Losses of officers during the First World War. Non-commissioned officer: history of the rank

According to wartime standards, the path of a soldier in war and near it usually rolled in a vicious circle: reserve regiment, front line, hospital, again reserve regiment and front line - and so on until the end of the worldwide carnage. For these stages, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 312 dated 22

The works of historians reflected the social qualities and political behavior of the largest groups of the population of Russia during the First World War - peasants, workers, soldiers. Of no less interest is the analysis of the processes that took place during that period within the officer corps of the Russian army, given its role and importance for the course of the armed struggle that Russia waged, as well as subsequent events of the revolution and civil war. The mobilization announced in the summer of 1914 marked the beginning of the formation of a wartime officer corps. It combined the old personnel base with a mass of people selected and trained under war conditions. If by the spring of 1914 the number of army officer corps was about 46 thousand people, then with the conscription of officers from the reserve and the early production of graduates of military educational institutions, it reached 80 thousand people. Significant losses in the first months of hostilities and ongoing mobilization activities required the creation of a system of mass training of wartime officers - warrant officers. In military schools and ensign schools they were trained in an accelerated manner; depending on the type of troops and the educational level of the contingent, training lasted from three to eight months. Lower ranks were promoted to officers without special training: at the front - for military distinction, and in the rear units - persons with secondary and primary education - “for honoring the combat authorities.” In total, about 220 thousand people were promoted to officers during the war years. Together with the personnel and reserve officers called up in the first months of the war for mobilization - 300 thousand. Losses of all types (killed and died from wounds, wounded and gassed, missing and captured) among the officers exceeded 71 thousand people, of which at least 20 thousand returned to duty by the fall of 1917. In October 1917, the number of officer corps of the Russian army was about 250 thousand people. In the ranks of the active army, the one-day census on October 25, 1917 counted 138,273 officers, that is, approximately 55% of the combat personnel. The socio-political evolution of Russian officers during the First World War has until now received only the most general assessments. The conclusions of experts on this issue are still influenced by ideological attitudes. Having increased several times in comparison with the first months of the war, the officer corps acquired a social appearance that was fundamentally different from the pre-war one. Such a massive recruitment, as well as losses among career officers, weakened its former class characteristics. Ensigns were accepted into accelerated courses at military schools and schools without any restrictions based on class, and after the February Revolution restrictions based on religion were also abolished. In the third year of the war, the officer ranks generally reflected the composition of the country's population, but included predominantly educated or at least literate people. General N.N. Golovin, in 1915-1916. The chief of staff of the 7th Army noted that 80% of the warrant officers who arrived at the front were of peasant origin and only 4% came from the nobility. The social appearance of the officer corps was also influenced by high losses, the greatest in the infantry (during the war - 300-500%), in the artillery and cavalry - 15-40%. It is believed that the career officers were virtually exterminated during the first two years of the war. However, this stereotype requires a critical attitude towards itself. It can be considered fair in relation to career infantry chief officers who went to the front as junior officers and company commanders. In other branches of the military and categories of command personnel, losses were not so great. Both in the second and third years of the war, the former career generals and the staff officer corps were at the head of the army and continued to determine its identity. These generals and officers commanded formations and units, worked at headquarters, and taught at military educational institutions. The increased needs of wartime created various opportunities for their production in ranks both in the active army and in the rear. The most obvious prospect for warrant officers graduating from schools and military academies was the front, battles and inclusion in the casualty lists. As the war progressed, a multidirectional trend in losses progressed: as junior command ranks were replaced by wartime officers, their share of casualties grew rapidly, while the share of career officers in casualties steadily decreased, with fewer of them remaining in junior positions. General Staff Colonel A.A. Svechin, later a famous Soviet military scientist, who commanded the 6th Finnish Regiment from August 1915 to January 1917, noted: “The bulk of the combat commanders - company and platoon commanders - were represented by warrant officers. They also gave the main figure of killed and wounded officers.” The high losses of officers were associated with the officers' ideas about the duty and place of an officer in battle, which encouraged them to show personal courage and lead by example. Minister of War A.A. pointed out their archaic nature and incompatibility with the war conditions of the new era. Polivanov: “The officer is always ahead, which is why the decline among them is huge. With the Germans and Austrians, the officers are all behind and control from there; their soldiers, being more developed, do not need the officer’s personal example and, moreover, know that this officer mercilessly shoots anyone who wants to leave the battlefield without orders.” Demonstrative contempt for danger and even some flaunting, understood as an indispensable feature of officer behavior, could have a positive impact on the morale of subordinates. However, such behavior of an officer in battle, designed in particular for an external effect, led to negative consequences - the most courageous and selfless, combat-ready element dropped out of the ranks. In addition, fearlessness and readiness for self-sacrifice often replaced tactical literacy and compensated for deficiencies in professional training. Losses in the officer corps created an attitude among commanders towards high losses of lower ranks as an all the more inevitable phenomenon. This is evidenced by the lowest proportion of officers in the total number of killed in the Russian army compared to the armies of other warring powers - 1.82% (in the French - 2.77, in the German - 2.84, in the American - 4.4, in the English - more than 5%). The sacrifices suffered by Russian officers on the fronts of the First World War have always remained perhaps the main criterion in assessing their appearance, to the detriment of assessing from the point of view of the real success of the results of their activities, taking into account the unsuccessful course and the catastrophic outcome of the war for Russia. For this reason, the professional features of the Russian wartime officer corps and the peculiarities of their understanding and performance of their official duty were not the subject of analysis. It is interesting that, despite the differences in political and ideological attitudes characteristic of the Soviet and the newest period of study of this problem, the large and democratic composition of wartime officer recruitment is considered by experts as perhaps the main factor in the decline in the fighting qualities of troops during the war, their disintegration and subsequently drawing them into the civil struggle. This view, characteristic of representatives of the command during the war and enshrined in the memoirs and historical heritage of emigration, became the logical basis for removing responsibility for the lack of military success from the generals and career officers and contrasting them with wartime officers, both professionally and socially. politically. From this point of view, it is of interest to review the real conditions of existence and interaction of these two groups within the wartime officer corps. Without setting out to analyze the activities of the high command in preparing and implementing major operations and leading troops in them, we will only note that its level has changed little since the Russo-Japanese War and already from the first weeks of hostilities deserved the most negative assessments. With the beginning of the war, the general corps was replenished with generals returning to service from retirement, as well as those serving in other departments. Their appointment to command and staff positions often occurred without taking into account combat experience, level of training and sometimes advanced age. Persons who had the rank of general, but who spent their entire lives in administrative service, transferred to the army and became commanders of formations. General V.F. Dzhunkovsky, who had never commanded even a company, after his resignation in August 1915 from the post of Comrade Minister of Internal Affairs and commander of the Separate Corps of Gendarmes, was appointed head of the 15th Siberian Rifle Division. Even the more than controversial professional reputation of A.N. Kuro-Patkina did not prevent him from receiving the appointment as commander-in-chief of the troops of the Northern Front within a short time after returning to service. The first failures in East Prussia showed the inadequacy of the senior command staff with the requirements that modern war placed on them. Within a short time, among the officers, an idea of ​​the weakness of command took shape, which was already spreading to commanders at all levels. A participant in these events, General Staff officer A.I. Verkhovsky, on the pages of his campaign diary, asked the question: “But why weren’t the command staff taught to fight?” The responsibility of the authorities for mistakes and the need for personnel changes was obvious to the officers. Having returned from the hospital to the front in the spring of 1915, Verkhovsky notes: “As for the review of the suitability of our old command staff for their positions, almost nothing has changed here. Only people changed places.” This situation was largely dictated by the fact that a formal principle of seniority was in effect during appointments to command positions and in wartime. The promotion of capable commanders who had proven themselves in combat conditions was thus difficult. Moreover, the most proactive officers, whose combat activities were noticeable against a generally passive and weak background, often experienced the prejudiced and hostile attitude of their superiors and neighbors. From the first weeks of the war, attention was drawn to the active, although not always successful, actions of the 48th Infantry Division of the 8th Army of the Southwestern Front. It was this activity, energy and absolute readiness to fight that distinguished her young boss, Lieutenant General L.G. Kornilov among the rest of the generals, trained by their previous service in the spirit of caution and passivity. Probably because of these qualities, Kornilov did not enjoy the favor of the command in the person of the commander of the 24th Army Corps, General A.A. Tsurikov and the commander of the 8th Army, General A.A. Brusilov, who later placed on him full responsibility for the failures of the division, as well as its defeat in April 1915. Such facts were not a private, episodic phenomenon. High levels of conflict characterized the relationships between commanders and staffs at all levels. Lack of trust, inability and unwillingness to cooperate in a businesslike manner in a combat situation affected the quality and results of combat missions. Along with purely subjective factors, the main reason for such relations was the disastrous style of troop leadership on the part of the majority of commanders and staffs. Some of his features were named by the cavalry commander General Count F.A. Keller: “1. Extreme dishonesty and often falsehood of reports and reports on the progress, successes and failures of battles. 2. The desire of superiors to place all responsibility on their subordinates, reaching the point that even in battle they do not order, but advise. 3. Little familiarity of the commanders with the terrain in which the troops entrusted to them operate and with which they are familiar only from the map. 4. The location of the commanders during the battle is remote from the place of the battle itself, and there can be neither personal observation nor personal timely leadership. 5. Fear of superiors, both junior and senior, to take responsibility and ask for instructions and permission over the phone during the battle itself and in moments that do not even allow for delay.” This, as Svechin put it, “tactical decomposition” of the command turned superiors and subordinates, commanders of neighboring units and formations from combat comrades into rivals and even warring parties, which also led to the moral decomposition of the officer environment. “The leadership of the Russian army... was suffering from a cruel illness, one of the most typical manifestations of which was animal egoism and accusations generously and continuously shouted at their neighbors,” Svechin wrote. “...Such an accusation from a neighbor indicates, first of all, that the commander is unable to bear the responsibility that lies with him.” The most obvious principle for classifying the bulk of the officers of the war period - career officers and wartime officers - makes it possible to assess their official position and prospects, but not always their military-professional qualities. Both categories found themselves in a similar situation at the beginning of the war. The combat situation placed increased demands on the officer. K.S. Popov, who began the war as a junior officer in the 13th Life Grenadier Erivan Regiment, noted with surprise: “Strange as it may seem, most of the officers who were considered outstanding in peacetime did not prove themselves to be outstanding during the war.” The most important thing that distinguished an officer from the general background was the presence of combat experience and the ability to adapt to front-line conditions. In the face of a real war, officers who had no previous combat experience, both regular and newly promoted, had approximately equal chances of succeeding as combat commanders or being completely unsuitable for this role. Based on these considerations, the officer corps was divided not into career officers and wartime officers, but into capable and incapable, who honestly performed their duties and cleverly imitated their performance, or neglected them under various pretexts. Their superiors of various ranks considered low combat and tactical training to be a common drawback of young warrant officers and officers called up from the reserves. Indeed, accelerated courses at military schools and schools for warrant officers could not provide the desired professional level, and most importantly, fully prepare them for action in combat conditions. Responsibility for these shortcomings lay with the military department and the teaching staff of educational institutions and therefore can be attributed to the disappointing results of the activities of the officer corps during the war. And yet, the officer replenishment as a whole earned rather positive assessments from front-line commanders. “The outbreak of its combat effectiveness that the tsarist army showed in 1916, it owes almost exclusively to this new layer of Russian intelligentsia that joined its ranks,” admitted Svechin. General N.N. came to the same conclusion. Golovin. Positively assessing the “change of blood” in the officer corps, he tried to comprehend the social content of this process: “With this “wartime ensign” victories were won in Galicia in the summer of 1916... Everything unpatriotic was arranged and assigned to rear and non-combatant positions... But everything was patriotic motivated, intelligent youth joined the army and filled the ranks of our thinning officer corps. A kind of social selection took place, the army gained a lot in terms of quality.” In general, we can agree with the opinion that the best human material for replenishing the officer corps in wartime turned out to be young people from among the intelligentsia and educated commoners with a more or less developed civic consciousness, not alien to patriotic rhetoric, romantic illusions and ambition. Svechin, highly appreciating most of the wartime officers who arrived in his regiment, distinguished several categories among them. Along with ensigns from students and recent high school students, well-educated, distinguished by selfless courage, he singled out, as even better, a group represented by students of teachers' seminaries and public teachers, more adaptable and hardy, who knew how to find an approach to the peasant soldier. The democratic style of behavior of intellectual officers actually contradicted the traditional system of relationships between an officer and a soldier in the tsarist army, in which, for example, a handshake was unthinkable. This kind of liberties usually caused criticism and reproaches of familiarity from superiors and most colleagues. Nevertheless, front-line life itself required junior officers to build their relationships with soldiers rationally, in accordance with the conditions of service and real combat work. There is no doubt that some young officers did not strive to strictly follow the canons of military ethics, consciously transferring their social experience and manners into the army environment. The appearance of this type of officer was noted and appreciated by the soldiers. “During its formation, the battery was replenished with officers. There were two more ensigns, two brothers - Muscovites, the Shcheglyaev brothers (sons of the professor). The eldest of them was called Vladimir, both of them were completely different types of people. Vladimir trained us, taught us the material part of the guns. In class, if you hit someone with your elbow, you will definitely apologize. At one time I met him and saluted him. Having caught up with me, he took my hand from the visor, shook it and said: “Well, let’s agree that if I’m walking, there are no officers anywhere close, come up and we’ll say hello. As an equal, you offer your hand. Is there anything to read?” - “Where,” I say, “do the soldiers read anything at all, and where can I get books?” - “Come to my dugout, I have books, you’ll take them. Read!” The images of former, career officers were preserved in the soldier’s memory due to a completely different attitude: “The landowner officers do not consider the soldier to be a human being. During the retreat from Kovno, while crossing the Neman, a bridge was blown up. The general shouted: “Gentlemen officers, save yourself.” And about the soldiers he said that we have enough of this manure. Our staff captain Rostislavsky didn’t call his messenger anything other than “shithole”; he probably didn’t know his first and last name.” Evidence that personnel service officers “do not consider a soldier to be a human being” is not uncommon. Of interest is the diary entry of junior non-commissioned officer Shtukaturov, who, after being cured in the hospital in July 1915, was sent back to the front. “The commandant came and began to examine those who said that they were missing some things. Commandant with the rank of staff captain; getting angry, he began to scold all of us, without addressing anyone in particular. Why did he plant anger in the hearts of the soldiers at parting? If the German Kaiser had seen this, he would probably have been very grateful to him... Everyone was offended, indignant exclamations were heard: “This is how they understand us, they consider us worse than dogs, why are they crippling us, etc.” The attitude towards the soldier as a consumable material of war and an unreasonable substance requiring only imperious pressure was quite typical. The type of “landlord officer” associated with him caused a constantly accumulating reciprocal hostility, which resulted in a storm of soldier hatred in 1917. In general, despite the difference in the behavior of the authorities, the moral climate and the condition of the units, a noticeable part of the junior commanders from among the wartime officers, especially those distinguished by courage, tactical abilities, the ability to gain authority among the personnel, and often a certain amount of adventurism, achieved success and promotion. Having established themselves at the front as combat commanders, they adopted the most valuable qualities and traditions of the officer corps, mastered and fell in love with their military profession. By 1917, many, commanding companies, teams and even battalions, reached the ranks of lieutenant and staff captain, were awarded high awards and, thus, were not inferior to their career colleagues in military merits. From among them came the most famous commanders who represented both fighting sides during the revolution and civil war: A.I. Avtonomov, R.F. Sivere, I.L. Sorokin, A.I. Todorsky, N.V. Skoblin, A.V. Turkul, V.G. Kharzhevsky and many others. The system of values ​​and interests of officers during the war years remained largely unchanged, but differed significantly depending on the position and prospects of its various categories. Not everyone was able to meet such a general and obvious social guideline for the officer corps of the warring army as skillful military-professional activity with the goal of a speedy and victorious end to the war. The expectations and thoughts of the officers, like the entire population, were directed towards a peaceful future, which, naturally, was associated with victory. However, they assessed the degree of their personal responsibility for achieving this goal differently, feeling either high social involvement (“win the war”) or low, even social indifference (“survive the war”). As the unsuccessful course of the war became more and more obvious, and victory receded into an unclear future for Russia, the first position remained relevant for the inexperienced officer youth, who had not yet lost their romantic illusions. Their older comrades, who became more familiar with the military reality, experienced disappointment, which gave rise to internal discontent and oppositional sentiments. The cadre of officers, who connected their post-war life with continued service, determined their own behavior to the greatest extent guided by pragmatic considerations. Svechin, while generally positively assessing the qualities of the personnel officers of his regiment in the summer of 1915, nevertheless noted: “The best of them were already killed in the first year of the war, and the rest were thinking about the future of the regiment after the end of the war; they created savings during the war so that the regiment would have funds “later.” Many bosses, managing significant government sums and property, had the opportunity to “improve savings” for their own benefit. Revealing the features of regimental accounting, Svechin makes it clear that, being essentially uncontrolled in the field, it was a huge field for all sorts of abuses. At the end of 1916 - beginning of 1917, when the rise in inflation became noticeable, quartermasters and farm managers, with the knowledge or with the direct participation of the command, found the use of government funds both in order to preserve them from depreciation and to obtain commercial benefits. The idea of ​​career success has not lost its appeal. It was considered natural and even commendable to take advantage of any opportunities for career advancement in military conditions. It is difficult to recognize as favorable the atmosphere that has developed around the procedure for rewarding distinguished officers - with manipulations both during presentation and at the stage of making a decision on awarding awards, especially the most honorable ones - St. George's. “Unfortunately, the issue of awarding the badge of the Order of St. according to the statute. George degenerated from the very beginning of the war into the ugliest form, which lowered the significance of this military award,” recalled General B.V. Gerua. “You couldn’t be sure, seeing a cross on someone’s chest, that it was truly deserved.” In general, injustice and abuse by superiors associated with nominations for military awards constantly poisoned relations among officers. Being a frequent subject of officers' letters, they were even included in a separate section in military censorship reports. At the height of the Brusilov offensive in the summer of 1916, in a letter from the active army, the author reported: “The combat situation does not allow us to feel all the pettiness and vulgarity that still reign among our officers. There is some kind of bacchanalia in the pursuit of crosses and orders, non-existent feats are invented and the necessary testimony is obtained at the cost of requests and mutual favors. Moreover, here too they separate career officers from warrant officers, the former are taken care of everything, while the latter are left to do things on their own.” In November of the same year, one of the officers was indignant: “Every day, every hour, we are convinced that there is no justice in our regimental commander in nominating officers for military awards... The whole secret here is bribes. Shame and disgrace". Of interest are some features and peculiarities of how representatives of the officers understand and perform their official duties. The conditions of the war radically changed the nature of the officer's activities. Front-line reality demanded from commanders at all levels qualified, selfless, and most importantly, constant participation in combat work and training of troops. However, the understanding that officer service is professional work was not available to everyone. Over the long period of peace, career officers have acquired an attitude toward service not as a social function, but as a social position that provides a certain status and privileges. The war actually overturned the previous system of priorities, in which primary attention was paid to the formal side of an officer’s behavior in the service and in society, rather than to actual merit. In combat conditions, internal corporate solidarity and friendly liberalism resulted in insufficient demands from superiors on the one hand and low personal responsibility of subordinates. General A.E. On the pages of his diary, Snesarev noted the facts of decomposition among career officers. “The commander of the 45th regiment (Belevich), hesitatingly, counted the officers and found 8 captains in the rear. One of these “after being wounded” studied at the school of warrant officers, although he had never been in combat. Research has established that he boarded the ambulance train and arrived in the Caucasus “shell-shocked,” and from the Caucasus to the city already “wounded.” K.S. Popov recalled that in his regiment, “the battalion commanders, with the exception of one, were not at all combat-ready and after the first battle they disappeared from the regiment for the entire duration of the war without being wounded.” How widespread such phenomena were can be judged by the stating part of the order for the North-Western Front dated September 15, 1915: “From the information received by Headquarters, it is clear that the nearest military rear areas are overcrowded with completely healthy combat officers, while the units in which heavy losses continue , have almost only warrant officers as officers. Thus, regimental headquarters, 2nd category convoys, various non-combatant positions in regiments, regular and non-regular, are occupied in the vast majority of units by healthy officers who have never been evacuated (that is, wounded - I.G.).” Low activity and a sluggish attitude towards their duties can be considered a general, typical background for the activities of the officer corps at all levels of service, both in the rear and at the front. M.K. Lemke described the style of work at the headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief: “The service does not tire anyone except Alekseev, for hours during classes they talk about completely unrelated subjects, mainly about promotions, etc., read newspapers, telegrams from agents, generally work with great coolness... General work productivity is amazingly insignificant, which does not prevent, however, almost everyone from considering themselves - and, most importantly, sincerely - very busy.” Snesarev, taking temporary command of the 64th Infantry Division in September 1916, wrote in his diary: “I found: 1) the officers do not study the map, 2) they do not keep in touch with their neighbors, 3) they reconnaissance is weak... there is generally little activity and creativity; They sleep or lie around more.” His observation does not seem unique, since many officers made similar impressions, especially those who had the opportunity to compare their service with their pre-war, civilian life. Ensign D. Oskin, a Tula peasant before the war, in his memoirs, in a chapter with the telling title “Loafers with Asterisks,” writes: “Most officers in various regimental commands are literally lazy. I had to be the head of the regiment's weapons, and my duty was to hear the report of the senior weapons master in the evening and sign the report he wrote to the division quartermaster. The rest of the time has nowhere to go. He was the treasurer of the regiment - and there, service activities did not exceed half an hour a day. In a company, only during battles do you have to lead the soldiers. In the convoy and at the headquarters there is complete idleness among the officers.” The gradual decline in the combat and moral qualities of the armed forces during the World War was based on the deep-seated social and political problems of Imperial Russia and reflected the progressive socio-political crisis. During the war years, the political image of the officer corps also underwent significant changes, since in war conditions many attitudes and values ​​that existed and were cultivated in declarative form in peacetime were actually tested. Meanwhile, the massive recruitment brought its own social and political experience to the ranks of the officers. By 1917, in the ranks of the army there were many participants in the revolutionary movement, members of political parties and people who sympathized with them. With the beginning of the war, a number of State Duma deputies who were reserve officers joined the army. Two of them are cadet lieutenant A.M. Kolyubakin, Octobrist Lieutenant Colonel A.I. Zvegintsev - died. Right monarchist ensign V.V. After being wounded, Shulgin returned to the Duma. Numerous representatives of the zemstvo intelligentsia who joined the officer corps were bearers of liberal and moderate leftist views. Finally, among the wartime officers there were also members of socialist parties; Bolshevik officers A.Ya. worked in the army. Arosev, R.I. Berzin, A.E. Dauman, P.V. Dashkevich, Yu.M. Kotsyubinsky, D.I. Kursky, N.V. Krylenko, A.F. Myasnikov, I.P. Pavlunovsky and others. Their very presence in the troops influenced the mass of soldiers and officers, contributing to the propaganda of leftist views and the spread of opposition sentiments, although the scale of this activity before February 1917 could not have been large. In front-line conditions, it most often came down to conversations with soldiers, and even here a certain amount of caution had to be observed. Veteran of the socialist movement, later a prominent Soviet scientist, academician S.G. Strumilin, who with the rank of ensign commanded a company of the 432nd Yamburg Regiment on the Northern Front, recalled: “It was not difficult to hint that the Russian landowners, the Sukhomlinovs and the meat-eaters, were no better than the German barons, that we had many enemies in our own country... But it was much more difficult “It was necessary to check to what extent such unspoken thoughts reach their intended destination, are assimilated and digested into their own conclusions.” Disloyal actions and statements by officers attracted the attention of security authorities. In secret reports to the Police Department, it was repeatedly noted that “student warrant officers play a large role in agitation among soldiers.” Svechin characterized the officer recruits from among the intelligentsia who came to his regiment as predominantly socialist-minded, but did not see this as a problem for himself as a commander, because in assessing the qualities of an officer in a combat situation, the honest and professional performance of his duties came to the fore. For the time being, participation in the common cause of defending the fatherland united people of very different views. Only a defeatist position, at least one expressed openly, became reprehensible in this circle. The mood of the officer corps, like the majority of the population, was more influenced by the course of military events and the development of the social situation in Russia than by the work of political parties. The most important factor was military failures; attempts to explain them inevitably led not so much to a search for the reasons for what was happening, but to a search for those responsible. In this regard, several semantic constructions are most characteristic of the mood of the officers, especially at the turn of 1916-1917. The blame for the country's unpreparedness for war, the shortcomings of its armed forces, the backwardness of the economy and low cultural development was naturally placed on the country's leadership and high military command. Differences of opinion concerned assessments of the autocratic order and the degree of personal responsibility of the monarch. The most conservative part of the officers, not inclined to criticize the tsar, focused their reproaches on the government and generals, or rather on individuals from among them, without connecting them with the figure of Nicholas II. This point of view was expressed by Guards captain N.V. Voronovich: “In the second and especially in the third year of the war, when I had to come into contact with the consequences of the criminal negligence of the irresponsible people who stood at the head of our military administration, I became more and more disillusioned with the legal order to which I had become accustomed from a very young age and which considered it the only correct and fair thing. But even then only deep pity arose in me for the king, for whom I never harbored hostility. If I sometimes allowed myself to condemn him, it was only for the unsuccessful selection of advisers and for his weak character.” The more pragmatic part of the army elite, not so bound by monarchical illusions, was able to move a little further in their reasoning. Lieutenant Colonel Verkhovsky wrote in his diary at the beginning of 1917: “It is obvious to everyone that the main reason why we have not won so far is the autocratic system, which kills all initiative in the country and gives the army so many unsatisfactory people among the command staff.” Criticism of the ruling circles had by that time become commonplace in the army, both in the rear and at the front. A.I. Denikin quotes the words of a certain prominent figure Zemgor, who first visited the army in 1916: “I was extremely amazed... at the freedom everywhere, in military units, in officer meetings, in the presence of commanders, at headquarters, etc. , they talk about the worthlessness of the government, about court dirt.” Disappointment with the authorities and the prevailing order in Russia gradually permeated the officer environment more and more. Military events contributed to the formation of a critical view even among people who were completely loyal and far from politics in the pre-war period. Lemke recalled his colleague SM. Krupina, a young officer called up from the reserves, who served as adjutant under Alekseev. “In his own words, before the war he was a real official, a nationalist, a man who did not think particularly deeply about the conditions of Russian life. Now he realized that society and government are two poles... the revolution is completely inevitable, but it will be wild, spontaneous, unsuccessful, and we will again live like pigs.” Lemke continued: “Yes, and there are now tens of thousands of such Krupins. He says that he himself knows many to whose minds and hearts 1905 said nothing, but 1914 and 1915 said everything.” The political self-determination of the officers was no longer hampered by such once indisputable formal restrictions as the oath of allegiance to the throne. Lemke makes one more observation: “A symptomatic story by the cornet Andrei Andreevich Tchaikovsky. He often visits the house of Princess Drutskaya-Sokolinskaya, whose son is the vice-governor here. The whole family, especially the vice-governor, is completely Black Hundred. Conversations about politics are conducted very animatedly by all the guests, including our officers. Recently they got so heated in an argument that the vice-governor argued from the oath of allegiance to service that they had all taken: “After all, you swore the oath!” “Yes,” Tchaikovsky answered him, “but was this our conscious and free act? It was done by us out of ignorance; it was rather involvement in an unfavorable deal with conscience. And then, we swore an oath to serve honestly and unhypocritically, but the essence Our understanding of these very concepts has changed." At the end of 1916, when the unpopularity of the government reached its peak, the gaze of officers increasingly turned to its main legal critic - the State Duma. Anger directed at the authorities and expectations associated with the Duma and Duma politicians were heard in officers’ letters from the front: “But our government doesn’t give a damn, it does not do what is best for the people, but what is beneficial for itself personally... It makes my hair stand on end.” they start from rumors, and everyone believes it, because they don’t convene the Duma, they say they don’t convene it deliberately. Everyone is surprised at the patience in the rear”; “With what greed we read the speeches of real Russian patriots like Miliukov...” It was natural for the low level of political culture among officers to explain the problems and military failures of Russia by the presence of an internal conspiracy, German influence in the ruling elite, and the activities of spies. In the spring of 1915, the case of Lieutenant Colonel S.N. acquired significant public resonance. Myasoedov, accused of spying for Germany and executed by a military court. The fact of Myasoedov’s involvement in espionage at different times was very reasonably disputed by both emigrant and domestic historians, believing that the “case” was the result of intrigues between groups competing in the spheres of power with the aim of compromising and eliminating the Minister of War V.A. Sukhomlinova. Contemporaries did not question the espionage of Myasoedov, who enjoyed the patronage of Sukhomlinov. The commander of the Gendarme Corps, General Dzhunkovsky, claimed that Myasoedov entered the headquarters of the 10th Army in violation of established official procedures, and it was his activities that explained the defeat of the army troops in February 1915. This version was also accepted by the highest military circles, since it provided a convenient explanation for military failures. Denikin, years later, stated on the pages of his memoirs: “I personally have no doubts about Myasoedov’s guilt.” He, conveying Alekseev’s opinion, indirectly confirmed the accusations of treason against the Empress, which were spread in 1916. Having perceived rumors about German espionage that had penetrated everywhere, the army masses, including officers, began to be wary of the government elite. Distrust and irritation towards the authorities extended to the entire political life, the essence of which was poorly understood by the frontline officers and was perceived as a sphere of all kinds of speculation and abuses in which government and Duma circles, indifferent to the interests of the front, were mired. Snesarev, who was on vacation in the capital at the end of 1916, noted that Petrograd “is nervous, full of gossip and gossip, lacking a normal, balanced perspective... As for the political mood, it is uniformly leftist: everyone repeats the persistent idea that the government does not want work with society, that it does not take into account public opinion, that we are standing on the edge of an abyss, etc.” The general tried not to succumb to such sentiments, but was indignant at the Duma members who turned their public mission into a profitable business. Verkhovsky expressed the attitude of front-line soldiers to the activities of politicians with extreme emotionality: “While we are exhausting ourselves here, behind our backs in the rear there is some kind of bacchanalia of internal politics.” Even for the most part, not very politically developed officers perceived the increase in political activity in the rear with alarm. At the end of 1916, Podesaul A.A. expressed his impressions on this matter in a letter to his wife. Upornikov. “Now, when there is nothing to do, I read newspapers from line to line. Well, what a mess it is! I can imagine how hot it is now upstairs and how many events unknown to us are happening there. The impression is that everyone wants to grab a tastier piece. And war is such a great setting for all this.” Finally, a common feature of the mood of the active army and the officers in particular was dissatisfaction with the state of the rear. Numerous vices of the military and political leadership, constant problems with supplying troops, information about life in the rear gave rise to the idea that not only the government, but also society had turned away from the front, and the army remained the only force fighting for the fate and interests of Russia. On the last day of 1915, Verkhovsky wrote: “We are now feeling another painful, offensively difficult thing in the army. After the first impression of the war, when all life seemed to be concentrated in one effort, now we have been forgotten. People coming from Russia, having recovered from their wounds, say that there is a continuous holiday in Russia, restaurants and theaters are full. There have never been so many elegant toilets. They forgot the army...” The conviction about the abyss that had arisen, dividing the front and rear, only intensified in the future. It was conveyed in poetic form by front-line soldier Ensign A.N. Zhilinsky in a letter from the end of 1916: “Here are gases and fire - there is gold, diamonds, / Here are wooden, unknown crosses - / Merchants and speculators proudly rule there, / And nearby - hunger and tails.” The concern and anxiety of front-line soldiers was caused by obvious signs of economic disorder in the rear. Information about this, along with letters coming from home, was delivered in abundance by vacationers returning to their units. The officers going on vacation had the first impression of the chaos that engulfed railway transport and the difficulties that the journey home entailed. The falling standard of living in the rear especially worried officers of worker and peasant origin. Oskin, who returned from vacation in September 1916, told his colleagues: “Life in the rear is becoming extremely expensive... A dozen eggs in the village cost seventy kopecks, there is no white flour, no butter, sugar is hard to come by. Rumor has it that the city will soon switch to selling bread on ration cards. In the city of Kozelsk, where I often visited, the shops are empty and there are no goods. There are a lot of speculators on the trains, traveling from city to city, buying cheaper in one place and selling more expensive in another. The population is tired of war and is looking forward to peace.” By the end of 1916, anxiety about the situation of families in the rear, dissatisfaction with high prices and hatred of the bourgeoisie profiting from military difficulties were the central themes of not only soldiers, but also officers’ letters. “Poor, poor residents of Moscow. You are at the mercy of these real internal enemies - the merchants. This is where the patriotism of the Russian merchants showed itself. Fate will deal with him in the end.” “Moscow is not only the center of all of Russia, but also the center of all our ugliness, profiteering, impudence, and rip-offs. There are more dangerous enemies there than the Germans.” The difficult impressions of the opposition of the rear to the front led to reflections on the post-war life awaiting former front-line soldiers. Finding himself in the rear, the officer acutely felt his alienation among a society living with other problems and, moreover, placing the blame for military failures on the army. “Now, while we sometimes lose our last strength, lose our health and very often our very lives,” Upornikov wrote home, “at a time when we have weeks in which we don’t even have time to wash ourselves, people sometimes look at us a little. a little better than ordinary robbers. I had to meet such views on my last trip, and it’s simply amazing how many people think like that... When I think about this, when I involuntarily remember carriage rides and other conversations during my vacation, a terrible feeling of resentment wells up in my soul.” With indignation, they saw in the rear an abundance of young men, both military and civilian, avoiding the front - officers of reserve units and various military institutions, civil officials, employees of the paramilitary organizations of the Zemsky and City Unions, who received the contemptuous nickname “Zemgusars and Hydroulans.” The views of Russian officers on the goals and objectives of the war, determined by their political knowledge and guidelines, deserve special attention. Researchers come to the conclusion that at the beginning of the 20th century. At the military top, ideas about Russia's hostile encirclement and the threat to its security from foreign powers in both the West and the East prevailed. Russian military leaders considered Russia's intervention in the global conflict inevitable, explaining it by the geopolitical, economic, cultural and even moral confrontation between Germany and Russia. In general, as Denikin admitted, “the officer corps, like the majority of the average intelligentsia, was not too interested in the sacramental question of the “goals of war”.” The idea of ​​a joint coalition struggle and solidarity with the Entente allies never occupied a prominent place in the ideas of the military, and being part of the official rhetoric, gradually caused more and more irritation, especially among front-line soldiers. In 1915, the unpopularity of the Allies among the troops was already such that the command did not dare to refer to the need for coordinated actions with the Allies when setting combat missions. The hardships of the war convinced us that Russia, if not fighting a strong enemy one-on-one, was bearing the brunt of the war because of unscrupulous allies. Thus, in the international space, Russia is surrounded not by enemies and allies, but only by opponents of varying degrees of hostility. In July 1916, the positions occupied by Snesarev's division were visited by a group of Japanese officers. The Russians were not lulled by temporary alliances caused by circumstances, and wariness towards recent enemies in the Far East remained. Snesarev was also worried about a question on a larger scale: “Of course, we will fight with them, but first or after the British? - that is the question". According to the general, Russia still had a long time to establish itself in the world by force of arms. With the outbreak of the war, only the idea of ​​defending the fatherland from aggression from Germany and Austria-Hungary could meet a more or less unanimous response in society. This idea governed all categories of officers. The need to defend the Motherland was not questioned, but it was precisely the ideas about the Motherland, its good and their own responsibility for it that differed among representatives of different strata of society. The most homogeneous views were those of career officers, whose concepts of professional and state duty were initially naturally combined, but military failures and the obvious processes of decomposition of the army and state during the war caused discord. Accusations against the high command, authorities, politicians - the forces that personified the state - led to the natural conclusion that it was state power in its existing form that prevented officers from fulfilling their professional duty and prevented the army from winning victories. In the conditions of the social, political, economic crisis that gripped Russia at the turn of 1916-1917. in the views of the officers, one way or another, they reflected the mood of the broadest strata of society with its general fatigue and disappointment from news from the front, irritation with the activities of the authorities and command. Added to this was dissatisfaction with the attitude of society towards the army, signs of loss of internal unity. The overwhelming majority of officers, feeling the futility and futility of military service, gradually accumulated discontent. The weakness of the government and its loss of the remnants of public authority also harmed the professional interests of the officer corps; from a reliable support of the monarchy, it gradually turned into an oppositional social force. The First World War was a factor of enormous social and political changes that predetermined the paths of subsequent development of many countries participating in the conflict. A special place in these processes belonged to representatives of that part of the population that was directly involved in hostilities; it was they, with their life experience and social activity, that most influenced the outcome of the war for their countries and their post-war future. In this sense, the example of Russia is very significant, for which participation in the World War, although it did not lead to military defeat, but turned into a complete collapse of the previous social system and state order, marking the beginning of their revolutionary transformation.
Grebenkin I.N. History Questions No. 2 (..2010)

THE FIRST WORLD AND ITS HEROES
(To the 100th anniversary of the First World War)

We want to talk about the one
Deliberately forgotten by someone,
But not that far away
War,
About the First World War!

Yu. Pyatibat

“This year (2014) the Day of Remembrance of Soldiers Who Fell in the Battles of the First World War is celebrated for the first time in Russia. The events and heroes of the bloody massacre, underestimated during the Soviet period, are now emerging from the shadows, arousing serious interest from scientists, as well as the descendants of the participants in the hostilities themselves. “A forgotten war, erased from history, is actually returning for the first time to official historiography on the scale it deserves”

V. Medinsky

FROM THE HISTORY OF WORLD WAR I

The reason for the outbreak of war was the famous shot in Sarajevo on July 28, 1914. Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. But in order for this “small war” to become the First World War, the great powers had to be drawn into it. They were ready for this, but to varying degrees.
The Russian government knew that the country was not ready for war, but Russia could not give Serbia to be torn to pieces by the Austrians, sacrificing its authority in the Balkans, won with the blood of Russian soldiers. Emperor Nicholas II signed a decree on general mobilization. This was not yet a declaration of war, but a formidable sign for Austria-Hungary and Germany. And on July 31, 1914, Germany demanded that Russia stop mobilization within 24 hours. There was no response to the German ultimatum, and on August 1, the German ambassador Count Pourtales brought a note declaring war to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Two days later, Germany declared war on France, an ally of Russia and Serbia, and the next day German troops invaded neutral Belgium in order to go to Paris through its territory, the shortest route. Then events escalated: on August 6, Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia; On August 23, seemingly distant Japan intervened in the war, declaring war on Germany, and in October the Ottoman Empire took the side of Germany, a year later - Bulgaria... The world war began, and there was no longer any way to stop it: each participant only needed victory ...
The war lasted more than four years, killing about 30 million people. After its end, the world was missing four empires - Russian, Austro-Hungarian, German and Ottoman, and new countries appeared on the political map of the world.

GENERALS OF WAR

It so happened in the popular consciousness that, no matter how much heroism ordinary soldiers and junior commanders show, battles are won (and lost) by commanders - field marshals, generals... They make decisions, determine the strategy of the future battle, send soldiers to their deaths in the name of victory. They are responsible for the outcome of each battle and the war as a whole...
In the Russian army during the First World War there were enough generals who commanded divisions, armies, and fronts. Each of them had his own path, his own military destiny, his own measure of military leadership talent.

Alexey Alekseevich Brusilov (1853 - 1926)– a man with “military bones”, a career military man. He also fought in the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878, where he distinguished himself during the capture of the fortresses of Kara and Ardahan. Before the First World War, he was an assistant to the commander of the Warsaw Military District (remember that part of Poland with Warsaw at that time was part of the Russian Empire). It was Brusilov who had the opportunity to prove the power of Russian weapons when in the summer of 1916, as commander of the Southwestern Front, he carried out a brilliant offensive operation. This operation received the name “Brusilovsky breakthrough” in military textbooks.
What happened at the end of May 1916? The offensive was planned in advance on several fronts, but it was not yet fully prepared when the French allies asked for help: the Germans were advancing and threatening to crush the French army. The Allies were also defeated on the Italian front. It was decided to provide assistance.

Baron
P. N. Wrangel

Brusilov knew how well the enemy defenses were fortified, but decided to attack. He was a talented military leader and decided to use the tactics of several simultaneous strikes, forcing the enemy to guess - which of them is the main one? On May 22, Brusilov’s army went on the offensive and broke through the enemy’s defenses in four places at once, capturing more than 100 thousand people in three days of fighting! The offensive of the Russian army continued throughout the summer, and a large territory was conquered from the Germans and Austrians up to the Carpathians. Our losses amounted to about 500 thousand people, but the enemy lost three times as many killed, wounded and prisoners - up to 1.5 million!

Admiral
A. V. Kolchak

After such successes of the Russian army, the Romanian king, who had been hesitant for a long time, decided to take the side of the Entente. But even the victorious Brusilov breakthrough could not provide the Russian Empire with overall success in the war. Its economy was falling apart, its power was weakening every month, and 1917, with its revolutions, was inevitable...
And what about Brusilov himself? He gained wide popularity not only in the army, but also among the common people. After the February Revolution, in May 1917 he was appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and then advisor to the Provisional Government. He refused to participate in the Civil War on the side of the White Army, and in 1920 he even received a position in the Red Army, which caused outrage among many of his military comrades. And the descendants inherited from the famous general interesting memoirs about World War I, which historians still use in their works.
It is worth remembering the chief of staff of the Russian army, general of infantry (that is, infantry general) Mikhail Vasilievich Alekseev (1857 -1918), he was the son of a simple soldier and, having begun his service at the age of 16, rose to the rank of general. He fought with the Turks in 1877-1878, with the Japanese in 1904-1905, and began World War I as the chief of staff of the Southwestern Front. From August 1915 he became the chief of staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Headquarters (in August 1915, Emperor Nicholas II assumed the duties of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief). But in fact, Alekseev led all major operations of the Russian armies on the German front. After the October Revolution of 1917, he became one of the leaders of the White movement, but “did not finish the war”, dying in September 1918 in Yekaterinodar (now Krasnodar).
Many future leaders of the White Army - A. I. Denikin, L. G. Kornilov, N. I. Ivanov, N. N. Yudenich and others - proved themselves to be talented military leaders during World War I. Such historical figures (military leaders from the Civil War) as Admiral A.V. Kolchak (he was also a famous polar explorer), Baron P.N. Wrangel, and hundreds of other military generals and officers also took part in the battles of World War I.
Some senior officers from the First World War went to serve in the Red Army - M. D. Bonch-Bruevich, S. S. Kamenev. Many famous Soviet generals and marshals took part in the war, most often as non-commissioned officers and ordinary soldiers.

GEORGIAN CAVALIERS

The famous St. George's Cross, the highest soldier's award during the First World War, was established back in 1807, at the beginning of the Napoleonic Wars, and for more than 100 years bore the official name "Insignia of the Military Order." It was awarded only for personal courage shown in battle, and in 1913, by imperial decree, it received the official name “St. George’s Cross,” which was soon renamed among the people to “Egoria.”
The St. George Cross had four degrees of distinction. In addition, special St. George medals were established. Soldiers' Yegoriyas of the 1st and 2nd degrees were made of gold, and those of the 3rd and 4th degrees were made of silver. Only at the end of 1916, when the country's economy found itself in a deep crisis, it was decided to replace gold and silver with similar, but not precious metals.

K. F. Kryuchkov

The first in history to receive the soldier's "George" was non-commissioned officer of the Cavalry Regiment Yegor Mitrokhin, who distinguished himself in the battle with the French near Friedland on June 2, 1807. And the first person to earn the St. George Cross in World War I was Kozma Kryuchkov, who served in the Don Cossack Regiment. Having met with four of his comrades a patrol of 22 German cavalrymen, he personally killed the officer and 10 more enemies, receiving 16 wounds. The award found the hero ten days after the start of the war - on August 11, 1914. Newspapers wrote about the hero, his portraits were cut out from magazines and decorated the walls of lordly apartments and peasant huts. During the Civil War, Kryuchkov fought in units of the White Army and died in 1919 in a battle with the Bolsheviks.
Among the Knights of St. George there were many soldiers who linked their fate with the Red Army. Many of them became famous commanders over time. This is the hero of the Civil War Vasily Chapaev (three "Egoria"), future marshals: Georgy Zhukov, Rodion Malinovsky and Konstantin Rokossovsky (two crosses each). Full holders of the soldier's St. George Cross (award of all degrees) were future military leaders I.V. Tyulenev, K.P. Trubnikov and S.M. Budyonny. Among the Knights of St. George there were also women and children. The only foreigner awarded all four degrees of the St. George Cross was the famous French pilot Poiret. In total, during the First World War, almost two million Egorievs of all grades were manufactured and awarded to soldiers and non-commissioned officers who distinguished themselves in battle.

CHILDREN IN WORLD WAR I

Children have always sought to imitate adults. Fathers served in the army, fought, and sons played war, and in the event of a real enemy appearing, by hook or by crook they tried to get into the active army. This was the case during the Patriotic War of 1812; and during the defense of Sevastopol in 1854-1855; and in the Russian-Turkish, Russian-Japanese wars. and during the First World War. In order to get to the front, not only high school students, but also boys of 12-13 years old were ready to quit their studies.
During these years, in England and France, Boy Scouts (a children's movement that united hundreds of thousands of schoolchildren in its ranks) guarded railway stations, bridges, and patrolled roads. But even there, escapes to the front were a frequent occurrence. And let’s not even talk about Russia! Dozens of boys were taken off trains heading to the front line, caught at railway stations, and put on the wanted list as “runaways from home.” Most of them were returned to their parents, but there were also “lucky ones” who managed to become soldiers or partisans. Many of them behaved like real brave men and earned military awards - St. George's crosses and medals. Portraits of yesterday's high school students in gymnasiums with brand new "St. Georges" on their chests excited the imagination of their peers, and hundreds of new "young fighters" fled to the front. Thus, in 1915, newspapers published a portrait of a Chechen boy, Abubakar Dzhurkaev, a 12-year-old student at a real school who became a dashing cavalryman.

Some boys tried to act “according to the law”: applications with a request to enlist them in the active army were received from all eighth-grade students at the Libau gymnasium, from half of the high school students of the Riga and Kazan gymnasiums, from students of the Penza Drawing School...
7th grade high school student Mazur from the city of Vilna (today it is Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania) turned to the commander of the 1st Army, General P.K. Rennenkampf, with a request to enlist him in military service. And the general agreed! The boy was left at headquarters, where he even made important improvements to the design of the telegraph. And then he died, as millions of adult soldiers and hundreds of children who made their way into the active army died during the war.
Young volunteers fled from Moscow, Petrograd, Odessa, Kyiv, Novgorod, and even Vladivostok, far from the front. They fled from villages and Cossack villages. Escapes to the front were both individual and group. In the newspapers of those years, there is a story about the son of a gendarme captain from the city of Dvinsk, a high school student Sosionkov, who gathered a group of eight students and went to war.
What did the boys do during the war? They were orderlies, staff clerks, orderlies, carried cartridges, and sometimes became dashing scouts. There was also such a case: six partisan boys from the Pskov and Novgorod provinces, having made their way to the rear of the German army, which was fighting against the 2nd Army of General A.V. Samsonov, shot down an enemy plane with a rifle.

HEROES OF THE FIRST WORLD

ALEXEEV Mikhail Vasilievich
(1857 -1918)

General, the largest military leader, the son of an officer who began his service as a soldier. He was an orderly of the famous General M.D. Skobelev during the Russian-Turkish War, participated in the war with the Japanese, was the chief of staff of the Headquarters of Emperor Nicholas II, and after the revolution - one of the creators of the White Army.

BOCHKAREVA Maria Leontievna
(1889 -1920)

A peasant woman, the first Russian female officer after the famous Nadezhda Durova. She took part in battles and was awarded the St. George Cross and several medals for bravery. In 1917 she organized a “women’s death battalion” that defended the Provisional Government. She fought in Kolchak's army. After his defeat, the Cheka executed him in August 1920 in Krasnoyarsk.

BRUSILOV Alexey Alekseevich
(1853 -1926)

General, an excellent cavalryman, participant in the Russian-Turkish War, holder of many military orders and two St. George medals. He became famous during the First World War as a skilled military leader and organizer of the famous breakthrough. After the revolution he served in the Red Army.

DENIKIN Anton Ivanovich
(1872 -1947)

Military leader, writer and memoirist. One of the most talented generals of the First World War, commander of the “iron brigade”, which distinguished itself in battle. After the October Revolution, commander of the armed forces of the South of Russia, fighting the Red Army. While in exile, he wrote several books. Died in the USA. In 2005, his ashes were transferred to Moscow and buried at the Donskoye Cemetery.

KRYUCHKOV Kozma Firsovich
(1890 -1919)

Don Cossack, who destroyed 11 Germans in battle, received 16 wounds and was awarded for this the first in the history of this war the St. George Cross of the 4th degree. In one of the battles of the Civil War, Kryuchkov, who fought on the side of the whites, was killed.

NESTEROV Pyotr Nikolaevich
(1887 -1914)

One of the first Russian pilots, staff captain, founder of aerobatics, who invented the aerial “Nesterov loop”. He died in battle on August 26, 1914 near Lvov, having made the first ramming of an enemy airplane in history.

ROMANOV Oleg Konstantinovich
(1892 -1914)

Son of Grand Duke Konstantin Konstantinovich, great-grandson of Nicholas I, poet, admirer of A. S. Pushkin, the only member of the imperial family who died in World War I. Died from a wound received during the battle, a few hours before his death he was awarded the St. George Cross .

CHERKASOV Pyotr Nilovich
(1882 -1915)

Captain 1st rank (posthumously), hereditary sailor, participant in the Russo-Japanese War. He fought an unequal battle with superior enemy forces and died while standing on the captain's bridge. After this battle, German ships left the Gulf of Riga.

WRITERS AND WORLD WAR I

“The writer cannot remain indifferent to the incessant, brazen, murderous, dirty crime that is war.”

E. Hemingway

Those who write about the war, in most cases, know the war firsthand: they themselves fought, were soldiers, officers, and war correspondents. The First World War gave the world many brilliant names, from both sides of the front line. The famous writer Erich Maria Remarque (1898 -1970), who wrote the novel “All Quiet on the Western Front,” fought in the German army and was even awarded the Iron Cross for bravery. Together with the Austro-Hungarian army, the author of the great novel about the brave soldier Schweik, Jaroslav Hasek (1883 -1923), went on a campaign against Russia (and was later captured). Ernest Hemingway (1899 -1961), an American writer who gained fame for his novels and short stories, was also a military driver.
Many Russian writers and poets, being very young people during the First World War, fought in the army as officers or soldiers, and were military doctors and orderlies: Mikhail Zoshchenko, Mikhail Bulgakov, Nikolai Gumilyov, Sergei Yesenin, Konstantin Paustovsky, Benedict Lifshits, Isaac Babel and others. Many established writers at the beginning of the war also put on military uniforms. They either fought as part of the active army (the famous prose writer I. Kuprin, writer V. Svetlov), or became war correspondents, like V. I. Nemirovich-Danchenko and children's writer K. I. Chukovsky.
The First World War, having left an indelible mark on their souls, one way or another influenced their creativity. You know some of these authors, and some you are hearing about for the first time. This means that there is a reason to find their books and read them.

We present to your attention an annotated list:
THE FIRST WORLD WAR IN LITERATURE

Book “White Generals” is a unique and first attempt to objectively show and comprehend the life and work of outstanding Russian military officers: Denikin, Wrangel, Krasnov, Kornilov, Yudenich.
The fate of most of them was tragic, and their dreams were not destined to come true. But the authors urge us not to judge history and its characters. They encourage us to understand the feelings, thoughts and actions of their characters. We all need this, because history often repeats itself.

This is not just a work, but a kind of chronicle of time - a historical description of events in chronological order, seen through the prism of perception of the “children of the terrible years of Russia” during the First World War and the violent civil war.
The complex and sad fate of a noble family, suffocating in a bloody whirlpool, under the pen of Mikhail Afanasyevich Bulgakov, takes on the features of an epic tragedy for the entire Russian intelligentsia - a tragedy, the echoes of which reach us to this day.

This is the most popular work of Czech literature, translated into almost all languages ​​of the world. A great, original and outrageous novel. A book that can be perceived both as a “soldier’s tale” and as a classic work directly related to the traditions of the Renaissance. This is a sparkling text that makes you laugh until you cry, and a powerful call to “lay down your arms,” and one of the most objective historical evidence in satirical literature.

First World War. The eve of the revolution. A terrible time for our country. And - the legend of the Baltic Fleet, which performed miracles of heroism in unequal battles with the German army for Moonsund. A legend about the courage of officers - and the almost suicidal courage of ordinary sailors.
One of the most powerful, tough and multifaceted books by Valentin Pikul. A book that grabs you from the first page and keeps you in suspense until the last page.

Remarque, E. M. On the Western Front no change [Text]: novel T. 1 / E. M. Remarque. – M.: VITA-CENTER, 1991. – 192 p.

The novel by E. M. Remarque is one of the most striking literary works about the First World War. They were torn out of their usual life and thrown into the bloody mud of war. Once they were young men learning to live and think. Now they are cannon fodder. And they learn to survive and not think. Thousands and thousands will forever die on the fields of the First World War. Thousands and thousands of those who returned will still regret that they did not lie down with the dead. But for now, there is still no change on the Western Front...

Love and loyalty helped the sisters Katya and Dasha Bulavin, Ivan Telegin and Vadim Roshchin survive the turmoil of revolutionary upheavals and the fire of civil war. Russian people, they have drunk to the full the cup of sorrows and suffering that befell Russia. Their life - with separations and meetings, mortal danger and short, sizzling moments of happiness - is a true journey through torment with a guiding star of hope in the dark sky.

“Chapayev” by Dmitry Andreevich Furmanov (1891 -1926), a book about the famous division commander, hero of the civil war, is one of the first outstanding works of realism literature.

The novel that made Ernest Hemingway famous. The first - and the best! - a book of the “lost generation” of English-language literature about World War I. The center of the novel is not war, but love.
A soldier falls in love with a nurse working in a hospital. Together they decide to flee from possible reprisals to which the hero may be subjected. Lovers who escaped death, having seen enough of the war, strive to find a quiet haven, escape and live without blood and weapons. They end up in Switzerland. Everything seems to be fine and they are safe, but then the heroine is in labor...

The novel tells about the class struggle during the First World War and the Civil War on the Don, about the difficult path of the Don Cossacks to the revolution. It’s as if life itself speaks from the pages of Quiet Don.
The smells of the steppe, the freshness of the free wind, the heat and cold, the living speech of people - all this merges into a free-flowing, unique melody, striking with its tragic beauty and authenticity.

The entire issue is dedicated to the centenary of the beginning of the First World War, which redrew the map of Europe beyond recognition and changed the destinies of peoples.

Feat of war

Not the first evening the waves sang
In the people's sea, and moaned
Elemental wind, full of power,
And the anthem flew to the sky like a shaft;
The sky was burning again
Dawn, unprecedentedly clear,
When from the enemy's border
The news of war arrived. War!
War! War! So these are the ones
The doors have opened before you,
Loving Russia,
A country with Christ's destiny!
So accept the crown of thorns
And go to murderous hell
In his hand with his stern sword,
With a cross shining in your chest!
Forgive me, unharvested, peaceful ear!
Dear earth, forgive me!
Fate itself thunderous voice
Calling Russia to go into battle.

S. Gorodetsky

The shoulder straps have not yet been torn off
And the regiments were not shot.
Not yet red, but green
The field by the river is rising.
They are neither too old nor too young,
But their fate is sealed.
They are not generals yet,
And the war is not lost.

Z. Yashchenko

Our fellow countrymen - participants in World War I

The first one on the left is Kulbikayan Ambartsum

We are waiting for you at:
346800, Russia,
Rostov region,
Myasnikovsky district,
With. Chaltyr, st. 6th line, 6
Opening hours: from 9.00 to 17.00

Closed: Saturday
tel. (8 -6349) 2-34-59
e-mail:
website:

The First World War and its heroes [Text]: information and bibliographic annotated list of literature for high school students / MBUK Myasnikovsky district "MCB" Children's library; resp. for ed. M. N. Khachkinayan; comp.: E. L. Andonyan. – Chaltyr, 2014. – 12 p.: ill.