christian pagan antiquity and direct all his energy to the fight against the “harmful Kaganate.” This is a typical path for those who today join the ranks of Russian neo-pagans.

By his own admission, Sokolov turned to politicized neo-paganism in July 1994, when he began to develop the ideas of the “Russian Family Veche Vedic Tradition” as the basis for the state ideology of the Russian Federation. To do this, he became a participant in the Russian liberation movement and founded an opposition newspaper in Samara, a “youth socio-political publication”, “Freethinker”. In 1996, this publication was closed for extremist views. Then Sokolov began publishing an openly racist newspaper, “Veche Roda,” speaking on behalf of a certain Russian Family Veche liberation movement.

Answering questions from a journalist in 1996, Sokolov reproduced Kandyba’s historiosophical and religious ideas about the Russian Family, the Heavenly and eternal nature of the “Russian Family Veche Vedic Tradition”, as well as the fact that over the last millennium the latter was allegedly replaced by “Anti-Russian Rootless Immoral Ruthless Totalitarian Kagan principle”316. This supposedly happened thanks to the machinations of “foreign intelligence”, which created a caste of non-Russian people within Kievan Rus, which in the form of the “Rootless Elite” seized power over the Russian Family. Sokolov denounced the totalitarianism of the “Kagan (Negro, Christian) Caste system of government,” identifying it with the modern democratic system. He stated that for a thousand years now Russia has been ruled by a “non-Russian and semi-Russian minority” led by the Great Kagan.

Following the neo-pagan myth, Sokolov associated the political “anti-Slavic” coup with the name of Prince Vladimir, who, it turns out, was a resident of the Khazar and Varangian Khaganates and led the “colonization of Rus'.” In this he relied on Christianity, which, Sokolov emphasized, was a typical technique of the Kaganate, which helped him get rid of the ancient local cultural tradition. Thus, the great Russian culture with its thousand-year-old writing and science was ruined, and its place was taken by “non-Russian (Christian) churches” designed to eradicate the Russian Spirit and strengthen the power of the “non-Russian minority.”

What kind of “minority” this is, Sokolov did not directly explain, using euphemisms - “Rootless Elite”, “Kagan principle”, “World Kaganate”. But for anyone familiar with the modern anti-Semitic Khazarian myth, there are no secrets here. It is extremely clear what kind of enemy the Russian people had to fight. Sokolov did not hide this. After all, he not only called Christianity a “foreign faith,” but also saw in it “the religion of the ancient Jewish cattle-breeding tribes” (“Zion Tradition”), directly opposite to the “Russian Vedic Tradition.” And he considered the Old Testament to be instructions for the colonization of other peoples. He associated true democracy with a system of national proportional representation, supposedly characteristic of the “Russian Tribal Veche Vedic System.” Therefore, he demanded the immediate restoration of this system; otherwise, he declared, the Russian Family would face death. At the same time, he referred to one of the Eurasian works of Prince N. S. Trubetskoy (1921), where he warned against the disastrous nature of foreign domination. Sokolov picked up these words all the more readily because he did not recognize the legitimacy of the modern Russian state system, seeing in it the dominance of “non-Russian (Kagan) laws.” He saw the ideal in the creation of a “Unified Great Russian Tribal (National) State within the Russian Federation,” that is, a purely Russian state. In his opinion, only this will put an end to the “suffering of the Great Russian Family” and the collapse of the power of the “non-Russian and Masonic elite” (Parhomenko 1996).

To the question of what it means to be Russian, Sokolov answered without hesitation: “It is impossible to be Russian without the Russian Spirit. To be Russian means that the Russian Spirit is within us!” When asked by the correspondent to explain the meaning of the “Russian Spirit,” he rushed into confused discussions about feelings, intuition, reason and will as the integral essence of Russianness (as if other peoples did not have these feelings). Realizing that this was not enough, he added the presence of the “Russian Tribal structure”, “Russian Tribal state”, “Veche structure” and “Vedic tradition”. The “Russian Religion” has not been forgotten either, which, following Kandyba, he characterized as “Russian monotheistic materialistic teaching – Russian Vedas (Knowledge) – Science.” We are talking about “truly Russian”, “purely Russian”, which has allegedly been persecuted since 988. Sokolov explained that “Russianness” requires “service and worship of the Russian Family (Russian Ancestors) as the only true way to achieve immortality!” . Since all this can raise new questions, in order to avoid ambiguities, he put an end to the discussion by talking about “a person who is Russian by blood” (Parkhomenko 1996: 4). Now everything was falling into place: it was about creating a Russian state for people purely Russian by blood. In other words, Sokolov dreamed of a racist state like the former South Africa. It is no coincidence that he reproached the Soviet government for “forcibly crossing one Clan, incompatible by tradition, ideology and morality, with another.” There remains, however, the question of where Sokolov dreamed of finding “purely Russian by blood people” in order to populate the racist state dear to his heart.

His ethnological views are of some interest. He used the term “Kin” to mean ethnos, ethnic community, and referred to nation (by which he meant nationality) as a “species”. Therefore, he, like other Russian ethnonationalists, included Great Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians in the Russian ethnos, considering them as separate nations (Parkhomenko 1996: 5). In his mouth, the Russian Patrimonial Principle meant the trinity of these components, and he stood for the voluntary reunification of Great Russia, Ukraine and Belarus and was even ready to give the palm to Kyiv or Minsk. And it did not occur to him that if the apartheid regime was introduced, which directly follows from his concept, all non-Russian peoples would have every right to demand withdrawal from the statehood he constructed, and Russia would completely collapse. His words about his friendly attitude towards non-Russian indigenous peoples are unlikely to deceive any of them. After all, in the Veche of the Russian Family that he created, which claimed to govern the country, there was, by definition, no place for any non-Russians. And it was not at all an accidental reservation that his words about “blacks who are at a very low moral level of development” sounded. It seems that he was ready to find such “blacks” in Russia. In any case, his ethnological views made it possible to do this. And indeed, with reference to Imam Shamil, he painted an unattractive image of the mountaineers (“drunkenness, robbery, unbridled self-will, wild ignorance...”), apparently believing that Shamil was writing about certain eternal qualities inherent in them.

Sokolov adhered to a two-color idea of ​​the modern world, where at one pole there are “traditional Tribal (National) Veche values”, and at the other – the values ​​of “Rootless Totalitarian Nazism”, focused on the Masonic motto “From multitude to unity”. To the second he attributed the desire to level out cultural diversity and turn people into faceless “economic animals” (Parkhomenko 1996: 5). By identifying “Nazism” (that is, aggressive nationalism) with “internationalism,” Sokolov demonstrated the complete confusion of his ideas about the modern world.

Today, the “Hyperborean idea” is used not only for neo-imperial claims. Paradoxically, some of those who advocate expanding democracy in Russia and regionalism also turn to it. Indicative here are the views of the Petrozavodsk journalist and amateur philosopher V.V. Shtepa, who began his career as a “traditionalist” and a big fan of A. Dugin, but then, after a tour of Western Europe, revised his previous views and became a staunch critic of “Byzantinism” and a supporter of regionalism. In many ways, in solidarity with the New Right and remaining a follower of Yu. Evola, Shtepa speaks in florid language about the values ​​of modern European democracy, which allows for pluralism and gets rid of rigid normativity. He proves that Russia will be saved only by the project of a new Northern civilization based on regionalism. The Hyperborean idea serves him as an Aesopian language, allowing him to defend the values ​​of freedom, creativity and democracy, the prototype of which he finds in the world of Hellenism and in the medieval Novgorod Republic. He contrasts them with “the dictates of the Abrahamic religions,” meaning by this an authoritarian regime. Following Nietzsche, Shtepa sees in Hyperborea a “look into the future”, a “futurological project”. He states that Hyperborea may never have existed, but it can be created in the 21st century. as a kind of international Northern community, covering all northern countries and peoples, supposedly similar in culture. However, he nowhere explains what exactly he means by “cultural proximity,” since the North, as is known, is inhabited by peoples with very different cultures. But he praises the “Nordic man” as a “Varangian discoverer”, a creator, a bearer of a free spirit, possessing the will to everything new and not constrained by tradition. He contrasts this with the supposedly endlessly conservative and despotic south with its Abrahamic religions, which supposedly look only backward, do not encourage creativity and sow only hatred (Shtepa 2008).

The idea of ​​“North” fascinates Shtepa not so much with the past as with the future. In his opinion, the North as an “archetype of the Earthly Paradise” erases the contradictions between the West and the East. Discussing Hyperborea, he refers to the same Warren, Tilak and Zharnikova, but paradoxically sees in it not reality, but a utopia, understandable only on an intuitive level (Shtepa 2004: 126–130). Shtepa is critical of multiculturalism and sharply criticizes it for its excessive emphasis on ethnicity and race. The counterbalance to this is the idea of ​​Hyperborea, based on spirit, and not on blood. Opposing the “Tatar-Muscovite empire” with its inevitable assimilation, he proposes as an alternative a certain Northslavia with its “Pomeranian nature.” Sometimes he calls it Belovodye, emphasizing that it does not coincide with modern Russia (Shtepa 2004: 312–319).

Fluently using Aesopian language, Shtepa does not care about the clarity of the concepts used and, addressing different audiences, presents his ideas in very different ways. Thus, speaking at a conference dedicated to the indigenous peoples of the North, he presented the Northern civilization as multi-confessional, multi-ethnic and multilingual, and addressing Russian nationalists, he spoke about the “colonial status of Russians”, who allegedly turned into a “national minority” suffering from “ethnocracy”. He argued that the “raw materials empire” not only does not serve the interests of Russians, but that Gazprom officials are allegedly even “anthropologically different from Russian people.” He was also concerned about the growing number of “ethnic Muslims” and the dominance of “ethnic mafias.” He advocates the abolition of Article 282 of the Criminal Code, which prosecutes “inciting national hatred.” It is noteworthy that in this case he refers to “freedom of speech” in the United States and completely ignores the fact that similar articles exist in the legislation of a number of leading European states. At the same time, he calls on Russian nationalists to shift their emphasis from “fighting enemies” to building positive, creative regional projects (Shtepa 2011).

Shtepa advocates for a political nation rather than the “white race” and tries to redefine the term “Russian” as “a sign of Russian culture and civilization” not associated with ethnic Russians alone. And for supporters of “ethnic Russianness” he offers reservations. At the same time, he proves that if each region shows its “ethnocultural face” in full force, then no migrants will take root there. Speaking against conservatism, he reverently refers to the ideas of the American ultra-conservative P. Buchanan, who speaks out in defense of tradition. In other words, Shtepa’s views are marked by striking contradictions, and he acts less as a philosopher than as an ideologist, and at times displaying cultural racism, which he borrowed from the New Right.

To an even greater extent, such sentiments are reflected in Shiropaev, who, having revised his previous views, offers a non-standard solution to the problem of statehood, unexpected for a Russian nationalist. He opposes great power and imperialism, which he associates with the hated “Eurasian project.” He also does not share traditional anti-Westernism: it is in the West that he proposes to look for allies, but at the same time he perceives the West in racial tones in the form of a “white world.” Moreover, Shiropaev even doubts the unity of the Russian people and sees in them a conglomerate of subethnic groups that differ both psychologically and physiologically. Therefore, he is a supporter of Russian separatism, believing that in several small Russian states it will be easier to defend the interests of Russians than in a huge multinational empire317. Their center of gravity, in his opinion, should be “Great Rus'”, covering the central and northwestern regions of Russia, and in his imagination it is depicted as homogeneous in “cultural and racial” terms. In addition, he endows her with Germanophile attitudes (Shiropaev 2001: 126–129)318. However, while rejecting “imperialism,” Shiropaev is not at all a principled opponent of any empire. In his dreams, the confederation of Russian republics is depicted as a springboard for “new white colonization” and the formation of a “modern neocolonial empire” (Shiropaev 2001: 129). In other words, his “Aryan counter-project” largely resurrects the ideas of the German Nazis and reflects the features of “catch-up modernization” - he is attracted by the image of a classical colonial empire with a dominant master people and the colonial population subject to it. This, in his opinion, is what distinguishes Russian Westernism.

P. Khomyakov is also a fierce opponent of the empire. Having a great interest in its genesis, he does his best to demonstrate its negative role in world history. At the same time, he freely manipulates facts, caring only that they work for his concept. Ignoring the political reality of ancient Western Asia, he artificially constructs a huge “empire” there, including a variety of actually existing states, and declares it a product of the “Semitic world.” Moreover, by his own admission, it does not matter where the center of such an “empire” was located and what it was called. Much more important to him seems to be the centuries-long expansion of the “empire” to the north, in which it always saw a resource for exploitation and capture of slaves (Khomyakov 2003: 194–204, 273–274). Khazaria also finds a place in this picture of the world, turning out to be a fragment of the “First Empire” (Khomyakov 2003: 245–246). Moreover, in the light of the racial approach, the almost eternal confrontation of the southern “empire” with the northern “white people” turns out to be a variant of the classic racist mythology about the clash of “Aryans” with “Semites”, especially since the author unconditionally classifies the entire population of the “empire” as the “Semitic race” " It is noteworthy that he also represents this population as “descendants of marginals and descendants of populations of anthropoids” (Khomyakov 2003: 204–205), thereby turning them into a special biological species.

As a result of such manipulations with historical facts, Khomyakov portrays “whites” not just as a constant victim of the “empire,” but as an object of encroachment by a “lower species.” He portrays the South as nothing more than a “concentration camp” surrounded by black “cannibals.” In addition, he states that the propaganda activities of the "empire" were carried out by the state church. At the same time, he is concerned not so much with the real situation in ancient Western Asia as with the modern situation, and, as for Petukhov, references to ancient societies serve him as an Aesopian language that helps illuminate modern problems. This also allows him, firstly, to emphasize that the “totalitarian empire” was not a local phenomenon, but a global evil, and secondly, to connect it with the “foreigners” who allegedly imposed such political orders on the “whites”, for whom they were "someone else's heritage." In other words, the types of statehood, in Khomyakov’s view, turn out to be closely related to the racial factor. Therefore, in order to successfully fight the “empire,” he calls on Russians to join the ranks of the “national White movement” (Khomyakov 2003: 217). And in order to kindle in them hatred for the “empire,” he paints it as a monstrous monster, demonizing it in every possible way. Moreover, he discovers the archetypes of its “cannibalistic morality” in the Bible and portrays the Semitic peoples as “genetic monsters” (Khomyakov 2003: 231).

Paying tribute to modern migrant-phobic sentiments, Khomyakov warns against the degradation of Europe due to the influx of immigrants. He sees salvation in the creation of a “national-aristocratic state” and states that today Russia is closest to this (Khomyakov 2003: 334–335). He places his bet on the Russian middle class, which, in his opinion, has overcome “anti-racist prejudices” and is more ripe than others for technocratic and biological thinking, declaring “outsiders” as individuals of a different species (Khomyakov 2003: 349). In the fight against the “imperial center”, he relies on the Russian regions, setting Ukraine as an example for them (Khomyakov 2003: 355). Like Shiropaev, he is not afraid of the collapse of Russia, and in the name of the prosperity of the “Russian Aryans” he is ready to give up both a significant part of the territory and the “Russian Asians” living there. His model of the future Russian national state includes the European part of Russia with the northern part of the Volga region, as well as the region of the Northern Urals and the Tyumen region, but he does not need the North Caucasus (Khomyakov 2006: 99). Anti-imperial sentiments are also shared by some other neo-pagan ideologists, for example the above-mentioned V. Pranov and A.P. Bragin, who believe that the idea of ​​empire contradicts the “Russian spirit” (Bragin 2006: 488–489). An ethno-national homogeneous state based on “national-racial values” seems to them much more tenacious (Pranov 2002: 193; Bragin 2006: 174).

The materials reviewed indicate that Russian radical nationalists do not agree on how they see the desired state - an empire or a nation state. Even for those who are inclined towards the idea of ​​a national state, it is difficult to decide what exactly they mean by “national” - Russian or Slavic, and if Russian, then limited only to Great Russians or including also Ukrainians and Belarusians. In any case, they believe that the unity of society in such a state should rest on a single faith. However, original paganism was aimed precisely at clan-tribal differentiation, and not at integration (which is why there was a need to replace it with world religions). Contrary to this, many authors associate paganism with monotheism and believe in the existence of a “single Slavic faith.” They care little about the fact that, for example, the Czechs, having become acquainted with the Russian imperial version of Pan-Slavism, back in the 1840s. they recoiled from Russia in horror and since then have diligently avoided Pan-Slavism in general (Masaryk 1968: 76, 90; ?erny 1995: 27 ff.). Modern Ukrainians are not attracted by the prospect of returning to the empire (Honchar et al. 1992; Borgard 1992; Koval 1992: 36; Yavorsky 1992: 41 ff.).

Be that as it may, radical Russian nationalists until recently could not decide what kind of political structure they needed - an empire or a nation state. However, they were convinced that in any case the “white (Aryan) race” should dominate in this state. But in recent years, the idea of ​​an ethno-national state seems to be gaining more and more support in this environment. It is on this platform that today’s Russian national democrats stand (Shnirelman 2012b: 124–125).